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ABSTRACT 
 
J. Luis Manuel Campos 
 
Blast Theory: Intermedial Performance Praxis and the 
Generative Conditions for Performance Subjectivity 
 
The work of the British theatre company Blast Theory explores intermedial 
dramaturgies that this thesis claims can be categorized as radical because 
they present a generative characteristic. Intermediality, understood here as 
the impact of analogue and digital technologies in theatrical performance, 
establishes complex relationships between physical and virtual spaces, 
structures that create a rich polyphony of multiple temporal orchestrations, 
and narratives that present a multiplicity of performative arrangements. 
Intermedial performance, as a performative and experiential event, 
encompasses a triad of performative interactions between performers, 
spectators and the media itself executed at and concentrated on the moment 
of the performance encounter. This research argues that this encounter 
displays a generative character – a moment at which all the attending 
performance variables come together in a constant process of performative 
re-activation thus generating the intermedial performance event.   
 
Within this descriptive parameter, this research claims that recent 
performance conceptualizations fail to account for the work of Blast Theory. 
Contemporary performance and liveness debates focus principally on the 
ontology of performance. So, notwithstanding their differences, performance 
theorists such as Lavender (2002), Fischer-Lichte (2008), and Schechner 
(2003), and presentness/presence theorists such as Phelan (1993) and 
Power (2008) all agree that performance is an ontological, ephemeral, and 
fleeting event. While there are many valid points in these diverse approaches, 
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they only offer a partial account of the specificities of the work of Blast Theory 
and, by extent, the intermedial performance event.  
 
This thesis therefore relocates the terms of the debate on a constructivist 
epistemological basis. In this way, the thesis proposes that an intermedial 
performance event must be understood beyond the ontological approach by 
specifically interrogating the conditions of intelligibility; that is, its operative 
and intelligible architecture of attending elements and the participating 
subject. The key hypothesis shared is that in introducing a constructivist 
reading of epistemology, as described by Alfred Whitehead and Gilles 
Deleuze, a new account of intermediality in performance emerges as a radical 
dramaturgy, incorporating generative aspects, and with this, a unique type of 
intermedial performance subjectivity is enabled. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The British theatre company Blast Theory explores dramaturgical modes of 
theatrical performance that this thesis claims can be categorized as 
intermedial. Intermediality, broadly understood as the use of analogue and 
digital technologies in theatrical performance, establishes complex 
relationships between physical and virtual spaces; structures that create a 
polyphony of numerous temporal orchestrations; and dramaturgical narratives 
that present a multiplicity of arrangements. The particularities of these spatial, 
temporal and narrative compositions enable and construct, this thesis 
proposes, intermedial dramaturgies that present a radical potential in their 
configurations.  
 
‘Dramaturgy’ is here broadly defined as a relational mode of theatrical 
‘composition’, ‘structure’ or ‘fabric’, stressing the mutual relationships between 
the enabling and participating elements in a performance and the production 
of performance processes at the very moment of the performance event 
(Turner and Behrndt, 2008: 3). Dramaturgy is also employed to specifically 
highlight the operative strategies that make possible the realization of a given 
intermedial performance event as an assemblage of narrative lines, points of 
connections and an intertwining of divergent dramaturgic materials into a 
compositional scaffolding. The term ‘radical’ is used drawing on its 
etymological meaning. It derives from the Late Latin adjective radicalis, 
meaning ‘of roots’ and ‘relating to a root’ and also from the Classical Latin 
noun radix, meaning ‘root’. It is applied in this research as implying two 
aspects: first, ‘of and relating to’; that is, the inherent constitution of a given 
entity or event; and, second, as ‘requiring a different reading of’ and as 
‘favouring a fundamental change in the understanding and conceptualizing of 
a given entity or event’. Put simply, by calling it radical, this thesis stresses 
that a new conceptualizing reading of intermediality is needed to fully account 
for its dramaturgical distinctiveness. This thesis argues that the use of 
analogue and digital technologies implies a reconfiguration of the experiential 
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nature of the dramaturgical event into a radical dramaturgical aesthetic, which 
is filled with generative potential and novel intertwining (temporal, spatial and 
narrative) experiences. Seen thus, the radical nature of intermedial 
dramaturgy proposed here stresses modes of construction in which constant 
processes of mediality are activated through the entanglement of human and 
non-human agencies, enabling continuous information transfers in complex 
knowledge-making dramaturgical systems.  
 
Intermedial performance encompasses, as Robin Nelson (2010) explains, a 
triad of performative interactions between performers, spectators and the 
media itself at the moment of the performance encounter: ‘[a mode of 
performance] where devices, events and activities are formed out of 
relationships, necessary interdependences, and mutually co-relating entities’ 
(Nelson, 2010: 17). The performative is broadly understood here via theorists 
such as Judith Butler and Amelia Jones to mean ‘reiterative enactments 
across time’ (Jones, 2012: 12) of acts of constitution of both worldly structures 
and human subjects. From this perspective, these acts of constitution engage 
in continuous processes of emergence, creation and action. In this sense, 
here we understand these temporal constitutions as seeing both the 
emergence of the subject and the dramaturgical structures as executed at the 
moment of performance and not as ontologically pre-given as a fixed 
essence; that is, the performative implies ‘a world in which subjects and 
objects have not yet come into being and, even if materialized, are always in a 
constant state of flux and transformation’ (Salter, 2010: xxvi).  
 
Drawing directly on Nelson’s understandings of the performative encounter, 
this thesis proposes that such a triadic encounter is to be understood in terms 
of a ‘generative theory’ or what this thesis calls a ‘generative characteristic’.  
The term generative here means a construction of a system whose dynamics 
are able to generate multiple performative variations and modes of being. 
Thus, a generative characteristic is the moment at which all the attending 
performance variables come together in a constant process of re-activation, 
which is articulated, this thesis claims, through performative and constructive 
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frames that re-configure and generate the potential of performance constantly. 
This performative triadic encounter is here termed ‘the execution of the event’.  
 
This thesis offers an alternative to a range of other approaches to intermedial 
performance, notably intervening in debates around the ontology of 
performance, as well as liveness and presentness, in order to conceptualize 
the intermedial transaction and the participating subject in the intermedial 
dramaturgical event. In differentiating itself from these alternatives, the 
argument here gives priority to a constructivist reading of epistemology in 
order to offer a definition of intermedial performance to determine the limits of 
such performance by offering a critical account of its generative 
characteristics.1 Epistemology is broadly understood as the philosophical 
enquiry into the nature of knowledge and the examination of the subjective 
contribution to the event where the subject is grasped in a constitutional role. 
The understanding of epistemology that this thesis employs as a 
methodological framework is not to be understood in terms of the classical 
‘idealist’ epistemological tradition, but in terms of a constructivist epistemology 
as theorized by Gilles Deleuze and Alfred North Whitehead. This constructive 
epistemology, roughly defined for now, discusses epistemology and ontology 
as non-separated philosophical fields – it recognizes onto-epistemic features 
– and conceives processes of actualization and individualization as an onto-
epistemic construction in which object/world and subject get constructed as a 
unity and as an event, actively highlighting the intertwining of agential human 
and non-human entities.2 Put simply, this thesis claims that only by 
introducing a Whiteheadian and Deleuzian reading of epistemology can a 
                                                        
1 The epistemological approach advocated requires a more fluid understanding of the inter-
relationship between epistemology and the theatrical event than the standard view has 
allowed, which, apart from very few cases such as David George (2007), has seen, in 
general, performance and epistemology as two different fields of enquiry (George, 2007: 27-
28).  
 
2 The term constructivism is informed by the writings of Whitehead, Deleuze and 
Whiteheadian and Deleuzian scholarship. This research’s understanding of Whitehead as a 
constructivist philosopher also comes from Isabelle Stengers’ monumental scholarship on 
Whitehead (2002) and the works of Steven Shaviro (2009), Keith Robinson (2006) and Gilbert 
Simondon (2005). Deleuzian scholarship such as Claire Colebrook (2004), Laura Cull (2011) 
and James Williams (2011) has been highly influential. For Stengers (2006) and Shaviro, 
philosophical constructivism is a non-foundationalist and non-anthropomorphic epistemology. 
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clear and precise articulation of both the participating subject and the 
intermedial phenomenon be conceptualized. It aims to describe the unity of 
these two phenomena in terms of an onto-epistemic event.3 From this 
theorising perspective, this thesis argues that the execution of the event 
encompasses constructivist characteristics that see no difference between the 
notion of the intermedial performance transaction and the participating 
subjects – performers and spectators, both of whom are activated at the 
moment of the triadic encounter. Conceived thus, performers and spectators 
are seen here are equal partners in the performative acts of constitution. We 
put aside notions of a passive spectator that absorbs performance processes. 
Instead, the notion of spectatorship employed in this research highlights its 
agential participation and investment in the performative constitution of the 
execution of the event. As such, and most importantly, henceforth references 
to the term ‘event’ will imply the evental construction of both participating 
subject and intermedial phenomenon. We do not emphasize here the event of 
performance as an artwork as opposed to static works of art; nor do we stress 
a phenomenological point of view of an attending subject (performer and 
spectator) attending to a given worldly structure – a dramaturgy, in this 
instance. Instead, we highlight how the term event, within a constructivist 
reading of epistemology, encompasses the constitution of both dramaturgy 
and the participating subject as an evental unity that fully accounts for the 
entanglement of agencies in the constant creative process of evental 
execution.  
 
                                                        
3 The epistemic relationship between subject and object/world proposed here is not a 
transcendental reduction to the subject, as in Kant and Husserl. However, there is one aspect 
that I take from this tradition, that is, the impersonal or pre-individual conditions that make any 
experience the experience that it is. However, the position highlighted here is that these 
conditions are not given a priori, as Kant explains, but rather, these conditions, this thesis 
proposes, agreeing with Deleuze and Whitehead, cannot be dissociated from the actual way 
they are encountered. Hence, on the one hand, the ontological side which emphasizes the 
moment to moment of the encounter; and on the other hand, the epistemological that seeks 
the relationship between the non-subjective conditions which are bound to the moment of the 
event’s emergence – its generative structures – and the subjective conditions also 
understood as generative. In this sense, the Deleuzian and Whiteheadian onto-epistemic, in 
seeing the epistemological as a supplement of the ontological and both as a construction, 
accounts for the ontological moment to moment, and the subjective and non-subjective 
structures – the epistemological – of the generative encounter. 
 
 18 
Seen thus, this research proposes that attempts to conceptualize the 
intermedial event on purely ontological grounds would only offer a reduced 
explanation of the particularities of such an event. What counts is not the 
mode of performance – its manner of being – as ontological approaches 
emphasize, but, rather, the pre-subjective and subjective conditions that make 
such being possible; that is, the articulation and constructive functionality of 
such an event – its epistemic manner of being – in relation to its temporality, 
spatiality and narrativity. Within these parameters, this research agrees with 
Erika Fischer-Lichte (2008), Marvin Carlson (1996) and Cormac Power (2008) 
insofar as they argue that theatrical performance opens up a liminal space, 
which gives central importance to the understanding of the nature of 
performance as event.4 However, it argues against them in positioning the 
radical dramaturgy of the intermedial event as neither a temporal linearity nor 
an ephemeral articulation that occurs restrictively in a “here and now” – the 
ontological emphasis – but, more exactly, as an event that in its generative 
and constructive manner can coherently be conceptualized by using an 
epistemological framework that accounts for the pre-subjective and the 
subjective elements of the triadic encounter. Here, it is argued that the 
ontological framework overlooks the generative nature of performance as 
such because of its overreliance on a vitalist “here and now” – a foundational 
reading of ontology and an ontological position framed as temporal linearity. 
However, because intermedial work stresses these generative conditions in 
the triadic encounter of the execution of the event, ontological approaches 
                                                        
4 Henry Bial (2004) introduces the concept of liminality to define a space in-between two 
different spaces with spatio-temporal qualities. In this context of understanding the liminal, 
Warren Linds (1996) also explains how the term liminal can be linked to the term metaxis, 
which derives from the Greek word metaxu, and was first used by Plato meaning between+in. 
In Intermediality in Theatre and Performance, Freda Chapple and Chiel Kattenbelt (2006) 
point to a number of important issues that arise when two creative media converge and when 
this convergence is mediated as a performance itself, which they define in terms of in-
betweeness. They write, ‘intermediality is about changes in theatre practice and thus about 
changing perceptions of performance, which become visible through the process of staging. 
We locate intermediality at a meeting point in-between the performers, the observers, and the 
confluence of media involved in a performance at a particular moment in time. The 
intermedial inhabits a space in-between the different realities that the performance creates 
and thus it becomes, at the minimum, a tripartite phenomenon’ (Chapple and Kattenbelt, 
2006: 12). 
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are, therefore, poorly positioned to make sense of the particularities of 
intermedial performance.  
 
The argument proposes that intermedial scholarship will benefit by a greater 
clarity in articulating the radical potential of intermedial dramaturgy. Drawing 
on the epistemological writings of Deleuze and Whitehead, particularly 
highlighting their understanding of the event as one of internal multiplicities, 
process over completeness5 and dynamic orchestrations over single linearity, 
this thesis aims to undertake a corrective approach to the standard ontological 
debates with a view to clarifying the radical aspects of intermedial dramaturgy; 
that is, this research will articulate a theoretical articulation of intermediality as 
one in which the temporal, the spatial and the narrative enable radical 
dramaturgic constructions. As such, temporality, spatiality and narrativity are 
considered here as the ‘epistemic conditions’ (Allison, 1986: 15) that make the 
intermedial event possible.  
 
This research aims to do this by focusing on three case studies drawn from 
the work of Blast Theory – 10 Backwards (1999), Something American (1996) 
and Day of the Figurines (2006). The work of Blast Theory is discussed as a 
platform to interrogate the application of this argument – through this 
argumentative application we will also present the dramaturgical particularities 
                                                        
5 Both Deleuze and Whitehead can be considered process philosophers. Nicholas Rescher 
(2000) describes process philosophy as a doctrine in which ‘becoming is no less important 
than being – but rather the reverse … [the] ever-changing nature [of reality] is to be seen as 
crucial to our understanding of reality … [a reality in which] processes are not “agents” but 
“forces” [that create the process]’ (Rescher, 2000: 4). Furthermore, ‘reality is not a 
constellation of things at all, but one of processes. The fundamental “stuff” of the world is not 
material substance, but volatile flux … process is fundamental … everything is a matter of 
process, of activity, of change (panta rhei). Not stable things, but fundamental forces and the 
varied and fluctuating activities they manifest constitute the world’ (Rescher, 2000: 5). 
Rescher also describes that process philosophy invokes some basic propositions: ‘1. Time 
and change are among the principal categories of metaphysical understanding; 2. Process is 
a principal category of ontological description; 3. Processes are more fundamental, or at any 
rate not less fundamental, than things for the purpose of ontological theory; 4. Several, if not 
all, of the major elements of the ontological repertoire (God, Nature as a whole, persons, 
material substances) are best understood in terms of processes; [and] 5. Contingency, 
emergence, novelty and creativity are among the fundamental categories of metaphysical 
understanding’ (Rescher, 2000: 5-6). He continues, ‘a process philosopher, then, is someone 
for whom temporality, activity, and change – of alteration, striving, passage and novelty-
emergence – are the cardinal factors for our understanding of the real’ (Rescher, 2000: 6). 
Critically, emergence is the result of a given modus operandi. He explains that the classical 
principle operari sequitur esse (functioning follows upon being) is the reverse to esse sequitur 
operari. For process philosophy, he discusses, what a thing is consists in what it does.  
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that make the work of Blast Theory specific and unique. This thesis intends to 
prove that Blast Theory’s praxis fittingly maximizes the utilization of this thesis’ 
line of argument; that is, the work of the company aptly indicates and 
validates the generative characteristic that is proposed in this research 
because Blast Theory, as we shall see, opens up questions about the very 
nature of intermediality and rethinks the relationship between humans and 
non-humans in their practice, and, therefore, does not focus on a purely 
anthropocentric perspective in the company’s mode of creation and 
presentation. The work of Blast Theory cannot be simply described as a 
manner of staging technologies within dramaturgical environments. Instead, 
the company’s work creates a complex system of variables in which the 
organic and non-organic agential factors are intrinsic elements in the 
temporalizing, spatializing and narrativizing aspects of the dramaturgy. In 
other words, the media technologies are not simply employed as 
compositional framing mechanisms; rather, they activate the practice from 
within, setting the execution of the event in motion. Throughout its history, 
Blast Theory has created a range of pieces that, as complex systems, present 
different degrees of articulating openness in their dramaturgical 
configurations. Moreover, the company’s practice emphasizes and generates, 
we suggest, the conditions under which media technologies enable novel 
knowledge-making dramaturgical realities, intensifying the manner of 
constructing a variety of medial strategies. Hence, these works, we claim, can 
be called radical because they require a novel manner of conceptualizing.   
 
From this perspective, in choosing the three case studies, first, we have 
decided to review and acknowledge the production arc that Blast Theory has 
undergone in its trajectory as a company; that is, we forefront the historicity of 
the company. In this sense, the first two case studies examine performances 
produced prior to Blast Theory’s engagement with The Mixed Reality Lab at 
the University of Nottingham – a milestone in the direction of its work. The 
final case study reviews a production created after that collaboration had 
started. Apart from this “chronological” reason, second, each of the case 
studies was selected because each performance explores a different modality 
of praxis, ranging from a dance-theatre piece to a pervasive performance-
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game. Third, and final, the three case studies will show different modes of 
dramaturgical openness in their configuring parameters.   
 
Although each case study will interrogate the three suggested epistemic 
conditions, each of the three analyzed performances will also focus on a 
different angle of the enquiry into the proposed radical characteristic. Hence, 
the chapters will develop the argument of this research progressively by 
discussing areas of differentiality, relationality and mereotopological structural 
complexity in relation to the suggested radicality of the three epistemic 
conditions. In this way, this theoretical legwork will capture the pre-subjective 
generative features of each proposed epistemic condition. Additionally, at the 
end of each chapter, the thesis will discuss a myriad of suggested possibilities 
by which intermedial performance also informs a reading of a constructivist 
epistemology; that is, simply put, what intermedial performance tells us about 
epistemic constructivism. 
 
To assist the articulation of these findings, this research explores 
diagrammatic mapping strategies, as described by Deleuze in his discussion 
of non-linearity and non-hierarchy. Diagrammatic mapping strategies will 
visually amplify these concepts as they emerge in the course of the argument. 
In Foucault, for instance, Deleuze (1988) describes the diagram as ‘the 
presentation of the relations between [elements] … or the distribution of 
particular features’ (Deleuze, 1988: 72-73). Within these parameters, the 
diagrammatic mapping employed here is not used as an analytical tool. 
Rather, it creates an illustration of the conceptualizing relations analyzed in 
relation to Blast Theory’s performance instances.  
 
Once these epistemic structures have been examined, the argument will 
participate in the intermedial performance debate and create new knowledge 
by drawing, within the framework of a constructive epistemology, a succinct 
formulation of why exactly intermediality is so potentially radical: it generates 
a new way of understanding the performance subject; that is, a subject that, 
as opposed to Kantian classical epistemology, ‘no longer says I’ (Deleuze, 
1994: 276) and it is not conceived as a disinterested and contemplative 
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observer of a pre-given and pre-established work of art. This is not a subject 
that attends to and intends to a given performance transaction. Instead, we 
propose a conceptualization of the subject whose, on the one hand, identity is 
executed as a set of continuously renewed relations and instantiations 
between himself and the environment in which he is situated and whose, on 
the other hand, process of constructing subjectivity is continually generating 
consciousness, perception and modes of experience and interpretation – all 
these instantiated at the very moment of practice. The epicenter of the 
argument, then, is a theory that understands the aesthetic event not in terms 
of an attending subject that apprehends an object but a subject who is 
generated alongside dramaturgically generated orchestrations such that both 
‘prehend’ one another (Whitehead, 1929: 312). This is a subject that is neither 
pre-existent nor stable, but always in the process of becoming, individuated 
by inherent dramaturgical differences and multiplicities – a conceptualization 
of the subject’s identity as an event that incorporates the human and the non-
human through processes of creativity. As we shall see, creativity, within a 
constructivist reading of epistemology, is considered the ‘ultimate category’ 
(Whitehead, 1929: 25); that is, creativity accounts for the experience and 
onto-epistemic co-constitution and co-emergence of both subject and worldly 
structures. From this point of view, the explored notion of the subject will be 
identified as a learner. We offer a conceptualization of the subject that 
emphasizes his performative engagement with the constitution of the 
conditions of intelligibility of the execution of the event in a constant process 
of creating and applying the new knowledge that arises out of the emergent 
dramaturgical structures – a learner who is in an incessant process of 
activating concepts and ideas, thinking in practice, experiencing perceptions, 
exploring interpretations and developing knowledge in a dramaturgical world 
of affects and embodied cognition that sprouts in performative and situated 
practice.   
 
The analysis here will produce a new concept of the performance subject that 
will be called the ‘onto-epistemic intermedial subject’, incorporating both an 
ontological understanding of the ‘experiencer’ (Nelson, 2010: 45) of 
performance as well as an epistemological analysis of the elements that are 
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constitutive for it – the non-subjective conditions of the experience. The 
argument will show that a new conceptualization of the intermedial 
performance subject will begin to “fill the gap” left open by standard 
approaches to the performance subject, which rely simply on a 
phenomenology of the performance experience. These standard approaches 
such as Lapage, 2008; Dixon, 2003; Causey, 2006; Nelson, 2010; and 
Fischer-Lichte, 2008 have been modelled, generally, on hybridity, 
ephemerality, co-dependence, fragmentation, extension, fluidity and the lack 
of ontological and epistemological unity. 
 
1. Blast Theory: An Instance of Intermedial Performance 
Practice. 
 
Blast Theory, led by Matt Adams, Ju Row Farr, and Nick Tandavanitj, is a 
theatre company based in Brighton and London. The company creates work 
that operates across boundaries between practices, exploring a variety of 
media landscapes and using different artistic disciplines such as computer-
generated environments. Blast Theory is renowned internationally for their 
interdisciplinary approach to performance using interactive digital media, at 
least in their most recent work, to create original and unique forms of 
performance and mixing performance genres and modes of presentation 
across the Internet, live performance and digital broadcasting.  
 
Since the company started, its work has interrogated the relationships 
emerging between the development of technologies and theatrical 
performance, exploring artistic processes in which different media platforms 
are used to create dramaturgical environments, emphasizing the conditions 
under which the spatial, the temporal and the narrative are particularly 
constructed within these environments. For the company, analogue and digital 
media present the basis of a unique artistic engine for the creation of 
aesthetic experiences, exploring the inter-relations between digital and 
physical worlds and mixed-reality praxis. Blast Theory explores novel forms of 
dramaturgical articulation, thereby taking the incorporation of technology as a 
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compositional and articulating starting point, rather than simply embedding 
technologies in traditional theatre structures. As such, the group has 
developed innovative ways of translating technological schemes and 
structures into dramaturgical compositions, vitally stressing the emergence of 
novel human-technological relationships throughout the history of the 
company. In this way, the dramaturgical strategies developed by them explore 
the potentials of interdisciplinary artistic practices and redefine commonly 
accepted dramaturgical parameters such as narrative linearity. Central to the 
making of Blast Theory’s work is the constructing of an artistic experience that 
is always culturally mediated and negotiates the relationships between the 
various processes that enable art to come into being such as matters of 
mediality and the role of technologies in the modes of production and 
presentation. 
 
Through the use of analogue and digital technologies in their performances, 
they also present a direct engagement with the participant subject, the site of 
performance and artistic practice. Media technologies are used as a platform 
to develop the conditions for such practices. In this sense, its work has been 
characterized as emphasizing the ambiguities and boundaries of artistic 
exploration and modalities through which the artwork reveals the interfaces 
between itself, the technology applied to its development, and the 
participating subject in it (see Giannachi and Benford, 2004, 2011; Crabtree, 
2003; and Crabtree, Capra and Benford, 2007). In general, their works 
present interactivity as a form of dramaturgical participation that creates a 
multi-layered and open-ended artistic engagement – interactivity for Blast 
Theory not only is a process of interaction, but a mode of interpretation and a 
means of production and reception – all carefully orchestrated through the use 
of media technologies.  
 
Within these creative dramaturgical parameters, Blast Theory has been a 
major partner in two research projects: The Integrated Project on Pervasive 
Gaming (2004-2008) including partners such as the Swedish Institute of 
Computer Science, Sony and Nokia; and Participate, a UK project exploring 
mobiles devices that included the BBC, BT and Microsoft Research. 
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Additionally, the group collaborates with The Mixed Reality Lab, University of 
Nottingham. 
 
The company explains their approach as, 
Collaborative [and] interdisciplinary work that is highly 
innovative in its process and execution. To maintain this 
practice requires long rigorous periods of development 
followed by international showings over several years that are 
usually context specific. (www.blasttheory.co.uk. Accessed, 
01-09-2012) 
 
The company also focuses on the social, ideological, ethical and political 
aspects of technology in relation to the politics of new media – although these 
are aspects of the work that lie beyond the immediate aims and scope of this 
thesis.6 In describing the artistic ethos of Blast Theory, Matt Adams (2010) 
states that the company is committed to ‘reaching outside the boundaries 
typically addressed by performing arts, visual art, or digital art’ (Adams, 2010: 
15-04-2010, interview notes). In doing so, the company explores the inter-
links and crossings between everyday life and art, particularly in the context of 
their collaboration with The Mixed Reality Lab.7 He also explains how, in their 
performance pieces, ‘the company creates hybrid worlds of aesthetic 
engagement’ (Adams, 2010: my interview notes), thematic and operational 
possibilities. Moreover, he (2007) describes how, 
[t]hematics is one thing but the set of internal relationships in 
an interactive work is paramount and this is where the most 
fascinating things are going on and by not announcing a 
                                                        
6 For a thorough analysis of these socio-political, ideological and ethical aspects in relation to 
technology with a particular emphasis on the work of Blast Theory see Benford and 
Giannachi, 2008, 2011; Adams, Benford and Giannachi, 2008; and Crabtree, 2003. 
 
7 From this perspective, the work of the company could be also described as new avant-
gardism, where one finds the experimental extension of the personal and the socio-political of 
a given epoch as explored in artistic movements such as Fluxus and Happenings during the 
1960s and 1970s. Interestingly, in relation to intermedial performance, Greg Giesekam (2007) 
offers a definition of intermediality that highlights aspects of experimental compositions. He 
says that intermediality creates a very specific mode of production, which he categorizes as: 
‘assemblage productions, which create “compositions”, where a breakdown of hierarchies can 
be observed. The constructability of the intermedial work encourages performance 
explorations that are more oriented ‘towards discovering new relationships between images, 
texts, and performances through open-ended experiment’ (Giesekam, 2007: 14). His 
describing parameters coincide with some of the categorizing remarks discussed to explain 
the avant-garde movements. 
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concept or theme so clearly you invite people to inhabit these 
spaces and then be implicated much more directly in the 
relationships that emerge and the ways that technology is 
mediating their relationships … [between participants] and the 
artwork generally. (Adams in Giannachi, 2007: 59) 
 
Relevant here are Adams’ remarks regarding the functionality of the 
engagement, the relationships between participants and artwork and his view 
on the emergent possibilities of the encounter. Within this context, he also 
describes the work of Blast Theory as, 
an enquiry of the technological relationships established 
within a given artwork and within electronic and physical 
spaces. Blast Theory uses emergent dynamics as 
dramaturgical composition. For us, it is important not to pre-
plan narrative and dramaturgical closure. This has always 
been our purpose since we started to work together as a 
company. (Adams, 2010: 15-04-2010, interview notes)  
 
In relation to these emergent dynamics described by Adams, the work of Blast 
Theory sees a shift in the focus of performance away from a complete artwork 
to the idea of process and the generation of dramaturgical diversity and 
complexity; that is, Blast Theory’s performances are never the result of linear 
processes of dramaturgical articulations, but always emerge from a plurality of 
relations between the constantly mutating parameters of the performance’s 
attending variables – variables, moreover, that are always already complex in 
themselves. In other words, the generative characteristic of their work allows 
for the creation of complex dramaturgical forms and highlights the significance 
of the multiple relations that compose each single performative frame 
occurring during the internal orchestrations of the execution of the event – 
again, we suggest, pointing to its radical nature. 
 
The work engages with specific dramaturgical strategies to create a 
systematic environment where elements of narrativity, temporality and 
spatiality are combined to articulate performances that could be categorized 
as architectures of complexity. These dramaturgical architectures – where 
each attending variable intertwines and connects to produce a performative 
fabric of experience at the very moment of the execution of the event – are 
multifaceted and intricate. Now, given the radical dramaturgical parameters 
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suggested by Blast Theory’s work, how adequate is it to describe, analyze 
and categorize such innovations in terms of the standard critical positions that 
characterize performance debates around the categories of the ontological, 
liveness and presentness positions that only offer a reduced account of the 
generative manner of the execution of the event? It is to these questions that 
we now turn. 
 
2. Liveness, Presentness and the Ontological Debate. 
 
Most contemporary performance and liveness discussions take the ontology 
of performance – its manner of being – to be the most significant aspect in 
determining the nature of the performance event. As a general introduction, 
these debates in performance analysis can be described as ontological for the 
following reasons: first, they have equated the mode of being of performance 
with the idea of the immediate and phenomenological presence of the 
performer – and thus restrict the proper definition of performance to an 
ontology of what has been termed the “here and now” by, for instance, Peggy 
Phelan (1993) and Erika Fischer-Lichte (2008); second, this “here and now” 
has also been connected with notions of non-reproducibility, authenticity and 
transformation prominent in debates around notions of liveness and 
ephemerality; and, third, the ontological approach asserts that the “here and 
now”, grasped as the “being” of performance, should be understood as the 
very essence of performance. Arguably, this approach is clearly favoured by 
most performance analyses and includes figures such as Fischer-Lichte 
(2008), Richard Schechner (2003), Andy Lavender (2002) and Patrice Pavis 
(1982). It is discussed most prominently in the dispute over the problem of 
liveness in the debate between Philip Auslander (1999) and Phelan (1993); 
but it also can be found in presentness theorists such as Cormac Power 
(2008). This ontological approach emerges from a disagreement with the 
semiotic, formalist, and materialist approaches to theatre and performance 
and stresses the “lived” component as well as the vitalism of the performance 
transaction. However, this thesis argues, in the first instance, this approach 
suffers from an over reliance on the vitalist aspect of performance – by this we 
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mean, the ontological principles of vitalism, which, broadly, consider living 
things to be governed by laws different from those governing inanimate 
objects; the attempt of this approach was to make a clear dichotomy between 
static objects of art such as a painting and performance as an “object” of art in 
process. In the second instance, here it is argued that the clear emphasis on 
the “here and now” as the prominent understanding of the mode of being of 
performance has obscured and reduced the understanding of performance 
considerably. In what follows, these questions are addressed explicitly by 
looking at some of the principal theoretical moves regarding these ontological 
readings, focusing on how these positions have been justified as well as what 
they omit. 
 
Ontological analyses of performance, in general, have interrogated the 
temporal articulation and manner of being of the intervening elements of 
performance, focusing on performance in the widest sense: ‘the whole 
constellation of events … that take place in/among both performers and 
audience from the time the first spectator enters the field of performance – the 
precinct where the theatre takes place – to the time the last spectator leaves’ 
(Schechner, 1973: 8). Cormac Power (2008) explains that the starting position 
on these debates was formulated when Richard Schechner set the terms with 
his idea of art as an event8 – what he calls an ‘actual’ (Schechner, 2002: 59). 
This actualization, according to Roberta Mock (2000), encompasses both the 
evental creative condition of the performance as an event and the artwork 
itself conceived as an organic whole. Mock relates Schechner’s ‘actual’ to the 
temporality of performance by stating that, 
time is adapted to the event or else the event is organized 
around a consideration of time, that its production results from 
conscious or deliberate decisions and that its text or blueprint 
is repeatable (although necessarily alterable when actually 
[re-]presented). (Mock, 2000: 3) 
 
                                                        
8 In another definition, Schechner calls performance ‘the whole binary continuum 
efficacy/ritual-entertainment/theatre’ (Schechner, 2002: 141-2). However, in this definition, he 
seems to be mixing areas of ideology in relation to live performance with its ontological mode 
and manner of being that he also equates with temporal linearity.   
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Mock refers to the performance event in relation to areas of temporal linearity 
and notions of representation and reproducibility. In this way, she clearly 
places herself within the ontological debate by emphasizing a vitalist 
understanding of ontology.  
 
Actively adding to the debate, Peggy Phelan (1993) states: ‘Performance’s 
only life is in the present’ (Phelan, 1993: 146). She discusses how 
‘Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise 
participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it 
does so, it becomes something other than performance’ (Phelan, 1993: 146). 
Furthermore, ‘performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivity … 
becomes itself through disappearance’ (Phelan, 1993: 146); She concludes 
that ‘performance in a strict ontological sense is non-reproductive’ (Phelan, 
1993: 148). For her, broadly speaking, performance can only be considered a 
live event. In determining it as a live event, Phelan introduces, Power 
explains, two key elements into performance theory. First, she conceives 
performance as an ephemeral event, framed within a reading of ontology as a 
vitalist and essentialist “here and now”; and second, she equates the live with 
authenticity, thus, establishing a complete opposition to mediatized 
performance. Moreover, she writes, 
To the degree that performance attempts to enter the 
economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise 
of its own ontology … For only rarely in this culture is the 
“now” to which performance addresses its deepest questions 
valued. (Phelan, 1993: 146) 
 
Responding to this, Philip Auslander (1999) declares, 
the qualities performance theorists frequently cite to 
demonstrate that live performance forms are ontologically 
different from mediatized forms turns out, upon close 
examination, to provide little basis for convincing distinctions. 
(Auslander, 1999: 159) 
 
Auslander argues that it is both erroneous to qualitatively separate live 
performances from mediatized ones and that to somehow privilege live 
performance on the basis of its authenticity, repetition, intimacy, or resistance 
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to reproduction is to equivocate over the meaning of performance itself, 
ignoring its social, cultural and political context. He explains,  
Live performance thus has become the means by which 
mediatized representations are naturalized, according to a 
simple logic that appeals to nostalgia for what we assume 
was the im-mediate: if the mediatized image can be recreated 
in a live setting, it must have been real to begin with. This 
schema revolves (or rather fails to revolve) into an impossible 
oscillation between two poles of what once seemed a clear 
opposition: whereas mediatized performance derives its 
authority from its reference to the live or the real, the live now 
derives its authority from its reference to the mediatized, 
which derives its authority to the live, etc. (Auslander, 1999: 
38-39) 
 
Auslander follows,  
if live performance cannot be shown to be economically 
independent of, immune from contamination by, and 
ontologically different from mediatized forms, in what sense 
can liveness function as a site of cultural and ideological 
resistance. (Auslander, 1999: 7)  
 
As such, he says that the ‘the relationship between the live and the 
mediatized is one of a competitive opposition at the level of cultural economy’ 
(Auslander, 1999: 11), not at the level of intrinsic ontological differences. He 
continues, ‘I do not see that opposition as deriving from the intrinsic 
characteristics of live and mediatised forms, but, rather, as determined by 
cultural and historical contingencies’ (Auslander, 1999: 11). Auslander 
concludes, ‘It is not realistic to propose that live performance can remain 
ontologically pristine or that it operates in a cultural economy separate from 
that of the mass media’ (Auslander, 1999: 40). Furthermore, he writes, 
To understand the relationship between live and mediatised 
forms, it is necessary to investigate the relationship as 
historical and contingent, not as ontologically given or 
technologically determined … prior to the advent of those 
technologies (e.g. sound recording and motion pictures) there 
was no such as thing as “live” performance, for the category 
has meaning only in relation to the opposing possibility. 
(Auslander, 1999: 51) 
 
Contra Phelan, he claims that live performance has today been assimilated 
within a broader range of mediatized performance such as television and 
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cinema and criticizes how her position has become a ‘site of anxiety … [to] 
reassert the integrity of the live and the corrupt, co-opted nature of the 
mediatized’ (Auslander, 1999: 39).9  
 
However, two aspects in Auslander’s positions need to be mentioned: first, as 
Power explains,  
by highlighting the reproductive and replicative potentials of 
mass media, in particular television, Auslander inadvertently 
draws our attention towards theatre as a representational 
form particularly well suited to critiquing the illusions of 
liveness. (Power, 2008: 173).  
 
Second, as Mathew Reason (2004) discusses,  
Auslander’s central aim of correcting the imbalance that he 
sees existing in the privileging of the live and neglect of the 
mediatized is significant. However, … it seems that serious 
consideration of the [experiential] perceptions … [is] 
neglected. While strong in his attempts to describe changing 
cultural attitudes to different forms of performance, Auslander 
ultimately seems uninterested in exploring what experiential 
distinctions might exist, even in the particular historical 
context in which he is writing. In seeking to debunk the 
unquestioning valuation of the live over the non-live, 
Auslander does not actually explore the phenomenological 
experience of the various forms of live … and non-live 
[performance]. (Reason, 2004: www.participations.org. 
Accessed, 12-10-11) 
 
Additionally, Power fittingly summarizes how other recent contributions to the 
liveness debate such as Pavis and Lavender embrace a more conciliatory 
approach than Auslander and Phelan, but Power also points out that they, 
Pavis and Lavender, have not significantly altered the underlying terms. On 
the one hand, Pavis (1992) argues for the temporal flux of performance and 
speaks of the interferences between theatre and media, and, in the same vein 
                                                        
9 Auslander justifies his position from a cultural-historical shift. He states, ‘the ubiquity of 
reproductions of performances of all kinds in our culture has led to the depreciation of live 
presence, which can only be compensated for by making the perceptual experience of the 
live as much as possible like that of the mediatized, even in cases where the live event 
provides its own brand of proximity’ (Auslander, 1999: 36). Further, he says, ‘whatever 
distinction we may have supposed there to be between live and mediatized is collapsing 
because live events are becoming more and more identical with mediatized ones … ironically, 
intimacy and immediacy are precisely the qualities attributed to television that enabled it to 
displace live performance’ (Auslander, 1999: 32). 
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as Phelan, states that the ephemeral ontology of performance gets “polluted” 
with the incorporation of media forms or what he calls ‘technological and 
aesthetic contamination’ (Pavis, 1992: 134). Steve Dixon describes how 
‘Pavis sees media and reproductive technologies not simply as an 
unavoidable influence on theatre, but as a specific “contamination” of it’ 
(Dixon, 2007: 124). Dixon also highlights how, 
champions of live performance such as Phelan and Pavis 
proclaim its uniquely ephemeral ontology in the face of both 
its increasing marginalization as a cultural form, and what is 
perceived as its gradual ontological erosion through the 
incorporation of (or contamination by) dominant media forms 
and paradigms. (Dixon, 2007: 125)  
 
On the other hand, Lavender (2002), in an attempt to reconcile both sides of 
the liveness debate, describes how the introduction of media technologies in 
performance has had a decisive impact on the ontological understanding of 
performance. He explains, 
In mixed media performance there is a state of being 
simultaneously elsewhere, of being doubled … Mixed media 
performances present spatial continuity (the stage remains 
the same) and discontinuity (screen space is fundamentally 
different from stage space). This is a multiple theatre, where 
perspectives, ontological states and meanings are not only 
plural, but simultaneously so. (Lavender, 2002: 189-190) 
 
However, Lavender still insists that theatrical performance ‘has always traded 
in nowness, and at various points in its history has developed new ways in 
which to heighten the spectator’s awareness of the present moment’ 
(Lavender, 2002: 189) – a position close to Phelan’s understanding, 
emphasizing the temporal linearity and essentialist immediacy of the “here 
and now”. Along the same lines, he discusses the intermedial theatrical 
experience as multiple but still happening in the “now”. He writes, 
it is hardly surprising, then, that the intersection between 
theatre and new technologies, between the live and the 
mediatized, between stage and screen celebrates multiplicity 
at the very point of media merging. Faced with plurality of 
representational modes and meaning-effects, the spectator 
experiences a frisson of pleasure – now – at the wonderful 
synchronicity of their realization. (Lavender, 2002: 190) 
 
Furthermore, he continues, 
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an experience of liveness is partly a question of being in fuller 
possession of this [phenomeno-experiential] moment … 
liveness and its sibling nowness … [allow us] to experience 
more fully the present moment – “live in the now”, as people 
… say. […] A phenomenological understanding of 
performance follows hot on this particular trait, emphasizing 
… nowness, the singularity of experience in the present 
tense. (Lavender, 2002: 188-189)                  
 
Within the same contexts regarding the incorporation of media technologies in 
performance, Matthew Causey (2002) writes, ‘both “here and now” and “not 
here and now” [are] possible through the incorporation of technologies of 
digital media in such forms as video, hypertext, interactivity, and virtual 
presence within live performance’ (Causey, 2002: 182). As in the case of 
Lavender, Causey also points out notions of multiplicity in relation to digital 
performance environments. However, his positions are still described within 
the “here and now” ontological conceptualizing framework and a 
phenomenological perspective on liveness.  
 
Recently, Power has proposed that, contra Auslander, Phelan understands 
performance ‘within rather than without a mass media economy… For Phelan, 
live performance highlight[s] the problematic status of the real in a mediatized 
age’ (Power, 2008: 170). Furthermore, following Lavender, Power argues that 
the ontological aspect of performance is defined by the relation between fixed 
and mobile stages implied by stage screens; that is, what is seen and 
represented onstage (Power, 2008: 170). 
 
Additionally, Power describes how, against Auslander’s positions, Mock has 
argued that the spatio-temporal qualities of theatrical performance cannot be 
achieved in areas of film or “heavily” mediatized performances. Her 
understanding is similar to Phelan’s. However, Mock takes a position that 
might incorporate some mediatized elements within the processes of 
performance’s presentation. For Mock, liveness is now defined as ‘the 
potential for discourse between the processes of presentation (which are 
never finished until the performance is finished) and reception which is the 
characteristic of the live performance’ (Mock in Power 2008: 157). Yet again, 
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she seems to conceptualize these processes as temporal linearity and a 
phenomenology of an attending subject to the performance transaction.  
 
In general, those who advocate the special ontological significance of 
performance have responded to Auslander by highlighting that performance 
can only be defined as a spatio-temporal ontological event, stressing the 
phenomenological aspect of it. Dixon discusses how, 
perhaps, then, a phenomenological examination of liveness 
may provide a more solid foundation for unlocking its 
ontology, and more tangible perspectives on the debate. Even 
without recourse to raw dictionary definitions of liveness, in 
phenomenological terms, it must be agreed that liveness has 
more to do with time and now-ness. (Dixon, 2007: 127) 
 
However, this thesis argues that these phenomenological readings are 
conceptualized from a point of view of a “pre-established” subject attending to 
a phenomenon, actively stressing an anthropologic implication. 
 
In this context of a phenomenological reading of liveness and ontological 
ephemerality, Erika Fischer-Lichte (2008) states, ‘the central focus … [lies] on 
the bodily co-presence of actors and spectators and the so-called “liveness” of 
performance’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 67). For her, ‘it is necessary that actors 
and spectators assemble for a particular time span at a particular place and 
do something together’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2005: 23).  
 
From this perspective, she posits, 
The bodily co-presence of actors and spectators to be the 
fundamental, essential defining factor, between and through 
which the performance happens as well as the bodily actions 
which both parties perform. This dynamic and, in the end, 
unpredictable process, during which unplanned and 
completely unforeseen things arise, excludes the notion of 
representation, expressing and mediating given meanings 
from elsewhere. (Fischer-Lichte, 2005: 25) 
 
Agreeing with Phelan, she suggests,  
A new dichotomy has emerged between the live performance 
constituted by the bodily co-presence of actors and spectators 
and the autopoietic feedback loop and mediatized 
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performance, which serve the co-existence of production and 
reception. Mediatized performance invalidates the feedback 
loop. (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 68) 
 
She continues,  
It [performance] is ephemeral and transitory; however, 
whatever happens and takes shape in its course comes into 
being hic et nunc (here and now) and is experienced by its 
participants as being present in a particularly intensive way … 
performances exhaust themselves in this presentness, that is 
in their permanent emerging and passing. (Fischer-Lichte, 
2010: 31) 
 
Moreover,  
The bodily presence of actors and spectators threatens to 
disappear as a result of its own mediatization. These 
recorded sequences at least seem to interrupt the feedback 
loop. The spectators watch the video images, but … [can] not 
influence them … as far as the audience [is] concerned the 
feedback loop was interrupted. (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 73) 
 
Fischer-Lichte’s conceptualization of the autopoietic feedback loop of 
performance provides a fuller account of performance as an ephemeral 
ontological event regarding the internal functionality of the performance. 
However, it can be argued that her accounts are merely a developed 
explanation of Phelan’s original proposals since they are still reliant on a 
vitalist emphasis on the essentialist living “here and now”.  
 
Adding to the liveness debate, Fischer-Lichte explains that both sides of the 
dispute rely on denying each other’s claims as a ‘fundamental opposition 
between live and mediatized performance in order to prove the cultural 
superiority of one over the other’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 69). According to 
Auslander, she explains, the mediatized and reproductive aspect of 
performance grants performance a cultural status. This, according to Phelan, 
negates the very constitutive aspect of performance. However, Fischer-Lichte 
proposes that ‘neither Auslander’s denial of the difference [between live and 
mediatized] nor Phelan’s affirmation of its unique status solves the question of 
a so-called cultural superiority [of performance]’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 69). 
She emphasizes that Auslander makes two important contributions, which are 
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fundamental to her understanding of performance. First, according to her, ‘the 
blurring of boundaries between live and mediatized performance in favour of a 
generic mediatization’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 69). He states,  
the live event itself is shaped to the demand of mediatization 
… To the extent that live performances now emulate 
mediatized representations, they have become second-hand 
recreations of themselves as refracted through mediatization. 
(Auslander, 1999: 158) 
 
Second, in relation to reproduction technologies, he writes, ‘almost all live 
performances now incorporate the technology of reproduction at the very least 
in the use of electric amplifications, and sometimes to the point where they 
are hardly live at all’ (Auslander, 1999: 158). To this second argument she 
responds that as a result of mediatization, the autopoietic feedback loop is 
threatened and interrupted. Furthermore, agreeing yet again with Phelan, 
Fischer-Lichte asserts that ‘the bodily co-presence of actors and spectators 
cannot be grasped by reproduction technologies’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 69). 
Both Phelan and Fischer-Lichte agree that performance cannot be saved and 
recorded.10 She states, ‘[a]s Peggy Phelan rightly notes, a performance 
cannot be “saved” retrospectively’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 75). Furthermore, 
‘Performance does not consist of fixed, transferable, and material artefacts; it 
is fleeting, transient, and exists only in the present. It is made up of the 
continuous becoming and passing of the autopoietic feedback loop’ (Fischer-
Lichte, 2008: 75). 
 
Performance, according to Fischer-Lichte, generates itself through the 
interactions between actors and spectators, which can neither be planned nor 
predicted. Performance relies, she proposes, on an autopoietic process 
characterized by its contingency. Moreover, in Performance as Event: 
                                                        
10 Within these parameters, however, Fischer-Lichte, disagrees with Phelan in one aspect of 
the argument; that is, Phelan’s view that performance cannot be documented. She explains 
that, in documenting the performance event, this archival and documentation is a platform to 
speak about past performances. She quotes, ‘talking about performance marks its absence, a 
loss. It only exists as an accessible object – to be referred to, discussed and evaluated – 
insofar as we recognized its disappearance, and this experience presumes the 
acknowledgement of inaccessible conditions … questions of artistic intent and subjective 
experience are irrelevant to the art of performance’ (Bormann and Brandstetter in Fischer-
Lichte, 2008: 75).  
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Reception as Transformation, Fischer-Lichte (2010) puts the emphasis on 
defining and characterizing performance by its nature as events. 
Performance, she posits, 
enables a specific mode of experience that corresponds to a 
particular form of liminal experience. Since a performance 
comes into being by way of the interaction between actors 
and spectators and produces itself as an autopoietic process, 
it is impossible to label it an artwork in the sense of an object 
… performance exists only in the process of performance; it 
exists only as event. (Fischer-Lichte, 2010: 37) 
 
The autopoietic feedback mechanism, she explains, determines performance 
as a reciprocal and dialogical relationship of co-emergence between 
performer and spectator. She writes, ‘the relationship between actors and 
spectators [is established] as one of co-subjects’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 44).  
 
Some aspects of her definitions are worth noting. First, as noted, her 
arguments are still underpinned by the ontological framework of the “here and 
now” – the spatio-temporal coordinates, on this view, are the main constitutive 
elements in articulating her proposed thesis of co-emergence. Second, her 
understanding of co-constitution and co-emergence relies on a “simplistic” 
phenomenal reading of the perceiver or experiencer as participating in – even 
co-acting in the development of the performance event. The psychologist 
Gilbert Garza (2002) explains that generally a classical reading of 
phenomenological co-emergence sees, on the one hand, the phenomena as 
fundamental ontological structures of the human experience as it is 
meaningfully and actively lived; and, on the other hand, following Husserl, 
sees the experiencing subject as primary to the experiential moment. Drawing 
on this conventional understanding, she conceives the relationship between 
the phenomena and the attending (and/or intending to, as in Husserl) subject 
to such phenomena as a mutual interplay that transforms one another. This 
dynamic interplay is what traditional readings of phenomenology also 
understand as co-constitution (see Husserl, 1964 and Moran, 2000); that is, 
very broadly put, the experiential bond between the person and the lived 
world, in which each is only comprehensible in terms of the relation between 
each other – in other words, a vitalist approach. Most importantly here, her 
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understanding of co-constitution is rudimentarily based on how subject and 
performance world inform each other, which is still erroneously reliant on a 
conception of a phenomenal subject attending to a given world/phenomena. 
She writes,  
a constant exchange takes place between the perceiving 
subject and the object perceived, which dissolves the 
fundamental object and subject opposition … both autopoietic 
feedback loop and perception permanently glide back and 
forth between subject and object positions. Subject and object 
no longer form an opposition but merely mark different states 
of positions of the perceiving subject and the object perceived 
which can occur consecutively or, in some cases, 
simultaneously. (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 172)  
 
 
In this definition, we clearly observe an essentialist reading of vitalism. 
Deleuzian scholar Claire Colebrook (2010) discusses that this limited and 
reductive reading of vitalism ‘in its narrow sense might be identified … as the 
ways in which systems … have their origin in animating life but then come to 
operate independently of the thought and sense that is their condition of 
emergence’ (Colebrook, 2010: 1). In this sense, within a given environment, 
subject and object are co-dependent of each other but still present 
independent characteristics.  
 
With this is mind, and third, her ideas on autopoiesis are informed by a flawed 
reading of biological notions of autopoietic organisms as explored by 
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1980). She sees autopoiesis as a 
constant dynamic process of re-formation and re-configuration, which she 
then uses to justify the temporal self-forming and transformational dynamic of 
the performance event. The physicist Fritjof Capra (2003) fittingly defines the 
concept of autopoiesis within scientific backgrounds. He writes, 
According to the theory of autopoiesis, a living system 
couples to its environment structurally, i.e. through recurrent 
interactions, each of which triggers structural changes in the 
system. For example, a cell membrane continuously 
incorporates substances from its environment into the cell’s 
metabolic processes. An organism nervous system changes 
its connectivity with every sense perception. These living 
systems are autonomous, however. The environment only 
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triggers the structural changes; it does not specify or direct 
them. (Capra in Bryon, 2014: 32)  
 
However, on a close reading of Capra and Maturana and Varela’s writings, 
they do not explain autopoiesis as a mechanism of continual transformation, 
but rather the opposite, they describe autopoiesis as a mechanism that, 
although autonomous, tends towards stability and closure. They clearly point 
out how a given biological organism changes its internal dynamic and re-
configures itself only when being affected by external – and the word external 
needs to be stressed – elements to the internal components/parts/cells of 
such organism.  
 
Both Phelan and Fischer-Lichte, then, have equated ontology with a spatio-
temporal framework. However, by focusing only on the “here and now” as the 
defining features for the ontology of performance, both theorists limit their 
analysis to a single aspect of the ontological structure of performance; what 
they miss, this thesis suggests, are broader questions concerning what it 
means for something to have being; or, in other words, what the conditions 
that make being possible are. As this research notes, reading performance in 
terms of its epistemology – that is to say, by taking into account the epistemic 
conditions of the experience, the moment in which the subject encounters the 
experience, and the encounter itself – will necessarily reveal a broader 
structural nexus that supports and makes possible the “live” performance 
event.  
 
When extrapolated to intermedial performance, the consequence of this 
epistemic reading is that intermedial practice cannot be reduced to the 
mechanisms of autopoiesis, as explained by Fischer-Lichte, to capture the 
generative characteristics of the execution of the event. Nor does the “here 
and now” explain a given spatio-temporal narrative articulation of the kind we 
find in Blast Theory’s intermedial work. Most importantly, these ontological 
debates, this research argues, are, therefore, inadequately positioned to 
account for the proposed radical nature of intermedial dramaturgies. In this 
way, firstly, the significance of the increasingly complex interaction between 
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“live” forms and mediatized experience is bound to be anachronistic, and, 
secondly, the reduction to a vitalist “here and now” is insufficient to explain 
and account for the work of Blast Theory and, we suggest, intermedial 
performance in general. The framework provided by the notion of 
intermediality that this research follows moves away from the theoretical 
polarization of the live and the mediatized and provides a lens through which 
to explore the generative patterns manifesting across the execution of the 
event. The implications of this for intermediality are that technology, 
subjectivity and the artwork are inseparable and expand in a multiplicity of 
manners that only the application of a constructivist reading of epistemology 
to conceptualize the intermedial event can capture and make sense of.  
 
3. Intermediality: Some Initial Considerations. 
 
The concept of intermediality has been difficult to define because it has been 
widely used in a myriad of critical backgrounds.11 Klaus Bruhn Jensen (2008) 
offers what we may call a “standard definition” of the meaning of the term in 
relation to the use of media in performance and historicizes this development 
calling for an understanding of the ‘intermedial turn’. He writes, 
intermediality refers to the interconnectedness of modern 
media of communication. As means of expression and 
exchange, the different media depend on and refer to each 
other, both explicitly and implicitly; they interact as elements 
of particular communicative strategies; and they are 
consistent of a wider cultural environment. (Jensen in Bay-
Cheng et al., 2010: 15) 
 
One aspect of the concept is always agreed upon in all definitions; that is, the 
mutual influence and interaction between media. Chiel Kattenbelt (2008) 
describes, 
                                                        
11 As an example of this widely debated aspect, Asuncion Lopez-Varela Azcarte (2008) 
argues that in considering intermediality from the point of view of comparative cultural studies 
– defined here as ‘a theoretical and methodological framework built on tenets of (radical) 
constructivism, inter-disciplinary and the contextual and empirical study of culture’ (Lopez-
Varela Azcarte in Chapple, 2008: 10) – intermediality can be analyzed as ‘the relationship set 
in-between the employment practices of multimodal media in contemporary cultural practices’ 
(Lopez-Varela Azcarte in Chapple, 2008: 10). Thus, intermediality is located in the space 
where definite ‘territorial demarcations as their points of encounter constantly shift’ (Chapple, 
2008: 10).  
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with respect to those co-relations between different media 
that result in a redefinition of the media that are influencing 
each other, which in turn leads to a refreshed perception. 
Intermediality assumes a co-relation in the actual sense of the 
word, that is to say a mutual affect. (Kattenbelt, 2008: 25)  
 
The Theatre and Intermediality Research Group of the International 
Federation for Theatre Research (IFTR) stands at the forefront of the ongoing 
research discourse. In Intermediality in Theatre and Performance (2006), this 
group advertises intermediality by saying that it is located at the ‘intersection 
situated in-between the performers, the observers, and the confluence of 
media, medial spaces and art form[s] involved in performance at a particular 
moment in time’ (IFTR, 2006). Interestingly, the group places intermediality as 
an in-between state of dynamic reconfigurations through which the employed 
media produces a new experience.12 In one of the chapters of the book, Mise 
en Scene, Hypermediacy and the Sensorium, Lavender (2006) describes how 
‘the simultaneous coexistence, the mutual play of what might appear to be 
two distinct media – the screen and the stage – and the ways in which their 
very co-relation produces effects of immediacy that are deeply involving – 
more pleasurable – for spectators’ (Lavender, 2006: 56), stating that ‘one of 
the potencies of live performance is precisely its ability to involve the 
spectator in an awareness of the here and now, the uniquely present moment 
of current experience’ (Lavender, 2006: 64). In Mapping Intermediality in 
Performance (2010), the second book of the group, they describe the 
intermedial transaction as one of portals, interconnectedness, syncretism, 
nodes and networks, to list just a few (2010: 19-21). As a group convenor and 
panel speaker of the Intermediality in Performance working group at the IFTR 
conference in Barcelona (July, 2013), Sigrid Merx explained that the groups’ 
focus has shifted from the notion of the in-between towards the idea of a 
‘both-and approach’ (Nelson, 2010: 15); that is, ‘a bridge between mediums’ 
(Nelson, 2010: 14) that work together as a system to accomplish 
                                                        
12 Other theorists emphasize the role intermedial techniques play in the mode of theatrical 
production – for instance – Greg Giesekam (2007) offers a distinct definition of intermediality 
as a new mode of staging. He writes, ‘[the intermedial is a] type of production, where more 
extensive interaction between the performers and various media reshapes notions of 
character and acting, where neither the live material nor the recorded material would make 
much sense without the other’ (Giesekam, 2007: 8). 
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‘communicative strategies’ (Nelson, 2010: 15). Nelson describes how ‘the 
relations between different media in a multi-tracked text are ultimately a 
matter of perception and interpretation’ (Nelson, 2010: 13). Further, how the 
‘mediums work together in digital culture … [and] challenge established 
modalities of experience (Nelson, 2010: 17). 
 
Liesbeth Groot Nibbelink and Sigrid Merx (2010) discuss the dramaturgy of 
intermediality regarding spectatorial addresses and staging modalities in 
terms of different and multiple perspectives and aesthetic implications.13 They 
write,  
First, intermediality allows for a particular way of structuring 
the stage, employing aesthetic strategies such as montage 
(spatial, simultaneous) and collage, doubling, difference, 
framing and interactivity … A second aspect is related to the 
dramaturgy of spectatorial address: the structuring of the 
encounter between the stage and the spectator. Both 
principles organize the performance as process, and, in doing 
so certain themes emerge by which intermedial performance 
– as a theoretical object – reflects on its position within a 
digital culture. (Groot Nibbelink and Merx, 2010: 223-224)  
 
However, one could argue that, within these descriptions, the in-betweeness, 
portals, and nodes of intermedial dramaturgy only refer, on the one hand, to 
the manner in which the placing of the media – its staging modalities – 
reconfigures the compositional dramaturgy of a given performance’s 
aesthetics;14 and, on the other hand, to a phenomenological account of 
intermediality. In regards to this second aspect, Maria Chatzichristodoulou 
                                                        
13 In relation to its aesthetic staging modalities regarding areas of multiple and dynamic 
modes of dramaturgical presentation and the importance of the spectatorial address, 
intermediality can be also grasped as a subset of post-dramatic theatre. Hans-Thies 
Lehmann’s (2006) proposals on post-dramatic dramaturgies discuss post-dramatic principles 
of dramaturgical composition in terms of their mode of presentation as a more open-ended 
and multiple mode dramaturgical composition, disrupting, as an example, classical notions of 
dramatic teleology.  
 
14 Freda Chapple (2006) proposes that ‘intermediality becomes a process of transformation 
of thoughts and processes where something different is formed through performance’ 
(Chapple, 2006: 12). She points out the process of transformation occurring during the 
performative encounter. However, she only seems to imply that the relationship between 
theatre and performance requires a new form of thinking about the interpretative and 
categorizing possibilities (“what it is”) that the staging inter-relation between the “live” and the 
technologies bring into question. 
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(2011), reviewing the group’s second book, states that its proposals focus 
“extensively” on a phenomenological account of intermediality. She writes, 
‘the focus on experience suggests that the phenomenon of intermediality is 
defined on the basis of the audience members’ perception of it and the 
experience it affords her’ (Chatzichristodoulou, 2011: 231).   
 
In contrast, Peter Boenisch (2006a) appropriately posits the idea of 
intermediality in performance as no longer reducible to the concept of using 
different technologies in live performance.15 Earlier in 2003, he wrote,  
rethinking the “inter” in the debate on intermediality and 
foregrounding instead the basic mediality of theatre, we may 
come to understand theatre no longer as something trans-
historically fixed and stable, which in present days, all of a 
sudden, is challenged by new media – but will rather 
acknowledge that theatre itself constantly challenges its own 
history as a traditional medium of literate culture. (Boenisch, 
2003: 44)  
 
Moreover, in Aesthetic Art to Aisthetic Act: Theatre, Media, Intermedial 
Performance, he (2006a) describes intermediality as ‘an effect performed in-
between mediality, supplying multiple perspectives and foregrounding the 
making of meaning rather than obediently transmitting meaning’ (Boenisch, 
2006a: 103). In Mediation Unfinished: Choreographing Intermediality in 
Contemporary Dance Performance, he (2006b) writes,  
The message has not already been made and is waiting in 
the wings to be decoded; signs do not represent, but only 
ever more forcefully present their yet undecided meaning: 
intermediality is indeed mediation unfinished. It becomes 
clear that the inter of intermediality is not performed in 
between dance and technology, in-between live theatre and 
mediatized screening, but touches directly on the very 
process of mediation. (Boenisch, 2006b: 161)  
                                                        
15 Peter Boenisch (2003) argues that in the context of understanding the conventions of 
theatre, the term intermediality has been “sneaked” into the performance debate. For him, 
theatre is intrinsically intermedial and, therefore, not reliant on the presence of projections or 
computer technologies to justify the use of the term. In 2006, he also writes: ‘Theatre itself is 
a media technology that utilizes, at its very heart, other media to transmit and store, while it 
highlights at the same time the process of processing information. Essentially theatre is a 
semiotic practice, which incorporates, spatializes, in disseminates in sensorial terms (thus: 
performs) the content and cognitive strategies of other media by creating multiple channels, 
and a multi-media semiotic and sensoric environment. It is exactly through this door where 
intermediality enters theatrical performance’ (Boenisch, 2006a: 113). 
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Furthermore, he states,  
Intermediality, I suggest, is an effect created in the perception 
of the observers that is triggered by the performance – and 
not simply by the media, machines, projections or computers 
used in performance. I conceive intermediality as much more 
than yet another strategy to be simply devised, or than just 
the latest media-technological gimmick feature waiting to be 
switched on as explained by the instruction manual. 
(Boenisch, 2006a: 113-114) 
 
Agreeing with Boenisch, this research proposes that the term intermediality is 
an effect of processes of mediality because both the “inter” and “medium”, 
etymologically, already mean an in-between. In this way, intermediality comes 
after the media is placed in a theatrical setting as its effect.16 Hence, 
intermediality cannot be simply conceptualized as the blending and placing of 
different media and technologies in “live” performance.17 The proposed 
reading of intermediality here, however, emphasizes that intermediality is 
better understood, with Deleuze and Whitehead, in terms of ‘what it does’ and 
‘how it works’, rather than ‘what it means’ and/or ‘what it is’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1983: 109) – as an ontological conceptualizing approach would do – 
since the intermedial is in itself produced and constructed by the effect of 
medial connections. Intermediality produces not just a new opportunity for 
performance or novel modes of staging, but also a new aesthetic of 
performance. Put slightly differently, intermediality, this thesis argues, cannot 
be just reduced to a description of technology and theatre – all theatre can be 
considered intermedial, as Boenisch points out – but rather as a distinct 
attempt to transform the theatre/performance aesthetic. Consequently, this 
research claims that once viewed in terms of its radical dramaturgical 
potential intermediality is framed as the creation of an aesthetic construction 
                                                        
16 Deleuze considers art in general as the field of aesthetic effects, sensations, feelings and 
affects. Elizabeth Grosz (2008) offers a thorough analysis of his writings on aesthetics.  
 
17 Greg Giesekam (2007) also points out that intermediality is more than blending media in 
theatrical settings. He refers to Philip Auslander’s contention that ‘the incursion of 
mediatization into live performance is not simply a question of the use of certain equipment in 
that context. It also has to do with approaches to performance and characterization, and the 
mobility and meanings of those within a particular cultural context’. (Auslander in Giesekam, 
2007: 15). 
 45 
in which the attending dramaturgical variables and the participating subject 
come into being at the very moment of the execution of the onto-epistemic 
event. 
 
Boenisch makes another pertinent remark in this regard, pointing to the 
relationship between making and transmitting meaning in relation to the 
interaction between the “live” and the technological elements.18 Drawing on 
his distinction, the intermedial definition sought here, following the 
philosophical positions of Timothy Barker (2009b), posits that when we think 
about the performative nature of both interaction and technology, ‘the 
distinction between the way in which something is performed and the way in 
which something is aesthetically comprehended cannot be maintained’ 
(Barker, 2009b: 17). As Barker suggests, we also highlight the manner in 
which the performative nature of the event, 
unfolds both understanding and performing, the knowledge 
gained from the interaction cannot be separated from the 
performative action that provided the condition for this 
knowledge to emerge. Hence, process and experience are 
implicated in one another. (Barker, 2009b: 17)   
 
Furthermore, he discusses how ‘the processes of systems, organizational 
structures, affects and the relationality of entities are important, not 
consciousness per se, which is merely an outcome of these processes’ 
(Barker, 2009b: 21).  Extracting from these theoretical perspectives, this 
thesis stresses that the performative and creative characteristic of the 
execution of the event makes it impossible to distinguish an encoded 
object/transaction from the act of encoding. Hence, process, experience and 
knowledge-making are mutually and inseparably implicated in a constant 
process of re-formation, disrupting classical understandings of hermeneutics 
and transforming classical notions of representation into notions of re-
presentation. In other words, the work of art is not “already there” waiting to 
be interpreted by an attending subject “towards” the performance; rather, the 
conceptualization of intermediality presented here places the participant 
                                                        
18 According to Peter Boenisch (2006a), intermedial performance presents three semiotic 
layers regarding the presentation onstage of a given digital object. He explains that this media 
object is simultaneously presented, present and representational (Boenisch, 2006a: 114). 
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subject inside the diegetic frame of content; the experiencer engages in a 
constant re-framing and self-positing of the diegetic frame itself from within. 
Seen thus, the diegetic frame and the human emerge through their mutual – 
the entanglement of agencies – performative co-constitution, enabling 
processes of medial onto-epistemic constructions.  
 
The notion of medium becomes central to the proposed understanding of 
intermediality here. Christopher Balme (2001) offers some remarks in relation 
to the notion of medium and argues that intermedial discourse distinguishes 
three different understandings of intermediality, 
The first refers to the transposition of the subject matter from 
one medium to another medium. The second is intermediality 
as a specific form of intertextuality and the third refers to 
intermediality as the re-creation of the aesthetic conventions 
on one particular medium within a different medium. (Balme in 
Chapple et al., 2006: 13) 
 
Etymologically, the term medium can be simply defined as a channel – or 
even a system – of communication and as the technical means of, in this 
instance, artistic expression. In this conceptualizing framework, ready-made 
messages are encoded in a particular way, sent over the channel, and 
decoded on the other end. However, agreeing with Walter Ong19 (1982) and 
Mary-Laure Ryan (2004), we propose that the manner in which the 
communication is transmitted through the medium as a channel impacts in a 
central way the construction of the form and content of the transmitted, keenly 
stressing the ‘configuring action of the medium’ (Ryan, 2004: 17). What 
counts here is the how something is communicated, presented and 
experienced. Simply put, how the channel is constructed – not what it is or its 
manner of being, hence, placing the emphasis in the onto-epistemological 
construction rather than “simply” in the ontological. 
 
A constant trait observed in the work of Blast Theory is the specific manner of 
exploring the use of the latest digital technology as an intrinsic and 
fundamental mode of creation and presentation. The use of the newest 
                                                        
19 Walter Ong (1982) offers his definition in relation to literacy and cultural studies in regards 
to digital technologies, but his remarks are also helpful here. 
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technologies, as Marshall McLuhan (1964) in the earlier stages of the 
intermedial debate pointed out, does not mean the obliteration of one 
technology by the newest one, but a continuous developmental use. He 
writes, ‘a new medium is never an addition to an old one, nor does it leave the 
old one in peace. It never ceases to oppress the older media until it finds new 
shapes and positions for them’ (McLuhan, 1964: 158). Interestingly, this is a 
process of technological development that requires new ways of reading, 
making sense and experiencing how a given medium affects the form and 
content of a given intermedial work. Most recently, along the same lines and 
in parallel with Boenisch’s reading, Susan Broadhurst (2006) explains how the 
use of media technologies requires the understanding of a performance 
transaction as one that requires different modes of reading, interpreting and 
understanding; that is, ‘a thinking that makes little distinction between the 
referent and meaning, or for that matter between reality and representation’ 
(Broadhurst, 2006: 148).  
 
The incorporation of technological elements creates dramaturgies as inter-
relations of performative mediations, where boundaries between the media 
blur. Accordingly, the performative combination of media in the work of Blast 
Theory produces a fabric of multiple experiential inter-relations and inter-
engagements where re-mediation and re-presentation concurrently happen in 
a process of constant activation – the execution of the event. 
 
Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin (1999) explain that in this co-relation of 
media a process of re-mediation occurs. They write,  
A medium is that which remediates. It is that which 
appropriates the techniques, forms, and social significance of 
other media and attempts to rival or refashion them in the 
name of the real. A medium in our culture can never operate 
in isolation, because it must enter into relationships of respect 
and rivalry with other media. (Bolter and Grusin, 1999: 65) 
 
From this angle, they define re-mediation as ‘the representation of one 
medium in another’ (Bolter and Grusin, 1999: 45).  Kattenbelt (2008) explains 
that re-mediation, according to them, achieves different grades and levels in 
theatrical performance according to the artistic and aesthetic choices that the 
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performance makers take in placing media contexts in relation to other media 
contexts and inextricably media elements also in relation to one another 
(Kattenbelt, 2008: 25). Re-mediatization, for them, creates both a sense of 
immediacy and hypermediacy. Hypermediacy is understood here as 
immediacy in analogue, digital and virtual worlds and develops dramaturgical 
presentations that attempt to intensify the experience of the “real”: ‘the 
inseparability of mediation and reality’ (Bolter and Grusin, 1999: 55).20 
Lavender (2006) explains that ‘[h]ypermediacy is not simply a question of 
multiplicity of sources, images or image systems. It is expressed through 
simultaneity: two or more sources, images, systems and effects in play at the 
same time in a shared ecology’ (Lavender, 2006: 56).  
 
Drawing on McLuhan, Bolter and Grusin describe how ‘what is new about new 
media comes from the particular ways in which they refashion older media 
and the ways in which older media refashion themselves to answer the 
challenges of new media’ (Bolter and Grusin, 1999: 15). Through this 
refashioning, according to them, re-mediation occurs. Following Bert 
Vandenbussche (2003), two important remarks can be drawn from their 
definitions. On the one hand, it can be implied that there is a sense of 
‘repurposing’ (Bolter and Grusin, 1999: 45), as the ‘recycling of a particular 
subject matter [content] taken from one medium within another medium 
without displaying a formal interaction between the two media’ 
(Vandenbussche, 2003: www.imageandnarrative.be. Accessed, 10-07-2011) 
in order ‘to erase all traces of mediation’ (Bolter and Grusin, 1999: 5). On the 
other hand, for Bolter and Grusin, re-mediation is also understood as a 
‘strategy to represent within a medium not the subject matter of another 
medium but the medium itself (Bolter and Grusin, 1999: 45)’ (Vandenbussche, 
2003: www.imageandnarrative.be. Accessed, 10-07-2011). Here it is argued, 
instead, that what is important is not that one medium represents itself in 
                                                        
20 Bolter and Grusin explain how hypermediacy calls for a logic of immediacy, broadly defined 
as a desire to make the process of mediation imperceptible. In the context of Blast Theory 
works, I argue, instead, that the processes of mediation are made apparent and explicit. Blast 
Theory highlights the processes of mediation to foreground the participant subjects the 
experience of technological mediation in the construction of the performative mediated 
dramaturgical actions.  
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another medium, but that form and content should be interpreted as being 
constructed by the formal functioning of a given medium and how the medium 
makes the executing subjects aware of how a given medium is being used. 
Shifting away from McLuhan’s divisions between message and content, and 
drawing on Bolter and Grusin’s proposals, we highlight that re-mediation 
should be understood as the temporal and continuous process of medial 
transformation in which form and content are constructed. 
 
In reference to notions of medium, Jensen (2008) explains that not only does 
the concept of medium in intermediality call for an understanding of form and 
content through re-mediation, but also for the specific manner in which a 
given medium approaches sensory modalities. He writes, 
Three concepts of intermediality may be identified in 
communication research, deriving from three notions of what 
is a medium. First, and most concretely, intermediality is the 
combination and adaptation of spared material vehicles of 
representation and reproduction, sometimes called 
multimedia, as exemplified by sound-and-slide shows or by 
the audio and video channels of television. Second, the term 
denotes communication through several sensory modalities at 
once, for instance, music and moving images. Third, 
intermediality concerns the interrelations between media as 
institutions in society as addressed in technological and 
economic terms such as convergence and conglomeration. 
(Jensen in Bay-Cheng et al., 2010: 16)  
 
It is in relation to the possibilities of the connection between intermediality and 
the human sensorium, this thesis suggests that we should understand 
Jensen’s claim that, 
As a term and an explicit theoretical concept, intermediality 
has perhaps been most widely used in reference to multiple 
modalities of experience, as examined in aesthetic and other 
humanistic traditions of communication research. (Jensen in 
Bay-Cheng et al., 2010: 17) 
 
Along the same lines of ‘multiple modalities’ of experience described by 
Jensen, Nelson proposes ‘intermedial theatre [as] both physically based and 
on-screen; experiences may be both actual and virtual; spaces may be both 
public and private; bodies may be present and absent’ (Nelson, 2010: 17). In 
this sense, intermediality can be said to ‘mark the concrete effects of being 
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definitely multiple and interrelational … [and it is also] formed out of 
relationships, necessary interdependencies, and mutually co-relating entities’ 
(Nelson, 2010: 17). Following Lavender (2002), Nelson also states that 
intermedial performance presents a sense of simultaneity. Lavender writes,  
Mixed-media performance presents spatial continuity (the 
stage remains the same) and discontinuity (screen space is 
fundamentally different from the stage space). This is a multiple 
theatre, where perspectives, ontological states, and meanings 
themselves are not only plural but simultaneously so. 
(Lavender, 2002: 190) 
 
Also, regarding the above-quoted ‘multiple modalities’, Lars Ellestrom (2010) 
explains that the intermedial is also multimodal. His theoretical framework 
explores notions of modality, explaining that four modalities – material, 
sensorial, spatio-temporal and semiotic – can be observed in various modes 
and degrees of configurations and modal appearances. These modal 
appearances are what he calls ‘basic media’ (Ellestrom, 2010: 30). He also 
speaks of ‘qualified media’ (Ellestrom, 2010: 30); that is, the use of media 
within specific historical context. As a result of these two, he discusses how 
any technical medium can be described as any object or body that realizes, 
mediates and displays basic and qualified media. He writes,  
the defining features of a technical medium are its capacity to 
realize specific interfaces and the perceiver’s capacity to 
interact with these interfaces and with other users of the 
medium … any technical medium, accordingly, can fully 
mediate certain basic and qualified media. (Ellestrom, 2010: 
30-31) 
 
This manner of mediation is what he terms ‘the operational and qualifying 
aspect of media’ (Ellestrom, 2010: 25). According to him, a technical medium 
can be described as form and basic and qualified media as content. In this 
sense, mediation, for him, is the ‘relationship between technical media and 
basic and qualified media’ (Ellestrom, 2010: 32). Interestingly, in his 
definitions, mediation, in its modal changes and operational aspects as a 
process, presents a transformational manner that can be potentially re-
positioned as radical; that is, the articulating possibilities of a given intermedial 
dramaturgical arrangement can be modally and operationally re-activated 
generatively.   
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In the context of mediation as a process, Barker (2012) explains that medium 
as a process ‘provides the conditions for media entities to take form’ (Barker, 
2012: 11). He also writes, 
Mediation is a process that draws one media entity into a 
relationship with other pieces of media. By this it establishes a 
media ecology, where the relationships within the ecology 
direct the becoming of the singular media entity [the many 
become one] … the character of an entity it’s gained through 
its involvement in a system. (Barker, 2012: 11) 
 
Agreeing with Barker’s position, this thesis also stresses that mediation as a 
process can be also considered a generation of process because each new 
mediated entity sets ‘the conditions for the becoming of entities. This is a 
temporal process generating particular conditions for becoming’ (Barker, 
2012: 13).21 In this sense, the becoming flux of the process of mediation 
causes the media re-conditioning.  
 
With all this in mind, and returning to the techniques through which 
intermediality accomplishes the activation of the human sensorium by means 
of constructing mediation, the writings of Deleuze and Whitehead, this 
research proposes, offer a distinct conceptualizing framework since their 
explorations of process and becoming can help theorize the techniques that 
intermediality explores such as transformation of the temporal order (linearity) 
of performance, and creates the sufficient and necessary conditions for 
dramaturgical multiplicity and complexity to arise. It is for this reason that we 
need to speak of a new kind of intermedial subject. 
 
                                                        
21 The work of Timothy Barker has been highly influential on this doctoral research, 
particularly Time and the Digital (2012). His explorations regarding notions of time, within the 
context of a process philosophy, in relation to digital technology, situating his book in ‘the 
intersection between technology and culture’ (Barker, 2012: 3), is a thorough attempt at ‘re-
thinking the relationship between time and digital technology, taking an approach grounded in 
[process philosophy] and aesthetic theory’ (Barker, 2012: 7). Although he does not base his 
writings on a constructivist reading of epistemology, his account of Deleuzian and 
Whiteheadian process philosophy has illuminated this research. His ‘Time and the Digital 
does not enter into discussions of consciousness per se’ (Barker, 2012: 7), which is the 
contribution to knowledge of this thesis.   
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The conceptualization of subjectivity in relation to intermedial praxis has not 
taken centre stage in recent debates. It is worth noticing, nevertheless, that, in 
articulating performance definitions, some of the key figures have pointed out, 
if broadly, some characteristic traits of subjectivity within performance. In their 
writings, Phelan, Schechner and Fischer-Lichte emphasize their 
understanding of the type of subjectivity that performance enables. 
Notwithstanding their differences, the three coincide in allocating some similar 
and specific traits to the idea of the performance subject. Phelan sees it, in 
line with her main ideas on performance, as ontologically ephemeral; 
Schechner stresses its ontological/actual aspects of being determined by and 
determining the performance transaction; and Fischer-Lichte conceptualizes 
the subject as purely intersubjective, co-dependent and ephemeral, generated 
by the dynamics of the autopoietic feedback loop and lacking the autonomous 
free will of the Kantian transcendental subject. Furthermore, intermedial 
performance scholarship such as Louise Lapage (2008), supporting her ideas 
with performance theorists such as Hans-Thies Lehmann (2006) and post-
humanist thinkers such as Katherine Hayles (1999), calls the subject of 
intermedial performance a being ‘modelled on hybridity and fluidity’ (Lapage, 
2008: 146) and a ‘schizzo subject who is constructed across and in-between 
technologies’ (Lapage, 2008: 143) opened up to shared ontologies between 
the technological and the human. Moreover, she describes how technological 
and media environments ‘refuse the subject his/her essential character as a 
conscious, autonomous, and intelligent, being located in a meaningful world’ 
(Lapage, 2008: 146). She also asserts the impossibility of a transcendental 
subject in intermedial work: ‘there is no transcendental subject’ (Lapage, 
2008: 145). Furthermore, she claims that the subject ‘is precluded any 
possibility of free will’ (Lapage, 2008: 139).22 Along the same lines, Dixon 
                                                        
22 Her post-human reading of the subject of intermediality emphasizes the epistemological 
over the ontological: ‘critical to this discussion of post-human subjectivity and epistemology … 
[is the demonstration] that cognitive reality is derivative of particularized material instantiation 
… [As such, the performance world and] the subject … are formed of specific organizations 
which alter the very terms of cognition or consciousness’ (Lapage, 2008: 145). Furthermore, 
she highlights the epistemic ‘mutual and interdependent action between beings and objects’ 
(Lapage, 2008: 146). Hers is a post-human reading informed by Maturana and Valera’s 
postulates (Lapage, 2008: 144-145). This thesis, instead, highlights the onto-epistemic. In this 
way, cognition is not derivative, but emergent at the very moment that both subject and world 
constructively instantiate.  
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(2003) describes the subject in relation to digital practices as linked to the 
Artaudian ideas of the ‘double’ and the ‘uncanny’; and Matthew Causey 
(2006) sees the subject in digital performance as ‘extended’ and 
‘reconfigured’ (Causey, 2006: 16). In a more articulated study, Nelson terms 
the participant subject of the intermedial event as the performative 
‘experiencer’ and claims that this ‘experiencer’, in relation to post-structuralist 
assumptions, is ‘a conflicted, non-self identical subject who may end up 
perpetually performing her various identities in an endless process’ (Nelson, 
2010: 23). In this sense, Nelson highlights the performative in relation to 
subjectivity. He also writes: ‘such digital paraphernalia do not necessarily 
entail the abandonment of a human paradigm … to explore the human 
condition in the [Kantian] Enlightenment tradition’ (Nelson, 2010: 23). 
 
Arguing against these above-mentioned positions, as will shall see on chapter 
five, the onto-epistemic conditions, of both the performance transaction and 
the participating subject via performative, creative and generative frames, 
interrelates the intelligibility of the intermedial phenomenon and the concept-
making and affect-feeling subject as a unified evental construction. In other 
words, this is not a case of a “chicken and egg syndrome” – of who or what 
comes first to explain the existence, emergence and mode of being of the 
other. Here, there is no intermedial performance without the intermedial 
subject and no intermedial subject without the intermedial performance. There 
is only the constructivist aesthetic of the intermedial dramaturgical event.   
 
4. The Organization of Chapters. 
 
Chapter one introduces a constructivist reading of epistemology as the 
methodological framework for this research. It establishes the theoretical 
parameters that articulate such a reading within the perspective of a 
Deleuzian and Whiteheadian understanding.  
 
Chapters two, three and four present a detailed analysis of the chosen 
performances, as case studies, at hand – Blast Theory’s 10 Backwards 
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(1999), Something American (1996), and The Day of the Figurines (2006). 
Each chapter interrogates the presented onto-epistemic conditions, but 
focuses on a specific aspect of such conditions. For instance, chapter two will 
highlight notions of differential temporality in relation to the overall proposal. In 
this way, each of the case studies presents a more developed position by 
stressing a different perspective of the epistemic conditions that this thesis 
proposes as crucial to the understanding of intermedial performance in terms 
of radical modes of presentation, designing strategies and interfacial 
organizations.  
 
Chapter five conceptualizes the notion of the ‘onto-epistemic intermedial 
subject’. The chapter articulates a subject definition that engages with and 
accounts for intermedial performance processes of constitutive experience, 
notions of constructivist creativity and dramaturgical generative forms. 
Further, the chapter proposes the indivisible connection between the 
intermedial phenomenon and the participating subject as an event.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Methodology: The Introduction of a Constructivist 
Reading of Epistemology 
 
 
This chapter introduces a constructivist reading of epistemology as the 
methodological framework for this research. An epistemological reading of 
intermediality aims to produce a definition of the performance event that takes 
account of its conditions of possibility seen here as the conditions that make 
the intermedial event intelligible and accounts fully for its manner of being. 
From this perspective, the epistemology of intermedial performance is the 
understanding and appreciation of the conditions under which intermedial 
performance is possible. In appreciating an intermedial performance artwork, 
this thesis proposes that we experience, make sense of, and take part in 
something that exists through a generative act, understood here, not in the 
Kantian manner of purely ‘subjective’ a priori categories, but in Deleuzian and 
Whiteheadian terms: as the point at which all the elements of performance 
and the participating subject come to an immanent point of synthesis – the 
execution of the event. 
 
The concept of immanence, central to Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, is 
crucial to this research’s understanding of a constructivist epistemology. 
Laura Cull (2011) in a discussion of A Thousand Plateaus (1987) and What is 
Philosophy? (1994), pertinently suggests that when Deleuze and Guattari 
speak of the ‘plane of immanence’, they mean a plane ‘that is characterized 
by the perception of movement rather than objects, by those who occupy it’ 
(Cull, 2011: 81). Within these defining parameters of compositional 
movement, immanence, according to Cull, is not to be understood as 
something that ‘is immanent to something else (such as phenomenological 
consciousness), but only as pure immanence’ (Cull, 2011: 82). In this way, the 
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idea of the generative condition of the execution of the event is best grasped 
according to Deleuzian categories. Deleuze writes, ‘we will say of pure 
immanence that it is a life, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life … a 
life is the immanence of immanence: absolute immanence’ (Deleuze in Cull 
2011: 82). For Deleuze, life comprises the organic and non-organic, the 
individual and the pre-individual, at the moment of each given constructive 
encounter. Plainly, the focus here is that the proposed idea of generativity 
should be understood in terms of immanence and that immanence, in 
Deleuze’s sense, as Cull explains, is pure immanence, meaning, bluntly, 
immanence is all there is. 
 
Cull also notes the Latin root of the word immanence. It derives, according to 
her, from the word immanere, which can be translated as ‘to dwell within’ 
(Cull, 2011: 82). Furthermore, she expands on the meaning of the word by 
adopting John Mullarkey’s (2006) understanding of the term as ‘existing or 
remaining within’, being ‘inherent’ and existing ‘within the physical world’ 
(Mullarkey in Cull, 2011: 82). In relation to the notion of immanence, Cull 
argues that Deleuze sees no ontological ‘separation between thought and 
being (or subject and object), which in turn proffers the possibility of a direct 
(rather than always-ready mediated) encounter with the real’ (Cull, 2011: 82). 
Seen thus, we can argue that there is no ontological difference within the 
immanent nature of the intermedial event in which both the performance 
phenomenon (the pre-individual) and the participating subject (the individual) 
are constructed in a constant and re-configuring set of relations (the onto-
epistemic) at the very moment of execution. Both are produced immanently 
and concurrently through the performative movements of constant 
dramaturgical re-framing: the generative act. In Pure Immanence: Essays on 
Life, Deleuze (2001) writes,  
Immanence is not related to Some Thing as a unity superior 
to all things or to a Subject as an act that brings about a 
synthesis of things: it is only when immanence is no longer 
immanence to anything other than itself that we can speak of 
a plane of immanence … [which may] be defined by a subject 
or an object that is able to contain it. (Deleuze, 2001: 27) 
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In other words, the plane of immanence for Deleuze should be approached in 
terms of the univocity of Being. It must be thought of in terms of the individual 
as a system interacting with the various systems present in worldly structures. 
Put simply, the plane of immanence as a system is the constant reworking 
and emerging of the worldly structures and the human as Being as an event – 
what we have called here the execution of the event. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, the notion of the event is explicitly linked to the emergence of the 
plane of immanence. They write, 
THE plane of immanence is that which must be thought and 
that which cannot be thought. It is nonthought within thought. 
It is the base of all planes, immanent to every thinkable plane 
… Perhaps is the supreme act of philosophy [considered as 
the creation of concepts]: not so much to think THE plane of 
immanence as to show that it is there, unthought in every 
plane, and to think it in this way as the inside and the outside 
of thought, as the non-external outside and the non-internal 
inside – that which cannot be thought and yet must be 
thought. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 59-60)  
 
In relation to the notion of emergence, Experience Bryon (2014) offers a solid 
standard definition. She explains how, 
emergence describes what parts of a system do together that 
they would not do alone, or how collective properties arise 
from the parts. It can also speak to a system’s function in that 
it can describe what something might do in relation to its 
environment that it would not do by itself. In this way it is very 
much about the dynamic relationships between things. 
(Bryon, 2014: 14) 
 
Accordingly, a central question in a constructivist epistemology of intermedial 
performance is that of the relationship between the emergent generative act 
that brings the artwork into existence and the experiencers of that artwork. In 
this sense, at the epistemological level we see the interconnectivity and 
functioning of the performance’s attending variables and structuring choices.23 
The epistemological level is also the level of the mechanisms and articulating 
                                                        
23 Some of the terminology employed in an understanding of the epistemological level as one 
of functionality, operativity and procedural processes may be similar to what David Davis 
(2004) designates as aesthetic functionalism and aesthetic proceduralism. As Davies 
describes, ‘the functionalist believes that, necessarily, an artwork performs a function or 
functions (usually, that of providing rewarding aesthetic experience) distinctive to art. By 
contrast, the proceduralist believes that an artwork necessarily is created in accordance with 
certain rules and procedures’ (Davies, 2004: 238).  
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relations. Furthermore, the epistemological level is the level of the conditions 
that make possible such a functioning and structuring, stressing how the 
emergent operability of these elements presents knowledge-making aspects.  
 
Whiteheadian and Deleuzian scholar Steven Shaviro (2009) aptly describes 
how Deleuze and Guattari (1984) argue that there is no separation between 
the producer and the product, or, rather, between nature and subject. For 
them, he explains, both nature and subject belong to the same process of 
production as part of a constructive process. They write, ‘there is no such 
thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one 
within the other’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984: 2). From this perspective, 
Deleuze bases his idea of Being on the rejection of any hierarchical and 
ontological distinction between mind and matter. Shaviro explains how this 
rejection, for Deleuze, involves a refusal of any distinction between worldly 
products and a transcendent producer in favour of the notion of Being as an 
event and rejects an anthropocentric point of view and notions of identity as 
guaranteed an ontological essence. Manuel DeLanda (2002) fittingly explains 
how Deleuze’s philosophy is not ‘about essences or any other transcendent 
entity, so in his philosophy something else is needed to explain what gives 
objects [and subjects] their identity through time. Briefly, this something is 
dynamical processes’ (DeLanda, 2002: 5). In this sense, and translating it into 
the performance paradigm, a performance transaction and the participating 
subject are intrinsic to each other and immanent at the moment of encounter 
between the co-constitutive relations as a dynamic process established 
between performance subject and performance phenomenon. 
 
Epistemology, broadly, interrogates the conditions of possibility of a given 
event. Within the background of Kantian epistemology, Henry Allison (1986) 
coined the term ‘epistemic conditions’ (Allison, 1986: 15) in relation to such 
conditions of possibility. Kantian scholarship has devoted a large amount of 
critical thought to the notion of the articulation of the subject (see Paul Guyer, 
2000; Henry Allison, 1986; Terry Eagleton, 1990; and Georges Dicker, 
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2004).24 A full description of this literature is beyond the scope of this 
research. It is, however, useful to engage with some of the terminology that 
has sprung from these interpretations of Kant’s transcendental philosophy in 
order to position Deleuze and Whitehead’s own epistemological postulates.   
 
In his epistemological critique, Kant defined the concept of transcendental 
idealism as the search for the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
possibility of all possible empirical knowledge. The principal idea, he 
proposed, was that ‘the a priori conditions of a possible experience in general 
are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience’ 
(Kant, 1929: 138). Hence, it is argued, Mikel Dufrenne (1973) explains, that 
the conditions of experience are the conditions ‘which make the object an 
object – not in itself, but insofar as it enters into experience in such a manner 
that the subject can relate to it’ (Dufrenne, 1973: 443).  
 
In Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Allison (1986) argues that these conditions 
of experience should be understood as ‘epistemic conditions’, a term, 
however, never used anywhere in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781). 
Gary Bahnam (2005) discusses that it is important to note that Allison’s 
replacement of the more traditional Kantian concepts of ‘a priori form of 
sensible intuitions’ and ‘categories of the understanding’ by ‘epistemic 
conditions’ was not simply a matter of updating and simplifying Kant’s highly 
technical language (Bahnam, 2005: 4). Instead, as Banham suggests, Kantian 
transcendental philosophy is an interrogation into the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the creation of a given experience by a human subject; that is, 
the constitutive role of the subject in such an experience.  
 
                                                        
24 Paul Guyer (2000), Henry Allison (2004) and Terry Eagleton (1990) explain that by the late 
18th Century, Kant tried to reconcile the rationalist and empiricist sides of our knowledge of 
the world around us. Eagleton (1990) explains how in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy tries to establish the necessary conditions for the possibility 
of our knowledge. On Kant’s analysis, very broadly, our knowledge is construed and 
essentially made possible by the structure of our own minds. Human cognition is the result of 
an application of concepts to sensations, creating “intuitions” of things in the world, not as 
they are in themselves, but as they appear to our senses, which, therefore, implies a subject-
based component, a purely subjective representation in a spatial-temporal framework 
(Eagleton, 1990: 70-75). 
 60 
Although this was seen as controversial within mainstream Kantian 
scholarship and interpretation, the concept of ‘epistemic conditions’ is, 
nevertheless, useful for the articulation of the argument that this thesis 
develops, since it accounts for the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
creation of an experience – the technologically mediated experience of the 
intermedial performance event, in this instance. Two aspects of the term may 
appear problematic. First, the term refers specifically to the transcendental 
condition for the experience of objects, while a performance is always a ‘lived’ 
temporal event; and, as a consequence, second, although it enquires about 
the possibility of the experience of external objects, it is still heavily idealistic 
in its applications – presenting the conditions of time and space as ideal in a 
pure Kantian manner and, in this sense, not acknowledging that the 
performance event possesses its own spatio-temporal articulating framework 
and its own agency. However, the usefulness of the term is that it opens up 
the possibility to equate the conditions of the possibility of the experience with 
the conditions of the possibility of knowledge – and the subject – of the 
experience. Seen thus, this research repositions Alison’s ‘epistemic 
conditions’ on the basis of a Deleuzian and Whiteheadian becoming/evental 
plane, an epistemology of the event as coinciding with the emergence of the 
subject – from Alison’s ‘epistemic conditions’ to this research’s ‘onto-
epistemological conditions’.  
 
If, according to Kant, the conditions of the possibility of the experience, 
Allison’s ‘epistemic conditions’, are the same as the conditions of the 
possibility of the articulation of the subject, then, following his argument, what 
can be extrapolated is the idea that the conditions of the possibility of the 
performance event, the epistemic conditions of performance, are the same as 
the conditions of the possibility for the existence of performance subject. In 
other words, the onto-epistemic performance phenomenon and the epistemic 
performance subject are intrinsically intertwined. 
 
Deleuze offers a different and more critical perspective on Kant in relation to 
his account of individuation, which provides the transcendental conditions for 
thought and the transcendental conditions of experience. Deleuze sees no 
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difference between the event and the subjective individuation occurring in that 
event. Edward Willat and Matt Lee (2009) discuss how while Kant and 
Deleuze are at completely opposing poles on the philosophical spectrum, 
nevertheless, on the most basic level, they are both, in principle, concerned 
with the problem of describing the transcendental conditions of experience. 
 
Willat and Lee discussing Quentin Meillassoux provide a useful summary of 
this distinction. They write,  
the great limitation of transcendental philosophy is then that it 
limits thought to what is ‘for us’, excluding what it is in itself 
(2008: 3-4). A process of cognition is ‘always there’ underway 
(2008: 7) and if we start with this we only have an outside 
relative either to consciousness and its forms of 
understanding (as in Kant) or to consciousness of sensation 
and its characteristics (Deleuze). (Willat and Lee, 2009: 7) 
 
Furthermore, Willat and Lee suggest that both Kant and Deleuze are 
concerned with the transcendental conditions of experience and sense and 
the question of whether these conditions can account for the experience fully. 
Deleuze does not reject the possibility of a transcendental philosophy, but he 
terms his understanding of transcendentalism as ‘transcendental empiricism’ 
(Deleuze, 2004: 56). Although heavily influenced by Hume’s classical notion 
of sense-data empiricism, Deleuze, Willat and Lee review, gives a 
transcendentally inflected account of empiricism. He repeatedly insists that 
transcendental empiricism seeks the conditions for the given. In Difference 
and Repetition (2004) Deleuze says, ‘difference is not diversity. Diversity is 
given, but difference is that by which the given is given as diverse’ (Deleuze, 
2004: 280). For transcendental empiricism, ‘the given is not the origin, but is a 
result, a product, an effect’ (Deleuze, 2004: 68-69). Put simply, Deleuze is 
concerned with the conditions of the real experience rather than, as in Kant, 
all possible experience as such.25 In other words, we move away from the 
                                                        
25 Robert Piercey (1996) describes how Deleuze’s work ‘advances an ontology of difference 
– that is, a metaphysics in which differentiation and determination are seen as the principal 
characteristic of what there is’ (Piercey, 1996: 270). At the same time, Piercey continues, 
‘Deleuze’s ontology is a kind of transcendental philosophy. His ontological claims emerge 
from something like transcendental analysis, in that they describe “not the sensible, but the 
being of the sensible” (DR, 266). They are “transcendental empiricism” (DR, 56) – 
“empiricism” because their subject matter is something “which can be perceived only from the 
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transcendental idealism of the Kantian First Critique ‘to a constructivist one … 
[that is,] from merely formal conditions of possibility to concrete conditions of 
actualization’ (Shaviro, 2009: 34).  
 
Throughout the First Critique, Kant describes time and space as the pure 
forms of intuition or sensibility of the understanding, its two principal 
conditions, since even the other categories of the understanding that Kant 
describes such as quantity, modality, quality and relation are dependent on 
time and space. Following his proposals, this research also proposes time 
and space – or the orchestrations of time and space (temporality and 
spatiality) – as the two main epistemic conditions of intermedial performance. 
To these two, this thesis adds narrativity as the third epistemic condition of 
intermedial performance because narrativity can be considered the means 
through which the abstract components of space and time are rendered ontic, 
or real, or determinate. Temporality, spatiality and narrativity, it may be 
argued, are the three epistemic conditions of performance in general. 
However, it is the contention here that when applied to intermedial practices, 
as the three Blast Theory case studies will show, intermedial work can be 
better grasped in the way such works explicitly conceive these three 
conditions insofar as they break with the logic of traditional performance by 
executing dramaturgical orchestrations that explore notions of fragmentation, 
non-linearity and multiplicity. In short, intermediality transforms the epistemic 
conditions of performance thus allowing for a novel form of performance 
subjectivity to emerge. Put differently, this thesis argues that it is through 
narrativity that both the orchestrations of time (temporality) and the 
orchestrations of space (spatiality) are articulated synthetically. As a result, 
temporality, spatiality and narrativity are here proposed as the three main 
onto-epistemic conditions of intermedial performance – as a specific and real 
                                                                                                                                                              
standpoint of a transcendental sensibility” (DR, 144); “transcendental” because they describe 
not the material world itself, but the conditions of there being such a world. Deleuze’s 
ontology seeks “to determine an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field, which 
does not resemble the corresponding empirical field” (LS, 102), but which makes the 
empirical field possible’ (Piercey, 1996: 270). Steven Shaviro (2009) explains how Deleuze 
describes ‘the transcendental as a field of potential energies in metastable equilibrium. These 
potentials can energize or inform a subject, but they do not determine its nature ahead of 
time’ (Shaviro, 2009: 81). 
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experience of a given reality, using Deleuze’s terms. Therefore, the 
functionality of temporality, spatiality and narrativity needs to be interrogated 
to account for an epistemic definition of the radical nature of intermedial 
dramaturgies. In this sense, these three onto-epistemic conditions create 
intermedial dramaturgies that manifest their existence as a system that is in a 
state of immanence at the very moment of the execution and as the 
processes that create the generative conditions under which immanence is 
created, perceived, experienced and sensed, hence, these dramaturgies can 
be called radical.  
 
In the introduction’s opening paragraphs, it was noted that the generative 
characteristic operates in a manner of constructive and generative frames 
executed as creativity. It is to these describing terms that we turn our attention 
now. 
 
First, Jungmin Lee (2008) discusses how Deleuze in Cinema I (1986) offers 
some remarks on the notion of the frame, originally explored in cinematic and 
filmic contexts. Deleuze writes, ‘the frame is conceived as a dynamic 
construction in act [en acte], which is closely linked to the scene, the image, 
the characters and the objects which fill it’ (Deleuze, 1986: 13). This dynamic 
process, Lee explains, can be read to create in a manner of installing and 
enfolding. Conceived thus, a frame can also be a mechanism that encloses 
the functional mechanism and attending variables of a given event – and/or 
an internal fragment of a given event. Crucially here, Deleuze notes that 
framing is a mechanism of enclosing, which, at the same time, opens up the 
creation of a new frame. He writes, ‘[a frame] opens onto a play of relations … 
which weave a whole’ (Deleuze, 1986: 17-18). As such, each Deleuzian 
frame, Lee reviews, generates the next frame creating a chain of framing 
generations. Deleuze argues, ‘when a set is framed … there is always a 
larger set, or another set with which the first forms a larger one … on 
condition that it gives rise to a new [one]’ (Deleuze, 1986: 17). In this sense, 
Deleuze also highlights the processes by which each frame can be extended 
into a new one through compositional and transversing forces. From this 
perspective, the enclosing and the opening up of the framing constructs the 
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generative aesthetic proposed in this research. Dramaturgical framing is 
understood as the creation of dynamic and processes, enabling a systematic 
complexity. One question arises: What is the force that guides this dynamical 
framing? In the opening paragraphs of this chapter, we have discussed 
Deleuze’s notion of immanence and established, following Cull, that 
immanence is compositional movement. It is from this perspective of 
movement as a driving energy that we propose that framing is an ongoing 
process, engaging in relational activity. This relationality can be categorized 
as movement and as an organizing force between the attending elements. 
From this perspective, each frame is an instantiation, as installing and 
opening up, relationally generated, arranged, experienced and made sense 
of. Dramaturgical frames here are also seen as nodes and processes and, 
most importantly, these framing relations provide the context for the synthetic 
transitions between the compositional frames, creating connections through 
architectures of unfoldings. In this sense, the frames can be categorized as 
ontogenesis, constantly engaged in processes as thresholds; that is, from 
being to becoming, from one generative force to a framing construction to 
another generative force. A frame is creativity in movement.  
 
The notion of the frame explored in this research can be also linked to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the ‘plane of composition’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1994: 183), defined as an aesthetic field of possible sensations, 
affects, arrangements and the creation of thought. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
an artwork is both thought and pure sensations and affects. They explain how 
‘composition is the sole definition of art’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 191). 
Furthermore, the plane of composition of a given aesthetic event expresses 
both the becoming of the artwork and its real conditions, conditions that define 
the genesis of a given aesthetic experience and not the conditions of a 
possible aesthetic experience, as in Kant. In doing so, the plane of 
composition enables art to ‘create the finite [each plane or frame] that restores 
the infinite [all the possible articulations and configurations that may enter into 
the constructive equation]’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 197). In this sense, 
through the performative construction of each plane of composition or frame, 
‘the many become one and are increased by one’ (Whitehead, 1978: 21); that 
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is, the many participating elements become one as a univocal synthesis that 
is in constant transition to amalgamation. This continual transition can be also 
seen as the dynamic force that guides the constant process of reframing. 
Seen thus, this logic of multiplicities becoming one enables a multi-linear 
conception of the intermedial event that produces spatio-temporal and 
narrative frames, which brings the constructivist aesthetic suggested here to a 
mobile territory of constant dramaturgical re-configuration.  
 
The plane of composition in art is also the ‘fundamental encounter’ between 
the attending variables to a given work of art and the participating subject 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 208). In this sense, each frame, as an aesthetic 
plane of composition, is an onto-epistemic construction in a constant process 
of self-positing and re-activation. Deleuze and Guattari write,  
The work of art only applies by its internal consistency 
according to the principle that wants the self-position of the 
created (its independence, its autonomy, its life by itself). As 
such, by virtue of this principle, the work resembles nothing, 
mimics nothing. It must “subsist by itself”, on its own, without 
pointing or referring back to a world outside it, which it would 
reflect, or to a subject which it would express. (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1994: 163) 
 
 
Apart from theorizing art as a percepts-and-affects compound that stands by 
itself, Deleuze and Guattari also describe art as thought because art creates 
concepts and generates intelligibility – as opposed to the Kantian postulates 
of the Third Critique in which aesthetic experience is disinterested and 
contemplative, but not intellectual. In relation to art as a concept-making plane 
of composition, Deleuze and Guattari insist that ‘the concept is not given, it is 
created; it is to be created. It is not formed but posits itself in itself – it is … 
self-positing’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 11). As self-positing, art is to be 
considered as given only in its tendency to become. Concept and plane are 
posited together in a mutual implication. In short, the self-positing manner of 
the artwork in constructing concepts is at once the work of establishing a 
plane of pure immanence. In this way, for Deleuze and Guattari, art is always 
immanent with life. They write, ‘there is no other aesthetic problem than that 
of the insertion of art into everyday life’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 293).  
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Deleuzian scholar Patricia Pisters (1994) explains that ‘according to Deleuze 
and Guattari, in aesthetic creation the boundaries between “reality” and 
“fiction” are no longer relevant, since the experience of the event is real’ 
(Pisters, 1994: 152). Pister continues, 
Essential to understanding the role of aesthetics is the fact 
that Deleuze does not make a distinction between art as a 
fantasy that presents us with possible but unreal experiences 
and art that reflects or represents reality. For Deleuze (and 
Guattari) aesthetic creation is not an experience of something 
else (unreal or second order), but the production of a real 
experience in itself. This conception of aesthetics is related to 
Deleuze’s general rejection of the idea of representation, 
which he develops in Difference and Repetition. (Pisters, 
1994: 154) 
 
In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze (1990) indicates that ‘Aesthetics suffers from 
a wrenching duality. On the one hand, it designates the theory of sensibility as 
the form of possible experience; on the other hand, it designates the theory of 
art as the reflection of real experience’ (Deleuze in Pisters, 1994: 153). 
Deleuze argues, according to Pisters, that these two aspects of the aesthetic 
need to be unified, so an aesthetic theory can account for the conditions of 
the real experience.26 
 
In this context, we highlight Deleuze’s understanding of art as life itself. 
Through the central notions of becoming and immanence in A Thousand 
Plateaus and What is Philosophy?, art is conceived as precisely a place of 
                                                        
26 Gregory Flaxman (2008) describes how ‘[Deleuze considers that] “It is strange that 
aesthetics (as the science of the sensible) could be founded on what can be represented in 
the sensible” (1994: 56) … for the insistence upon rendering aesthetics according to 
conditions of possible experience, or what we can simply call the concepts of representation, 
paradoxically defines experience in advance of experience. In The Critique of Pure Reason, 
for instance, Kant seeks to elaborate a 'transcendental aesthetic' by defining the concepts 
that render sensation possible and intelligible. While Kant affirms that the mind must be 
affected in a certain way in order to provoke thought, and thence the very labour of critique, 
he finally turns away from the being of the sensible we experience in order to offer an 
exposition of the conditions of possibility for such experience. Hence, the conditions of 
possible experience are defined as a priori, but as principles that have the status of right 
these conditions must be applied to experience and, reciprocally, experience must be 
subjected to these conditions. “Representation means the synthesis of that which is 
presented”, Deleuze writes. “Synthesis therefore consists in the following: a diversity is 
represented, that is to say posed as contained in a representation” (1990: 15)’ (Flaxman, 
2008: 13-14). 
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passing. As Deleuze and Guattari (1994) remark, ‘Life alone creates such 
zones where living beings whirl around, and only art can reach and penetrate 
them in its enterprise of co-creation’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 173). 
Similarly, Deleuze (2001) bluntly states, ‘What is immanence? A life’ 
(Deleuze, 2001: 28-29). Claire Colebrook (2010) stresses that it is important 
to notice the use of the word ‘a’. By using it, Deleuze does not refer to life in 
general, but to a singularity, an evental instantiation (Colebrook, 2010: 1-2) – 
or to what this research calls a constructivist generative frame. In other words, 
within the constructivist aesthetic proposed here, each aesthetic plane of 
composition is an instantiation of life. In fact, for Deleuze and Guattari, ‘all art 
becomes creatively vital precisely through the plunging into the pure 
immanence of Life … [for them, art is] an act of co-creation with the vital and 
autopoietic forces of immanence’ (Ambrose, 2009: 112). In this context, 
autopoiesis as the process of life, following Shaviro, can be described as the 
processes of an entity that ‘is alive precisely to the extent that it envisions 
difference and thereby strives for something other than the mere continuation 
of what already is … Rather, life must be understood as a matter of “originality 
in response to stimulus”’ (Shaviro, 2009: 92). Furthermore, as Deleuzian 
scholar Simon O’Sullivan points out, in the interaction between the subject 
and the artwork, ‘art is not just made for an existing subject in the world, but to 
draw forth a new subject from within that which is already in place’ 
(O’Sullivan, 2010: 204). In this sense, the encounter between an artwork and 
a subject is not ‘the production of actual art-works or simply composed things 
in the world, but also the practices of a life and of treating one’s life as a work 
of art’ (O’Sullivan, 2010: 206). In short, ‘[l]ife means novelty’ (Whitehead, 
1929: 104).  
 
In relation to Deleuze’s understandings of art as creatively vital, as opposed to 
essentialist and foundational readings of vitalism as implied in the liveness 
debate, Deleuzian vitalism, John Protevi (2006) explains, conceives life as 
concerning the capacity for emergent properties in the self-positing and 
construction of a given organic and non-organic vitalist system; it also means 
the creation and constant renewal of a complex system, as a plane of 
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immanence, engaging in constant processes of relational activity (see also 
Protevi, 2011). Colebrook (2010) offers a clear explanation, 
A living being, as a being, must have its own membrane or 
border and a milieu; but as a living being must be also open 
to a life that can never be reduced to any single form … 
[vitalism here] is at one and the same time committed to … 
the emergence of the milieu in which thought takes place 
while also confronting the thousand other plateaus that pass 
life through … for vitalism is at once an imperative to account 
for the dynamic emergence of forms, ideas, sense and 
structures … while acknowledging that which cannot be 
generated from within thought itself. (Colebrook, 2010: 7) 
 
Furthermore, she (2008) writes,  
vitalism has, in its dominant mode, always been a theory of 
internal relations, and has, therefore, been tied to organicism: 
something is what it is only because of its relation to a living 
whole, and the living whole is just the equilibrium, system or 
set of relations that grants each moment its individuation. On 
this picture, nothing could be understood as having an 
essence or potentially outside its definitive relation… Deleuze 
and Guattari’s vitalist philosophy stresses that relations are 
extrinsic: nothing has a proper potential that it strives to 
actualize, for various encounters will redefine any singular 
potential, and once actualized … singularities could always 
enter into other relations. (Colebrook, 2008: 130) 
 
In this regard, in Of Life as a Name of Being, or, Deleuze’s Vitalist Ontology, 
Alain Badiou (2000), explains,  
the key injunction of Deleuzian ontology is this: being cannot 
be bound to any category, to any fixed disposition of its 
immanent distribution. Being is univocal insofar as beings are 
never classed or distributed … this is the fundamental reason 
why being deserves the name of life. (Badiou, 2000: 192-193)   
 
Life, for Deleuze and Guattari, becomes along what they call ‘threads’, ‘lines 
of flight’ or ‘lines of becoming’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 323). Critically, 
they describe these lines as lines of multiplicity and non-linearity:  
a line of becoming is not defined by the points it connects to, 
or by the points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes 
between points, it comes up in the middle … a becoming is 
neither one nor two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-
between. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 323) 
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As such, life is an open-ended becoming that re-configures constantly. In this 
context, each performative encounter, each generative frame, can be 
described as the gathering together of immanent threads and lines of 
becoming. 
 
Drawing on this point of view, the proposed notion of the execution of the 
event encourages us to think of the pre-individual attending variables and the 
individual as producing themselves creatively and in unexpected ways 
through their continuous mediating connection and interaction. This 
perspective, we suggest, renders problematic established definitions of 
interactivity in relation to art, particularly in digitally informed backgrounds. For 
example, Gabriella Giannachi (2004) in relation to virtual theatre art explains 
that it, 
consists of a dichotomous paradox, torn between its 
ontological status which locates it as a part of the real and its 
aesthetic, through which it demonstrates its difference from 
the real. From this point of view of perception, a viewer 
experiences this dichotomy as the principal characteristic … 
[it] offers fluid and open forms that allow the viewer 
simultaneously to be inside and outside the work of art. 
(Giannachi, 2004: 123) 
 
Also, Soke Dinkla (1997) explains that interactivity in art is the phenomenon 
by which the viewer encounters the work of art: ‘the dialogue with the system 
that becomes artistic material … [viewers are] at the same time spectators 
and actors’ (Dinkla, 1997: 41). For her, the encounter, located in time and 
space between the participants and the dynamics of the encounter, creates 
the work of art. She stresses that interaction takes place between the digitally 
informed system and users. On another definition, Katja Kwastek (2013) 
explains that interactivity in digital art forms tends ‘towards a relaxation of the 
rigid boundaries between digitally and analogically mediated interaction and 
between active participation in feedback processes’ (Kwastek, 2013: 8). In 
relation to the work of art itself, she writes, ‘its workliness is based 
fundamentally on the inseparability of the recipient’s action and the manifest 
entity of the system created by the artist … [t]he incorporation of interactivity 
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in its very structure is what makes interaction possible in the first place’ 
(Kwastek, 2013: 167).  
 
As opposed to these positions, the argument here, although it fittingly 
acknowledges the encounter as constitutive of the aesthetic experience, does 
not emphasize an “enabler”/viewer attending to the work of art, which comes 
into being by the operational association between a human and an artwork – 
independently if the artwork has been pre-established and created to be 
interacted with. Here, we account for how the two emerge together in the co-
constitutive relation between the individual and the pre-individual without 
being preoccupied about any dominating terms and stressing the agency of 
both the human and non-human at the very moment of evental activation.27 
To quote Alberto Toscano (2006),  
the interactionist position affirms instead that the modelling of 
the operations of individuations, and of the manner in which 
each and every time they bring heterogeneous interactants 
together, means that any single condition of individuation … is 
necessary but necessarily not sufficient. (Toscano, 2006: 149) 
 
Furthermore, he writes, ‘individuation creates a relational system that holds 
together what prior to its occurrence was incompatible’ (Toscano, 2006: 139). 
Toscano is here influenced by Horst Hendrinks-Jansen’s writings. Taking from 
a biological theory referred to as ‘constructivist interactionism’, Hendricks-
Jansen (1996) explains how, 
Dynamical systems theory has made it impossible to conceive 
of complex behaviour as arising interactively from the 
structures of the environment in conjunction with the 
creature’s internal dynamics. We no longer need a 
hierarchically organized planning system to explain intricate 
temporal structure. A natural creature’s behaviour does not 
need to be preplanned. It does not have to exist as an 
abstract internal representation in the creature’s head before 
it can be executed. The complex structure emerges as and 
when it happens from the dynamic coupling between an 
                                                        
27 Performance debates regarding intermedial interactivity and digital environments have 
described the participating subject, for instance, as a ‘participant’ (Benford and Giannachi, 
2011) and as a ‘user’ (Baker, 2012) and have highlighted the manner in which the interactivity 
between the subject and digital elements occurs, stressing the manner in which such 
interaction is informed by the digital elements.  
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organism and its environment. (Hendricks-Jansen, 1996: 325-
326) 
 
In this sense, individuation cannot be understood without the simultaneous 
actualization of the pre-individual elements. Put simply, actualization and 
individuation are intrinsic parts of the same mediating and evental process. 
We highlight the execution of the event as co-implication at its highest level 
where immanent relations perpetually determine new individuation and 
actualizations on each specific encounter. This position allows us to further 
problematize Fischer-Lichte’s notion of co-dependence, occurring during her 
understanding of the functioning of the autopoietic feedback loop because, 
although she acknowledges co-dependence, she still conceives the 
participating subject as aprioristic. She writes, ‘we experience ourselves as 
actively perceiving subjects and simultaneously pervaded by the perceived’ 
(Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 173). Against her position, each generative 
dramaturgical frame, we argue, can be also grasped as a creative interaction 
where the simultaneity of producing and being co-produced happens in the 
ongoing and interfacial28 process of the radical aesthetic proposed in this 
research: the participant, the participated-in, the process of participating and 
the participating analogue and digital tools/elements are constructively 
entangled, creating, as Hendricks-Jansen points out, dynamics couplings. 
These couplings can be considered as an autopoietic feedback loop that is 
internal to the system, but this proposed autopoietic system, as opposed to 
Fischer-Lichte’s postulates, implies constructive co-constitution as a plane of 
immanence. Simply put, this thesis does not deny that the system, as 
explained by Hendricks-Jansen, can be also categorized as autopoietic 
emergence. Instead, it argues against the understanding of autopoiesis that 
Fischer-Lichte’s ontological and phenomenological postulates propose that 
see the system as constituting its own environment unilaterally – a position 
imbued in traditional readings of vitalism. Here, we put the emphasis on how 
the emergence of the complex structures comes into being as internal to a 
                                                        
28 In The Interface Affect, Alexander Galloway (2012) describes the notion of ‘interface’: 
‘Interfaces are not simply objects or boundary points. They are autonomous zones of 
[aesthetic] activity. Interfaces are not things, but rather processes that affect a result of 
whatever kind … Interfaces themselves are effects, in that they bring about transformation’ 
(Galloway, 2012: vii) 
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system that fully acknowledges the human subject and its environment (the 
dramaturgical structures in this instance) that constructively realize, both as 
part of the same system, as Deleuzian vitalism, at the very moment of the 
execution of the event.  
 
Hendricks-Jansen explains that these dynamic couplings between 
organism/subject and system/worldly structures occur in what he terms 
‘situated activity’ and ‘interactive emergence’ (Hendricks-Jansen, 1996: 11). 
He discusses that ‘all behaviour is situated activity and all situated activity 
results from interactive emergence’ (Hendricks-Jansen, 1996: 30). He 
describes,  
Behaviour cannot be adequately described in terms of events 
that take place inside a creature’s head. It cannot be 
explained by rules that formalize neural activity or mental 
activity, for it comes into existence only when the creature 
interacts with … its environment … Emergence thus becomes 
important as an explanatory principle because of use. It is 
because of the emergent phenomena open up the 
possibilities for behaviour that did not exists prior to their 
emergence that an interactive explanation is essential. 
(Hendricks-Jansen, 1996: 30).  
 
Within these remarks of emergence and situated activity, and within the onto-
epistemic constructivist context of this research, this thesis finds physicist and 
feminist scholar Karen Barad’s concept of ‘intra-action’ (Barad, 2007: 33) – as 
opposed to the more “hierarchical” concept of interaction – more appropriate 
because it ‘recognizes that there is actually no between as such [between 
subject and technological element] and that human and non-human organism 
… emerge only through their mutual co-constitution’ (Kember and Zyliska, 
2012: 12). Barad (2012) develops her proposals regarding intra-activity in 
relation to a philosophical position that she terms ‘agential realism’. Without 
entering into the complexities of such a critical perspective, it can be defined, 
very broadly, as crucially acknowledging the agential potentialities of both 
matter and human subject as constantly emerging in processes of 
transformative entanglements, without considering them as given a priori to 
the moment of the encounter when mediality is generated. Barad describes 
the crucial difference: ‘instead of there being a separation between subject 
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and object, there is an entanglement’ (Barad, 2012: 52). In this sense, Barad 
clearly stresses how,  
agency is not held, it is not a property of persons or things; 
rather, agency is an enactment, a matter of possibilities for 
reconfiguring enactments … agency is about the possibilities 
for worldly re-configurings … it enlists, if you will, humans and 
non-humans. (Barad, 2012: 54-55) 
 
In Life after New Media, Mediation as a Vital Process, Sarah Kember and 
Joanna Zyliska (2012) further describe the concept of intra-action, 
the concept of intra-action postulates a more dynamic model 
of [subject] emergence of and with the world, whereby “the 
boundaries and components of phenomena become 
determinate” and the particular concepts [that arise with, in 
and through the intra-action] become meaningful only in 
active relation. Intra-action thus points out to the inherent 
performativity of [human and non-human] matter, and of the 
relations it enters into on many scales. (Kember and Zyliska, 
2012: 81) 
 
With this in mind, the notion of medium can be also grasped by applying a 
Deleuzian and Whiteheadian vitalist reading of the term. Kember and Zylinska 
describe how mediation can be discussed as a “theory of life”,  
mediation becomes a key trope for understanding and 
articulating our being in, and becoming with, the technological 
world, our emergence and ways of intra-acting with it, as well 
as the acts and processes of temporality stabilizing the world 
into media, agents, relations and networks. (Kember and 
Zylinska, 2012: xv) 
 
Put simply, the notion of intra-action conceptualizes that there is performative 
and agential action occurring between the human and the non-human.29 In 
this sense, the triadic encounter – media, performer and spectator – is 
conceived as a non-hierarchical relation, as both Toscano and Hendricks-
                                                        
29 In relation to processes of mediation, this thesis argues that Barad’s philosophical notion of 
the ‘intra-actions’ within the context of a constructivist epistemology offers a stronger position 
than notions of intermediation as explored by Katherine Hayles (1999) and Louise Lapage 
(2008) within the context of post-human philosophy. Post-human readings of intermediation 
examine notions of agency and knowledge-making at the boundaries between the human and 
the non-human (the technological). However, as Barad (2003) points out, these post-human 
readings are mainly concerned with epistemology. In contrast, her concept of ‘intra-actions’ 
acknowledges the performative and agential aspect of a constructivist epistemology, hence, 
placing the emphasis in both the ontological and the epistemological and the human and non-
human: ‘It is vitally important that we understand how matter matters’ (Barad, 2003: 803). 
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Jansen stress. Seen thus, the entanglement of their agencies during the 
execution of the event is fully accounted for. Each intra-action, as a frame or 
plane of composition, acknowledges the performative construction of 
experience and intelligibility. In a private conversation with Robin Nelson (16-
02-2013) at The Royal Central School of Speech and Drama, Nelson 
discussed that the intermedial performative encounter should not simply be 
understood as physical manipulation occurring between subjects and media 
technologies, but rather as a performative experiential meeting of the 
intervening elements and the participating subjects. As such, the case studies 
interrogated here present three different modes of encounter and medial 
dramaturgical strategies. In the first one, 10 Backwards, the triadic encounter 
implies technical manipulation between the performers and the technologies; 
in the second one, Something American, there is no physical manipulation in 
the encounter by either the performer or the spectator, although in the 
articulation of its narrative aspects the performer responds to the content 
explored on the analogue screen; and in the third one, Day of the Figurines, 
there is physical manipulation by both the performer and the spectator. 
However, we aregue here that, independently of the modality, in these three 
intermedial instances there is a performative, knowledge-making and 
experiential meeting between the technological intervening variables and the 
participant subjects in a manner of intra-actions and situated activity at the 
very moment of evental execution. This performative perspective, we stress, 
does not render the spectator as an object-spectator. Instead, it actively 
highlights his agency as a performative activator of intra-active processes of 
generating mediality. 
 
Second, creativity, for both Deleuze and Whitehead, implies the creation of 
the new as a constant process of new instantiations. In relation to creativity, 
Deleuze understands creativity as an encounter with experimentation. This 
experimentation, according to him, makes the subject think because he is 
forced by something he cannot recognize – the newness of a given 
experience as a sensory, affective and intellectual contact with something 
new, the fundamental encounter. Regarding experimentation, ‘experience is 
rendered meaningful not by grounding empirical particulars in abstract 
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universals [in other words, a priori categorical imperatives, as in Kant] but by 
active experimentation on ourselves’ (Semetsky, 2004: 1). Deleuze describes 
creativity as a violent encounter and a disruption. This disruption creates and 
constructs new conditions for thinking and sensing, enabling the potential for 
new ideas to emerge. Regarding the notion of the new, In Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze (1994) explains,  
The new, with its power of beginning and beginning again, 
remains forever new, just as the established was always 
established from the outset, even if a certain amount of 
empirical time was necessary for this to be recognized. What 
becomes established with the new is precisely not the new. 
For the new – in other words, difference – calls forth forces in 
thought, which are not the forces of recognition, today or 
tomorrow, but the powers of a completely other model, from 
an unrecognized and unrecognizable terra incognita. 
(Deleuze, 1994: 136) 
  
In Deleuze and the Production of the New, Daniel W. Smith (2008) explains 
that the concept of the new in Deleuze, 
attempts to layout the conditions under which novelty itself 
would become a fundamental ontological concept (Being = 
Difference = the New) … For Deleuze, the problem of the new 
is coextensive with the attempt to determine the conditions of 
real experience (since the real is the new). (Smith, 2008: 
151).  
 
Deleuze explains that the real conditions of experience present a generative 
manner that accounts for the novelty of the new. In this sense, each real 
conditioning generates the next real conditioning. Smith writes, 
to be a condition of real experience, the condition can be no 
broader than what it conditions – otherwise it would not be a 
condition of real experience, capable of accounting for the 
genesis of the real. This is why there can be no categories (at 
least in the Aristotelian or Kantian sense) in Deleuze's 
philosophy, since the categories cast a net so wide that they 
let all the fish (i.e. the real) swim through it – or as Deleuze 
puts it at one point, they are like baggy clothes that are much 
too big (1990a: 44). But this requirement – that conditions not 
be broader than the conditioned – means that the conditions 
must be determined along with what they condition, and thus 
must change as the conditioned changes. In other words, the 
conditions themselves must be plastic and mobile, “no less 
capable of dissolving and destroying individuals than of 
 76 
constituting them temporarily” (Deleuze, 1994: 38). (Smith, 
2008: 153) 
 
In this context, the conditions of a given real experience are 'determining both 
the condition and the conditioned' (Deleuze, 1990: 122-123) in a generative 
manner, presenting a constant and immanent process of re-articulation 
through the multi-directional and multi-dimensional activity of creation as 
Being.  
 
In reference to Whitehead’s explanations of creativity, Timothy Barker (2009a) 
describes that ‘when Whitehead explains the notion of creativity, he is not 
discussing human creativity’ (Barker, 2009a: 1). Rather, he understands 
creativity as ‘the actual creativity of every moment of the world. He is 
indicating that each instant in time – and everything that exists in that instant 
in time – is a new creation’ (Barker, 2009a: 1). Every new creation includes 
process of actualization and individualizations enabled in continual becoming 
(Whitehead, 1978: 18-22). Furthermore, Shaviro points out, ‘for Whitehead, 
the experimenter cannot be separated from the experiment, because they are 
both present in the world in the same manner’ (Shaviro, 2009: 27). According 
to Reto Luzius Fetz (1990), Whitehead describes creation and creativity as 
analogous terms and discusses them as a ‘radical calling-into-being’ (Fetz, 
1990: 199).30 For Whitehead, creativity is ‘the principle of novelty’ (Whitehead, 
1929: 21), expressing the notion that each event is a process issuing in 
novelty. So, when Whitehead writes about the ‘past hurling itself into a new 
transcendent fact’ (Whitehead in Barker, 2009a: 1), he ‘is proposing that the 
transcendent fact … in his terms, is the becoming of the present moment’ 
(Barker, 2009a: 1) as a creative actualization – or what he calls ‘actual 
occasions’ (Whitehead, 1978: 19).  
 
The term actual occasion is central to Whitehead’s philosophy. Whitehedian 
scholarship such as Robinson (2009), Shaviro (2009), and Faber and 
                                                        
30 Reto Luzius Fetz (1990) discusses the Whiteheadian notion of creativity in relation to the 
metaphysical postulates of Thomas Aquinas. He explains that Whitehead also, as Aquinas, 
links the concept of creativity in relation to other metaphysical notions such as the concept of 
God. 
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Stephenson (2010) emphasizes that the term ‘actual occasion’ is the principal 
conceptual element in Whitehead’s process philosophy. Each actual occasion 
is defined as a single moment of subject/object experiential and knowledge-
making creative constructions.31 Importantly, ‘these entities are always in 
process. They are always happening’ (Barker, 2009a: 3). Whitehead posits 
that creativity is the actualization of potentiality and the process of 
actualization is an occasion of experiencing. Consequently, ‘the act of being 
of such actual occasions must be interpreted as creativity in the strict sense 
insofar as it involves the actualization of hitherto unrealized forms of 
definiteness’ (Fetz, 1990: 202). Furthermore, Barker explains that these 
creative constructions – the actual occasions – are rather complex as each 
single moment ‘bears with it relationships to all the creative moments that 
occur before’ (Barker, 2009a: 3) and after each creative actual occasion, 
hence, emphasizing multiplicity and complexity. 
 
Whitehead proposes that object/world and subject do not exist as fixed 
entities, but as entities in the making through processes of creative becoming. 
Shaviro explains that both Deleuze and Whitehead think of the process of 
actualization of potential as the creative activity that drives the world (Shaviro, 
2009: 17-19). Conceived thus, in Whitehead, we see that it is the process of 
entities that constitutes their existence – not their materiality, their manner of 
being, or what things are. In Whitehead’s view of the entire universe, there 
only exist things in the making as direct outcomes of the flux of events 
(Barker, 2009a: 2-3).  
 
The concept of actual occasion articulates the constitution of any given onto-
epistemic being and experience. Barker (2012) explains that an actual 
occasion is, 
in a constant process towards its satisfaction, towards its 
becoming; once this satisfaction is achieved the actual entity 
begins to perish in order that another actual entity may begin 
its becoming. Whitehead attributes this process to every entity 
                                                        
31 In Process and Reality (1928), Whitehead also refers to the term ‘actual occasions’ as 
‘actual entities’.  
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in the universe, and it is this process, the becoming and 
perishing of actual entities, that produces time. (Barker, 2012: 
40) 
 
Shaviro reviews that Whitehead strictly distinguishes between events and 
occasions. He discusses how Whitehead uses,   
the term event in the more general sense of a nexus of actual 
occasions, inter-related in some determinate fashion in one 
extensive quantum. An actual occasion is the limiting type of 
an event with only one member. (Shaviro, 2009: 17)  
 
With this definition in mind, an event might be just one particular occasion, a 
single incident of becoming, but, more generally, an event may be described 
as a group of such incidents; a multiplicity of becomings; a series of entities. 
Understood as multiplicity, the event, throughout Whiteheadian thought, is 
also termed as a connection of ‘nexus’; that is, a ‘nexus’ understood as both 
temporal correlations and togetherness in relation to the attending 
singularities of a given event: ‘[a nexus is] a particular fact of togetherness 
among actual entities’ (Whitehead, 1929: 20). To clarify further, an occasion, 
Shaviro explains, is the process by which anything becomes and an event is 
an extensive set, or a temporal series, of such occasions. Put simply, an 
event is, according to Whitehead, an extension of occasions that extends, 
expands and overlaps with each other.  
  
Barker also describes the temporal processes implied by the nexus. He 
writes, 
For Whitehead temporal reality is produced by process: in 
particular, the creation of particular entities at any moment in 
time. An entity at one instance forms a nexus with another 
actual entity, at the next instant, exchanging information and 
subjective form, prior to its perishing, and thus creating 
continuity between entities over time. (Barker, 2012: 40-41)  
 
Furthermore,  
every moment for Whitehead, is a moment of becoming, as 
every actual occasion is a new creation at every instant. As 
both objects and subjects are remade at each instant in a 
unison of becoming … an actual entity is always in the state 
of becoming as it gathers information from other actual 
entities so that it may exist, or it is in the process of perishing 
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as it ceases to exist as a self-creating entity, making room for 
the next actual entity and making its content available for 
inclusion in this subsequent entity and actual entity is never 
static, it is always preexisting and postexisting. (Barker, 2012: 
45-46) 
 
In this sense, no actual occasion ‘comes into being ex nihilo, rather, it inherits 
data from past occasions’ (Shaviro, 2009: 19), creating a sense of tracing, 
and yet, ‘each actual occasion is also self-creating, or causa sui, by virtue of 
the novel way in which it treats these preexisting data or prior occasions’ 
(Shaviro, 2009: 19). Moreover, Shaviro explains that, in this sense, each 
occasion is a quantum, ‘a single incident of becoming’ (Shaviro, 2009: 18), 
which could be interpreted as becoming punctual and atomistic, but also 
implying a sense of renewal and repetition, ‘not as a continuity of becoming’, 
but ‘a becoming of continuity’ (Whitehead in Shaviro, 2009: 19). Put slightly 
differently, ‘each act of becoming is unique’ in the overall and continuous 
production of novelty (Shaviro, 2009: 20). In short, actual occasions, then, are 
describable in two ways: as Being and as becoming; that is, ‘how an actual 
[occasion] becomes constitutes what that actual [occasion is]’ (Whitehead, 
1929: 87).  
 
The process between actual entities creating nexus, becoming, forming and 
perishing to become something new again is what Whitehead describes as 
‘prehensions’ (Whitehead, 1929: 176). One occasion prehends, grasps, 
gathers and incorporates the actual occasion datum – defined by Whitehead 
as the realized subject-world content of a single occasion – and, once 
satisfied, opens up to the possibility of a new prehension by the “about-to-
become-datum” next actual occasion (Barker, 2012: 43). Put simply, this is 
how process occurs.32 In being and becoming, each occasion is constructed 
                                                        
32 The ontological scheme proposed by Whitehead is articulated by his notion of actual 
occasions (Stenner, 2011; Weber, 2006; Meyer, 2005; Kraus, 1998; Robinson, 2005). 
Stenner (2011) explains that this is a process-oriented assemblage of constructive human 
experiences that encompasses all things in the world. In this sense, each act of constructive 
experience must be grasped as an atomic moment; that is, the minimum possible experience 
in the context of a relational world of subject-world constructive experiences. This manner of 
seeing an actual occasion as atomic and with a self-realizing nature organized through the 
continuity of temporal nexus brings into mind Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of the ‘molar’ 
and the ‘molecular’. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) make a sharp difference between what they 
call ‘molecular’ and ‘molar’ structures. Roughly, molar multiplicities are organizable 
 80 
and is constructing itself. Importantly, ‘this act of construction is based upon 
the continuity of a flux of information as the past is prehended in the present 
of the actual occasion’ (Barker, 2012: 43). As such, each occasion, as Paul 
Stenner (2008) explains, exemplifies a relation:  
whereby a subject has a concern [Whitehead uses concern 
as implying a constructive facet] for its objects. Its objects are 
thus the components in the subjectivity of the occasion, but, 
importantly, the subject itself comes into being through its 
objective concerns. (Stenner, 2008: 98-99) 
 
The consequences of this are: on the one hand, the becoming of highly 
complex processes and multiplicity of events; and, on the other hand, ‘it is not 
the subject/object relationship that is constitutive of experience; rather, 
experience should be thought of as the co-mingling of both consciously and 
non-consciously experiencing entities’ (Barker, 2012: 45). In this way, each 
generative dramaturgical intermedial frame can be also grasped as an actual 
(dramaturgical) occasion. In short, each dramaturgical variable and the 
participating subject – as a datum – are always in constant process of being 
and becoming in and through the relational, complex and open processes of 
generative characteristics – the radical aspect of the execution of the event.  
 
In The Concept of Nature, Whitehead (2004) explains that the immanence of 
events is given by extension, that is, each event overlaps and extends over 
other events through the process of becoming. Also, in The Concept of 
Nature, Whitehead notes that the relations between events are transitive, and 
that events are parts of other events (Whitehead, 2004: 34). He writes, ‘in 
respect to extension two events are mutually related so that either one 
includes the other, or one overlaps without complete inclusion, or they are 
entirely separate’. (Whitehead, 2004: 34), Put simply, Whitehead (1995) 
writes: ‘events are lived through, they extend around us. They are the medium 
                                                                                                                                                              
(hierarchical), disciplined, and display a stable nature; they are systems of territorialization or 
re-territorialization. Molecular structures are structures that display the quality of giving rise to 
more connections (to the outside) and to the potential for change in nature. They are not 
unifiable, nor totalizable, which is to say that these forms are most likely to give rise to 
revolutionary becoming. They write, ‘it effects a dissolution of form that connects the most 
diverse longitudes and latitudes, the most varied speeds and slownesses, which guarantees 
a continuum by stretching variation far beyond its formal limits’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 
309).  
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within which our physical experience develops, or, rather, they are themselves 
the development of that experience’ (Whitehead, 1995: 62).  
 
According to Stenner, an actual occasion ‘is not a substance or material, but 
an activity of realization’ (Stenner, 2008: 99). In relation to realization and 
activity, process, as becoming, is the manner through which both, realization 
and activity, come into being. As such, a process ontology replaces an 
ontology of substance (see Stengers, 1997). Stenner describes that ‘the word 
“actual” in actual occasions requires the distinction between the actual and 
the potential. Actuality is the realization of potential in a particular concrete 
form’ (Stenner, 2008: 99). Simply, an actual occasion can only be understood 
as a process of actualization within all its potential actualizing features. 
 
Stenner also explains that ‘the realization of potential into actual form is called 
the process of concrescence in the sense of becoming concrete. Potential, 
when actualized in a given occasion, concretizes in a radical specific concrete 
form’ (Stenner, 2008: 99). It is through concrescence processes that 
actualization happens, creating a new unit where the many become one. 
Stenner describes that the process of unification ‘effects a reduction in the 
complexity of their prior potential. Actuality is thus a decision (in the sense of 
“cutting off”) amid potentiality’ (Stenner, 2008: 99). 
 
This aspect of decision and inclusion of the potential that is actualized is the 
prehension, which Whitehead throughout his writings also calls ‘feeling’ as a 
being in relation to other entities (Whitehead, 1929: 176-177) – ‘a feeling is 
the operation of passing from the objectivity of an object to the subjectivity of 
an actual occasion. The concrescence of an actual occasion is thus effected 
by feelings through which objects enter into the real internal constitution of a 
subject’ (Stenner, 2008: 99). Stenner continues,  
an actual occasion is thus a pattern grasped into the unity of 
the event or a selective and hence “evaluative” patterning of 
the many into one. In other words, an actual occasion is a 
passage from a state of disjunctive diversity to a state of 
conjunctive unity. (Stenner, 2008: 99) 
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Having reviewed the concepts of creativity and the generative aspect of the 
frames or planes of compositions as the pillars that support this research, we 
now turn to the description of the theoretical aspects that underpin the three 
proposed onto-epistemic conditions. 
 
1. The First Onto-epistemic Condition: A Constructivist 
Reading of the Temporality of the Event. 
 
From the point of view of a constructivist reading of epistemology any 
temporal articulation presents an intricate configuration that creates an 
architectural complexity of interrelated temporal elements articulated through 
a series of differential temporal multiplicities. These multiplicities operate 
within a set of relations and connections that can be described as immanent 
within the experiential creative moment. In this sense, the notions of 
becoming and immanence define any given temporal event.  
 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze (1994) articulates the present moment 
as one of multiplicities. He presents an understanding of the now-time as 
becoming and as the unconditioned event; that is, an understanding of the 
event that cannot be reduced to historical actualizations but encompasses 
internal multiplicity and temporal differentiations. In What is Philosophy?, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994) explain that, in understanding the event as pure 
becoming, the temporality of the event has ‘neither beginning nor end … the 
event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its self-positing as a 
concept, escapes’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 110) and, hence, escapes a 
chronological articulation. In explaining the Deleuzian conceptualization of the 
event, Alain Badiou (2007) discusses that for Deleuze the event has a dual 
characteristic: on the one hand, the event can be articulated as a temporal 
composition-structure; and, on the other hand, the event is intrinsically linked 
to notions of subjectivity.  
 
In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze (1990) explains what he calls the four axioms 
of the event – the first two related to the structural characteristics of the event, 
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the second two related to the event in terms of the construction of subjectivity. 
Influenced by Hume and Bergson, Deleuze (1994) describes time as 
‘constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates in the repetition of 
instants’ (Deleuze, 1994: 70). Simply put, the present moment is a contraction 
of time from the continuous passage of moments that occurs in the mind by 
way of synthesis. 
 
The first axiom defines the event as an ‘unlimited becoming [which] becomes 
the event itself’ (Deleuze, 1990: 9). The singularity of the event is one made 
out of multiplicities – a one-all structure. The event is the becoming of 
becoming with a sense of multiple and unlimited becomings. As such, the 
event is not fixed, but open to other events. In this sense, events, Badiou 
explains, are relational; they extend over each other in continuous becoming. 
Badiou writes, ‘events occur, and they do not stem from being qua being' 
(Badiou, 2007: 65). 
 
The second axiom conceptualizes the event as ‘always that which has just 
happened and that which is about to happen, but never that which is 
happening’ (Deleuze, 1990: 8). In this sense, the event is a synthesis of past 
and future – what Deleuze calls the ‘synthesis of time’ (Deleuze, 1990: 9).33  
In other words, the future conceptualized as a dimension of the past and the 
present as including both past and future. Deleuze, in the ‘first synthesis of 
                                                        
33 The Deleuzian temporal synthesis has been the topic of immense critical and philosophical 
debates that are beyond the scope of this research. However, some aspects are worth 
mentioning. Deleuzian scholar James Williams (2011) explains that, on a Deleuzian account, 
time is made in multiple synthetic processes – his famous three syntheses of time. Williams 
explains that these multiple times cannot be reduced to one another according to an order of 
priority or hierarchy. Instead, the processes and the times are related according to a series of 
perspectives – these perspectives are what Deleuze calls syntheses. According to Williams, 
the syntheses are a network of related processes operating on one another. Deleuze 
identifies three syntheses. The first synthesis implies a process in the present determining the 
past and the future as dimensions of the process; that is, the present comprises the past and 
the future. The second synthesis focuses on the past as the primary process. Within these 
second synthesis parameters, the present becomes a dimension of the past. This, in turn, 
adds another process in relation to the first synthesis. Most significantly, Williams describes, it 
means that the present is not one process but many, dependent on its place as primary 
synthesis or as a dimension of another synthesis. The third synthesis is the dimension of the 
future as part of the present and a further and “farther” projection of the past. The present is 
the moment of the habit – broadly, the critical and practical skills. The past is the moment of 
memory and the future is the moment of desires and aims. In the Deleuzian synthesis, the 
memory-skills-desire present moment is the living present.  
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time’, considers the ontology of time as a figure with no separation between 
past and future. Badiou explains, 
consequently, the event would not be what takes place 
between the past and the future, between the end of a world 
and the beginning of another. It is rather encroachment and 
connection … it exposes the unity of passage, which fuses 
one-just-after and one-just-before. (Badiou, 2007: 38)  
 
Influenced by Hume, Deleuze discusses the notion of the living present in 
relation to the three syntheses of time. Broadly, the living present is a 
synthesis that encompasses a retention of the past and a projection into the 
future. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze (1994) proposes that the 
relations that activate the synthesis of time between past, present and future 
into the living present enables the experienced and the experiencer to be 
actualized through the experiencing. Two aspects of the Deleuzian event are 
crucial for the argument here: on the one hand, actualization, for Deleuze, 
happens in the living present of a “now”, which incorporates the future and the 
past and must be grasped as multiple and differential; on the other hand, as 
opposed to substance and essentialist event ontology34, the Deleuzian event 
ontology, by contrast, is a temporary structure, a set of states of affairs, 
grasped as an interlocking and relational “movement of activity”, where 
creative forces re-activate constantly.  
 
Simply, it is not what is happening, but ‘that in what happens, has become 
and will become’ (Badiou, 2007: 38). The Deleuzian event and the present 
moment of the event reject the conceptualization of the present as a 
chronological and essential “now” and demand the conceptualization of the 
present as an ‘operative paradox of becoming’ (Badiou, 2007: 38). Badiou 
discusses how this manner of understanding the event can be expressed in 
                                                        
34 Keith Robinson (2010) explains that, in general terms, for Deleuze and Whitehead, events 
are the fundamental constituents of their understanding of process ontology, replacing 
substances. On the contrary, ‘in [process] event ontologies, events are fundamental and 
things or substances can be variously viewed as “effects”, “products” or temporary 
“structures” of events, simple sets of properties or patterns recognizable in events’ (Robinson, 
2010: 115). The event ontology of Deleuze and Whitehead is the immanent movement of 
creativity itself [as in the constructive creation of the generative frames proposed here], a self-
realizing moment of activity [the performative aspects of the frames] out of which the actual 
makes itself. (Robinson, 2010: 115).  
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two ways: ‘[firstly] there is no present (the event is re-presented, it is active 
immanence which co-presents the past and the future); [and secondly] 
everything is present (the event is living as the essence of time)’ (Badiou, 
2007: 38). It can be said, then, that the event is infinitely divisible and that this 
divisible characteristic incorporates the temporal realization of the event, its 
actuality.  
 
The third axiom establishes: ‘the event is of a different regime than the actions 
and passions of the body, even if it results from them’ (Deleuze, 1990: 9). 
Badiou explains that ‘the event intensifies bodies, concentrates their 
constitutive multiplicity. It would therefore be neither of the same nature as the 
actions and the passions of the body, nor supervene on them’ (Badiou, 2007: 
38). Badiou goes on, ‘the event is not identical to the bodies, which it affects, 
but neither is it transcendent to what happens to them or what they do, such 
that it cannot be said any longer that they are (ontologically) different to 
bodies’ (Badiou, 2007: 38). 
 
The fourth axiom states: ‘A life is composed of a single and same event, 
lacking all the variety of what happens to it’ (Deleuze, 1990: 9). The event, 
Badiou explains, is what composes a life. Deleuze uses the analogy of a 
musical composition, which is organized by its theme but presents internal 
compositional variety – the variation of the musical notes creates the melody. 
As such, the musical composition as One is the convergence of the 
multiplicity of attending notes that create the overall theme and musicality of 
the composition. Simply, the One is all, but the One is also in and for itself. In 
this sense, the event ‘is not what happens to a life, but what is in what 
happens, or what happens in what happens, such that it can only have a 
single event’ (Badiou, 2007: 39) – a univocity. Put slightly differently, the 
Deleuzian event, ‘with regard to any multiplicity whatsoever … is of the 
essence of the Event to compose them into the One that they are, and to 
exhibit this unique composition in a potentially inﬁnite variety of ways’ (Badiou, 
2007: 39).  
 
Cliff Stagoll (2010a and 2010b), in The Deleuze Dictionary, explains that for 
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Deleuze an event arises from a set of particular forces, ‘marking every 
moment … as a transformation’ (Stagoll, 2010b: 90-91). In his definition of 
Deleuze’s concept of becoming, Stagoll writes: ‘every event is but a unique 
instant of production in a continual flow of changes evident in the cosmos. 
The only thing ‘shared’ by events is their having become different in the 
course of their production’ (Stagoll, 2010a: 26). 
 
In relation to this research argument, a significant aspect of Deleuze’s event is 
the notion of potentiality.35 Brian Massumi (2002) describes potentiality as ‘the 
immanence of a thing to its still indeterminate variation, underway’ (Massumi, 
2002: 9). He explains the Deleuzian distinction as ontological, which means 
that the way things are is completely different from the way their potentialities 
are. Also in relation to the notion of potentiality, Dag Petersson (2004) 
explains that ‘a potentiality does not change in the same way actual beings 
change’ (Petersson, 2004: 40). Thus, it can be said that ontogenetically – 
broadly defined as the becoming of things – the two belong to two different 
modes of existence. In this sense, the ontogenetic difference between an 
actual thing and its potentiality can ‘be defined by the way changes relate to 
an event’ (Petersson, 2004: 41). Furthermore, Petersson explains, 
The being of a thing changes, and constitutes an event, when 
that being is affected by another being (another thing or 
force), as in, for instance, a car crash. The being of a 
potentiality changes immediately with the change of another 
corresponding potentiality, and that constitutes an event 
immanent to the change itself [as for instance, a market 
company acquiring another competency, which allows it to 
develop a new market – the change in the company is 
different from the change in the car (the car goes from being a 
thing to being a wreck; the company changes, but it still 
preserves its status)]. Thus, an event constituted by a 
changing thing is different from an event immanently 
constituted as a change in potentiality … when potentialities 
change, the event is the transition between a set of variables. 
(Petterson, 2004: 41-42) 
 
                                                        
35 Deleuze’s notion of potentiality can be traced back to Aristotle. Aristotle stated that, unlike 
a thing, a potentiality could manifest itself without existing as an actual thing. In this sense, 
realization, materiality and potentiality could appear to be interrelated, but show themselves 
as different. 
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Vitally here, the notion of potentiality in Deleuzian thought is intrinsic to 
concepts such as intensity, multiplicity and heterogenesis – these three are 
linked to generative movement of attending compositional forces, as Deleuze 
would say.  
 
Intensity can be described as the order of movement in relation to differential 
and heterogeneous fluxes. Further, intensity, in its heterogenesis, is 
compositional and constructive. It can simply be described as a density of 
events, as nestings occurring across time. Without entering into the full 
philosophical complexity of the term and Deleuze’s intricate and gruelling 
engagement with Bergson, Spinoza and Nietzsche, in Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze discusses the term intensity as a system of creative and 
compositional forces. Deleuze specifies that an intensity presents a 
relationship with the notion of creation – as a singularization, fluctuation and 
the opening up towards the new – and multiplicity of a given event’s 
singularity. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze affirms that the true subject of 
intensity is singularity, or rather the construction of a singularity by the 
movement aspects of intensities – this intensive movement, Deleuze argues, 
directs itself at itself and at the other, creating chains of mutuality.36 
 
The notion of intensity is important to help understand Deleuze’s proposals in 
relation to the event and the notion of temporality. Deleuzian scholarship such 
as Williams (2011), Boundas (2006), Colebrook (2009) and Bell (2006) all 
agree that evental intensity positions the temporality of the event in a clear 
opposition to a chronological reading of the present as foundational and 
essentialist. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze (1990) discusses how a given 
event ‘is eternally that which just happened and which will happen, never that 
which is happening … events are like crystals, they only become and grow by 
their edges [later on he describes edges as borderlines and surfaces]’ 
(Deleuze, 1990: 17-18). Moreover, In The Fold, Deleuze (1993) writes, ‘the 
                                                        
36 In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze defines a singularity as: ‘Singularities are turning points 
and points of inflection; bottlenecks, knots, foyers, and centers; points of fusion, 
condensation, and boiling; points of tears and joy, sickness and health, hope and anxiety, 
“sensitive” points’ (Deleuze,1990: 52).  
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event is a vibration with an intensity of harmonics or sub-multiplicities, a 
sound wave or a light wave, or even a small part of space, smaller and 
smaller during a shorter and shorter duration’ (Deleuze, 1993: 105). Seen in 
this way, the Deleuzian event is one of unlimited potentialities through which 
each sub-part ‘become incarnate in fluxes’ (Deleuze, 1993: 109) of possible 
potential, compositional and constructive aspect. Deleuze places intensity at 
the level of the in-between, since creation and creativity always take place in 
the middle – in the creating of something new. Put slightly differently, intensity 
is linked to difference; it is related to fluidity; it is located in the in-between; it is 
creation; and, finally, it is also a mode of concretization.  
 
Plainly, Deleuze argues against a conceptualization of chronological time that 
suggests that each experienced moment is securely established and follows a 
past-present-future cadence, problematizing traditional points of temporal 
reference in relation to the singularity of the “here-right-now”. Also, Deleuze, 
by providing concepts of immanence, dismantles the equilibrium of temporal 
succession and conceives time as a fractured composition of multiple 
perspectives. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze (1990) proposes that ‘the event 
is not what occurs (an accident), it is rather inside what occurs [the immanent 
functionality of what occurs]’ (Deleuze, 1990: 149), and, in this respect, what 
occurs ‘divides itself infinitively in past and future and always eludes the 
present’ (Deleuze, 1990: 5).  
 
Apart from intensities and potentialities, the Deleuzian event presents another 
crucial characteristic for the argument followed here: the difference between 
the actual and the virtual. Deleuze describes, ‘the virtual must be defined as 
strictly a part of a real object – as though the object had one part of itself in 
the virtual into which it plunged as though into an objective dimension’ 
(Deleuze, 1990: 208-209). Deleuzian scholar Keith Robinson (2009) explains 
that Deleuze, throughout his writings, differentiates between what he terms 
the virtual and the actual. The virtual – not to be confused with notions of 
virtual reality – is conceptualized, very broadly, as the possible. Robinson 
writes,  
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the possible might be actual, but has no reality, whereas the 
virtual is not actual, but is real. In another sense the possible 
can be realized and the process of realization takes place 
through resemblance … In contrast the virtual is not realized 
but actualized. (Robinson, 2009: 234) 
 
Robinson continues, ‘in actualization the virtual differentiates itself in the 
creation of a novel actuality that does not resemble its virtual conditions’ 
(Robinson, 2009: 234). Further, Robinson points out that Deleuze sees 
actuality in contrast with, but not in opposition to, potentiality and virtuality. In 
general terms. For Deleuze, the potential must be grasped as the virtual 
rather than the actual. Against what could be considered a rigid distinction 
between the actual and the virtual, Deleuze argues that the real is always 
actual-virtual. Any actual thing is produced only from virtual possibilities. In 
Deleuze, ‘the activity of the event is described as dynamic and intensive … all 
events “communicate” virtually and acquire determinate qualities actually’ 
(Robinson, 2010: 115).  
 
Colebrook (2002) fittingly describes, ‘it is just not that the actual world is the 
effect of the virtual potential, [but that] each actual thing maintains its own 
virtual power. What something is (actually) is also its power to become 
(virtually)’ (Colebrook, 2002: 98). In short, the real, for Deleuze, is the actual 
(what something is) and the virtual (what something might be). Following 
these philosophical positions, it can be argued that, on the one hand, to 
equate the real with an essentialist reading of ontology and the chronological 
linearity of the “here and now” only offers a partial understanding of the 
particularities of a given event; and, on the other hand, the reality of the 
present moment not only encompasses the “It is”, but it also includes the “It 
will be”, “It might be”, “It might have been”, “It was”, “It has been”, “It had 
been” and “It will have been”.  
 
In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze also outlines his proposals of transcendental 
empiricism through a division of time into two types, in relation to pure time: 
Chronos, the eternal past and future; and Aion, the moment of the present. 
Joshua Ramey (2006) discusses how Deleuze suggests that Aion is always 
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divisible, but never infinite. In contrast, the time of Chronos is a larger 
category inclusive of all instants, running through all of time. Deleuze 
highlights the instant of the present as a series of interrelated multiplicities. 
Within these parameters, the Deleuzian sense of becoming, a being in 
constant movement, can be contrasted with ontological notions that describe 
being as process and change, but that still allude to being as an essence. 
What is remarkable about his philosophical position, Ramey explains, is that 
Deleuze does not contradict that one can exist in the pure present, but rather 
that one might work towards existing in it (Ramey, 2006: 96). According to 
Ramey, this existing in the pure present is inscribed in the formations of the 
plane of composition and the plane of immanence both as the site of pure 
immanence as life as a singularity and immanent within the potentialities of 
the actual and the virtual. (Ramey, 2006: 27).37  
 
As noted, Deleuze defines the virtual as the intensive multiplicity of potential 
forces and elements immanent to the real – in contrast to the actual. In 
Difference and Repetition, he writes, ‘the virtual must be defined as strictly a 
part of the real object – as though the object had a part of itself in the virtual 
into which it plunged, as though into an objective dimension’ (Deleuze in 
Ambrose, 2009: 103). In this sense, Darren Ambrose (2009) explains that 
both the actual and the virtual are the real. For Deleuze, the virtual field is pre-
individual prior to any pure consciousness. It is the real, yet virtual, condition 
of emergence of actualized phenomena as an ontological actuality. Ambrose 
describes, 
this movement of ontogenesis from virtual to actual “always 
takes place by difference, divergence and differentiation” 
(Deleuze, 2004: 264)”. Deleuze constantly pursues the 
emergent and divergent paths of differentiation and becoming 
from the virtual to the actual: these are lines of creation. 
(Ambrose, 2009: 104) 
                                                        
37 Darren Ambrose (2009) clarifies the distinction between the plane of immanence and pure 
immanence; whilst that which exists forms on the plane of immanence, Deleuze differentiates 
it from pure consciousness. Deleuze highlights that consciousness, as in Husserl, is of an 
object by a subject. This reading distorts the plane of immanence by stepping outside of it. 
Therefore, Deleuze posits that we cannot speak of immanence as pure consciousness, for 
this makes an object of consciousness. In doing so, as opposed to a subjective 
phenomenology as in Husserl, we can only speak of the phenomenology of the event and of 
pure immanence.    
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Interestingly, Ambrose points out the creative aspect from the virtual to the 
actual. Deleuze writes, 
Actualization breaks with resemblance as a process no less 
than it does with identity as a principle. Actual items never 
resemble the singularities they incarnate. In this sense, 
actualization or differentiation is always a genuine creation … 
For a potential or virtual object to be actualized is to create 
divergent lines which correspond to – without resembling – a 
virtual multiplicity. (Deleuze in Ambrose, 2009: 104)  
 
In this sense, the work of art – the intermedial transaction in this instance – is 
the pre-individual waiting to be actualized as life – or pure immanence – at the 
moment of the execution of the event; that is, the intermedial phenomenon, as 
the pre-individual, only becomes evental during the triadic execution. The 
execution of the event can be thus defined as an evental process of 
actualization; that is, a fundamental encounter as a process of creation that 
includes a dynamic process of individuation. The temporal execution of the 
event is immanent to that creative process as a compositional process of self-
forming – or self-positing – form that is engaged in processes of individuation. 
Ambrose describes, ‘the virtual thus becomes actualized, but also always 
remains something immanent within the actual, a virtual multiplicity always in 
reserve, still to come’ (Ambrose, 2009: 105-106).  
 
The intermedial aesthetic plane of composition is, in this context, to be 
grasped as creative – a plane of the actualization of the virtual, enabling self-
positing forms. The intermedial aesthetic plane of composition engages life ‘in 
an enterprise of co-creation’ (Ambrose, 2009: 106); that is, the construction as 
a co-creation – an autopoiesis now grasped as a constant process of self-
positing – of the pre-individual and the individual during the event. In short, 
the intermedial aesthetic plane of composition breeds the multiplicities of the 
pre-individual virtual into a creative process of experiential and intellectual 
activity, always constantly re-formed in the plane of immanence – 
thought/subject and world/object as co-created immanently – as pure 
immanence or life. In other words, each intermedial aesthetic plane of 
composition is constructed within the plane of immanence, yet the plane of 
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immanence is that which constructs itself through self-positing, including 
processes of virtualization. Hence, this constant self-positing of the plane of 
immanence allows for the continuous re-activation and generative 
characteristic of each intermedial plane of composition. 
 
2. The Second Onto-epistemic Condition: A Constructivist 
Reading of the Spatiality of the Event.  
 
A constructivist reading of epistemology sees spatiality conceived as a 
complex montage of layered spatial orchestrations. It redefines an 
environment that is in constant process of spatial dislocations and self-
positing. In this way, such a reading explores a multiplicity of spatial 
presentations, both actual and virtual, that reposition the spatial boundaries of 
any given event.  
 
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari (1986) explore, among other 
topics, the particularities of space. Without fully entering into the rather 
complex explanations with regards to the socio-political aspects of a given 
spatial configuration, what some scholarship such as Colebrook (2004), Vidler 
(2002), Parr (2010) and Buchanan and Lambert (2005) argue is that the core 
theme of their understanding of space is the conceptualization of space as a 
performative activation in a constant ‘nomad’ movement (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1986: 474). 
 
In Plateau 14 of A Thousand Plateaus, titled The Smooth and the Striated, 
Deleuze and Guattari propose two types of space: the ‘smooth’ and the 
‘striated’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 474). Edward Casey (1998) explains 
that both types of space act as processes, each one continually and mutually 
being translated and transversed into/by the other. Along the same lines, 
Colebrook (2004) notes that the relationship between the smooth and the 
striated elucidates the nature of space, its conceptualization and creation, as 
well as the process of subject actualizations. 
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While each type of space, according to Colebrook, can be distinguished and 
studied separately, the inextricable link between the two concepts constitutes 
an element of montage. Following Casey, striated space can be broadly 
defined as measurable, Euclidian and ordered space, the space that can be 
counted, ‘always from point to point’; and smooth space is the space that 
cannot be counted: it is ‘heterogeneous’ and presents ‘qualitative aspects’ 
(Casey, 1998: 303). It, therefore, resists exact Euclidian punctual location. As 
Deleuze and Guattari put it, 
Smooth space is precisely the space of the smallest 
deviation: therefore it has no homogeneity, except between 
infinitely proximate points, and the linking of proximities is 
effected independently of any determined path. It is a space 
of contact, of small tactile or mutual actions of contact, rather 
than a visual space like Euclid’s striated space. Smooth 
space is a field without conduits or channels. A field, a 
heterogeneous smooth space, is wedded to a very particular 
type of multiplicity: non-metric, acentered, rhizomatic 
multiplicities that occupy space without counting it and can be 
explored only by legwork. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 371) 
 
With this in mind, and in relation to the understanding of intermediality here, 
on the one hand, striated space corresponds to the geometric particularities of 
the physical performance space – what we can consider the infrastructural, 
including both the physical dimensions of the theatre venue and the physical 
dimensions of the scenographic elements such as the screen. In other words, 
the exact relation between the spatial points that predetermines and informs 
the development of spatial formations. Smooth space, on the other hand, 
describes the space of potentialities and the unfolding of the spatial planes of 
composition that, in turn, enables the generative becoming of intermedial 
spatiality. As Darren Ambrose (2009) discusses,  
The smooth space of the virtual is defined as a relatively 
undifferentiated space and continuous topological space 
(hence smooth) which is incessantly undergoing 
discontinuous differentiation and transitions and is 
progressively acquiring determination until it condenses into 
measurable and divisible metric space (hence striated) … [in 
this sense, the materiality of space] is never a homogeneous 
substance that passively receives forms but is itself 
composed of intensive and energetic virtual traits. (Ambrose, 
2009: 114) 
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Similarly, Manuel DeLanda (2002) clarifies, 
Deleuze distinguishes the progressive unfolding of a 
multiplicity through broken symmetries (differentiation), from 
the progressive specification of the continuous space formed 
by multiplicities as it gives rise to our world of discontinuous 
spatial structures (differentiation). Unlike a transcendent 
heaven, which exists as a separate dimension from reality, 
Deleuze asks us to imagine a continuum of multiplicities, 
which differentiates itself into our familiar three-dimensional 
space as well as its spatially structured content. (DeLanda, 
2002: 23) 
 
By drawing on biological notions of morphogenesis, as Deleuze describes, the 
intrinsic combination of striated and smooth space conditions the emergence 
of the new. In this sense, a topological relationship happens at the 
intersection between the striated and the smooth, constituting continuous 
spatial formations that reject any notion of linearity between the spatial points. 
Dance scholar Kate Sicchio (2001) describes topology, a term normally used 
in mathematical, geographical and geological fields, as ‘sets of space that 
continuously transform in movement’ (Sicchio, 2011: 24). These spaces, she 
suggests, are ‘not measured in Euclidian geometric space but, instead, form 
relationships with other spaces through movement’ (Sicchio, 2011: 24). 
Similarly, Brian Massumi (2002) explains that topological concepts can be a 
valid platform from which to explore interdisciplinary approaches to 
performance-making since the spatial complexity they exemplify reveals how 
the creation of the dramaturgical frames interrelate in their composition. 
Regarding these spatial interrelations, topology, following Manuel DeLanda 
(2002), can also be described as ‘the one in which many discontinuous forms 
… [blend] into one continuous one’ (DeLanda, 2002: 24). In this context, 
intermedial spatiality is always in a process of taking form. This taking form is 
the dynamic of becoming. A relational merging occurs, implying a 
redistribution of the spatial processes in the making as ‘an opening to the 
complex fielding of multiplicities’ (Manning, 2013a: 8). From this perspective, 
we highlight how in the correlation ‘between points there are always more 
points … [which correspond to] finite segments internally defined by a unique 
arrangement of infinities’ (Parisi, 2013: xi). In this manner, the smooth and the 
striated are ‘at once extended and intensive’ (Parisi, 2013: xi). Conceived 
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thus, spatiality can be discussed as ‘how wholes (continuities) become parts 
(discontinuities)’ (Parisi, 2013: xii). In this way, the creation of the spatial new 
functions in a manner of constant spatial re-positionings and self-positings, 
continuously producing new spatial arrangements – what Deleuze calls 
processes of ‘territorialization’, ‘deterritorialization’ and ‘reterritorialization’ 
within his proposals regarding nomadology (uninterrupted movement).  
 
For Deleuze, territorialization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization are 
concepts fundamental to his description of process. Using the analogy of an 
animal becoming man, Deleuze (2002) describes these processes as follows,  
We could go back to the commonplaces of the evolution of 
humanity: man, deterritorialized animal. When they say to us 
that the hominoid removed its front paws from the earth and 
that the hand is the first locomotor, then prehensile, these are 
the thresholds or the quanta of deterritorialization, but each 
time with a complementary reterritorialization: the locomotor 
hand as the deterritorialized paw is reterritorialized on the 
branches which it uses to pass from tree to tree; the 
prehensile hand as deterritorialized locomotion is 
reterritorialized on the torn-off, borrowed elements called tools 
that it will brandish or propel. (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 
134)  
 
In this definition, Deleuze presents a shifting processual territory whose 
heterogeneous elements – once established or territorialized – open up 
through processes of deterritorialization immediately to the new. In other 
words, to deterritorialize is to signify a freeing movement away from 
centralizing demands.38 Simply put, a movement that breaks away from the 
established to the creation of the new.  
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, smooth space drifts and moves away from 
fixed points towards polyvalent orchestrations of potentialities and directions. 
In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari explain, space is nomad, always moving 
and connecting – ‘always there rather than here ... in between here and there, 
this place and that place, distributed between them’ (Casey, 1998: 305). 
                                                        
38 The concepts of ‘territorialization’ and ‘deterritorialization’ have been used extensively in 
areas of politics in relation to the state apparatus, geo-political positions and relations of 
power-knowledge as explored by Foucault. It has also been linked to Jacques Derrida’s 
notions of deconstruction and ‘the metaphysic of presence’.  
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Shifting away from the specifically localized, nomad space always occurs as 
place – in a given place. Further, it is a place that is not simply “here”, in a 
precise unit of space, but in a locality that is unlimited. Casey writes,  
For its non-delimitation, nomad space is no more a purely 
dimensional, empty physical infinity [as Kant would put it] than 
it is a condensed plenary … despite its enormity, [nomad 
space] is not a strictly measurable space with definite 
borders. To inhabit such a region is not merely to be at a 
place in it, much less at a point in it (there are no points in 
nomad space). Nor is it to be at the centre of the vastness … 
instead, the nomad is spread throughout … as much there as 
here, always on the way between places. (Casey, 1998: 304) 
 
Both Casey and Colebrook explain how the analogy with nomad life is evident 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s spatial thinking. A nomad inhabits the whole region, 
always between locations. Deleuze and Guattari write,  
The life of the nomad is the intermezzo … for the nomad … 
locality is not delimited; the absolute, then, does not appear at 
a particular place but becomes a non-limited locality; the 
coupling of the place and the absolute is achieved not in a 
centred, oriented globalization or universalization but in an 
infinite succession of local operations. (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1986: 381)  
 
Casey asks a relevant question: How are we to understand this concept of 
local operations? These operations, Casey explains, are ‘the basis of the 
constitution’ of experience, its conditions, and the constitutive aspect of 
smooth space (Casey, 1998: 305). Put simply, local operations are how one 
moves from space to space consisting for the most part of relays involving 
skilled motions such as using vehicles or ships. These local operations, 
Casey describes, in such a smooth and nomad space, make one experience 
space efficiently and intensively, moving from space to space as a ‘voyage in 
place’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 382). Furthermore, this aspect of intensity 
moves away from the Kantian understanding of space as extensio to what 
Deleuze and Guattari call intensive spatium. Casey writes,  
Such a voyage in such a place/region is measured neither in 
terms of quantity of distance or motion or time nor in terms of 
its physical resonance; its intensity is not intimate but belongs 
to the very vastness of the region in which the journey is 
made. (Casey, 1998: 306) 
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According to Casey and Colebrook, this notion of spatium with its intensive 
qualities brings forth the idea of immersion. Immersion in a nomadic smooth 
space ‘is body-based and landscape-oriented’ (Casey, 1998: 306) – as 
Deleuze and Guattari explain the human subject moves from points of origin 
to points of destination continually appropriating directions and engaging in 
local operations (Casey, 1998: 306). What makes spatium intensive is 
precisely the way in which the human subject, being on the land, orientates 
himself by synthesizing landmarks, using transport and taking directions. On 
the ground, there is ‘no intermediary distance, all distance is intermediary’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 307); all is in relation to the experience 
happening in the land and the modalities of such experiences. In this sense, 
‘each of these local operations establishes contiguity with the ground one is 
on, whether land or sea’ (Casey, 1998: 307). Subsequently, what one 
experiences and how one experiences it are an equal negotiation and 
construction – an onto-epistemic construction.  
 
Also, in its intensive manner, the experience of the spatium, allows Deleuze 
and Guattari to equate the term spatium with what they also call ‘haptic space’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 307), broadly understood as a space of 
intensive experiences. They write, ‘the first aspect of the haptic, smooth space 
of close vision is that its orientations, landmarks, and linkages are in 
continuous variation; it operates step by step’ (Deleuze and Guattari in Casey 
1998: 307). The haptic immersive environment synthesizes visual, auditory, 
and olfactory messages with tactile or vibratory information to create affective 
interfaces, enabling complete sensory experiences (Casey, 1998: 307). For 
Deleuze and Guattari, haptic space is fluid and intensive. Haptic space is 
deterritorialized and must be navigated by constant reference to the 
immediate concrete environment by perception, emotional connotations, 
affective responses, knowledge-making and experience, attending to the 
tangible properties and particularities of the physical environments that must 
be traversed – as walking through sand or snow (Casey, 1998: 307-308).  
 
Deleuze offers another distinct conceptualization to describe intermedial 
spatiality: the notion of ‘any-space-whatever’ (Deleuze, 1986: 109). In his 
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Cinema 1, he (1986) describes this ‘any-space-whatever’ as a space freed 
from conventional location and opened to a totality of relational spaces. For 
him, the ‘any-space-whatever’ is,  
not an abstract universal, in all times, in all places. It is a 
perfectly singular space, which has merely lost its 
homogeneity, that is, the principle of its metric relations or the 
connection of its own parts so that the linkages can be made 
in an infinite number of ways. It is a space of virtual 
conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible. (Deleuze, 
1986: 109) 
Deleuze also discusses the notion of ‘any-space-whatever’ as the space of 
the liminal and the interval. Far from understanding spatiality as a historical 
event, this thesis conceptualizes it as a self-distributing plane, a space that 
immanently unfolds itself, and, through this unfolding, conditions the spatial 
field it determines. In this sense, intermedial spatiality is an ‘any-space-
whatever’ where multiplicity and heterogeneity are incorporated. 
 
The idea of a folding and unfolding space with heterogeneous characteristics 
highlights Deleuze’s postulate of ‘the fold’ (Deleuze, 1993: 18), as an in-
betweeness of spaces – as an evental inter-being and intermezzo. The 
Deleuzian fold also discusses the relation between the outside and the inside 
and how these interweave. As a concept, the fold creates a new layer in the 
conceptualization of the inside/outside model, where the structure of space is 
presented in the binary and boundary between what is included and what is 
not; what is part of and what is not; and what belongs to and what does not.  
 
Deleuze describes the concept of the fold in relation to Baroque architecture. 
Yet, the concept presents a wider range of philosophical positions throughout 
his writing opus. Deleuze’s fold runs parallel in importance with his 
understanding of the event and, therefore, the construction to subjectivity: the 
third axiom of the Deleuzian event. In this regard, the concept presents 
limitless interrogating possibilities and has been used intensively in critical 
debates such as feminism, architecture or engineering. One aspect of the 
concept – its most basic, Deleuzian scholars such as Colebrook (2000) and 
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Buchanan and Lambert (2005) suggest – is the fold in relation to spatial 
multiplicities.  
 
The fold, for Deleuze, represents the ontology of becoming – of multiplicity 
and differentiation. The fold, for him, is topological. He writes, 
Thus a continuous labyrinth is not a line dissolving into 
independent points, as flowing sand might dissolve into 
grains, but resembles a sheet of paper divided into infinite 
folds or separated into bending movements, each one 
determined by the consistent or conspiring surrounding … A 
fold is always folded within a fold, like a cavern in a cavern. 
The unit of matter, the smallest element of the labyrinth, is the 
fold, not the point, which is never a part, but a simple 
extremity of the line. (Deleuze, 1993: 18) 
 
In this sense, the fold is in itself the multiple of the fold. It is a dimensional 
change, operating in multiple degrees of developmental intensities. He 
describes,  
Folding-unfolding no longer simply means tension-release, 
contraction-dilation, but enveloping-developing … The 
simplest way of starting the point is by saying that to unfold is 
to increase, to grow; whereas the fold is to diminish, to 
reduce, to withdraw into the recess of the world. Yet a simple 
metric change would not account for the difference between 
the organic and the inorganic … It would fail to show that 
movement does not simply go from one greater or smaller 
part to another, but from fold to fold. (Deleuze, 1993: 19) 
 
In Warped Spaces: Art, Architecture and Anxiety in Modern Culture, Anthony 
Vidler (2002), explains that Deleuze’s notion of the fold has proved to be a 
primordial conceptualizing topic for contemporary architects both as a material 
and a designing phenomenon. He writes,  
as Deleuze expands on the implications of the fold, and its 
cognates the pleat and the crease, it gains an almost 
ontological status as the defining characteristic of baroque 
space and thought … for Deleuze to say that the folds are 
manifested in “pleats of matter” is not simply to refer to a 
piece of cloth [Deleuze uses the example of Bernini’s 
sculpture of Santa Teresa]; matter is, in these terms, 
everywhere, in the void as well as in the solid and subject to 
the same forces. Folds then exist in space and time, in things 
and in ideas, and among their unique properties is the ability 
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to join all these levels and categories at the same moment. 
(Vidler, 2002: 117) 
 
Clearly drawing on a Leibnizian understanding, the Deleuzian fold is also in a 
continuous temporal movement, enveloping former folds and creating new 
ones. Deleuzian folds are constituted as forms of space in the pleat, under the 
pleat and between the pleats; a continuous pleating that erases the 
differences between the inside and the outside.39 In this manner, the fold both 
separates and brings together inside-outside spatial articulations.  
 
Along the same lines, Martin Kornberger and Stuart Clegg (2003) explain that 
for Deleuze the term fold ‘reverses the relationship between inside and 
outside … is neither inside nor outside but the space in-between, the 
interstitial’ (Kornberger and Clegg, 2003: 83). Moreover, they posit,  
the fold is precisely a space in-between where the order of 
the inside/outside and its lineal causality is interrupted: there 
is no powerful, transcendent centre that determines the 
periphery. Instead, we are thrown in the middle of an active 
play of forces, where cause and effect are inextricably 
interwoven. (Kornberger and Clegg, 2003: 83) 
 
This, according to Deleuze, creates a plane of immanence situated in a space 
in-between where the interfacial occurs and where spaces liminally co-
construct each other. Furthermore, and as a final point, the fold, according to 
Kornberger and Clegg, is the space where the outside intermingles with the 
inside in a manner that can be categorized as an event – an event happening 
at the meeting of the interior and exterior forces of space. Kornberger and 
Clegg clarify that ‘from an inside/outside perspective, the fold as a space of 
passages and thresholds, as a liminal zone … is a point of transition’ 
                                                        
39 In this regard, the spatial dramaturgical articulations that see the correlation of notions of 
inside and outside also imply a sense of spatial conjunction liminally. Taking from Gaston 
Bachelard (1958), Casey (1998) explains these conjunctions as ‘intimate immensity’ 
(Bachelard, 1958: 193). For Casey, the intimate immensity of a location connects place with 
space where the dichotomy between finite (place) and the infinite (space) is overcome. He 
writes: ‘in intimate immensity I enter space from place itself. I come to the immense from 
within rather than on the basis of exteriority … the in/out dyad has lost its divisive and 
diremptive character … Place and space shed their usual differentia: the clarity and 
distinctness of the near and small in one case, the emptiness of the far and the enormous in 
the other. They coalesce in a common immensity’ (Casey, 1998: 294-95) 
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(Kornberger and Clegg, 2003: 84). In understanding the fold as transitional, 
‘one state of being shifts into another, thus, they are spatial zones of 
becoming’ (Kornberger and Clegg, 2003: 84). In this sense, the fold occupies 
the space of the topological – the space where spatial identity is constructed 
and immediately transformed as a system of relations. In other words, a 
system of relations, as Casey explains, in which locality is not identifiable in 
objective space and undermines notions of spatiality as “pure” temporal 
diachronism in favour of notions of spatio-temporal relational juxtaposition and 
synchronicity. In this sense, the fold can be grasped as combining both the 
synchronic and diachronic in its topological manner. 
 
With all this in mind, we have seen that each spatial point in the world is an 
experience that unfolds the world from itself without an anticipated point in the 
future. In this regard, the creation of the spatial is the configuration of singular 
spatial actualities tending towards infinity, the renewal aspect of potentiality. In 
doing so, each spatial actuality, each spatial frame, deterritorializes the 
already territorialized to construct a new reterritorialization in a generative 
manner. This manner, this thesis suggests, is an all-encompassing spatial 
horizon. We suggest that spatiality spreads across temporality, creating a set 
of spatial relations that produce – while unfolding – spatial stability.  
 
3. The Third Onto-epistemic Condition: A Constructivist 
Reading of The Narrativity of the Event. 
 
As noted, narrativity, as the third onto-epistemic condition, can be considered 
the means through which the abstract components of space and time are 
rendered determinate. Here, it is argued that it is through narrativity that both 
the orchestrations of temporality and spatiality are articulated synthetically 
through the generative activation of the event’s constructive frames. 
Moreover, the proposed articulation of intermedial narrative via the generative 
triadic execution sees the construction of narrative engaged in a constant 
manner of performative re-activation: the unfolding and becoming of the 
radical aesthetic. 
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Within a constructivist reading of epistemology, we understand the term 
‘narrative’ via a Deleuzian tripartite ontology (see Protevi, 2011; Shaviro, 
2010; May, 2005). Seen thus, narrativity posits three interdependent registers: 
the virtual, the intensive and the actual. For Deleuze, as John Protevi (2012) 
explains,  
in all realms of being [and narrative can be described as one 
for him] (i) intensive morphogenetic processes follow the 
structures inherent in (ii) differential virtual multiplicities to 
produce (iii) localized and individuated actual substances with 
extensive properties and differentiated qualities. Simply put, 
the actualization of the virtual, that is the production of actual 
things [narrative] of the world, proceeds by way of intensive 
articulating processes. (Protevi, 2012: 3)  
 
Deleuze’s ontological project sees the virtual field as composed of thought 
and non-human entities as multiplicities, ‘which are constituted by the 
progressive determination of differential elements, differential relations and 
singularities’ (Protevi, 2012: 4); all related by ‘intensive processes’ (Protevi, 
2012: 3) that re-configure ad infinitum. With this in mind, intermedial narrative 
is here understood as presenting mereotopological relationships.  
 
In the previous section we have described topology, following Luciana Parisi 
(2013), as the study of continuities and connectivity within ‘the modulations of 
space and time’ (Parisi, 2013: 267). In this section, mereology is described as 
‘the theory of parthood relations: the relations of a part to whole and the 
relations between parts within a whole’ (Parisi, 2013, 2013: 264). Combining 
them both, mereotopology ‘investigates relations between parts and wholes, 
parts of parts, and the boundaries between them’ (Parisi, 2013: 264). 
 
In relation to the mereotopological, Parisi explains how connectivity, 
becomes the motor of spatio-temporal differentiations … 
[creating] emergent environments … [and] resulting in 
adaptable’ spaces … a dynamically growing space infused 
with … continual variations driven by the asymmetric 
temporalities’ of the participants elements. (Parisi, 2013: 115) 
 
She continues, 
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infused with the relativity of lived experience, thus announcing 
a radical transformation … marked by … indeterminacies … 
the possibility that there are distinct spaces co-existing in the 
same time … [in which no] point can be seen as an ultimate, 
privileged entry into the realm of intensive duration. (Parisi, 
2013: 116) 
 
She also highlights the relativity of the mereotopological. In this sense, the 
relativity, 
does not coincide with fluid bending of space in time, but 
more importantly involves shears, cuts, gaps, and events 
suspending the [linear] continuity of space-time … instead [it] 
enters into a relationship … [where] there can be simultaneity 
between distinct space-times. What defines simultaneity is 
indeed the realization that there is another order of actuality. 
(Parisi, 2013: 122)  
 
Additionally, in the context of theoretical understandings of mereotopological 
dynamics, Stamina Portanova (2008b) discusses how,  
rather than dissolving into the whole which they co-constitute, 
and rather than being [ephemerally] erased by the continuous 
relations in which they are implicated, the parts maintain their 
indispensable ontogenetic status … the relation generates the 
parts … [but without] the parts no relation would take place. 
(Portanova, 2008b: 4)  
 
The parts, according to her, are, 
never ontologically prior to the relations, in which they are 
involved but always coexistent with them, like an atom, which 
is not pre-existing or previously distinct, but always 
distinguishable from its molecular relations’ of which it is an 
intrinsic part. (Portanova, 2008b: 5) 
 
Moreover, 
each composing element or piece maintains its own 
singularity, like a precious tendency towards self-
individuation, which finds its proper sense in the articulated … 
continuum of the whole structure … in turn, each of these 
singular worlds feeds of the particular collaborative relations 
appearing between its own composing elements … and all 
these elements co-work towards … with the notion of the in-
between. (Portanova, 2008a: 7) 
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From this perspective, a mereotopological understanding of intermedial 
narrative conceives each narrative occasion as self-contained and self-
constituted, but also as open to a network of other narrative relations: the 
narrative whole ‘is neither given nor giveable … because it is the Open, and 
because its nature is to change constantly, or to give rise to something new, 
in short, to endure’ (Deleuze, 1986: 9). In discussing intermedial narrativity 
around the notion of mereotopology, a distinct conceptualization arises 
regarding how the functional structuring of narrative form and content is 
established by creating a network of narratological modulations that disrupt 
classical understandings of narrative construction as a structural linearity.40  
 
Narrativity is commonly grasped in terms of linear progression and the unity of 
acts through the composition of a narrative structure. Here, intermedial 
narrativity is discussed regarding the ways in which intermedial strategies 
release performance from classical conditions of narration and produce novel 
and radical possibilities. In general, intermedial narrativity draws attention to 
the structure of the narrative both as the basis of experience for the 
participant subjects and as a conceptual platform upon which the performance 
is built. In distinction to classical dramatic narrative structure, the narrative 
structures in intermedial practices emphasize its contingent nature within 
dramaturgical strategies along with its functional characterization. As this 
argument proposes, narrativity in intermedial praxis provides a platform that 
challenges both established narratological discourses such as structuralism, 
and well-defined narratological notions such as focalization – the point of view 
or how the narrative is told. We also stress how intermedial narrativity 
escapes conceptualizations of narrative text as a fixed structure and enters 
into the realm of hypertextualities, spatio-temporal expansions and 
mereotopological open-ended narrative occasions. 
 
In general, Onega and Garcia Landa define narrative as,  
                                                        
40 The term modulation is used here to mean the functional aspect and the process of 
changing some phenomenon for the purpose of transmission and “display”. Deleuze (1992) 
also offers a description: ‘like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one 
moment to the other, like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point’ (Deleuze, 
1992: 3).  
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the semiotic representation of a series of events meaningfully 
connected in a temporal and causal way … therefore, we can 
speak of many kinds of narrative texts. [The realms of these 
possibilities] Narrativization is one of the commonest ways of 
applying an order and a perspective to experience. (Onega 
and Garcia Landa, 1996: 4) 
 
In broad-spectrum terms, narrative analysis explores the particularities of 
textual production, structure and reception. Every narrative medium has a 
specific narrative form since they all have a specific use of representational 
techniques and emplotment strategies. Moreover, David Herman (2009) 
defines a prototypical narrative as,  
a representation that is situated in – must be interpreted in 
light of – a specific discourse context or occasion for telling … 
a structured time-course of particularized events … this 
representation also conveys the experience of living through 
the storyworld-in-flux, highlighting the pressure of events on 
real or imagined consciousness affected by the occurrences 
at issue … it can be argued that narrative is centrally 
concerned with qualia, a term used by philosophers of mind to 
refer to the sense of “what is like” for someone or something 
to have a particular experience. (Herman, 2009: 1)  
 
In relation to narrative, Mieke Bal (2009) defines narratology as ‘the ensemble 
of theories of narrative, narrative texts, images, spectacles, events and 
cultural artefacts that tell a story’ (Bal, 2009: 1). According to Bal’s definition, 
theory is understood as specifically linguistic and textual: ‘a systematic set of 
generalized statements about a particular segment of reality. That segment of 
reality, the corpus, about which narratology attempts to make its 
pronouncements consists of narrative texts’ (Bal, 2009: 1). It should be 
pointed out that most narratological studies have been developed within 
literature, language and grammatical fields. Given the context of this research, 
however, the narrative text must be understood as performance considered in 
itself as a narrative and geared towards facilitating an analysis of intermedial 
performance as text. In this sense, the performance text is here to be 
understood as a narrative system of interrelated elements.  
 
Bal also defines text as a ‘finite and structured whole of signs [elements and 
meanings]’ (Bal, 2009: 5). This definition does not imply that a narrative 
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performance text must be fixed and static, but that it presents its ‘reader’ with 
a beginning and an end: it is a performance system shared between 
performers and auditors of the performance – the participating subjects. Such 
a narrative performance text employs more than linguistic means – indeed, 
according to Bal, it is ‘a text in which an agent or subject conveys to an 
addressee a story in a particular medium, such as language, images, sounds 
buildings or a combination thereof’ (Bal, 2009: 5). A story can be considered 
to be the content of that text, which has a particular mode of expression, a 
manner of being told or presented, a particular dramaturgy. The presentation 
of the story is typically defined as a ‘fabula’. A fabula can be conceptualized 
as a ‘series of logically and chronologically related events that are caused or 
experienced by agents [be it the participant subjects or the attending 
variables]’ (Bal, 2009: 5). But as the case studies will show, intermedial 
performance opens up a series of problematics for traditional narrative 
performance theory, where the spectator belongs to the extra-diegetic world 
beyond the play. As we shall see, in the context of intermedial narrative, the 
spectator becomes incorporated into the narrative. He is a diegetic narrative 
agent as part of the system of performative and emergent intra-actions.  
 
What is suggested is that viewed as a unique dramaturgical strategy, 
intermedial narrativity as a radical performance text is not constrained by the 
lineal logic of traditional diegesis; instead, it is a network, a multi-dimensional 
and mereotopological narrative space, in which a variety of other narrative 
texts blend and clash, enabling a ‘composited heterocosm’ (Boenisch, 2010b: 
202) of narrative planes of composition that ‘refuses a complete, surveyable 
totality: it creates, rather, an intermedial space of overlaps and imbrications’ 
(Boenisch, 2010b: 202). Understood in this way, the intermedial performance 
narrative text is a tissue of references drawn from innumerable centres of 
praxis: it is characterized by interdisciplinary interlinks. For example, it has 
intertexts; that is, it is a narrative network, presenting “internal” units of textual 
multiplicity. Each text, in its mereotopological characteristic, is considered as 
indefinitely divisible into other texts, placing ‘everything in variation’, (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 5).  
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In relation to the above-mentioned variation, the notion of ‘hypersurface 
architecture’, generally used in architectural backgrounds, becomes helpful to 
identify the onto-epistemic functionality of intermedial narrativity. Drawing on 
Deleuze’s fold, Stephen Perrella (1998) defines a hypersurface architecture 
as an,  
enfolding of substances into differentiated topologies. The 
term hypersurface is not a concept that contains meaning, but 
an event, one with a material dimension … at the threshold of 
… [and] as a site of emergence for new intensities. (Perrella, 
1988: 10) 
 
Furthermore, he writes,  
“Hyper” implies human agency reconfigured by digital culture, 
and “surface” is the enfolding of substances into differentiated 
topologies. The term hypersurface is not a concept that 
contains meaning, but an event; one with a material 
dimension. We are currently at the threshold of this new 
configuration as a site of emergence for new intensities. 
(Perrella, 1998: 10) 
 
With this in mind, intermedial narrativity becomes a flux the outcome of which 
moves away from notions of spatial and temporal linearity and essentialist 
readings of the “here and now” to the parameters of the multiple, the relational 
and the differential. Perrella also stresses that such an emergent configuration 
can be categorized as a becoming of forms and influxes, increasingly grasped 
as fluid: ‘the co-presence of both material and image upon an architectural 
surface/membrane substrate is such that neither the materiality nor the image 
dominates’ (Perrella, 1998: 13). Moreover, ‘the hypersurface implies binary 
relationships such as image/form, inside/outside, structure/ornament [and] 
ground/edifice’ (Perrella, 1998: 8). In this sense, intermedial dramaturgy 
becomes ‘hypersurface’. Perrella also refers to the term as topological 
architecture, wherein space and time is constantly re-folding through and 
within surfaces as planes of composition. For Perrella, the notion of 
‘hypersurface’ as event-architecture shares conceptualizing parameters with 
Delueze’s notion of the fold, where the unfolding and re-folding of the spatially 
actual and virtual is interwoven.  
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Within these parameters, Gabriella Giannachi (2004) offers another 
perspective. She explains that in conceptualizing areas of performance and 
virtual reality, the event moves through the ‘hypersurface’. She explains, 
the hypersurface is where the real and the virtual meet each 
other. It is materiality and textuality, real and representation. It 
is also the site of virtual performance. Through the 
hypersurface, the viewer [experiencer] can enter the work of 
art, be part of it, as well as interact with it. Because the 
hypersurface is a liminal space, the viewer can double their 
presence and be in both the real and the virtual environment 
simultaneously. In other words, the viewer may be part of 
both the realm of the image and the sphere of the real, and 
may modify one through the other … the theatre of the 
hypersurface is not immersive but it simulates immersiveness 
… In this sense, the hypersurface is the theatre par 
excellence – a hyper-sur-face, a space twice removed from 
the ‘face’, in other words, a place twice above or beyond the 
world of appearance. (Giannachi, 2004: 95) 
 
In this sense, intermedial narrativity moves through medial folds and the 
creation of dramaturgicall articulations – as one inside another, connecting 
through nexuses.41  
 
With this in mind, the intermedial performance text is to be understood as a 
network and not primarily as an accumulative and progressive structure of 
narrative meaning. It generates meaning but as an ever-changing flux of 
relations, never identical to itself, always open to interpretations where the 
making and the transmitting – as pointed out by Boenisch – of meaning 
coincide. Intermedial narrativity thus places its participant subject in a process 
of constant narrative transformation as the narrative is transforming itself. 
Here, there is no limit to what Brian Massumi (1992) calls ‘spaces of 
interaction’ (Massumi, 1992: 98). Further, the construction of intermedial 
                                                        
41 Gabriella Giannachi (2004) also points out that the hypersurface is a surface with a meta-
dimension. As noted by Perrella, ‘hypersurface is a reconsideration of often dichotomous 
relationships existing in the environment. These binaries include; image/form, inside/outside, 
structure/ornament, ground/edifice and so forth; not as separate and hence static entities but 
as transversally-constituted fabrics or planes of immanence. Hypersurfaces are generated in 
the problematic relationships that occur when binary categories conjugate because such 
divisions can no longer be sustained in isolation through either linguistic or material divisions’ 
(Perrella in Giannachi 2004: 99). 
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narrative is in itself the creation of the medium; that is, the narrative medium is 
here more than the representation of one medium in another medium during 
processes of re-mediatization – as in Bolter and Grusin. The narrative – as a 
constructive medium and the situated emergence of the constructivist intra-
actions – results in a medium “charged with” and incorporating the peculiar 
medial characteristics of other medium – an all-encompassing of medial multi-
modalities, as Ellestrom discusses, where ‘the operational and qualifying 
aspects of media’ (Ellestrom, 2010: 25) act as narrativizing platforms. 
Consequently, the narrative as a constructive medium should not only be 
interpreted as the traditional relationship between form and content during 
processes of re-mediation, but it should also be grasped as the functioning of 
a medium. In this context, the concept of becoming refers to an multiple 
capacity of intermedial performance to expand narrative networks, to explore 
narrative functionality; to the very process of narrative emergence, involving 
‘creation, whereby human creative activity is accompanied … by the work of 
non human forces [as intra-actions]’ (Kember and Zylinska, 2012: 22); to 
produce endless intertextualities; and to resist as a fundamental impossibility 
the closure of meaning because of the constant re-working of the actual and 
virtual processes of medial fabulation.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Execution: Blast Theory’s 10 Backwards (1999) 
 
 
 
This chapter concerns the way in which the proposed radical aesthetic of 
intermedial work explores the differential aspect of the mereotopological 
narrative, particularly focusing on how such a radical dramaturgy needs to be 
grasped in terms of differential temporality within the presented constructivist 
reading of epistemology. In other words, the following will highlight how 
intermedial practices investigate, question, and experience the temporal 
aspect of the “now” and time in performance. Further, it addresses 10 
Backwards (1999), a piece by Blast Theory, as a case study to describe this 
instance as a type of intermedial praxis in which the immediacy and actuality 
of the present moment is peculiarly elongated and fragmented in terms of its 
experiential intensity and dramaturgical articulation. The suggested differential 
quality will distinguish the proposals here from the notions established by the 
liveness and ontological debates and, therefore, will present differentiality as 
an intrinsic and defining part of the radical dramaturgy. 
 
Intermedial performance, Edward Scheer (2010) points out, provides, 
perhaps, the most efficient materials conducive to the study of the temporal 
constitution of an aesthetic performance experience (Scheer, 2010: 119). 
Intermedial praxis, it can be argued, draws attention to the present both as the 
basis of experience and as a conceptual platform. Scheer notes,  
an experience of the present may be construed as the 
revelation of trans-historical, ever-changing, durational flux 
that guarantees all experience of time – but in intermedial 
performance the breakthrough into real duration is framed as 
one phase of a performative act, not as a unidirectional 
escape from reality. It therefore provides a way to intensify our 
engagement with the world. (Scheer, 2010: 119-120) 
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In 10 Backwards, the question of how time is produced – instead of what time 
is – highlights the particularities of intermedial temporality in its experiential 
and critical conceptualization.42 From this perspective and within the context 
of intermedial praxis, 10 Backwards enables and constructs time – as a 
structural and functional element that articulates the onto-epistemic 
constructivist conditions at the moment of the execution of the event.  
 
We explore here a novel concept of intermedial temporality in relation to 
process philosophy in order to understand the relationship between the use of 
media technologies in performance – technologies as a temporalizing element 
(Barker, 2012: 1-3) – and the participating subject. In this way, through the 
interrogation of 10 Backwards, this chapter shows something unique about 
the manner intermediality produces temporality in performance; that is, its 
differential aspect. Time in 10 Backwards is measured only dynamically and is 
no longer reduced to the thread of chronology where past, present and future 
are aligned on a linear continuum. Furthermore, time in 10 Backwards is 
identified with the interlacing movement of the creative forces of each 
mereotopological narrative plane of composition. Once an essentialist reading 
of chronology is pulverized, time becomes differential, multiple and 
fragmented like many facets of a shattered crystal, as Deleuze would say. In 
this respect, the understanding of intermedial temporality shifts from linear 
chronology and the reductive “here and now” to an understanding of 
temporality as intensities and densities – grasped here as moments of 
occurrence, as clusters of temporal orchestrations enabled by the 
mereotopological interplay of the dramaturgical attending variables, and as 
temporal intersections where different temporal articulations meet.  
 
Media technologies, 10 Backwards emphasizes, highlight the manner in which 
the temporal past, present and future position intermedial temporality as 
produced by a process of agential entanglements between the human and 
                                                        
42 Edward Scheer (2012) describes how the notion of time in contemporary performance 
‘implies a specific construction of time …(yet it) has another quality that invokes the flux of 
temporal experience, the quality of time experienced in the doing of an action rather than 
simply the quantity of chronological time that a task might consume’ (Scheer, 2012:1). 
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non-human. Drawing on Whitehead’s and Deleuze’s process philosophy, 
notions of the event and vitalist frameworks within the background of a 
constructive aesthetic, this chapter discusses how time is produced through 
temporal dramaturgical structures that highlight both its differential, multiple 
and synthesizing aspects and its being continually produced. Comprehended 
in this way, the temporal intermedial event, in inter-relating the human and the 
analogue and the digital elements of the performance world through 
processes of dramaturgical constructivist mediation – as intra-actions – 
becomes itself a process that generates the particular – and necessary and 
sufficient – temporal conditions for the differential becoming of intermedial 
dramaturgy.  
 
Intermedial temporality will be also explored as a temporal viscosity. Seen 
thus, intermedial temporality can be understood as a density that is both 
temporally fluid and consistent; as presenting both temporal thinness and 
thickness; as expanding and contracting; and as accounting for the differential 
temporal intensities that configure the intermedial event. This temporal texture 
explores multiple modes of presenting, experiencing and making sense of 
time, co-existing in the experiential present moment during the execution of 
the event. Looked at in this way, intermedial temporality can be discussed as 
non-linearity; as an interlacing turmoil of temporal flows; and as a multi-
temporal aesthetic construction produced by dramaturgical processes in 
which the experiential present moment escapes the rigidity of the 
inappropriate essentialist ontological “here and now” and enters into the 
fluidity and convergence – the functional synthesizing – of the multi-temporal, 
containing in itself differential and intensive relations between the past, 
present and future and, hence, highlighting the mereotopological aspect of the 
radical dramaturgy. 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section introduces 10 
Backwards. The second section discusses differential temporality as the first 
defining element of the radical dramaturgical aesthetic proposed here. This 
second section is sub-divided into three sections whose objective is to 
reposition, for instance, notions of temporal actuality in opposition to the 
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ontological and presentness debates. The final sub-section looks at 10 
Backwards within the lenses of the becoming and process philosophy and 
presents some questions and opens up some problematics.   
 
1. 10 Backwards: Description of Practice.  
 
Blast Theory presented 10 Backwards on the 11th of May 1999 at the Institute 
of Contemporary Art in London. Structurally and thematically understood, it is 
a 76-minute performance piece that combines live and pre-rendered mixes of 
video projections to articulate a dramaturgy that interrogates notions of 
personal identity in relation to temporal flows.43  
 
 
Figure 1: 10 Backwards. Production poster. Copyright: Blast Theory. 
 
The piece’s staging and dramaturgical strategies articulate an interplay 
between different media such as pre-recorded materials and “live” dramatic 
action where the notion of what is a temporal in-between – the so called 
                                                        
43 Andy Lavender (2002) also uses this performance to discuss his proposals of liveness and 
‘nowness’ (Lavender, 2002: 189).  
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liminal – finds the intra-activity of the performance’s attending variables and 
participating subject.  
 
The narrative and dramaturgical intermedial strategies employed such as 
travelling through time and inhabiting multiple realities negotiate the limits of 
the performance’s temporal experience and places the execution of the 
temporal structures in a position that exponentially and differentially multiplies 
the manner in which temporality can be experienced and made sense of.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: 10 Backwards. Still image. Niki in 1999 against 
a background showing a different time frame.  Copyright: 
Blast Theory. 
 
 
The intermedial dramaturgical elements explored throughout the piece 
engage the participant subject in a complex narrative that merges “live” action 
and pre-recorded material into a dramaturgical structure of juxtaposed 
elements, creating a manner of multi-temporal storytelling. One of the 
characteristics of the piece is that different narrative angles are engaged with 
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at the same time, exploring different temporalities as a variety of 
dramaturgical strategies are activated in order to create an experience of 
differential temporal modulations. In this sense, 10 Backwards becomes a 
piece about temporal perception, the prospectives of life and experiences 
where temporal perception, the exploration of memory and the potential 
projections into the future interlink. In this sense, the experience of time 
expands in a spatial and temporal extension of possibilities.  
 
The plot concerns a woman, Niki, who travels ten years into the future (see 
figure 2). Within an hour, she is brought back to the present, where she 
engages with processes of recognition of past and future experiences. Niki 
attempts to understand her present identity via interacting with her past and 
future identities, which are shown and interacted with on screens, one large 
and one small, either side of an elongated stage. The piece also includes two 
other performers who sporadically interact with Niki. There are several rows of 
audience members at each side of the stage, so they can see and experience 
each other.  
 
The production carefully explores notions of time and temporal materiality 
through a dexterous interlinking of the “live”, the pre-recorded video imagery 
and a live feed from a camera onstage. Throughout the piece, Niki becomes 
self-aware of her own positioning, constantly interpreting and trying to 
understand her own identity, memories and longings as the virtual and actual 
aspects of her own reality co-mingle so as to become indistinguishable. At 
times Niki videotapes herself in an almost compulsive manner, an 
emphasized aspect of the performance presentation. Furthermore, the 
relationship between her recordings, the live feed, and the pre-recorded 
material articulated as video diaries, through which she hypothesizes about 
her future and accesses future situations of what she might think to be her 
ideal life, while making a constant reference to her present state of being and 
her past experiences, enables her to experience and construct her present 
moment as clearly co-existing with layers of planes of the past and future as a 
system of the relationships of time. 
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Figure 3: 10 Backwards. Still image. Niki is being recorded and projected on the 
screens. There is also a live feed element. Copyright: Blast Theory. 
 
The screens project a live feed of her stage acts as well as pre-recorded 
material such as newspapers clippings and city images that show her in past 
and future life situations. Sometimes, her image is pasted physically via a live 
feed on top of one of those images. At times, the projected images are 
paused. Other times, there are jumps on the live-feed images and repetition of 
single and specific movements. Sporadically, she interacts with the frozen 
images, tries to imitate them, and even makes fun of them as she attempts to 
make sense of the situation while trying to recognise linkages and logical 
connections. In this sense, Niki is in a continual process of learning about 
herself. At other times, we can see her present self on the stage, her past self 
on one screen, and her future self on the other screen concurrently. There are 
also moments in which a picture of another person who physically resembles 
her appears. Occasionally, the screens are off, but we never cease to see 
them as a dramaturgical element placed onstage – they can be activated at 
any time, emphasizing a time of possibility and potentiality. Further, 
periodically, there is also a voice-over that describes her temporal 
experiences. At times, it is her voice; at other times it is somebody else’s 
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voice. Niki persistently explores and experiments with different manners of 
approaching the media elements. Affectively, her activities draws her and the 
audience into space-times of experiences that are in the process of being 
composed and opened to the indeterminacy of a present in the making. 
Through the scripted dialogue, the audience understands that Niki interacts 
simultaneously with her past, present, and future. Moreover, Niki also 
experiences time as presented spatially; that is, an experiential encounter 
where every perceived instant co-exists simultaneously next to each other in 
an encompassing frame of temporal possibilities and an agglomeration of all 
moments, a totalizing landscape of experienced, perceived and understood 
moments – a temporal dimension that lies at the heart of 10 Backwards’ 
intermedial strategies.  
 
10 Backwards shifts from lineal and one-dimensional conceptualizations of 
time to an understanding of time as temporal continua. In this sense, 
intermedial temporality becomes a temporal matrix that replaces notions of 
causal and linear progressions of temporal events for temporal notions in 
which temporality is grasped as intensities, densities and viscosities.44 10 
Backwards also rethinks time as re-presented spatially; that is, through the 
use of media technologies, pre-recorded material and live feeds the same 
moment in time is presented in different spaces, freeing the narrative from a 
fixed perspective and entering into the layering of the mereotopological. Its 
chronological narrative replaces causal temporal links with a chain of events 
that are presented as interrelated traces and a manifestation of multiple and 
mutual perspectives and modes of presentation.45  
                                                        
44 This shift in dramaturgical articulations of time has been observed in theatrical performance 
practices since the 1960s in the work of artists such as John Cage, Richard Foreman, 
Gertrude Stein and Robert Wilson who challenged lineal chronological constructions and 
explored temporal landscapes where events happen simultaneously in an immediate present. 
 
45 In this sense, 10 Backwards participates in the post-dramatic because it can be also 
explained as a composite of temporal presentations. In conceptualizing post-dramatic theatre, 
Hans-Thies Lehmann (2006) explains that the notion of absolute Newtonian time is obsolete 
– a postulate acknowledged here. He emphasizes that time becomes a dynamic relationship 
that has lost a linear ‘time frame’ (Lehmann, 2006: 155) and that time is ‘non-natural’ 
(Lehmann, 2006: 156). Further, he posits that post-dramatic performance departs from 
traditional understandings of the temporal experience as linear. Moreover, Lehmann states 
that ‘post-dramatic theatre is a theatre of the present’ (Lehmann, 2006: 143). Lehmann 
discusses the present as a “here and now” quest for presence. Furthermore, Lehmann, 
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2. 10 Backwards: The Differential Temporal Aspect of the 
Radical Dramaturgy. 
 
Overall, 10 Backwards can be understood as an articulation of temporality 
occupying a ‘continuous present’ (Bay-Cheng, 2010: 89). 10 Backwards 
creates a temporality that encompasses intra and sub-events, expanding the 
“now” into a matrix of temporally traced intensities, disrupting temporal 
linearity and occupying the temporal “location” of the continuous present and, 
hence, becomes mereotopological.46 Also, this temporality can be said to 
allow for a performance experience that differentially combines present, past, 
future where the temporality of each of the planes of composition takes form 
in the construction and creation – as taking form – of time and space. The 
overarching present of the performance can be categorized as continuous, as 
Sarah Bay-Cheng (2010) points out, because it intertwines its temporal 
elements in a fashion that is fluid, mutual and ongoing. The piece embraces 
the creative potential of encountering the temporal multi-medial possibilities 
created through its dramaturgical strategies. It constantly shifts from lineal 
temporal experiential frames to a multiplicity of aesthetics and theoretical 
modes of exploring temporality in the current landscape of intermedial 
practices. As such, the piece, as with Blast Theory’s work in general, 
interrogates the very nature of intermedial practice. The temporal frameworks 
that 10 Backwards articulates in its mode of execution reflect upon the 
temporal ontological implications that the processes of performative re-
                                                                                                                                                              
establishes the temporal understanding of the present as an ‘absolute present tense’ 
(Lehmann, 2006: 143), a term coined by Bohrer that conceives the present moment as a 
process, as a verb. In this sense, Lehmann places the post-dramatic present moment by 
stating that the present is not an object, nor a substance, nor an object of cognition 
(Lehmann, 2006: 143). For him, the present must be understood as something that happens 
– as opposed to classical aesthetic notions of the work of art as static and complete. He 
writes, ’[the present of post-dramatic theatre is] not a reified point of time, but as a perpetual 
disappearing of this point it is already a transition and simultaneously a caesura between the 
past and the future. [In this sense], the present is necessarily the erosion and slippage of 
presence’ (Lehmann, 2006: 144). 
 
46 Bay-Cheng (2010) explains that the notion of the ‘continuous present’ was first used by 
Gertrude Stein in 1934, particularly in relation to how drama manipulates time and articulates 
temporality (Bay-Cheng, 2010: 87).  
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mediation inflect regarding the use of media technologies in relation to notions 
of immediacy, the engagement with the present moment.  
 
Within these parameters, Andy Lavender (2002) suitably states that 
intermedial performance presents a sense of simultaneity and multiplicity of 
times. He says, ‘this is a multiple theatre, where perspectives, ontological 
states, and meanings themselves are not only plural but simultaneously so’ 
(Lavender, 2002: 190).  Similarly, Birgit Wiens (2010) explains, 
The process of performance is no longer limited to the here 
and now, but rather transgresses local contexts and 
environments … The space of intermediality, in this regard, is 
not already there, but can only be understood as a temporal, 
dynamic and highly complex spatial configuration, which is 
created within the process of the performance. (Wiens, 2010: 
94) 
 
10 Backwards encompasses temporal non-lineal matrixed characteristics and 
is situated within liminal generating planes of temporal signification and 
construction. The following sections aim, on the one hand, to explore the 
proposed aspect of differentiality in relation to production of temporal rhythms 
and reposition the notion of actuality and immediacy; and, on the other hand, 
to present intermedial temporality as a non-diachronic unfolding of temporal 
garlands. The objective is to demonstrate that, in investigating time in its 
intermedial onto-epistemic and intermedial articulating mode, the nature of 
time, the “what” of temporality, and its operative construction during the 
performance event, the “how” of temporality, cannot be separated if a fuller 
description of the temporal experience is to be conceptualized. In this sense, 
the differential aspect of the radical dramaturgy shows that each actual 
occasion as an activation is nomadic and that exists in the both the concrete 
and differential experience and the construction of space-time.  
 
2.1. 10 Backwards: Differential Temporality and the 
Production of Multi-temporal Rhythms.  
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The intermedial debate regards time as a concept and a springboard to both 
engage with discourses such as aesthetics and draw attention to the 
produced and contingent nature of time. In this sense, the conception of the 
temporal present in intermedial performance, Scheer (2010) explains, is seen 
as ‘functional rather than descriptive’ (Scheer, 2010: 119-120). Similarly, Chiel 
Kattenbelt (2006) suggests that in recent performance practices time both 
appears as a theme and as a constitutive element of the performance. 
Moreover, Kattenbelt aptly states that the use of media technologies in 
performance practices ‘disrupt[s] the traditional reception of time and space’ 
by the audience (Kattenbelt in Bay-Cheng, 2010: 87). Within these lines, he 
also speaks of a ‘temporalization of space and spatialization of time’ in the 
presentational modes that intermedial dramaturgies enable (Kattenbelt in Bay-
Cheng, 2010: 87).  
 
Along the same lines, Bay-Cheng (2010) notes that within recent performance 
practices notions of temporality are fluid.47 Drawing on Lev Manovich (2001), 
she calls for a ‘new temporality of the digital media’ (Bay-Cheng, 2010: 86); 
that is, both Bay-Cheng and Manovich describe a conceptualization of 
temporality as a dramaturgical ‘temporal montage (a composite of multiple 
images in a single moment in time)’ (Manovich in Bay-Chang, 2010: 86) 
where temporal difference mediates continuity in a presentational manner. 
Moreover, Bay-Cheng writes,  
No longer based on linear progression, external measures 
and materiality, time in digital contexts evolved into a 
dynamic, dispersed, yet coherent network of temporal points 
– a time that could encompass, as noted by Foucault, many 
different points simultaneously … a further realization of the 
continuous present … the temporalities of the network 
similarly draw from this notion of the simultaneous, 
continuous present. (Bay-Cheng, 2010: 88) 
 
Bay-Cheng also fittingly notes, 
                                                        
47 In the context of digital culture and post-modern understandings of time, Bay-Cheng (2010) 
also points out that the intermedial debate has incorporated philosophical ideas of time 
simultaneously sharing and engaging with different critical positions such as time as 
‘constructed (Lyotard), time as digitally compressed (Dixon and Smith), regressive 
(Baudrillard), elongated (Virilio), and annihilated (Huyssen)’ (Bay-Cheng, 2010: 86).  
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the experience of time, the new temporality, is one of many 
simultaneous experiences and memories capable of being 
stored and accessed in random order … random instead of 
linear; simultaneous instead of sequential … [a mode of 
experience] that thus reorders time in digital media and 
changes our perception of past, present and future. (Bay-
Cheng, 2010: 89) 
 
In an article titled E-scapes: Performance in the Time of Cyberspace, Alice 
Rayner (2002) describes how recent digital performance practices move away 
from notions of ontological space and time as the “here and now” in their 
dramaturgical manners of staging towards considerations of the performance 
of time. She describes, ‘the ways in which performance aligns with digital 
technologies to resist landscape and geometrical space, and to resituate 
space in the fugitive dimension of time’ (Rayner in Bay-Cheng, 2010: 86).   
 
In Rayner’s way of thinking, Bay-Cheng summarizes, ‘performance occupies 
no place, but rather ontologically exists only in a time’ (Bay-Cheng, 2010: 86); 
that is, in the perceptual and experiential “now” by an audience. In relation to 
her proposals, this chapter repositions the perceptual and experiential “now” 
in intermedial performance as an articulation of intensive and multiple 
temporalities – not described as presentationally ‘fugitive’, as Rayner 
designates, but as an interrelated temporal cadence of re-occurring 
temporalities – as intensities – and as a mutuality of times, therefore, 
stressing the differential aspect of the radical dramaturgy.  
 
Summarizing the aforementioned main points, Kattenbelt, not without merit, 
suggests that intermediality explores temporality as a dynamic network of 
temporal flows that affect the experience of time by a given audience; Rayner 
aptly proposes that intermedial temporality is a rich cadence of temporal 
points; Scheer discusses the intensifying aspect as durational frames of 
intermedial temporality regarding staging modalities; and Bay-Cheng 
appropriately sees temporality as a fluid network of temporal points that are 
not reliant on temporal linearity. However, although this thesis draws from 
these positions, it argues that what is still missing is an efficient way of 
discussing the temporal complexity enabled by intermediality because all of 
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their proposals are still reliant on the phenomenon of intermediality as a 
staging modality and the perceptual manner in which such a modality is 
experienced by “pre-established” attending subjects to the intermedial 
transaction. Subsequently, this chapter radically suggests a working definition 
of intermedial temporal dynamic articulations that stresses the notion of the 
evental and generative in-between in its intensive manner as a tool for the 
intelligibility of intermedial temporality; that is, an emphasis on its evental 
characteristics and the manner in which intermediality constructs a conceptual 
dimension of a given temporal theatrical and aesthetic experience that, most 
importantly, cannot be separated from the construction of the experience 
itself; in other words, the Deleuzian conceptualization of art and aesthetics as 
life. 
 
In relation to this intensive manner, the following diagrammatic mapping 
illustrates and visually amplifies the temporal dramaturgical characteristics of 
10 Backwards – how 10 Backwards produces temporality as temporal 
orchestrations through intensities and densities. The diagrammatic maps also 
help create a visual conceptual picture of multi-linearity and multi-facetedness 
in relation to its temporal articulation. The examples below show how the 
elements or ‘notes’ – a term used by Blast Theory’s Matt Adams to describe 
how the attending variables such as large screen and characters operate to 
articulate temporal intensities – present different intensities (Adams, 2010: 15-
04-2010, interview notes). 
 
The next diagrammatic map images list a series of onto-epistemic attending 
variables that temporally articulate 10 Backwards. The dotted lines represent 
the duration, intensity and presence of each of the listed elements throughout 
the first 26’ of the performance – a dramaturgical blackout occurs at minute 
26. For this reason, the first 26 minutes are critically explored and interrogated 
as a platform to conceptualize the production of intermedial temporality in 10 
Backwards.  
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Figure 4: Diagrammatic map showing temporal intensities on the large screen during 
the first 26 minutes of the performance. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Diagrammatic map showing the performers’ temporal activity during the first 
26 minutes of the performance.  
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Figure 6: Diagrammatic map showing temporal intensities on the small screen during 
the first 26 minutes of the performance. 
 
 
Figure 7: Diagrammatic map showing temporal intensities of theatrical attending 
variables such as costumes and sound effects during the first 26 minutes of the 
performance. 
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As the above graphics illustrate, the presentational intensity of the attending 
temporal variables presents aspects of interrelation; that is, each variable, in 
its intensity and occurrence, help us observe an operative pattern in which the 
matrixed temporal articulation functions to create a temporal environment 
based on multiplicity, repetition, cross-functionality and co-relation. 
Interestingly, when combining the graphic dotted lines into a single graphic 
the constitutive temporal characteristics of 10 Backwards show that all 
elements/notes intertwine to create a temporal conglomerate. This dotted 
stratigraphy shows and illustrates how all mapped elements are equal, 
intertwined, and a fundamental part of the creation of the performance’s 
temporal construction. 
 
 
Figure 8: Diagrammatic map showing temporal intensities during the first 26 minutes 
of the performance. The dotted lines show moments where clusters of temporal 
attending variables amalgamate. 
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This type of interconnectivity at the epistemic level shows that the functioning 
of the variables has a co-dependent and co-constitutive characteristic and, 
thus, a cross-functional articulation of temporal frames is created. 
 
 
 
Intervening dialogic variables (N): N1: Visual Images (i.e. projections of newspapers, 
projections of old pictures, text); N2: Voice (pre-recorded); N3: Dialogue spoken by 
character(s) on the screens; N4: Dialogue between ‘real’ character and virtual character; N5: 
Dialogue between ‘real’ characters; N6: Dialogue between ‘real’ character and the audience; 
N7: Dialogue of temporality (time as topic and/or time as experienced) between characters 
non-screen; N8: Dialogue of temporality (time as topic and/or time as experienced) on the 
screen. ‘Present Events’; N9: Dialogue of temporality (time as topic and/or time as 
experienced) on the screen. ‘Past Events’; N10: Dialogue of temporality (time as topic and/or 
time as experienced) on the screen. ‘Future Events’.  
Intervening large screen variables (LM): LM1: Screen projecting the female character 
(pre-recorded); LM2: Projection of real time (Live feed); LM3: Projection of other spaces/times 
such as urban landscapes (pre-recorded). 
Intervening small screen variables (SM): SM1: Screen projecting the female character 
(pre-recorded); SM2: Projection of real time (Live feed); SM3: Projection of other 
spaces/times such as urban landscapes (pre-recorded). 
Intervening theatrical variables (T): T1: Set; T2: Props; T3: Costumes; T4: Lights; T5: 
Sounds; T5: Screens; T6: Audience; T7: Performers (actual); T8: Performers (virtual). 
Intervening character variables (C): C1: Woman; C2: Man; C3: Man 2 
 
Figure 9: Diagrammatic map showing temporal intensities during the 17- 26 minutes 
of the performance. The graphic shows that all elements are interconnected to 
produce temporality.  
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Also in relation to notions of intensity, the diagrammatic map below visually 
amplifies how the performance presents clusters of occurrences and the 
intensive interlinking of the attending variables to enable the specificities of 
this dramaturgical construction.  
 
 
Intervening dialogic variables (N): N1: Visual Images (i.e. projections of newspapers, 
projections of old pictures, text); N2: Voice (pre-recorded); N3: Dialogue spoken by 
character(s) on the screens; N4: Dialogue between ‘real’ character and virtual character; N5: 
Dialogue between ‘real’ characters; N6: Dialogue between ‘real’ character and audience; N7: 
Dialogue of temporality (time as topic and/or time as experienced) between characters non-
screen; N8: Dialogue of temporality (time as topic and/or time as experienced) on the screen. 
‘Present Events’; N9: Dialogue of temporality (time as topic and/or time as experienced) on 
the screen. ‘Past Events’; N10: Dialogue of temporality (time as topic and/or time as 
experienced) on the screen. ‘Future Events’.  
Intervening large screen variables (LM): LM1: Screen projecting the female character 
(pre-recorded); LM2: Projection of real time (Live feed); LM3: Projection of other spaces/times 
such as urban landscapes (pre-recorded). 
Intervening small screen variables (SM): SM1: Screen projecting the female character 
(pre-recorded); SM2: Projection of real time (Live feed); SM3: Projection of other 
spaces/times such as urban landscapes (pre-recorded). 
Intervening theatrical variables (T): T1: Set; T2: Props; T3: Costumes; T4: Lights; T5: 
Sounds; T5: Screens; T6: Audience; T7: Performers (actual); T8: Performers (virtual). 
Intervening character variables (C): C1: Woman; C2: Man; C3: Man 2 
 
Figure 10: Diagrammatic map showing the temporal intensities of the first 26 minutes 
of the performance. The colours highlight the moments in which the occurrence of 
the temporal attending variables creates temporal clusters.  
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Drawing on these visual amplifications, we suggest that the cross-functionality 
of the attending variables aids the establishment of the evental in-betweeness 
that this work suggests and aptly highlight the temporalizing aspects of the 
intervening non-human agencies. It also helps articulate the repositioning of 
what has been termed ‘hybrid time’ (Benford and Giannachi, 2011: 71) into 
‘temporal articulations of mutuality’; and a re-conceptualization of the actual, 
departing from notions of “liveness” and the “now” as a diachronic vitalism to a 
categorization of the actual, as the following will show, as a construction of 
temporal multiplicities and mutualities.  
 
Firstly, 10 Backwards, as noted, in its temporal presentational aesthetics is an 
interrogation into the nature and construction of time. In this sense, 10 
Backwards is characterized by ‘the intention of utilizing the specificity of time 
as a mode of presentation to turn time as such into an object of the aesthetic 
experience’ (Lehmann, 2006: 156). In its use and implementation of time, 10 
Backwards reveals time as a Deleuzian and Whiteheadian multiplicity, 
undermining a temporal conceptualization of time as equated by the “now”, 
“liveness” and notions of presentness. Within these parameters, this thesis 
argues that 10 Backwards suitably demonstrates that there is no such thing 
as an essentialist present, but, as John Mullarkey (1999) aptly posits, a 
‘multiplicity of presents, each with a correlatively different past and future’ 
(Mullarkey, 1999: 54). Furthermore, he writes, ‘every moment brings with it 
something “radically new”’ (Mullarkey, 1999: 9-10), which can be read to imply 
a constant re-activation of the dramaturgical temporal parameters. 
 
Secondly, Steve Benford and Gabriella Giannachi (2011) validly explain that 
the temporal structure of technologically informed performance praxis 
presents ideas of time as a ‘hybrid time’ (Benford and Giannachi, 2011: 71). 
This hybrid temporal organization, they explain, creates new forms of 
temporal features, which engage with notions of fluidity and co-existence, 
and, in this regard, a sense of ‘between time’ (Benford and Giannachi, 2011: 
71). In proposing a framework for describing the presentational nature of 
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hybrid temporal structures, Benford and Giannachi conceptualize the aspects 
of the hybrid nature of temporal inter-weavings and interstices. They write,  
the temporal nature is also essentially hybrid, involving 
multiple time scales that rub up against one another. The 
hybrid temporal universe created by this kind of experiences 
not only accommodates embedded and emergent temporal 
narrative constructions, each with their own varying and 
occasionally even contrasting tempo-rhythms, but also 
manages its inhabitants’ relationship to clock time. (Benford 
and Giannachi, 2011: 95)  
 
Unlike naturalist or “traditional” theatre, 10 Backwards shows a temporal 
articulation in which elements such as slowing-down, halting and even 
speeding up involve a different aspect of temporal structure, and, most 
notably, combine multiple time layers, creating a narrative of mereotopological 
dimensions. In this sense, this research finds that this notion of hybridity does 
not fully account for the temporal complexity that 10 Backwards explores for 
two reasons: first, the notion of hybrid time appears to imply a lack of 
consistency; that is, one temporal structure, in its merging with another, loses 
or leaves behind some of its characteristics.48 Second, hybridity can be also 
conceptualized as subduable; that is, in the merging of temporal structures, 
one structure presents more influence, weight, and/or importance than the 
other.  
 
As a result of this, this chapter repositions notions of temporal hybridity in 
terms of temporal intensive mutualities. In general, the term mutuality implies 
notions of reciprocity, interdependence and symbiosis. In this sense, the 
performative temporal frames that articulate the intermedial event are better 
understood as a relation of mutual dependence and action – as the 
Whiteheadian nexuses – and a reciprocal relation of interdependent frames – 
a relation that can be described as directed and received by each other 
towards the other and that conveys a sense of temporal equality.  
 
                                                        
48 In a private conversation with Andy Lavender (2009), he discussed that the term hybridity 
seems to imply a lack of consistency. He suggested that in media contexts would be more 
appropriate to speak of interfaces and mutual inter-relationships (Lavender, 2009: 01-12-
2009, interview notes). 
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Within these parameters, Whitehead and Deleuze are relevant to support the 
argument of this chapter because of their critical engagement with notions of 
in-betweeness, mutuality, the production of time as processes and the actual 
as incorporating potentialities and virtualizations. The suggested temporal in-
between here involves movement, fluidity and flexibility, and a temporal 
matrixed whole without a fixed centre.49 This is a conceptualization of time 
that encompasses many different points simultaneously and where the 
present time becomes continuous time; that is, a temporal understanding that 
presents no hierarchy – a temporal structure that breaks with the traditional 
performance concepts of temporal linearity as a vitalist “here and now”.   
 
Claire Colebrook (2009) posits that temporal difference is important in 
understanding the event as a temporal in-between. In Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze carefully delineates the process in which repetition and 
difference coincide: broadly, a differential process always implies repetition 
and repetition is always differential in a processual manner – in a dynamic 
interplay, an incorporated difference is repeated, generating a series of 
independent repetitions, each with a productive and creative potential. In a 
Whiteheadian ‘becoming of continuity’ (Whitehead, 1928: 35), each temporal 
repetition, grasped as temporal cadences, creates the following one in 
manner of constant re-configurations. Clearly, these notions of complex 
repetition through internal difference and constant re-configurations among 
others present an apt framework to analyze the temporal aesthetic qualities of 
10 Backwards.  
 
If we understand the idea of time within 10 Backwards as ceaseless change 
and becoming, rather than the container of such a change, as in Kant, time 
becomes an explorative platform for differential movement. In this sense, 
Deleuze, inspired by Bergson, articulates the idea of the present as 
                                                        
49 Sarah Bay-Cheng (2010) explains that intermedial temporality can be described as a 
Deleuzian rhizome (Bay-Cheng, 2010: 89). However, we find the term matrix more 
appropriate to discuss intermedial temporality because, on a close reading of What is 
Philosophy? and A Thousand Plateaus where Deleuze and Guattari explain the concept of 
the rhizome, they point out that the rhizome presents no temporal articulation and, generally, 
dramaturgy is always temporal. 
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constituted by the co-existence of multiple durations. Broadly, for Deleuze 
there is no single “here and now”, but several different and self-differing 
actualities. In relation to duration, Deleuze (1998), 
Duration is always the location and the environment of 
differences in kind; it is even their totality and multiplicity. 
There are no differences in kind except in duration – while 
space in nothing other than the location, the environment, the 
totality of differences in degree. (Deleuze, 1988: 32)  
 
Drawing on this definition, the focus here is to interrogate 10 Backwards and 
see how time is conceived within the theorization of differential presents that 
Deleuzian duration implies, shifting away from the notions of the “now”, 
presentness and liveness as immediate, essentialist and authentic to the 
notion of the “now” as differential.50 Furthermore, the focus is also to conceive 
the “now” appearing as phenomenologically inaccessible outside the notion of 
the event. This understanding problematizes any notion of experiential time 
simply grasped as the immediate “here and now” and sees time as a realm 
beyond experience as such.51  
 
10 Backwards is presented as a network of temporalities shaped onstage 
between the fleshed characters and the pre-recorded characters on screen. 
The following are samples of the dialogue that Niki establishes with herself 
through the small screen:  
1.18 minute: New Year’s 1999 … so what are you doing for 
New Year’s eve? I don’t know … Two years in the future. 
Hopefully, I have the deposit for a home, so you have 
something to aspire. I am 31 years old now. 
 
3.48 minute: I am 34 years old now. Maybe I’ll have a second 
home. I don’t care what that is … some kind of chalet or 
something to escape to. Hopefully, I’ll still have all of my 
                                                        
50 Deleuzian scholar Todd May (2005) describes how ‘[Deleuzian] difference in itself is 
founding for identity, but does not appear as such (as difference itself) within those identities’ 
(May, 2003: 145). Identity, in this sense, is not equated with presence in an essentialist “here 
and now” or liveness but in the constitution of differential processes (May, 2003: 140-145).  
 
51 As Laura Cull (2009) aptly points out it comes as no surprise, then, that Deleuzian thought 
has started to enter the theatrical performance studies field given that performance is always 
a time-based art, a durational encounter between the materiality and semioticity of the 
dramaturgy. 
 
 132 
family. They will all be around. 
 
16.55 minute: I am now on the 9th year. I am freaked. I am 
nearly 40. I am thinking back when I was 29 and I feel I’ve 
done a lot … 30s. I am thinking back. Where have all the 
years gone? 
 
21.29 minute: I turn the final year into the future. I am 40 now 
and it is 2009.  
 
As the dialogues show, the temporal articulation is a network where multiple 
temporal points interact simultaneously, hence, stressing the 
mereotopological aspect of the narrative.52 Within the “live”, in the “now”, the 
“live” Niki interacts with the pre-recorded Niki who appears to be placed in a 
different temporal cadence (see figure 2). This, in turn, creates an overall 
temporal frame in which the “now” requires an understanding that must be 
grasped as an encounter with temporal difference. In this sense, the “now”, as 
the dialogue shows, is an interface that occupies a temporal inter-zone of 
multiple points of entrance – as a “suspended” time that can be accessed 
from any point – where the experience and construction of temporality is one 
of many simultaneously orchestrated (see figure 9).  
 
In 10 Backwards, each point of the experiential present accumulates – as a 
mutuality – from other domains of temporality where time does not always 
flow according to a chronological line; rather, according to an extraordinarily 
complex mixture of temporal relations (see Serres, 2008). As in Whitehead, 
every temporal frame is defined by its temporal relationship to other frames. In 
other words, the presentness of the event in 10 Backwards is constituted by 
the multi-temporal and multi-linear relationships formed between each 
temporal actual entity – each frame. In this sense, the application of analogue 
                                                        
52 Michel Foucault identified the postmodern period as the ‘epoch of simultaneity’ and 
juxtaposition. There is a clear transition from classical ideas of time as lineal and progressive, 
to modernist and later postmodernist ideas of time as a constellation, to most recent 
conceptualizations such as Deleuze’s identifications of time as a matrix of interconnections. 
Further, in The Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation (1978), Derrida writes: 
‘[in relation to understanding the present, it can be described as] a present outside time, a 
non-present. The present offers itself as such, appears, presents itself, opens up the stage of 
time or the time of the stage only by harboring its own intestine difference, and only in the 
interior fold of its original repetition’ (Derrida, 1978: 57). 
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and digital technologies in 10 Backwards not only enables multiple variations 
and intensities of time, but it also produces the time differentially, or as 
Deleuze (2000) writes in The Logic of Sense,  
Only the past and the future inhere or subsist in time. Instead 
of a present, which absorbs the past and the future, a future 
and past divide the present at every instant and subdivide it 
ad infinitum into past and future, in both directions at once. 
(Deleuze, 2000, 164) 
 
The use of pre-recorded material and live feed in 10 Backwards emphasizes 
the presentation of time through technological mediation, altering the 
experience of time from a chronological linearity to a differential and multi-
temporal experiential manner. The employment of technological devices 
enables the construction of a temporality that is dramaturgically mediated to 
provide for the potential of actualizations of both a series of multi-temporal 
cadences and a state of presentness in which the past and the future are 
constantly re-presented in the continuous present by making explicit the use 
of technologies in its dramaturgy; the mediatized encounter, in which the 
specific rhythms of the pre-recorded, the “live” and the live feed are 
concerned with making the present of time differential, enables the different 
mereotopological narrative occasions to form. 
 
From a constructivist point of view, the experience of time in intermedial 
practices should be simply grasped as the “live” in the immediacy of the onto-
epistemic construction as an intra-action. This specific sense of temporality 
relies on the exploration of the juxtaposition of different temporal 
dimensionalities and the inter-involvement of the theatrical and the 
cinematic/pre-recorded dramaturgical environment where the human and the 
non-human co-activate each other’s agencies. Seen thus, the term “live”, we 
suggest, can be conceived to incorporate both the human and non-human as 
life. In doing so, the immediacy of the temporal experience as a successive 
interrelation of generative frames is presented as a temporal movement 
whose chronological division in the “live” dimensionality of the execution of the 
event renders the understanding of ontology as the “now” obsolete and 
suggests an understanding of temporality that is essentially grasped as 
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temporal nodes, gates and portals, through which the immediate “now” calls 
to be repositioned as an immanence of traced temporal differentiations. The 
difference here in applying a constructivist epistemic framework is that the 
“live” becomes a temporal node merging the different temporalities together 
and, thus, needs to be conceptualized as radical because it requires a 
different reading than those explored on the ontological debates. 
 
In this way, the presentness of the moment produces and displays a double 
sense of multi-temporality: on the one hand, we are aware of the temporal 
rhythms, as a medium in a constant making, of each mediatized attending 
variable; that is, the production of time by the performance calls attention to 
itself, to how the production of time is being produced by constant processes 
of re-mediation (see figure 3). For instance, the technological manner of 
working of the pre-recorded materials shown on the screen, or the manner in 
which Niki holds the camera as a technical device, focuses the lenses and 
zooms in the image during the live feed cadences. In this way, the agency of 
the digital element and Niki’s agency combine – it highlights the emergent and 
situated activity of the intra-action – in the constructivist temporal creation of 
the experience, enabling relationships where multiple levels of human and 
non-human agency exist. As Barker (2012) says, ‘the process of using 
technological tools to interact with the world reveals itself to be fundamental to 
our experience of the world’ (Barker, 2012: 134). On the other hand, the 
presentation of time is also multi-temporal because each mediatized element 
explores and shows a different temporal orchestration where the past and the 
future synchronize contemporaneously with the present. As Deleuze writes, 
‘the past and the future do not designate instants distinct from a supposed 
present instant, but rather the dimensions of the present itself as far as it is a 
contraction of instants (Deleuze, 1994: 71). In this manner, the convergence – 
as tributary small water streams and creeks flowing into a main river – of all 
these temporal orchestrations into the presentness of the moment categorizes 
the presentness of that moment as one composed of differential multiplicities, 
rendering, yet again, obsolete in the process notions of presentness, as 
described by Power and Fischer-Lichte, as a “here and now” essentialist 
ontological category.  
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Another aspect in 10 Backwards presents interesting analytical possibilities.  
Each interaction between Niki and the incorporated technologies can be 
grasped as a section of the present within a larger event – as a singularity, as 
Deleuze would say, within the complexity of an event. In this sense, we are 
presented with a section of the present that has been elongated in such a way 
that it infiltrates the experiential present with the experienced past and the 
“yet-to-come” experience of the future: a ‘multiplicity of [temporal] processes, 
all extending over one another and all shaped by those things to which they 
connect’ (Barker, 2012: 135). In other words, the present moment expands – 
as a viscosity – to amalgamate past and future. This is not an understanding 
of time as hybrid, as Benford and Giannachi posit. Instead, time here 
becomes mutual, stressing the relation between Chronos and Aeon where the 
processes of being actualized shift through differential temporal planes. 
Refusing to experience time as linear, Niki engages with temporal extensions 
of her past and her future (see figure 2). Her temporal experience – and her 
trying to make sense of it as a learning process – is an elongation of her 
presentness in the experiential living present into the realm of an expanded 
temporality.  
 
In his engagements with Deleuze, Manuel DeLanda (2002) writes, ‘time is 
scalar, the present may be longer or shorter, temporally, for different 
oscillations … the length of the present is relative, but these relative presents 
are nested inside one another’ (DeLanda, 2002: 10). In this way, Niki’s 
presentness becomes an aggregation of moments that expand into temporal 
relations of different intensive contemporaneousness. The organizational 
dramaturgical structuring of the attending variables, the relationships between 
the “live”, the pre-recorded and live feed, and the mediating – as an intra-
actionist vitalist process of constructing mediation – relationships between 
them elucidate the becoming of her experience of the present moment as a 
continuous and constant re-conditioning that is in itself the outcome of its own 
process (see figure 13). 10 Backwards, distinctly operates with temporal 
experimentation as scalar, presenting it as multi-temporal, bringing forward 
the past and the future backwards into a continuous present. Engulfed in 
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multi-temporality, this continuous present shows scales of time concurrently 
and intensively experienced as non-linear sequences where, in its 
constructive aesthetic, the boundaries between the temporal pre-recorded 
and the “live” become blurry. In fact, they dissolve. Temporality, here, is a 
system, rhythmically articulated and treated as both suspended and concrete 
and expanded and contracted intensively. 
 
In the process of using the analogue and digital technologies as objects, not 
only is Niki sensing the objects, but she is also enacting sensory processes, 
involving herself – pragmatically and intellectually – in the process and 
enabling the participant subjects-audiences to be part of her processes of 
understanding; at times, she even explains how she is activativating the 
technological objects. In engaging with the technological world, she activates 
her whole human sensorium, as in Deleuze’s haptic, and learns through that 
process as a situated activity. Seen thus, ‘technology becomes fundamentally 
temporal as it intervenes with the processes by which … [the participant 
subjects] make meaning of the world, attaching itself to and affecting these 
processes’ (Barker, 2012: 134). Simply put, the agential technologies vitally 
enhance the haptic in relation to intelligibility. In this way, Niki, as a 
participating subject, is mutually connected with her multi-temporal and haptic 
world. Indeed, it is that connection as an intra-action, rather than being 
reducible to either of the elements connected, that enables the haptic and the 
knowledge-making characteristics of the constructivist aesthetic.  
 
The mediatization of the intermedial dramaturgy in 10 Backwards through 
which the network of attending variables and the participant subjects operate 
juxtaposes linear temporal progress with the radical temporal variations of the 
mediatized dramaturgical systems. In this respect, temporality in 10 
Backwards is investigated via the specificity of intermedial generation of 
mediality, as a vitalist process, in its constructive temporal aesthetic. Here, 10 
Backwards – and Blast Theory in general – in the mediatization of its 
dramaturgical world presents and re-orders temporal experience, implicitly 
emphasizing how each temporal plane of composition opens up to virtual and 
actual modes of temporal experience, hence, emphasizing its radical aspect. 
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In short, the above-discussed conceptualizations have seen the debate move 
from static, essentialist and linear ideas of time into a conceptualization of 
time that is dynamic and responsive; that is, a time that, in presenting, 
articulating and constructing itself, becomes present and immediate at the 
very moment of its becoming actuality. 10 Backwards brings the virtual events 
of the past and the future into the actuality of the continuous present moment 
through digitalized dramaturgical processes. By employing strategies such as 
slowness, freezing-outs, backwards and forwards temporal loops and 
repetitions, to list a few, the actuality of the present moment of each temporal 
constructive frame in 10 Backwards needs to be repositioned as an actuality 
understood in terms of mutuality and multiplicity and comprehended beyond 
the scope of unsuitable notions of actuality, as explained by Mock, Phelan 
and Fischer-Lichte.  
 
2.2. 10 Backwards: Repositioning Actuality.  
 
10 Backwards involves a direct presentation of time, highlighting an attention 
to the nature of time and constitutes a giving of time that explores different 
possibilities in regards to “clock-time”, “real-time”, “narrative time” and so 
forth. But, 10 Backwards is also more than a presentation of time. In its use of 
repetitions, loops, slowness, waiting, fastness, and stillness, 10 Backwards 
also constructs time as difference and as an encounter with multiple 
temporalities, in which the present moment is constituted as a multiplicity of 
presents iterating back and forth correlatively with different pasts and futures. 
The mutual interference of these temporal orchestrations, where the present 
demonstrates interfaces in a process of mutual co-dependence, creates a 
type of performance praxis that requires a repositioned definition of the term 
and the debate around notions of actuality. In what follows, the 
conceptualization of the term actualization in performance debates is 
rendered inappropriate to theorize the temporal intricacies of 10 Backwards. 
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2.2.1. 10 Backwards: Actuality as a Construction of 
Multiplicities and Mutualities. 
 
The term actualization, as noted in the introduction, has taken centre stage in 
performance debates regarding the ontology of performance, particularly with 
the writings of Mock and Schechner. In relation to the particularities of 10 
Backwards, however, this thesis argues that an analysis of actuality as 
differential in terms of its mutual and differential aspects and a repositioning of 
the term, encompassing the Deleuzian virtual and actual, will offer a full 
account of the specificities of intermedial temporality as explored in 10 
Backwards. Following the philosophical proposals of John Mullarkey (1999), 
this research suggests that, rather than virtualize other actualities and bring 
them to the realm of the “maybe possible”, actuality can, instead, be 
categorized as the differential aspect of time (Mullarkey, 1999: 469-472). 
Mullarkey writes,  
there is [not] one type of actual perception with the virtual 
existing beyond and around it (as a reservoir of difference) 
but rather that there are numerous different forms of 
actualities that virtualize their mutual differences … those 
differences are consigned to a halo surrounding that single 
actuality and called ‘the virtual’ or ‘the memory of the past’. 
(Mullarkey in Cull, 2009a: 211) 
 
In this sense, this multiplicity of actualities occurs: on the one hand, at the 
moment of the encounter, and, on the other hand, at the level and intensity of 
temporal experiential changes that intermedial performance enables. This is 
not a classification that goes beyond the experiential, but one in which 
actuality is the enactment of multiplicity and mutuality. 
 
Mullarkey explains that, within the Deleuzian definition of duration, the term 
actualization needs to be reconfigured and adapted. Along the same lines, 
Keith Robinson (2009) describes actuality within process philosophy as: ‘the 
product of the process of creative abstraction. Actuality is existence in the 
fullest sense of this term’ (Robinson, 2009: 220). Similarly, Cull (2009a) 
describes how the distinctions between space and time, and matter and 
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memory lead Deleuze to characterize actualization according to the 
conceptual pairing of the virtual and the actual. She follows that this Deleuzian 
conceptual characterization of actuality ‘dismantles the binary between the 
present and the absence of the past, inviting us to think instead of the 
becoming of the present and the virtual presence of the past’ (Cull, 2009a: 
209). Likewise, Deleuzian scholar Constantin Boundas suggests, 
The present can no longer be thought of as becoming past 
after a new present has come to replace it, nor can the past 
be thought of as being constituted after it has ceased to be 
present … we are indeed asked to think that the entire past 
preserves itself and, therefore co-exists with every present. 
(Boundas in Cull 2009a: 209) 
 
Within these lines, the constitution of the past and the present coincide. It is a 
kind of simultaneous articulation of reality as both virtual and actual. Mullarkey 
appropriately explains that actuality is normally described – as the 
presentness and liveness debates do – in terms of the essentialist ontological 
and the phenomenological. In contrast, Mullarkey argues that, within the 
parameters of the Deleuzian actual and virtual, actualization must be 
understood as a series of actualities. In describing how actualization has been 
linked to the actual and how the virtual has been conceived as some kind of 
hidden potential, Mullarkey crucially acknowledges that this description limits 
the scope of the perspective. He suggests that actualization should not imply 
a one type of present everywhere in relation to what is past and what is future, 
but a multiplicity of presents that can be thought of as an enlarged and 
differential multiplication. In this way, the actualization of the present moment 
also includes, according to Mullarkey and Cull, the reality and potentiality that 
the binary actual and virtual encompasses.  
 
Here is where and how the concept of actualism, as proposed by Mullarkey 
and Cull, becomes central to the concerns of this chapter: to deconstruct the 
notion of performance as ontologically ephemeral within an essentialist 
ontological reading of the “here and now”, and to put forth a conceptualization 
of temporal intermedial praxis in 10 Backwards not only as an actualism of 
multiplicities, as Mullarkey and Cull very aptly discuss, but also, we argue, as 
an evental construction of temporal intensive mutualities – as a viscosity. With 
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this in mind, temporality categorizes intermedial performance as a plurality of 
mutually informed presents or, as Cull writes, ‘a multiplicity of inhuman as well 
as human ways of being in time’ (Cull, 2009a: 213).  
 
Significantly, and drawing on Cull and Mullarkey, this proposed approach to 
intermedial temporality, within the conceptualizing parameters of actualism – 
as an evental articulation of mutualities – promotes one that is not reliant on 
anthropocentric perspectives regarding a phenomenal subject attending to a 
reality as Fischer-Lichte does. This distinct approach gives support to an 
enlarged experience of time and to a consideration of intermedial temporality 
as a viscosity of the present – a viscosity that implies, as the diagrammatic 
maps have visually amplified (see figures 4, 5, 6 and 7), both, on the one 
hand, frequency, duration and intensity and, on the other hand, a fundamental 
encounter with the density of the present moment, or as Cull discusses: ‘as 
presents, plural’ (Cull, 2009a: 213). Rather than describing intermedial 
performance, with a simple and generic “here and now”, as ontological 
authenticity and ephemerality, if we follow Phelan’s postulates, a new 
definition arises in which the temporal aspect of ontology asserts both the 
primacy of a process philosophy’s notion of becoming and the possibilities of 
intermedial temporality understood as a differential and multiple relation of 
present mutualities.  
 
This proposed understanding of temporal actualism as multiplicities – as Cull 
and Mullarkey discuss – takes into consideration the epistemic functionality 
and reality, as combining the Deleuzian virtual and actual, of multiple and 
mutual actualities; that is, not just a single actual, but a multiplicity of actuals 
in which the Deleuzian virtual and the actual intertwine in and throughout the 
evental in-betweeness of its own potentiality. As such, beyond merely 
describing temporality according to the virtual/actual distinction, we, drawing 
on Mullarkey, need to clearly consider the temporal intensive presence of 
multiple actualities – as the moments in which Niki interacts with both screens 
intensively trying to understand the possibilities of her own life – even when 
those actualities are invisible, imperceptible and yet-to-come; these actualities 
‘are always actual in and for themselves’ (Mullarkey, 2003: 481).  
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2.2.2. 10 Backwards: Actuality as a Rhythmic and Differential 
Construction of Slowness, Waiting, Repetition and Imitation. 
 
The notion of the actuality proposed here falls in line with the epistemic 
functionality of the constructivist intermedial event. In this context, the 
exploration of temporality in 10 Backwards presents a series of operating 
strategies that reposition actuality in terms of its rhythmic temporal 
characteristics. Such a recalibration sees the unfolding of temporality during 
the intermedial event in 10 Backwards as an in-between process of 
experiential expectancy; that is, it can be said to enfold – as an intra-action – 
the participant subjects, in an instantaneously interfacial space in which 
production and presentation of experiential temporal rhythms move 
backwards and forwards in a manner of mutuality.53  
 
The first distinctive strategy of the temporal articulation that 10 Backwards 
presents is the use of slowness. In the context of re-configuring temporal 
dimensions, 10 Backwards explores the use of motion control using non-linear 
editing. In doing so, the performance engages with and constructs a temporal 
dramaturgy that goes beyond linear notions of time. This very specific use of 
editing, slowness of the time frame in both the screens and the “live” action, 
creates the effect of a stammering and stuttering image – an analogy that 
Deleuze uses in Cinema 1 (2005) and Cinema 2 (2005) – in which the main 
dramaturgical frame of the image can be seen in-between temporal 
articulations. The compositional frame is re-ordered at a micro-temporal level 
and sometimes it is even stopped and frozen – what we can also call a-
                                                        
53 This aspect of experiential rhythms is close to Edmund Husserl’s understanding of time in 
relation to phenomenological experience. David Woodruff-Smith (2007) explains Husserl’s 
lectures on time consciousness published under the title On the Phenomenology of the 
Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Husserl describes the experience of time as a 
double ‘temporally structured’ flow. This double temporal structure receives a detailed 
analysis in his lectures on time consciousness. Husserl explains that the temporal flow of 
consciousness plays a fundamental role in our experience of the world around us. In the 
temporal flow, Husserl describes, we are conscious of the events flowing off in time around 
us. But in the same flowing experience we are also conscious of events flowing off in time in 
our own stream of experience. It must be pointed out, though, that Husserlian 
phenomenology is quite different from the proposals that Whitehead and Deleuze 
established.  
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temporality. A-temporality is not understood here to imply any metaphysical 
temporal categories but as “paused” time, as “something not expected”, as 
something not related to what has happened before, and as a stop of 
temporal flow.54  
 
 
Figure 11: Diagrammatic map showing different presentational temporal aspects of 
the small screen.  
 
As an illustration of this aspect, the above diagrammatic map shows how at a 
given specific moment both screens present a split in which the images 
projected as live feed and the pre-recorded images freeze. Dramaturgically 
the actress on the stage stops (and/or freezes) to observe how the temporal 
explorations that the screens create stops. This dramaturgical strategy makes 
the participant subjects clearly aware of the specificities of the production of 
                                                        
54 Yuval Dolev (2007) explains that the metaphysics of time and temporality have emphasized 
notions of reality in terms of ‘tense’ and ‘tenseless’ temporal paradigms in both continental 
and analytic philosophical traditions. In general, Dolev explains that the tenseless relations 
can be defined as ‘relations of succession: we give the tenseless relation between events e1 
and e2 when we say that e1 is later than, or earlier than, or simultaneous with e2’ (Dolev, 
2007: 5). Broadly, ‘the location of an event with respect to the present is referred to as the 
tensed relation of the event’ (Dolev, 2007: 5). It can also be said that tensed theorists are also 
known as presentists and that tenseless theorists are known as eternalists. The now wide-
spread use of presentist and eternalist theories within temporal metaphysics have provided 
philosophical backgrounds with a plethora of terms such as ‘tenseless relations’, ‘tensed 
facts’, and ‘tenseless truth conditions’ to name but a few. Dolev explains, ‘Tensed theorists 
contend, to put it roughly, that there is an ontological difference between the present, on the 
one hand, and the past and the future, on the other hand. “All and only present things are 
real” serves as a compressed expression of the view in most of its incarnations. Sometimes 
the tensed view focuses on time’s passage, on how future events are made “real” by 
becoming present and then lose their ontological superiority as they move into the past. 
Tenseless theorists reject this ontological hierarchy, asserting instead that all events are 
“equally real” and that the distinction between past, present, and future pertains to our 
experience and to the way we think and speak, but not to the things we experience, think, and 
speak about’ (Dolev, 2007: 6). 
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time; that is, the temporal dramaturgy becomes self-referential and calls 
attention to its own producing, authorizing and staging of time. 
 
The disrupted and fragmented editing is an intrinsic component with variable 
intensities and frequencies. This is a mediatized re-composition of the 
presence of the main character, in which micro-durations are both repeated 
and stopped. In this sense, they are differential. These re-compositions occur 
in the now-repositioned present moment – as plural presents, following Cull – 
and encompass a variety of different durations that allow for an experience of 
the present moment, the “now”, as elongated, stopped, fragmented, and 
restructured.55 Here, the present moment ‘is constantly re-presented in the 
present’ (Barker, 2012: 74).  
 
The live feed projections on the screen position themselves between stillness 
and motion, at once temporalizing and aestheticizing technology in a passage 
toward the next constructive aesthetic exploration of temporality (Barker, 
2012: 74). In this scenario, 10 Backwards is – using Deleuze’s analogy in 
relation to the cinematic – a postcard-like orchestration, which freezes the 
moment, reducing its temporal articulation to mere notations, as Adams would 
describe, while at once veiling the process by means of a highlighted temporal 
orchestration. Barker writes,  
The postcard marks a particular moment in time but is 
uprooted from that particular space and time as it is 
transported through the mail. This temporal information is not 
something that is realized within the postcard by the actuality 
of its image. Rather the temporal information surrounds the 
postcard as virtuality, as information that exists outside the 
visual field presented … [this information is] felt as multi-
temporality. (Barker, 2012: 73) 
 
This is a temporal orchestration of the experiential present in which – as in 
Deleuze’s synthesis of time – the memory of the past and the projection of the 
future get incorporated, becoming real in the interlacing between the actual 
                                                        
55 These micro-durations and extensions of the present moment call to mind works such as 
Douglas Gordon’s 24 Hour Psycho (1993) and Bill Viola’s The Passions (2003) and The 
Quintet of the Astonished (2001), where slow motions and fragmented moments create 
machine-like inscriptions of time into the parameters of human experience. 
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and the virtual. In this sense, even temporal stillness presents motion. The 
motion allows temporal stillness to be both fragmented and unified, forming 
context and allowing difference as a whole but multiple entirety.   
 
 
 
Figure 12: 10 Backwards still image. Niki sees herself magnified on the screens. This 
magnification both slows down and speeds up the movement of the image on the 
screen. Copyright: Blast Theory. 
 
 
The images are so magnified, at times, that the temporal fragment blurs into 
ever-shifting patterns of temporality, stressing its differential manner. In short, 
there is no optimal point from which to comprehend the live feed projections if 
attempted from a perspective of a linear temporality. The result of this 
dramaturgical strategy is the estrangement of a chronological time reduced to 
pieces and pulverized – as in Deleuze’s shattered glass analogy. The 
temporal articulation explored through the live feed projections requires the 
participant subject to occupy “real time” in order to experience the 
technological medium. The production of temporality is magnified and the 
material production of time is emphasized. In this way, yet again, the 
analogue and digital technologies in 10 Backwards call attention to 
themselves as a productive means – technologies as temporalizing – to 
create the experiential moment.   
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In these temporal magnifications, temporality occurs and goes by slowly in 10 
Backwards. The time-based nature of projections is intrinsically related to the 
appearance of the technology as a temporalizing factor.  
 
 
Figure 13: 10 Backwards still image. Niki records herself and projects the images 
using live feed on the screen. Copyright: Blast Theory.  
 
 
Barker discusses how, in general, in digital practices ‘time is not presented as 
a linear flow, but rather as recursive. Past events repeat, being re-presented 
in the present’ (Barker, 2012: 93). Furthermore, the participant subject 
‘watches the events in slow time and experiences the affects of these events 
in everyday time. Two levels of duration are thus presented, the slow time of 
the work and the time of the viewer; both come together to constitute the 
event of the viewing experience’ (Barker, 2012: 92). Drawing on these 
remarks, Blast Theory, we suggest, uses technology as a platform to both 
atomize and amplify human perception at the moment of the performative 
construction, dissecting its temporal mechanics in order to construct a 
temporal metaphor of temporal memory as the traces of the original moment 
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that, although both halted and repeated, are preserved, as temporally 
suspended, faithfully in the cadences of temporality.  
 
Temporality here is both accelerated and slowed, and contracted and 
extended in its eventfulness. In this sense, temporality can be said to exist in 
the differential liminal and produce both temporal extendedness and 
instantaneousness, or as Barker proposes, the present ‘continuously drawing 
into itself the immediate past … creating multiple scales of time 
simultaneously’ (Barker, 2012: 96). The consequence of this is the collapse of 
the present as an ontological essence and a linear unfolding. The flowing 
intermedial present, in its constant tendency towards newness, becomes both 
intimate and immediate through the mediated characteristics of technology as 
a factor in the temporalizing of the aesthetic where presentness becomes a 
temporal and intensive viscosity. Hence, the disruption of teleological – cause 
and effect – temporality becomes yet another temporal strategy in Blast 
Theory’s intermedial practice, which replaces teleological temporality with 
temporal loops, condensing, elongating and expanding time within moments 
of repetition.  
 
In one of the narrative sequences of 10 Backwards, Niki uses a video camera 
to record herself eating cereals.56 During this sequence, she constantly tries 
to perfect the manner in which she eats them by way of recording herself and 
repeating the actions. At times she is very careful in her repetitions, learning 
and repeating the patterns she observes on the just-recorded material, 
creating a staccato of live moments that mutually refer to each other. At other 
times, she becomes rather obsessive and neurotic, almost uncontrollable and 
even making fun of herself. Throughout this sequence, a voice-over tells her, 
while giving her instructions, that this learning process is a part of her trying to 
understand about herself. She listens attentively. The sequence temporally 
synchronizes Niki to the pre-recorded material and to the live feed. In doing 
so, the temporal cadence of the performative frame is sub-divided into several 
internal micro temporal sequences that mutually infiltrate each other.  
                                                        
56 In his conceptualization of the subject of intermedial performance as a digital double, Steve 
Dixon (2003) also uses this 10 Backwards’ sequence to illustrate his positions.  
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In this sense, the construction of reality ‘is not constituted by the elements that 
are captured by  … [each] medium. Rather the medium is used in order to 
translate the emotional effect of this reality’ (Barker, 2012: 86). Conceived 
thus, the process of mediation in 10 Backwards creates temporal aesthetic 
temporalizations where time grasped as timing enables the experiential flux of 
time and it is constitutive of this flux. In this ‘any-instant-whatever’ (Deleuze, 
2005: 6), the differential experience of time provokes affective responses to 
the use and production of temporality. Moreover, the fundamental encounter 
between the technological and the human in relation to temporal 
understandings,  
is a condition in which material actions and processes can be 
understood transductively in relation to the specific 
information technologies with which they interact. This 
transduction amounts to a temporal transaction whereby the 
… [non-human] system and the human system work through 
each other. (Barker, 2012: 139) 
 
As a temporal transaction, this experiential manner brings temporality in 10 
Backwards to a realm of temporal modulations of affects through which the 
participant subjects, both performers and spectators, are triggered emotionally 
and intellectually within the radically heterogeneous dramaturgical formations. 
 
The second observed strategy in 10 Backwards is the use of waiting as a 
temporal articulation – waiting as a time of anticipation, a time of anxiety and 
a time for anticipating the future. In describing temporal anticipation, Deleuze 
(1988) uses the metaphor of sugar dissolving into a glass of water. Cull 
explains how Deleuze emphasizes how, when dissolving, the sugar changes 
in a differential temporal process (in its dissolving the sugar cube presents a 
rhythmic and intensive process that changes its form, shape and solidity). He 
writes,  
It has a duration, a rhythm of duration, a way of being in time 
that is at least partially revealed in the process of its 
dissolving and that shows how sugar differs in its kind not 
only from other things but first and foremost from itself. 
(Deleuze in Cull, 2009a: 216) 
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The example of the melting sugar helps describe how the anticipating aspect 
in the temporal articulation reveals a relationship between time and logic – an 
expectation that things may come to the fore early, that things may only last 
for a specific length of time, and/or that things may potentially never happen 
(Cull, 2009a: 216-217). Further, the strategy of waiting also puts an emphasis 
on the dramaturgical aspects of accelerating and decelerating temporal 
processes. As time unfolds, multiplicity and mutuality occur, even when, 
apparently, “nothing” seems to be happening. The slowness of the moment 
produces in itself a sense of difference and repetition: ‘a co-existence of 
multiple durations in the event of attending to life’s way of being in time’ 
(Ansell-Pearson in Cull, 2009a: 217). Moreover, this apparent stillness also 
creates a rhythmic temporal movement through which temporal thresholds are 
capable of interlinking. It is, we suggest, a temporal process that pays 
attention to itself during the multiple and mutual processes that take part in 
the temporal execution of the event. In Cinema 2, Deleuze (2005) explains 
how the long and slow temporal exposure incorporates duration and presents 
a temporal articulation where the distinction between the past, present and 
future are indiscernible, 
What we call temporal structure … clearly goes beyond the 
purely empirical succession of time – past-present-future. It is, 
for example, a coexistence of distinct durations, or of levels of 
duration; a single event can belong to several levels: the 
sheets of past coexist in a non-chronological order. (Deleuze, 
2005: xii) 
 
In 10 Backwards, each slowing temporal moment is encapsulated into a 
single frame where the multiple layers of temporality are condensed in 
temporal convergence. The layers of instants in the temporal intensity of the 
slow temporality operate, as Deleuze explains in Cinema 2, simultaneous 
'peaks of presents and sheets of time', each with its own operative 'tones' and 
'aspects' (Deleuze, 2005: 96). Furthermore, the coexistence of both change 
and endurance conveys temporal duration: the presentation of ‘that which 
endures, through the succession of changing states' (Deleuze, 2005: 16). This 
long temporal exposure captures an extended duration of successive 
temporal states and presents these as a temporal unity. It is as if the temporal 
frames are accumulating to provide a depth of time on a single temporal plane 
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of composition. The long exposure can present a continuity of ‘any-instant-
whatever’ rather than a selected privileged moment. The long temporal 
exposure traces a continuity of temporal movement and also extends the 
temporality of the plane of composition and differentially reveals time in it. In 
this sense, the long temporal exposure enters into the realm of the 
mereotopological. 
 
Finally, the third observed strategy in the temporal articulations that 10 
Backwards exposes is the Deleuzian notion of imitation and repetition. Within 
conceptual Deleuzian parameters, imitation and repetitions do not imply the 
repetition of sameness. If Deleuze, as Cull explains, rethinks time as 
becoming, he also posits repetition and apparent mimesis as ‘species of 
becoming’ (Mullarkey in Cull, 2009a: 222), as part of becoming.  
 
As a visual amplification of this repetitive aspect the following diagrammatic 
map shows the projections on the small screen execute loops of temporality; 
that is, both the pre-recorded images and the live feed that is being recorded 
simultaneously show a one-minute loop intensive orchestration while the 
dramatic action on the “live” stage continues.  
 
 
Figure 14: Diagrammatic map showing temporal loops and fragmentations. The 
same material is repeated on the small screen every minute.  
 
 
Additionally, the combination of the attending variables exploring different 
aspects of intermedial temporality enables a presentation and production of 
time that can be also considered as interrupted. As the following diagram 
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illustrates, as an example, between minutes 19’ and 24’ on the small screen 
there is a sense of interruption and a repetition of interruptions in the use of 
time as a dramaturgical element.  
 
 
 
Figure 15: Diagrammatic map showing interrupted temporalities on the small screen.  
 
 
For Deleuze, as Cull and Mullarkey explain, what repetition repeats is 
difference, not ontological essence, not least because according to Deleuze 
there could be no identical repetitions but because there is only difference in 
repetition. Deleuze proposes that ‘everything which happens and everything 
which appears is correlated with other differences: differences of level, 
temperature, pressure, tension, potential, difference of intensity. (Deleuze, 
1994: 222). In this way, the use of repetition, imitation and waiting creates a 
differential temporal intricacy, engaging with temporal cadences of intensive 
difference.57 In this sense, every moment is different. Deleuze clearly stresses 
that repetition is difference as not-sameness, implying that there is no such 
thing as true repetition. The very repetition of each temporal articulation is in 
itself a new intensive nuance of a new temporal performative frame since 
each repetition is different from the original. In short, each repetition is the 
creation of the new, entering into the realm of the mereotopological since 
each repetition differentially refers to the overall temporal cadence. 
 
                                                        
57 In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze (1994) also defines difference in relation to the 
Kantian binary of the ‘phenomenon’ and the ‘noumenon’ explored in the first Critique. Deleuze 
writes, ‘difference is not the phenomenon but the noumenon closest to the phenomenon … 
every phenomenon refers to an inequality by which it is conditioned’ (Deleuze, 1994: 222).  
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Although not as obvious as temporal repetition, the use of imitation in the 
temporal cadences that 10 Backwards creates is also crucial in 
conceptualizing the first onto-epistemic condition. Again, the use of repetition 
is closer to Deleuze’s becoming rather than mere copying insofar as each 
imitation, according to Deleuze, transforms the imitated into a different 
temporal articulation. Imitation is not a representation of the same; it is an 
encounter with difference and, therefore, the creation of the new. Deleuze and 
Parnet (1987) explain: 
To become is never to imitate, not to ‘do like’, nor to conform 
to a model. There is no terminus from which you set out, none 
which you arrive at or which you ought to arrive at … The 
question ‘what are you becoming?’ is particularly stupid … as 
someone becomes changes as much as he does himself … 
becomings are not phenomena of imitation or assimilation. 
(Deleuze and Parnet, 1987: 2) 
 
With this in mind, each repetition, Deleuze explains, questions aspects of 
difference and sameness. In doing so, each repetition shatters notions of any 
essentialist notion of representational assurance. None of the repetitions is 
highlighted over the other, yet all infiltrate the present and are part of a 
complex temporal reality – as convergent paths where the virtual and the 
actual reconfigure in each registered repetition. Each temporal repetition is in 
a constant stream of difference – a new actual-virtual possibility and therefore 
a newly positioned temporal reality; it constitutes a whole differentiating 
becoming that dismantles traditional notions of mimesis and representation. 
This is not the repetition of the same, but rather the repetition of difference 
and the creation of new dramaturgical intensities mereotopologically. 
 
Through repetition, copying and augmentation strategies, the present moment 
in 10 Backwards is also a fragmented present that portrays variable durations 
– it expands and contracts as a viscosity. It is a fragmented moment that in its 
elongation allows for the past and the future to be included in it. This 
characteristic encodes an experience of temporality that is extended and 
multiple. Here, the participant subject breaks away from an experience of time 
that is a sequence of essentialist instants. Instead, the “now” becomes an 
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enormous matrix where temporal loops, for instance, enable the production of 
intermedial temporality. 
 
In relation to the experiential temporalities that video and digital worlds create, 
in The Temporalities of Video: Extendedness Revisited, Christine Ross (2006) 
discusses how the temporal loop both ‘inscribes itself in and substantially 
changes … [the temporal] exploration of extendedness and repetition’ (Ross, 
2006: 98). It extends the temporal orchestration and becomes an exploration 
of the actual and the potentially virtual. In its repetitive manner, the temporal 
loop reconstitutes the past with the possibilities it had – its potentiality – and 
‘makes these possibilities available again to renewed perception’ (Ross, 2006: 
98). In this way, each temporal repetition becomes a Deleuzian temporal 
synthesis. The temporal loop, 
lengthen[s] the duration experience precisely because the 
observer is solicited to attend to the passage of time and to 
allocate more attentional resources to process time-related 
information. In other words, the loop, the potentially endless 
repetition of a short scene, may lead to an extension of time, 
at least at the level of judgment, perception and experience. 
(Ross, 2006: 98-99) 
 
The temporal loops, we suggest, allow for a temporal processing that reclaims 
the instantaneity of the moment, while introducing its intensity and mutability. 
The temporal loop does not produce a hybrid time, as Benford and Giannachi 
discuss; rather, it contributes to the reigning of instantaneity, whilst 
acknowledging ‘temporal permutations in producing temporal extendedness 
from within its realm’ (Ross, 2006: 99).   
 
In 10 Backwards, the projected video relays allow a screen to show action 
that has just happened “live” flowing backwards and forward at different 
speeds, the performer imitating actions shown on the screen that she herself 
has just executed. In this sense, the temporal articulation of the piece does 
not obey the fixed linearity normally associated with the passage of time (only 
it does because the performance starts and ends). Here, temporality is flexible 
and malleable – as a viscosity – which not only problematizes the temporal 
stability of cause and effect, but also questions the central temporal and 
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ontological elements of performance such as the materiality of time and the 
liveness debate.  
 
The multiplicity of temporal perspectives is present and made explicit. 
Furthermore, temporal articulations are presented to reaffirm the centrality of 
the actuality of performance, now understood as a mutuality, and the 
immediacy of the temporal experience as non-reducible to a simple “here and 
now”.  As the following diagram illustrates,  
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Diagrammatic map showing the C1 in the experiential present as a 
continuous present.  
 
 
The performative temporal composition becomes a space of potentiality, of 
several simultaneous temporal viewpoints that offer simultaneous articulating 
possibilities – or as Deleuze (1984) writes in Difference and Repetition: 
‘multiplicity must not designate a combination of the many and the one, but 
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rather an organization belonging to the many as such’ (Deleuze, 1984: 182). 
A dynamic intertwining of temporal phenomena that allows for the 
interpretation of the event from several angles and in several sections at one 
and the same time; that is, a temporal articulation arranged into montages of 
temporal poly-perspectives. Drawing on this above visual amplification, the 
temporal differential montage is simultaneously presented as a construction 
that allows for several foci of temporal configurations. All parts, all temporal 
articulations, are mutually susceptible, forming the springboard and 
framework of each other’s development and becoming. 10 Backwards draws 
attention to the “now” of performance as a point of experience, knowledge-
making and temporal construction that is defined as a temporal flow invested 
in what belongs to the past and the future. Its realization, composed of an 
actuality of multiplicities, is formed in a layering – malleable as a viscosity – of 
temporal orchestrations, operating in or as the present. 
 
In this context, Jonathan Kramer (1988) explains how the performative time-
structure in performance is defined by ‘at least two temporal continua 
determined by the order of succession … the past-present-future qualities of 
events are determined by … [the articulation of their qualitative] shape as well 
as their placement within absolute-time succession of a performance’ 
(Kramer, 1988: 161). Interestingly, the performative event produces time, but 
this is time as differential that cannot simply be understood as the occupation 
of an essentialist reading of the “now”. Instead, 10 Backwards – scarlarly and 
mereotopologically – engages in constructing and synthesizing differential and 
multiple convergences of time, layering interconnected temporal experiences 
and the articulation of temporal rhythms that shape the experience with 
dramaturgical strategies such as temporal repetition and elongation. The 
“now”, here, is always in a process of being constructed by the operational 
mechanisms through which temporality is enabled. 
 
2.3. 10 Backwards: Becoming, Final Thoughts and 
Problematics. 
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In this section, this thesis adds some final remarks on how, in articulating the 
temporal and performative frames that construct the intermedial temporality 
10 Backwards enables, becoming is fundamental in as much as the becoming 
and self-generative nature of the frames construct the performative event. 
Instead of understanding the event as one of linear constitution, here the 
event, following Cull (2009a), is conceived as one of multiplicity rather than 
homogeneity. The dramaturgy of 10 Backwards is not simply concerned with 
multiplicity, imitation, slowness and repetition as manners of staging and 
presenting. Instead, the creation of a dramaturgical construction engages with 
presence and absence, temporal density and intensity, mutuality and temporal 
cadences through processes that fully generate novel modes of constructing 
mediality. Adams (2010) discusses how 10 Backwards is not interested in 
‘presenting linear dramaturgical beginnings, endings, and middles’ (Adams, 
2010: 15-04-2010, interview notes). Instead, the piece, on the one hand, 
asserts the predominance of onto-epistemic becoming, not only emphasizing 
the dramaturgical distinction between temporal structures, but ‘the distinction 
between one discrete moment and another, between being (this) and not 
being (this)’ (Cull, 2009a: 232) – when one onto-epistemic creative frame 
apparently ceases to exist and opens up to the next one; and, on the other 
hand, captures the dynamics that are established through the activation of the 
performative intra-actions.  
 
The temporal dimension of the onto-epistemic construction in 10 Backwards 
that this chapter has addressed brings to light the full scale of the constructive 
connection between attending variable and participant subject. In doing so, 
this temporal construction reminds us that it includes topological connectivity 
between the different modalities of the actuality that the executing temporal 
frames enable. This respect for the differential actuality of the present moment 
in intermedial praxis embraces multiplicity as an evental in-betweeness. In 
this sense, 10 Backwards creates a ‘temporal experience of time as a 
multiplicity of presents, an opportunity to attend to the plurality of ways in 
which life moves, and so also the multiples of even seemingly simple 
[temporal moments]’ (Cull, 2009a: 235). 
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In their becoming, the performative and generative nature of the temporal 
frames in the triadic execution of the event constructs 10 Backwards. 
Becoming, thus, functions as a performative creative articulation of analysis 
and operation. The emphasis on becoming and the event of becoming 
transforms the understanding of the triadic execution into a radical 
dramaturgy. Put in Whiteheadian terms, becoming is formalized in ‘the 
principles of process’ (Whitehead, 1978: 5) at the heart of a constructivist 
dramaturgical aesthetic. The being of 10 Backwards is constituted by the 
becoming of the execution of the event; its being is never a substrate – a pre-
given – that underlines the process, but it is always the consequence of the 
process of becoming.  
 
From this constructivist perspective, nothing is pre-given to the very moment 
of the triadic execution. The execution of the event is the expression of the 
process in which the attending variables come together in a becoming and 
generative manner that sees those attending variables not as pre-given or 
initial conditions, but as being formed, interpreted, made sense of and 
engaged with as creative processes and being in becoming themselves – as 
the being and becoming duality of each Whiteheadian actual entity. The onto-
epistemic nature of the triadic execution, understood with the help of 
Whitehead and Deleuze as processes of creativity, indicates the non-
substantial – and non-representational – activity of becoming itself which is 
only actual in and through its becoming.  
 
The attending variables that enable the execution of the event are not to be 
understood as a static and pre-fixed ‘sedimentation’ for something to become 
(Faber and Stephenson, 2011: 5). Instead, at the moment of the performative 
triadic execution, this ‘sedimentation … is nothing in itself, [no pre-given,] no 
substrate; it is only with new becoming in which it functions as its condition’ 
(Faber and Stephenson, 2011: 5). In this sense, becoming is both functionality 
and conditioning. Furthermore, the ‘structures of becoming [the attending 
variables of the execution are therefore] always in becoming, but are also the 
conditions of becoming in the sense that there is a paradoxical mutual rhythm 
between becoming and being’ (Faber and Stephenson, 2011: 5). With these 
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categorizing parameters, 10 Backwards becomes 10 Backwards at the very 
moment of execution. 
 
The temporal articulation of the performative frames is not one that highlights 
the ephemeral characteristics of the pre-given, as in Phelan and Fischer-
Lichte, but one that repositions the pre-given as immediately given at the 
moment of activation. Furthermore, it sees this given as becoming and 
generating. A given that, in its becoming, differentially constructs the actuality 
of the present as something that is becoming, has become, and will become 
combined together. In becoming, everything is in the temporal co-existence of 
its own constructivist flux in a liminal intersection of multiplicities. Deleuze’s 
notion of the event of becoming – once more – helps categorize these 
proposals. He writes, 
In every event of becoming there are many heterogeneous, 
always simultaneous components, since each of them is a 
meanwhile, all within the meanwhile that makes them 
communicate through zones of indiscernibility, of 
undecidability; they are variations, modulations, intermezzi, 
singularities of a new infinite order. Each component of the 
event is actualized or effectuated in an instant, and the event 
in the time that passes between these instants, but nothing 
happens within the virtuality that has only meanwhiles as 
components and an event as composite becoming. Nothing 
happens here, but everything becomes, so that the event has 
the privilege of beginning again when time is past. Nothing 
happens and yet everything changes because becoming 
continues to pass through its components again and to 
restore the event that actualized elsewhere, at a different 
moment. (Deleuze in Faber and Stephenson, 2011: 6) 
 
In this regard, Roland Faber and Andrea M. Stephenson (2011) explain, 
‘being is effectuated in becoming and per se is only a multiplicity of 
components in becoming, permanently reconstructed in ever-new instants of 
becoming’ (Faber and Stephenson, 2011: 6). In this sense, the generative 
structure that is becoming captures this ‘becoming-anew’ (Faber and 
Stephenson, 2011: 6) – the creation of the new as creativity. The 
dramaturgical structure dissolves into fluent components that re-restructure in 
their becoming. Hence, no pre-given dramaturgical substrate underpins the 
process of becoming and the re-construction of dramaturgical structures of 
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becoming. For both Deleuze and Whitehead, these structures are the 
conditions of becoming. But, for Whitehead, the structures, as Faber and 
Stephenson explain, are ‘not causes (or principles or grounds) that activate 
becoming, but sediments that are activated and are effected by the very 
process of becoming they condition’ (Faber and Stephenson, 2011: 6).  
 
Now, this theoretical point of view where there is nothing pre-given at the very 
moment of becoming opens up some problematics in relation to performance. 
If we faithfully follow Deleuze’s and Whitehead’s proposals regarding notions 
of becoming; that is, there is nothing pre-given at the very moment of the 
execution, then, put bluntly, it can be implied that there is no author of 
performance, which opens questions such as: When does the first frame 
start? Who sets up the first frame or plane of composition? Is it possible to 
think of performance outside a predefined dramaturgy? Are there any 
limitations to the notion of becoming in a performance paradigm?  
 
Firstly, in relation to the first question, a literal application of Whitehead’s 
notions of creativity and the actual occasions and Deleuze’s proposals 
regarding the plane of composition as not differentiating between aesthetics 
and everyday life would make no difference between a performance event 
and the act of, for instance, walking down a city street. Both would be 
considered, according to their constructivist postulates, as acts of onto-
epistemic construction as life. However, we suggest here that a performance, 
as a worldly structure, presents a more restricted manner of engaging with 
such a structure because of the pre-set dramaturgical parameters such as the 
duration of the performance and the particular environment in which the 
performance takes place. From this perspective, it can be argued that the 
choices that the participant subject can take are more, we may say, limited. 
Put slightly differently, the subject is less free in the way in which he can 
decide how to activate the worldly structures. In this sense, the performance 
debate destabilizes some of the intrinsic notions of a constructivist reading of 
epistemology because, according to such a reading, for instance, creativity 
occurs at interstice between actual occasions as a process. This interstice, as 
Shaviro points out, is freedom: ‘life is “a bid for freedom”’ (Shaviro, 2009: 92-
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93). What performance does to such a bid, we suggest, is that it limits its 
articulating and executing possibilities. 
 
Secondly, it is rather obvious to state that a given dramaturgical structure has 
been created to, more or less, a certain degree by an author – a director, a 
designer, or an artist – in order to drive the experience along one or more pre-
scripted parameters. Even in the most unplanned and non-scripted 
performance texts – whether incorporating analogue and digital technologies 
or not – some dramaturgical paths have been thought out. Dramaturgy, in 
general, invariably involves imposing a sense of ordering, a schedule and 
deadline on events.  
 
It is true that the majority of narrative clues in 10 Backwards are provided by 
Blast Theory, but what the intra-actions activate is only determined at the very 
moment of the triadic execution. This perspective, we suggest, can be applied 
to all Blast Theory’s work independently of the presentational modality of the 
work. From the combination of virtual computer-generated worlds and urban 
settings of Uncle Roy Around You (2003) and I Like Frank (2004); to the 
pervasive games of Can You See Me Now? (2001) and Riders Have Spoken 
(2011); to the installation-performance environments of Atomic Installation 
(1998); to the site-specific work in art galleries such as Flypad (2009); to 
Ulrike and Eamon Compliant (2009) that moves, during the Venice Art 
Biennale, from art pavilions and across the city of Venice; to the virtual games 
of Desert Rain (1999); and to interactive dance pieces such as Chemical 
Wedding (1992); in all these intermedial instances, the participant subject 
activates – while activating himself – the fluidity of the engagement with the 
dramaturgical structures during the execution of the event. Moreover, this 
perspective of the evental activation during the execution can be also applied, 
we argue, to all intermedial performance.  
 
However, independently of the complexity of the structures, as preliminary 
dramaturgical parameters, these have been put in place for the activation to 
start – to become. In their proposals, both Deleuze and Whitehead appear to 
have left an open door through which notions of authorship can be claimed 
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back. On the one hand, if we take into consideration Whitehead’s 
understanding of the ‘sediment’, as Faber and Stephenson point out, then an 
authorial figure can be regarded as a sediment – an author has planted seeds 
for the performance event to germinate. From this perspective, the notion of 
an author may not need to be rendered inappropriate: the author sets up the 
sediments/parameters of the performance/structure system, which will later 
operate autonomously during the becoming of the execution of the event. On 
the other hand, Deleuze’s notion of the pre-subjective – where materiality is 
waiting to be actualized – can be also read as implying a sense of authorship; 
that is, very simply, there is a subtract as a stratum not-yet deterritorialized. 
From this point of view, the stratum could be considered as the author’s 
work.58  
 
What has concerned us here, as a final note, is how intermedial praxis leads 
to a process in which the articulation of the present is transformed by the 
onto-epistemic variations of the intervening media, which change the 
experiential temporal effects and their interpretation in the temporal 
performance’s specificity. Correspondingly, the effects of intermediality in 
relation to a given performance’s articulation of temporality stage a 
performative act where the perspectival specificity of the Deleuzian actual and 
virtual are framed and blurred through intra-active processes of mediation. 
The network-like structure – the convergence and interlinking as a 
mereotopology – of the present moment that this chapter has proposed, 
drawing on Barker, Cull and Mullarkey, creates a progression that constitutes 
the unyieldingness of the performance’s becoming. The present moment in 10 
Backwards, the engagement with its experiential immediacy, is constructed at 
                                                        
58 Without entering into the complex technicalities of Deleuze and Guattari analysis of 
literature and cinema, it can be suggested that they do not “fully” deny the notion of 
authorship, but they conceive it, very broadly explained, as a signature and as an authorial 
self-inscription in the pre-subjective aspect of the event – as a virtuality, rather than actuality. 
In Cinema 1, Deleuze (1986) even writes, ‘certain great movements are like a director’s 
signature’ (Deleuze, 1986: 21). In Deleuze’s and Guattari’s writings about what a signature is, 
they conceive it as a constant process of signifying de-territorializations, continuously shifting 
from the individual to the collective as ‘something only by being something else’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1983: 87), on the one hand, blurring the lines between an author’s identity and the 
authorial collective identity of the activators of the work once it is produced and, on the other 
hand, stressing that the notion of the author is simply a signifying reference that bears little 
impact in the processes of becoming. 
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the very same instant in which the ontological differences between past, 
present and future onto-epistemically blur onstage when forging an interfacial 
convergence between temporal moments. This convergence positions the 
participating subjects in the event in a present moment of experiencing – the 
immediacy of the activating execution and the immediacy of the intra-action – 
that belongs to a world of differential temporalities. Most importantly, the 
experience of time in 10 Backwards is shaped in the in-between of the 
intermedial performance present – a present that can be only understood as 
the negotiation of temporal flows and a repositioning of the liveness of the 
theatrical performance; that is, an articulation of the “now” not as lineal, but as 
a matrix of temporal flows, and a repositioning of the liveness debate and 
presentness positions as not reduced to an essentialist “here and now” 
ontological category, and therefore, claiming the differential aspect of the 
radical dramaturgical aesthetic.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Execution: Blast Theory’s Something American (1996) 
 
 
 
This chapter concerns the way in which the proposed radical aesthetic of 
intermedial work explores the relational aspect of the mereotopological 
narrative. In the previous chapter we highlighted the differential characteristic 
of such an aesthetic, the following moves the argument of this thesis forward 
by particularly focusing on how such a radical dramaturgy needs to be 
grasped in terms of its relational attributes, paying particular attention to, on 
the one hand, the topological aspect of the mereotopological defining 
combination; and, on the other hand, concentrating on how these relational 
dimensions impact on the construction of spatiality within the presented 
reading of epistemology. From this perspective, the chapter highlights how 
intermedial practices enable and experience the spatial aspect of the “here” 
and space in performance. Put slightly differently, the exploration of media 
technologies in performance practices creates spaces that can be also 
grasped as liminal, differential and relational. In this sense, the agential and 
operative quality of the media, we suggest, also acts as spatializing, enabling 
the construction of intermedial orchestrations that are topologically relational.  
 
What follows sees the “here” as interrogating the articulation of a given 
intermedial construction, in this instance, Blast Theory’s Something American 
(1996). Specifically, this chapter questions intermedial spatiality as a 
phenomenon that is intrinsic to the way the present moment differentially 
stretches between temporal articulations, therefore, stressing the link between 
spatiality and temporality.59 As Matt Adams (2005) explains, the work of Blast 
                                                        
59 In For Space, Doreen Massey (2005) points out that the inclusion of time within space 
changes the way in which space is understood within critical debates such as human 
geography. She suggests space moves from being a fixed entity to a performative 
conception. In this manner, the inclusion of time within space highlights the performative act 
of making space and experiencing the practice of making space. 
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Theory ‘invite[s its participant subjects] to inhabit these spaces and then to be 
implicated much more directly in the relationships that emerge and the way 
that technology is mediating’ (Adams in Benford and Giannachi, 2011: 41). 
From this emerging perspective, the experiential, compositional, agential and 
knowledge-making aspects of spatiality within intermedial works such as 
Something American open up the possibility of discussing intermedial 
spatiality as always being in process and subject to time.  
 
In this context, the creation of spatial orchestrations, along with temporal 
structures, explicitly defers the sense of spatiality as a fixed entity and/or as a 
container, as Kant describes, towards a processual, performative and 
relational act of onto-epistemic construction. The performative triad of the 
execution of the event, in its generative nature, enables the creation of 
polyphonies of spatial orchestrations – what we call here spatiality – through 
which the collisions and boundaries between dramaturgical narrative spaces 
are blurred in their relational activation and medial creation, hence, we argue, 
pointing to their mereotopological aspect as a radical understanding of 
intermedial dramaturgy.  
 
With this in mind, the notion of intermedial spatiality proposed in this chapter 
not only includes the physical space, as striated space, in which the 
performance takes place but also accounts for the attending variables that 
make the onto-epistemic production and functionality of intermedial 
performance possible. In other words, the analysis of the production of 
intermedial spatiality, here, also includes the scenographic elements that 
enable – and condition while conditioning themselves in their becoming – 
such a production and functionality.60 In the work of Blast Theory, intermedial 
                                                        
60 Scenographic practices and scholarship have also investigated the notion of the frame as a 
compositional and presentational devise. However, this presentational and compositional 
understanding must not be confused with the notions of the generative frames, as a 
constructivist aesthetic, followed here. Ana Sanchez-Colberg (2002), for instance, uses the 
analogy of the frame in relation to how the concept of the frame helps discuss enquiries of 
performance and spatial practices. Sanchez-Colberg is interested in the presentational and 
dramaturgical aspect of the frame and the framing of performance as a set of elements in 
movement. Although Sanchez-Colberg’s proposals offer valid insights in the use of frames as 
a dramaturgical device that connects the spatial with the dramaturgical, her conceptualization 
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scenography operates beyond notions of stage design and static 
conceptualizations of mise-en-scene. Instead, the scenographic perspective 
followed here takes into consideration both the compositional and the 
constructivist aesthetic of the intermedial evental encounter. As a crucial 
platform to construct intermedial spatiality, the scenographic is defined here, 
following Rachel Hann (2013), as ‘the quality of an object, situation or event to 
impart scenographic qualities’ without being considered a pre-established 
structure (Hann, 2013: 05-09-2013, conference notes). In this sense, we 
move away from conceiving the scenographic as a platform to ‘create mood 
[and images], convey [semiotic] information and enhance thematic concerns’ 
to an understanding of the scenographic as intrinsic to enabling intermedial 
spatiality, stressing both the material and the ‘immaterial image and immanent 
space’ (Aronson, 2010: 87). Furthermore, we keenly highlight the 
scenographic as a sensorial and intellectual experience that generates the 
haptic.  
 
This chapter categorizes spatiality in Blast Theory’s intermedial praxis as a 
transitional space – a categorization that requires a repositioning of pre-
existing notions of intermedial space such as those found, for instance, in the 
writings of Birgit Wiens (2010). Argued as topological and relational, and 
mainly supported by Deleuze’s notions of the fold and Whitehead’s proposals 
of the nexuses, the discussion of intermedial spatiality can be thus 
conceptualized as being both synchronic and diachronic, pulverizing notions 
of space as a linear progression – as the ontological debates emphasize – 
and entering into the space of the interval – as an architecture of relations. 
 
Arnold Aronson (2008), a key figure in scenographic scholarship, traces the 
words space and spatiality to the Latin word spatium. He writes,  
[The Latin spatium] was used primarily as a term in racing to 
denote a course, distance or an interval … Thus, while we 
may define physical space as a distance between two points, 
or also as that area which is contained within an enveloping 
boundary or demarcation such as a circle or a sphere, it is 
                                                                                                                                                              
of a frame, as noted, differs from this research’s conceptualization because of the 
constructive onto-epistemic aspect proposed here.  
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also a measurement of time. The two may be 
interchangeable. (Aronson, 2008: 9) 
 
Interestingly, he places spatiality in relation to temporality and discusses both 
around the notion of the interval. The interval, Erin Manning (2009b) 
describes, allows us to see spatiality as a relational space. She explains the 
notion as an active space ‘with the tendencies of interaction but … not limited 
to them. Relation folds experience into it such that what emerges is always 
more than the sum of its parts’ (Manning, 2009b: 34). In this sense, it is, 
drawing on Manning, the spatial and temporal movement happening between 
the interval that enables us to categorize intermedial spatiality as a relational 
dynamism – as in-between two points, opening up to a relational landscape of 
potential and topological configurations. The temporal movement of the 
interval is understood as intensively and extensively horizontal (as extension) 
and vertical (as layers of depth), highlighting the intricate entanglement 
between the extensive and the punctually located and the intensive and the 
superficial (Manning, 2009b: 34-35). In other words, the interval can be 
considered as a time of transformation, a time of waiting in preparation for 
something else, but also, and most importantly, a spatial and temporal 
structure that is not static but somehow suspended in temporality, yet 
continuing its function. The interval is not a time of abrupt and harsh change 
but a time in which change happens both fast and slowly at different spaces 
and times. It is a liminal transformation – a gradual movement that tends 
towards the creation of the dramaturgically new.  
 
From the relational perspective of the interval, the correspondence and 
correlation between the parts of the emergent narrative configurations, as 
mereotopological, construct a structure between temporal and spatial planes 
of composition – neither here, nor there; neither now, nor the past or future. 
Conceived thus, the application of a constructivist aesthetic will help discuss 
how intermedial spatiality can be also understood using notions of landscape. 
A landscape is, broadly defined, a stratigraphic amalgamation of spatial 
structures that present no hierarchy in which series of compositional strata – 
as in Deleuze’s fold – are equally important to the overall configuration of the 
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structure. In this sense, landscape can be also understood as a 
mereotopological configuration.  
 
In relation to the topological, in Something American, we suggest, the 
activating of relationality is at its most intensive because, on the one hand, the 
dramaturgical articulations also include digitally-designed graphics, virtual 
theatre worlds and a myriad of pre-recorded material such as movie clips and 
cartoons; and, on the other hand, the speed of the movement at which spatial 
and temporal orchestrations unfold narrative changes constantly, varying from 
moments of complete slowness to rapid constant changes between the pre-
recorded material and the “live”; the pre-recorded material itself – the speed 
(or the lack of it) of the moving images; and the “live” intertwines between the 
performance’s choreographic phrases and the dialogue segments taking 
place, and changing constantly and differentially, in different areas of the 
stage. In this sense, the moments between the “live” and the pre-recorded 
also highlight the ‘both-and’ approach (Nelson, 2010: 15) to understanding 
intermediality as a complex system of dramaturgical interfaces between space 
and time that are connected to a dramaturgical structure, using media 
technologies.  
 
The argument here does not ask what intermedial spatiality is – its ontological 
manner of being as an essence or complete entity – or who intends to it but, 
rather, how intermedial spatiality, as an architecture of potential relationality, 
becomes the onto-epistemic condition for relational spatial continuities to 
appear. Subsequently, in discussing intermedial spatiality as topological, it 
can be also grasped as a spatial event of intensities and densities; that is, 
clusters of spatial formations that intertwine concurrently, produced along 
convergences of differential temporalities, hence, expanding on the proposals 
explored in the previous chapter. Most importantly, intermedial spatiality, as a 
topology, renders obsolete the essentialist ontological positions of the “here” 
as discussed by Phelan and Fischer-Lichte and, thus, can be considered as 
radical.  
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Looked at from the point of view of topological relations and the non-linearity 
of the interval, intermedial spatiality occupies, this thesis argues, the territory 
of the transversal. Felix Guattari (1972) defines transversality as: ‘a dimension 
that strives to overcome two impasses … [and] tends to be realized when 
maximum communication is brought about between different levels and 
different directions’ (Guattari, 1972: 80, my translation). In this regard, the 
intermedial, as transversal, emerges by the activation of temporal and spatial 
planes of composition from the transitional space in-between and the interval. 
This is to say a transversal spatial configuration arises, enabling the potential 
of different configurations in a number of differential spatial directions and 
temporalities. In its transversal manner, intermedial spatiality does not follow a 
sequential line. Rather, it cuts through spatial planes of composition, 
constantly connecting with the spatial “has-been” and the “yet-to-come” and a 
myriad of possible modulations between these. 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first presents Something 
American as a case study. The second section is divided into four internal 
sections. These discuss intermedial spatiality in relation to topological notions, 
including the interval and Deleuze’s fold within the suggested radical aspect of 
the dramaturgical structure. The sections also use conceptualizations of the 
concept of landscape to describe intermedial spatiality and explore the 
generative aspects of the intermedial scenographic as a fundamental element 
of the suggested radical aesthetic. The fourth, and final one, discusses the 
Deleuzian and Whiteheadian concept of becoming in the dramaturgical 
context of Something American and opens up some problematics in relation 
to the theorized relational aspect.  
 
1. Something American: Description of Practice.  
 
Blast Theory’s Something American (1996) won the Barclays New Stages 
Award in 1996 and toured the UK and Germany. The production was one of 
the Blast Theory’s earliest instances of intermedial praxis. As such, it 
demonstrates an embryonic articulation of the type of praxis that Blast Theory 
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will develop in future work. In opposition to traditional theatrical performance, 
Something American actively explores the intersection between the physical 
space for the stage, the scenographic strategies and the inclusion of media 
technologies, including virtual spaces and graphiclly designed environments. 
These derive from the creation of communicating narrative thresholds within 
the dramaturgicallly complex system, which in this case can be described as 
tightly configured. In other words, in the history of the company Something 
American is one of Blast Theory’s dramaturgically complex systems – a 
defining characteristic, as noted, in the work of Blast Theory – that is at its 
most limited in its structuring openness. Nonetheless, the mereotopological 
characteristic of the radical dramaturgy proposed here can be observed.  
 
 
Figure 1: Something American. Production poster. Copyright: Blast Theory. 
 
 
Something American is an interdisciplinary performance work. It uses 
technology to present an amalgamation between dance, performance and 
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film. It challenges pre-conceived conceptions of the separation between the 
“live” and the mediatised through the mediating processes of its dramaturgy. 
Blast Theory describes the piece as:  ‘Something American (1996) treated the 
USA as the Wild West, quoting freely from Hollywood films on a billboard 
sized projection screen’ (www.blasttheory.co.uk. Accessed on 12-05-2013). 
Matt Adams (2010) discusses how in creating Something American, Blast 
Theory aimed to ‘examine the disparities between the American media and 
the mythology that it helps to maintain. We observed America from a distance 
and presented our point of view’ (Adams, 2010: 15-04-2010, interview notes).  
 
At the opening of Something American, a voiceover announces: ‘This is our 
interpretation of America’. This very statement establishes, as one of the main 
interrogating themes of the piece, an investigation into the nature of American 
identity and space. On a bare stage (12 meters wide and 2 meters deep) the 
performance starts with a man dressed up as a New York policeman. He 
speaks of his desires, fantasies, fears and erotic thrills. He also discusses 
how the American geographical landscape has influenced his life.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Something American. Still image. Copyright: Blast Theory. 
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Behind him a cinematic and panoramic screen comes to life. The screen is 
used to explore the geographical, symbolic and cultural landscape of America. 
This is a landscape that is both personal to the policeman and to 
internationally recognized standard notions of American culture. On the 
screen is shown a vast geographical American landscape – an interpretation 
that also includes elements of the American cultural landscape with images of 
cowboys and even presidents such as George Bush Senior.  
 
The screen also portrays layers of icons, footnotes and speech bubbles, as a 
continuous and ever-changing electronic billboard that operates at different 
speeds. Sometimes, the screen shows the thoughts of the cop; at other times, 
it presents the dialogue of the characters; or the written thoughts and feelings 
of an all-knowing director/dramaturg explaining some of the performance 
aspects e.g. ‘he is a performer in a cop’s uniform’.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Something American. Still image. Copyright: Blast Theory. 
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The background images in Something American oscillate between vast 
geographical landscapes like the Mississippi’s river delta filmed from above, 
and miniscule vistas, such as the window of a house in the Midwest of 
America. In general, the shown articulations vary from urban to rural 
landscapes; from cartoons to historical footage; and from computer designed 
backdrops to lines of text. Interestingly, at times only the pre-recorded screen 
contents are shown. At other times, the film stops and the performers dance 
and act whilst the screen goes blank – although it never disappears from 
view. Sometimes the performers engage with text and react to the images 
shown on the screen, and, in other sections, both performers and film stand 
still and/or the interactions between them become rhythmic as they work in 
intervals.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Something American. Still image. Copyright: Blast Theory. 
 
One of the dramaturgical strategies employed in Something American is the 
use of cinematic fading.61 The fade, it could be said, has been traditionally 
                                                        
61 In Black to White: The Fading Process of Intermediality in the Gallery Space, Karen Savage 
(2008) proposes that, in the creation of dramaturgical intermedial environments, some 
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used as a tool in film to articulate narrative transitions typically dictating how 
the material is viewed as a focalizing devise. Here, however, the fade 
emphasizes the differential movement between the “live”, the pre-recorded 
and the interdisciplinary aspects of Something American. Through the use of 
fades the participant subjects are placed in a world that is in a state of 
continual haptic metamorphosis in which the film fragments, the dance 
choreographic phrases, and the dialogue performance segments unfold in 
one another through cross-fading cinematic frames. These fades, we suggest, 
are not to be understood here simply as blackouts, but as transitional 
dramaturgical explorations. They highlight, in their variational speed, the 
intensity and the transversality of the narrative intersections.  
 
In relation to these transitional features, the participant subjects are made 
aware of the functional aspects of the fading by way of dramaturgical 
dynamics such as slowness; narrative focalization; interactions between 
performers and the screen; the showing of filmic fragments; and the acting 
and dance phrases, hence, emphasizing aspects of differential temporality as 
discussed in 10 Backwards. In this sense, Something American draws 
attention to itself and the cross-functionality of the dramaturgical variables. 
This fading can be also said to constitute a strategy through which each 
compositional segment morphs into the next, crossing thresholds of temporal 
and spatial narrative orchestrations. In other words, the fade acts as a literal 
crossing between different medial contents and forms of the structuring 
narrative frames in relation to temporal dramaturgical change. In this regard, 
the fading enables and affords from within the intervallic characteristic of the 
mereotopological.  
 
Although the use of film is integral to the piece, Something American aligns 
itself more with “live” dance performance than with film and art installation 
practices. The explored combination between the “live” performance and the 
pre-recorded clips in Something American calls into question conventional 
uses of technology in performance – just as embedding digital technologies 
                                                                                                                                                              
practices use the technical device of the fade to contribute to the experiential moment of 
creating space as an interdisciplinary mode of presentation.  
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within dramaturgies – and takes into full consideration the materials and 
technologies that scenography has at its disposal, acknowledging its agency. 
In this manner, technology acts as a spatialitizing factor. Simply put, its 
agency is intrinsic to the production of spatiality. Seen this way, Something 
American explores spatial complexity as a multi-layering where 
simultaneously engaged spatial configurations propel the participant subjects 
into the realms of multiple narrative experiences happening 
contemporaneously. In doing so, the configurations of the temporal and 
spatial aspects of intermedial dramaturgy can be described here as being 
constantly superseding from any fixed point and entering into the realm of the 
relational where disjunction and multi-framing constitute the mechanisms by 
which intermedial performance can be produced, made sense of and 
experienced. Crossing over symbolic, geographical, filmic and digitally 
designed spaces, Something American with the use of performance, dance 
and film, creates an interdisciplinary and interfacial dramaturgical space, 
capturing the nomadic complexities of the geographical close and far; the 
spatially present and absent; and the “here” and “there”.  
 
2. Something American: The Spatial Relational Aspect of the 
Radical Dramaturgy. 
 
Something American, in its exploration of new spatial frontiers and the blurring 
of boundaries, moves across actual and virtual theatrical spaces. Equally, the 
performance, structured as such a complex montage of layered temporal and 
spatial orchestrations, redefines a narrative environment that is in a constant 
process of spatial displacement, constantly shifting, in doing so, between the 
smooth and the striated space.62 In this way, Something American explores a 
                                                        
62 In Mapping Intermediality in Performance, Liesbeth Groot Nibbelink (2010) discusses the 
term ‘displacement’. She writes, ‘in physics, displacement refers to the difference between the 
initial position and the final position of an object … [in engineering, it] measure[s] the process 
by which an object immersed in a fluid pushes some of the fluid out of the way … [in relation 
to intermediality, she explains how a displacement] removes [an object, a text, an image or a 
word] from their original context, thus drawing new attention to the object … Digital 
technologies that reconfigure the ontologies of space and time add a sense of displacement 
that increasingly characterizes intersections of media and theatre’ (Groot Nibbelink, 2010: 
97).  
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multiplicity of spatial presentations, both actual and virtual, that reposition the 
spatial boundaries of the performance event from a simplistic reading of the 
“here” to an understanding of the “here” as relational. The physical space of 
the theatre, as striated space, and the articulations of the virtual and actual 
spaces, as smooth space, creates topological constitutions in which the 
mediatized and non-mediatized scenographic strategies move and re-
configure. In this sense, the artwork enables a zone of generative interplay as 
creative intervals of spaces of potentiality interrogate the conditioned and 
conditioning material aspects of the attending variables and their ability to 
dramaturgically coordinate a multiplicity of spatial and temporal narrative 
viewpoints.  
 
2.1. Something American: Relational Spatiality and the 
Topological Dynamism of the Interval.  
 
The radical nature of the aesthetic frames proposed here highlights the 
intertwined relationship between temporality and spatiality. The intermedial 
performance debate has rightly discussed the presentational aspect of both 
temporality and spatiality. The so-called temporalization of space and 
spatialization of time has heavily informed intermedial performance positions 
such as Birgit Wiens (2010), exploring the problematics of space and 
highlighting notions of spatial disruption in intermedial praxis, particularly in 
relation to notions of intermediality as a mode of staging. Naturally, this thesis 
agrees on the disruption of traditional dramaturgical presentations of time and 
space by the application of media technologies in theatrical performance. 
Aptly, Chiel Kattenbelt (2006) writes, ‘the expansion of the principles of the 
theatrical imagination through the use of live video and recorded sound can 
be characterized most concisely as a temporalization of space and a 
spatialization of time’ (Kattenbelt in Bay-Cheng, 2010: 87). According to 
Kattenbelt, a sense of presentational simultaneity and succession occurs in 
intermedial dramaturgical praxis that enables such processes.  
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For Kattenbelt, the presentational simultaneity of the occurrences, the 
attending variables, allows for a concretization of the “side-by-side” and “one-
after-the-other”, producing this spatialization of time.63 On the one hand, 
simultaneity also impacts on spatial design in and through which multiple 
perspectives and locations can be articulated and presented concurrently, 
producing a sense of spatial multi-vocality; spatial simultaneity in intermedial 
practices also organizes, according to him, presentational heterogeneity; 
different times presentationally develop “side-by-side”; multiple dramaturgical 
spaces are orchestrated and articulated simultaneously. On the other hand, a 
sense of succession also occurs as a counterpart to the “side-by-side” sense 
of the simultaneous. This successive aspect – the “one-after-the-other” –
through which the attending variables organize the line of spatial 
presentational developments, affirms the temporalization of space; that is, the 
spatial re-configurations.  
 
Drawing on these remarks, Wiens (2010) highlights how, 
digitization and the possibilities of interactivity allow media-
spaces to become dynamically inter-engaged in ways that 
modify understanding of the liveness criteria of real-time 
event … the intermedial stage can be understood as an 
adjustable platform, or interface, in which real, imagined and 
                                                        
63 From this point of view, intermedial spatiality participates in the post-dramatic. Lehmann 
explores the dynamics of post-dramatic space in opposition to what he terms a ‘medium’ 
space (Lehmann, 2006: 150). For him, this notion of ‘medium’ encompasses the forms of 
space that set apart the dramatic from the post-dramatic. If dramatic theatre uses the 
‘medium’ as a space for representation, mimesis and metaphorical dramaturgies, the post-
dramatic, according to him, repositions the ‘medium’ in three distinctive aspects. These are: 
first, the replacement of the metaphorical and symbolic space for a metonymic space; that is, 
as with the literary figure, a sense of continuity in which a part stands in for the whole is 
established. He writes, ‘[the theatre space] is not primarily defined as a symbolic standing in 
for another fictive world but is instead highlighted as a part and continuation of the real 
theatre space’ (Lehmann, 2006: 151). Second, the post-dramatic ‘medium’ is articulated as a 
tableau in which the stage action is framed as a tableau vivant. Third, the medium as a 
tableau-like montage in and through which the participant dramaturgical elements are 
‘connected, isolated and assembled’ creating a sense of ‘spatio-temporal continuum’ 
(Lehmann, 2006: 151). Within these lines, Lehmann explains that the traditional hierarchies of 
dramatic theatre in relation to spatial configurations become obsolete because the continuity 
of the dramatic action does not rely on a linear exploration of spatial relationships in regards 
to dramaturgical composition. The use of this montage-like space develops an organizational 
structure as a ‘cinematic montage’ (Lehmann, 2006: 151); that is, a sense of spatial 
environment in which the gaze of the spectator is not led exclusively by the dramatic action. 
Within the ‘cinematic collage’, he describes the ‘medium’ establishes specific relations 
between spectator and performer and dominates the perception of the performance event.  
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virtual spaces can performatively reconfigure one another and 
create enlightening tensions. (Wiens, 2010: 94) 
 
Both Kattenbelt and Wiens offer relevant remarks in terms of the multiplicity 
and adaptability of spatial presentational configurations within intermedial 
practices. However, some aspects can be discussed from their definitions. 
Firstly, they both see intermedial spatiality as a manner and modality of 
staging. Secondly, in emphasizing the possibilities of interactivity within digital 
practices, Wiens implies that intermediality maximizes the phenomenal 
possibilities of human perception, which, for her, are still reliant on an 
attending subject to the intermedial transaction.  
 
Additionally, Wiens, drawing on Adolphe Appia, writes, ‘the music and the 
actions of the performers and the changing of lights turn the stage and its 
material elements into a temporal “rhythmic space”’ (Wiens, 2010: 92). She 
also observes that the temporality of staged spaces in intermedial praxis 
starts as an effect of the digital media – a position, we note, in line with 
Boenisch’s postulates regarding intermediality as an effect of mediality. In this 
way, for Wiens, spatial design and the dramaturgical staging of spatiality 
cease being a static phenomenon and become a movement one articulated 
by the materiality of the scenographic design and the spatial materiality and 
configuration of the performative space – be it a theatre building or an urban 
landscape (Wiens, 2010: 93-94). Drawing on Auslander (1999) and Dixon 
(2007), Wiens also fittingly points out that the introduction of media 
technologies in performance praxis enables media spaces to encompass a 
myriad of presentational inter-relations (Wiens, 2010: 94). 
 
Furthermore, Wiens, agreeing with Gay McAuley (1999), suggests that in 
intermedial practices ‘space is now seen to function as an “active agent” and 
co-player in theatre events (McAuley, 1999: 41)’ (Wiens, 2010: 91). Within 
these remarks, she defines spatiality in terms of the interplay of the following 
four characteristics, 
(1) theatrical space (architectural conditions of theatre); (2) 
stage and scenic space (set design, scenography); (3) place 
of performance (the local, sociocultural context); and (4) 
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dramatic space (spatial designs as evoked by the dramatic or 
post-dramatic text, libretto, choreography etc. (Wiens, 2010: 
91) 
 
The notion of spatiality in intermedial praxis, Wiens points out, moves away 
from considering ‘space as a fixed container’ (Wiens, 2010: 91) towards a 
spatial consideration that conceives theatrical spatiality as a transformational 
space of interconnections and dynamic interplays. Moreover, she rightly 
posits intermedial space as no longer ‘something not given, but rather as an 
occurrence … experienced as a perforation of a stable here and now’ (Wiens, 
2010: 92). Additionally, she suggests the spatial complexity64 of the 
intermedial stage: ‘spaces – in their complex relevance as material, corporeal 
as well as communicating modes – turn out to be complex and dynamic 
components … they are always preconditioned and products at the same 
time’ (Wiens, 2010: 93). Interestingly, she discusses the construction of 
intermedial spatiality in relation to communicating modes – the portals and 
nodes highlighted by the IFTR Intermediality group’s second book – through 
dynamic dramaturgical components and highlights intermedial spatiality as ‘no 
longer given’. However, on the one hand, she does not conceive dynamism in 
terms of a generative characteristic. Instead, she seems to imply the fluid 
movement, as in Kattenbelt’s succession, of a linear spatial articulation; and, 
on the other hand, although she speaks of the ‘perforation of the stable here’, 
she implies: first, this perforation as a presentational modality simply means 
that several spaces as presented at the same time, as in Kattenbelt’s 
simultaneity; and second, she stresses the occurrence of spaces of 
transformation are imbued on a essentialist ontological reading of the “here” 
because she still reads temporality as linear. 
 
The understanding of intermedial space, Wiens suitably explains, requires a 
‘both-and’ (Nelson, 2010: 15) approach to fully account for an understanding 
of the spatial configurations that intermedial praxis enables. In relation to the 
                                                        
64 Wiens discusses and supports her positions in relation to the manner in which Michel 
Foucault (1986) described the 20th Century as the ‘epoch of space’, and as ‘the epoch of 
juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed’ (Foucault in 
Wiens 2010: 93). Along these lines, she writes, ‘spatialization in the post-modern debate 
becomes a model of philosophical thinking, and the rejection of diachronic in favour of 
synchronic concepts of space and time become a prominent concern’ (Wiens, 2010: 93).  
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‘both-and’ approach, she offers a solid conceptualization of the intermedial 
stage. She writes, 
the intermedial stage affords the explorations of performative 
configurations between here and other spaces and 
experiments with simultaneous actions at different (locally or 
geographically separated) locations. These complex 
scenographies not only go beyond the boundaries of the 
theatre space … but also include what George Christoph 
Tholen calls “the playing space of media” (Schede and 
Tholen, 1999: 17). In other words: the processes of 
performance is no longer limited to the here and now, but 
rather transgresses local contexts and environments and 
playfully connects to telematic and other remote spaces … 
The space of intermediality, in this regard, is not already 
there, but can only be understood as a temporal, dynamic and 
highly complex spatial configuration, which is created within 
the processes of performance … The live phenomena of the 
media spaces (virtual spaces, telespaces, networks) that 
emerge on the stage are no longer constrained simply to the 
radius of the here and now. (Wiens, 2010: 94) 
 
This ‘both-and’ approach, she proposes, helps see the presentational 
specificities of the theatrical space as “here” but also as “there” – “here” and 
“there”, and both “here and there”, because, as proposed above, intermedial 
spatiality is both synchronic and diachronic. In short, this chapter agrees with 
Wiens that the “here” of the performative event also includes the “there” as 
explored through media technologies. However, it argues against her in 
claiming that the amalgamation of the “here” and “there” is not only structured 
via the presentational actual and the virtual, as in virtual theatre, but also in 
terms of: on the one hand, the Deleuzian understanding of the relationship 
between the virtual and the actual and the concept of the fold, which does not 
presupposes a spatial interiority and exteriority, nor does it imply a sense of 
“side-by-side” – instead, the fold is an intertwining of worlding relations; and, 
on the other hand, the Whiteheadian nexuses, which fuse the synchronic and 
the diachronic in their relational activation. Seen this way, the understanding 
of the synchronic and the diachronic, as Deleuze and Whitehead explain, is 
multiple and differential – it inhabits the synchronic and the diachronic space 
of the topological and relational interval. 
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Wiens makes another pertinent remark. She discusses the complexity and 
heterogeneity of intermedial explorations regarding spatiality. She writes,   
media spaces have to be examined not only in terms of the 
semiotic and phenomenological characteristics, but also in 
terms of their technological ramifications … and new 
performance modalities … the performativity of the 
intermedial theatron, in this respect, has to be analysed as a 
complex, heterogeneous and relational phenomenon. (Wiens, 
2010: 96) 
 
Significantly, she highlights how the performative and technological aspects of 
the intermedial transaction imply a repositioning of classical semiotic and 
phenomenological readings of the artwork as a fixed entity. In this sense, 
Wiens – in common with Fischer-Lichte – fittingly acknowledges the 
performance transaction as a performative event that is heterogeneous and 
complex. Yet, her call for new understandings of the semioticity and 
phenomenology of the event is articulated, once more, from the point of view 
of how the performance’s experience and the meaning enabled by a given 
performance transaction is perceived and understood by an aprioristic 
attending subject. Interestingly, Wiens also stresses the theatrical 
phenomenon as relational. However, her understanding of the term can be 
simply read to imply how the different elements in a given performance refer 
to each other in a presentational manner; instead the radical understanding of 
the term used here sees the relational as encompassing the differential and 
implying the constructive.  
 
In relation to compositional aspects in digital theatrical environments, Steve 
Dixon (2007) also writes,  
in multimedia theatre, projection screens or video monitors 
frame additional spaces this time in two dimensions … Yet, 
despite the flatness of the screen frame, projected media can 
in one important sense offer far more spatial possibilities than 
three-dimensional theatre space. (Dixon, 2007: 335) 
 
Similarly, Greg Giesekam (2007) emphasizes, ‘onstage action may be 
reframed through live relay, multiplying or magnifying performers onscreen, 
showing them in microscopic close-up, fragmented or shot from different 
angles’ (Giesekam, 2007: 11). Additionally, Carol Brown (2006) highlights the 
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topology of performative space as being framed by the physical space and the 
digital strategies within the overall composition of the performance event. 
Clearly drawing on Deleuze, she explains that the use of digital technologies 
creates presentational modes of intermedial staging that can be discussed as 
‘frames within frames within frames’ (Brown in Scchio, 2011: 27). Moreover, 
Brown, as suggested by Dixon and Giesekam, also highlights the 
morphogenesis between virtual and physical spaces and the relational aspect 
of digital spatiality as a specific mode of staging. In other words, for her, the 
media elements in mediatized performance add layers of spatial complexity, 
creating a sense of presentational spatial multiplicity. According to her, spatial 
frames both physical and virtual merge and converge. In this context, Peter 
Boenisch (2006b) notably highlights that ‘no single point in the space is in any 
way privileged and thus would guide the observers’ vision and perception – 
not even the framed stage as such … Spatial intermediality no longer projects 
one clearly focused space’ (Boenisch, 2006b: 157).   
 
However, intermedial spatiality here, contra Brown and Giesekam, is to be 
understood as a space in-between – as a modality of location – that carries 
the intensive and relational potential of the radical nature of the frames. First, 
regarding the proposed intensive aspect, the following diagrammatic map 
illustrates how the attending variables are executed as a series of intensities.  
 
A: “Live” stage dramatic action using a small section of the “actual” stage; B: “Live” stage 
dramatic action using the whole “actual” stage; C: Screen used continuously; D: “Live” stage 
action; E: Screen used intermittently; F: No dramatic action on the “actual” stage but dramatic 
filmic fragments shown on the screen. 
 
Figure 5: Diagrammatic map showing intensities in relation to the use of the screen 
and the “actual” stage.  
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Intermedial spatiality is explored in a differential articulation of processes that 
incorporate various uses of the “actual stage” as sections; the whole “actual” 
stage; and the screen in order to show the peculiarities that transform 
“traditional” assumptions about space and time in intermedial praxis. As the 
map showed, at moment 2’, E, D, C and B are at play. Second, in relation to 
the suggested radical relational aspect, the following diagrammatic map 
visually amplifies how Something American’s dramaturgy presents a 
configuration of spatiality as more than simply a punctual location of striated 
space. Rather, it enables a spatial and temporal configuration that shifts from 
the geographical to the symbolic and back again, creating articulations of 
smooth space.  
 
 
U: Urban landscapes; C: Computer generated graphics and designs; M1: Clips from classic 
movies shown using the whole screen; M2: Clips from classic movies shown using split 
screen shots; A1: Animation/graphics placed in a specific spatial location; A2: 
Animation/graphics placed in a non-specific spatial location; SC: Split screen showing a line 
to make the split obvious; SC1: Split screen showing specific spatial locations and filmic 
fragments; SC2: Split screen showing non-specific spatial locations and blank/black 
fragments. 
 
Figure 6: Diagrammatic map showing the observed different articulations on the 
screen between minutes 4 and 10.  
 
 
The following diagrammatic map visualizes how the spatial configuration of 
the execution of the event can be also categorized as a textual landscape and 
a world of graphic designs that range from cartoons to geometric patterns. In 
short, the diagram showcases a spatial configuration that goes beyond the 
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mere geographical location and enters into areas of graphic design as virtual 
environments.  
 
 
T1: Text as lines of dialogue; T2: Text as cartoon’s dialogue; T3: Text as informational 
backgrounds: the voice as written text of the narrator; C1: Graphic designs: graphics; C2: 
Graphic designs – cartoons; C3: Graphic designs – virtual environments; C4: Graphic designs 
– pictures/images of recognizable people such as George Bush Senior.  
 
Figure 7: Diagrammatic map showing the different articulations on the screen 
between minutes 7-19, highlighting the use of graphic design elements.  
 
 
In this way, intermedial spatiality here becomes a space of relational 
contributions and convergences – adding another defining aspect to the 
described differential viscosity as discussed in the previous chapter – 
between different configurations such as physical and media worlds; that is, 
spatiality dramaturgy moves through the ever-shifting intermedial 
environment. From this perspective, the postulates discussed by the 
ontological and liveness debates and notions of presentness as an 
essentialist “here” only offer, yet again, a minuscule account of the intricacies 
of such a dramaturgical configuration that occupies a space in-between. 
 
In relation to this space in-between, in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and 
Guattari (1988) describe it as follows, 
Between things does not designate a localizable relation 
going from one thing to the other and back again, but a 
particular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one 
and the other way, a stream without beginning or end that 
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undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle. 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 25) 
 
Within this conceptualization, a fluid and heterogeneous spatial articulation 
emerges. One in which spaces do not conflict, but, rather, one where the 
knitting of distinct spaces opens up the spaces in-between: the constant 
unfolding of the processes of deterritorialization. As the above diagram has 
illustrated, this is not a presentational amalgamation or juxtaposition of 
different dramaturgical elements that are fused into an amorphous one, nor a 
simple collection, as a spatial collage/montage understood as a “side-by-side” 
where parts are set against parts simply collecting them as aggregates. 
Instead, the radical process of relating parts, as a mereotopology, is stressed 
within a single field of creative composition and emphasizes the functional 
and differential collective of constructively joining planes of composition 
together. Deterritorialization activates the perceptual and intelligible 
experiences that the unfolding of the dramaturgy affords through the temporal 
emergence of mediality, interconnecting the enabled modifications in the 
manner the medial experience is generated: this manner is the constant 
progressing of the topological interval.65  
 
In Dance to Life, Rick Dolphjin (2010) expresses how ‘the topological rather 
than geometrical space … opens up a spatiotemporal way of spatial 
experience [and] refuse[s] the anthropocentric perspective’ (Dolphjin, 2010: 
167). From this perspective, we can again highlight that in the work of Blast 
Theory the creative aspects of the execution renders agency to both the 
participating subjects and the performative transaction – an agency that, as 
an intra-action, is capable of opening up a threshold of perception, 
intelligibility and experience, and creates the generative morphogenesis of the 
                                                        
65 This is the space where disparate elements intricately deliver the possibility of 
understanding intermedial spatiality as the Deleuzian notion of the line. For Deleuze, a line is 
not made of successive and linear points, between different spaces that do not move in a 
single specific direction but it is a continuous oscillating movement, in an arboreal manner, an 
endless differential, traced back and forth between two or more spatial configurations. In 
doing so, the line creates tension and intensity. The performative composition contains a 
structure that is a self-forming and always-renewing structure, which is achieved by the 
unfolding, as in Deleuze, of the generative frames in and throughout the onto-epistemic 
execution of the event. 
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event’s dramaturgy. Regarding the threshold, Erin Manning (2013b) points 
out, 
the threshold makes the opportunity for discontinuous 
potentialities to mix. As they come together … they collide in 
an emergent discontinuity. This emergent discontinuity 
becomes a continuity only to the extent that a third is 
introduced: relational movement. (Manning, 2013b: 345)  
 
In this sense, the threshold emerges as set of relations that, 
produce nodes of intensity that carry emergence across 
iterations. Emergence, understood as a quality of infinite 
potential with a margin of indetermination at its core, is 
sustained by the very elasticity of the nodes of intensity, an 
elasticity that bends … to make space for points of inflexion 
that, in turn, create differential of relation. (Manning, 2013b: 
345) 
 
This perspective of the emergence of the threshold shift away from the 
already constituted – from the pre-established “side-by-side” – to the plurality 
of an emergent relational multiplicity ‘in the relational movement of the shift in 
levels of process … it operates across and through … [and it is] immanent to 
it’ (Manning, 2013b: 348).  The relational threshold taps into the ‘cresting 
where the continuous and the discontinuous meet … [and where] novelty is 
invented’ (Manning, 2013b: 350).  
 
Drawing on Manning’s philosophical positions, we suggest that intermedial 
dramaturgy is always on the threshold. Emphasized by the fading strategy in 
Something American, the spatial plurality of dramaturgical modes enters into 
a dynamic form. Each spatial actual occasion combines, creating a relational 
architecture of emergence and becoming as its constructive mode of 
existence (see figure 5). With this in mind, intermedial spatiality inhabits the 
space of the middle. It is activated in transversal creative fields. Considered in 
this way, intermedial spatiality in Something American builds relations across 
the fields that it enables, whilst enabling and conditioning itself. It generates 
onto-epistemic experience. Moreover, this proposition of transversality 
enables the participant subject to draw a potential futurity into the actual 
experience. Such a potentiality happens at any spatial instance – at any plane 
of composition – in which each intra-action, renews the potential of the radical 
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aesthetic, transversalizing its movement and filling it with affective and 
knowledge-making potentiality, activated through a nomadic interfacing and 
unfolding haptic spaces.  
 
In this sense, Guattari’s notions regarding transversality as never given, but 
conquered through processual and constructivist aspects, become relevant. 
From this point of view, intermedial dramaturgy always moves – and becomes 
– from the middle as a mereotopological configuration; that is, it expands in a 
continuous and relational flow between each creative plane of composition 
and draws connections between them. From this radical relational middle, 
Something American’s spatial and temporal intermedial planes of narrative 
both converge and diverge across narrative transversal fields, generating 
modulations of intensities and multiplicities. Extrapolating from Manning’s 
(2013b) conceptualization of the threshold, we can categorize it as the fertile 
middle of the interval where narrative boundaries become populated by 
differential iterations of each other – as Boenisch points out, there is no single 
point of entrance or observing position. In this way, it is important to stress 
that transversality has little to do with a reductive presentational and 
communicational reading of intermedial dramaturgies. Rather, it radically 
addresses the differential existential territories of the constructivist aesthetic. 
As such, it emphasizes the transversality of the radical aesthetic understood 
here as a Deleuzian vitalist reading of mediation processes that construct an 
architecture of relations. 
 
In Sensing the Virtual, Building the Sensible, Brian Massumi (1998) discusses 
an original interpretation of topology concretely in relation to architecture as a 
spatial construction within an understanding of the Deleuzian virtual. In this 
way, topology could also be described as becoming in its renegotiating of how 
spatial topologies move from virtuality to actuality and back again. Massumi 
writes, 
Topology deals with continuity of transformation. It engulfs 
forms in their own variation. The variation is bounded by static 
forms that stand at its beginning and its end, and it can be 
stopped at any point to yield other still-standing forms. But it is 
what happens in-between that is the special province of 
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topology. The variation of seamlessly interlinking forms take 
precedence over their separation … when the focus shifts to 
continuity of variation, still-standing form appears as residue 
of a process of change, from which it stands out (in its 
stoppage).  … The variation, as enveloped past and future in 
ceasing form, is the virtuality of that form’s appearance (and 
of others with which it is deformationally interlinked.) 
(Massumi, 1988: 16) 
 
Crucial for Massumi, and relevant to this thesis, is the construction of novel 
combinations of spatial articulations as an active engagement with 
indeterminacy and emergence. In fact, spatiality – as with temporality – in 
relation to the applications of media technologies in the work of Blast Theory, 
necessarily needs to be conceived of ontogenetically in terms of spatial 
variations. In this sense, intermedial spatiality works at the level of onto-
epistemic functionality and Being – as with Whitehead’s understanding of the 
nexuses between actual occasions – in its constructive aesthetic, thus 
producing the new which is happening but “not-yet-finalized”, shattering 
simple and specific locations and linking the local and the non-local in a 
multiplicity of layers and un-stratified and intensive spatial orchestrations (see 
figures 6 and 7).  
 
One of the most interesting dramaturgical segments, this thesis suggests, in 
Something American happens between minutes 15-22. In this sequence, the 
screen flickers constantly, showing different speeds in the manner in which 
the pre-recorded material is presented. At the same time, on the “live” section 
of the stage we also see three of the performers executing a myriad of 
choreographic explorations. At times they dance together, moving across the 
whole stage. Sometimes they move extremely quickly. At others times, their 
choreographic movement – in a Pina Bausch manner, we may suggest – 
comes to a still point. Within the same sequence, we only see one performer. 
At other moments, we see two. At one point, they all vanish and the performer 
playing the policeman appears. While all this is happening, the overall speed 
of the dramaturgical fragment – highly emphasized by music tracks, lights and 
soundscapes in what could be described as a turmoil of intervening variables 
– constantly changes and the fading strategy intensifies. Here, a haptic space 
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of intensities is articulated. The participant subjects are thrown intp a spatial 
environment where the human sensorium is highly activated because it needs 
to respond to the barrage of dramaturgical stimuli and to a frenetic transition 
of images – enabling an intensive intra-active composition of affects and 
cognitive processes. In this sense, the operating of the employed media 
technologies as spatializing agencies intensifies the architectural structure, 
both striated and smooth, of the dramaturgical experience in the constant 
processes of deterritorializing.  
 
The activation of the dramaturgical material in the above-described segment 
inhabits the nomad interval. It maps the topological elasticity of the 
dramaturgical planes of composition, stressing in its multiplicity, the relational 
movement of the radical aesthetic and activating the intensive dramaturgical 
turmoil that the relational movement creates across the nexuses of the 
dramaturgical planes of composition. As in Deleuze’s fold, this is an 
intermedial dramaturgy that continuously blurs whilst the temporal and spatial 
layers within unfolding narrative strata generate at the level of interface. 
Throughout his writings, Deleuze introduces the concept of ‘strata’. At one 
point, he explains that among strata there is no fixed order, and that one 
stratum serves directly as a substratum for another: as the given for the 
becoming. To quote Deleuze and Guattari (1988), 
This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, 
experiment with the opportunities it offers, ﬁnd an 
advantageous point on it, ﬁnd potential movements of 
deterritorialisation … experience them, produce ﬂow 
conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensity 
segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all 
times. It is through a meticulous relation with the strata that 
one succeeds. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 161)  
 
Grasped as strata, each plane of composition is both stable and topologically 
opens up to the next one. Simply, they are relational. In this manner, each 
stratum differentiates itself from the other and from itself and is both 
synchronic and diachronic. Both, as Deleuze (2003) explains in Francis 
Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, different and ‘at one and the same level’ 
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(Deleuze, 2003: 36). They compose the always-modulating attending 
elements of a relational spatial surface.  
 
In relation to Something American, this always-modulating architecture is 
articulated as a place of exchange where transitive and fleeting layers of 
dramaturgical articulations interact – where the pre-recorded filmic material, 
the graphics and the “live” sequences unfold as interweaved strata of many 
modes of interdisciplinary practice (see figure 6). Moreover, in conceptualizing 
Something American as an architecture, the proposed theorization of 
intermedial dramaturgy becomes a manner of executing, already in the act, 
highlighting a thinking of intermedial dramaturgy in its varied manners of 
affording itself, construed as a mode of making and composing creatively in 
the act. Conceived thus, intermedial dramaturgy in Something American can 
be also described as a temporal and spatial landscape because the 
amalgamation of elements and the complexity of the practice’s practicing 
activate a coherent dramaturgical unit while still presenting internal and 
differential aspects.  
 
2.2. Something American: Intermedial Spatiality as 
Landscape. 
 
Something American executes, as a Deleuzian fold, a spatial architecture of 
correlated spaces characterized by multiplicity, discontinuity and continuity, 
flows and heterogeneity. The performance travels through interconnected 
spatial orchestrations that combine physical environments, symbolic spaces 
and pre-recorded spatial contexts that are enfolded, setting, in doing so, its 
own evental self-positing by capturing multiplicities into a functional and 
unified collective.66 Characteristically, the type of functionality we analyze 
here contains spatial aspects that amalgamate as strata; that is, the physical 
and the mediatized blurring the boundaries in the continuous smooth and 
                                                        
66 Notions of landscape and ecology have been also interrogated in performance studies. In 
the majority of cases, these notions, when applied to theatrical performance, have been 
interrogated from the point of view of presentational aesthetics and cultural studies (see 
Kershaw, 2012 and Arons and May, 2012). 
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striated re-negotiation of the constructivist aesthetic. From this point of view, 
this perspective shares defining elements with notions of landscape 
conceived as a mode of stratification.  
 
As stratification, these intermedial spaces are constructed in order to 
communicate and express the movement of temporality and narrativity. In 
Something American, the ‘cutting edges of deterritorialisation become 
operative … forming strange new becomings, new polyvocalities’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1988: 190–1). Because of this, intermedial spatiality in 
Something American responds to a communicative environment as an 
architectural topology where temporality and narrativity turn into experience 
as the experience is creating itself, as it is taking form. In this sense, the 
overall spatial configuration forms internal orchestrations or intra-events while 
shaping potentialities – as in Whitehead’s actual occasions within the 
relational characteristic of the event.  
 
Human geographers Christopher Perkins and Richard Huggett (2004) present 
the possibility of applying the notion of landscape, grasped as a dynamic 
construction, as an interpretative concept that can bring important insights into 
different critical perspectives. Along the same lines, geographers Janet 
Abrams and Peter Hall (2006) also stress the dynamism of landscapes. They 
interpret the notion of landscape as spatial points and elements ‘intertwined in 
singular and evolving relations to others’ (Abrams and Hall, 2006: 3). 
Moreover, they state, ‘from the interplay of such relations, functional patterns 
… [a landscape] emerge[s]’ (Abrams and Hall, 2006: 3). Most importantly 
here, physical geographers Robert Kitchin and Martin Dodge (2007) put 
forward an understanding of landscape as a set of relational entities, 
engaging constantly in processes of becoming. Conceived thus, their 
proposals regarding the concept of landscape move away from ontological 
readings of the “here” as an absolute location in time to the “here” as 
relational ontogenesis. They write, ‘the shift from ontology (how things are) to 
ontogenesis (how things become)’ must be observed to fully comprehend the 
notion of landscape (Kitchin and Dodge 2007: 4). This ontogenetic 
understanding of landscape allows Kitchin and Dodge to claim that 
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landscapes emerge in process through a diverse and relational set of 
experiential practices. In this context, landscapes are always in a state of 
becoming. They are ontogenetic (emergent) in nature. Kitchin and Dodge also 
write, ‘[landscapes] have no ontological security. They are … transitory … 
relational. They are never fully formed [but open to new formations]’ (Kitchin 
and Dodge 2007: 5).  
 
Furthermore, in Mapping Cyberspace, Kitchin and Dodge (2001) discuss how 
the concept of landscape can be also used to fuse the differences between 
physical and virtual spaces. Their central thesis is that these spaces cannot 
be thought as separate entities. Instead, they propose they ‘are interwoven’ in 
a series of experiential relations (Kitchin and Dodge, 2001: 24). Kitchin and 
Dodge suggest that digital and geographical spaces exist in an interfacial 
dominium. Both types of space, according to them, should not be grasped as 
two separate realms because ‘spill over is inevitable as both join to form a 
single experiential reality’ (Kitchin and Dodge, 2001: 54). Such ‘spill over’ 
suggests fluid yet orchestrated connections between geographical space and 
digital space in a dialectical interweaving.  
 
With these definitions in mind, the differential unfolding of the intermedial 
spatial articulations interrogated here responds to the dynamic re-activation of 
narrative configurations. As with the notion of landscape, where spatial 
structures and circulations are said to be in a constant process of re-
configuration and amalgamate all different ‘spilling over’ constituent elements, 
intermedial spatiality can be also said, as a dynamic intertwining, to engage in 
a process of landscaping articulations. Adding to Kitchin and Dodge’s 
descriptions, we argue that the modulation between the different parts and 
sections that articulate a landscape can be said to be mereotopological since 
the active correlation between the parts and the whole conditions the spatio-
temporal dynamism on the thresholds of morphogenetic modalities, 
topologically interlocked in different organizing centres.  
 
Broadly, if we consider a landscape as a relation of intervening elements, 
configured as a working system that incorporates its own dynamic process, 
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the spatial configurations of Something American can be also categorized as 
such. As the diagrammatic maps have helped visualize, the dynamic 
movement of the attending variables presents interfaces that systematically 
amalgamate their elements. From the computer generated graphics, pre-
recorded film and cartoons to the choreographic phrases and the splitting of 
the screen into a myriad of cinematic presentational frames, the modulations 
of the shown spatial structures can be grasped as unfolding strata within an 
overall spatial landscape. Seen thus, intermedial spatiality, as a landscape, 
can be said to be in constant processes of modulation within the overall 
dramaturgical landscape. As Deleuze and Guattari (2004) write in A 
Thousand Plateaus, ‘what holds heterogeneities together without their 
ceasing to be heterogeneous … are elements of a discrete aggregate, but 
they become consolidated, take on consistency’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 
363). In this sense, a landscape is constantly made and remade; that is, it is 
relationally transitory.  
 
2.3 Something American: the Generative Aspect of the 
Intermedial Scenographic.  
 
The purpose of this section is to offer some conceptualizing remarks 
regarding notions of scenography as a fundamental element in the articulation 
of intermedial spatiality and an overall dramaturgical structure, particularly 
emphasizing its generative nature in Something American. It is, however, 
beyond the scope of this section to fully engage with scenographic research 
and scholarship. Having said this, it is important to note how recent 
scenographic scholarship fittingly agrees that scenography is increasingly 
conceived of as an event, rather than a set of static physical elements (see 
Aronson, 2005, 2010; Nellhaus, 2006; Grondahl, 2010; Pavis, 2012 and 
Block, 2007).67 Nonetheless, critical debates regarding scenography still 
                                                        
67 Paul Allain and Jen Harvie (2006) discuss that ‘even though the practice [of scenography] 
has existed for hundreds of years in various forms, as a term ‘scenography’ is relatively new 
and still unfamiliar. It has superseded the phrase ‘theatre design’, for ‘scenography’ denotes 
the integrated work on all the elements of production, from costumes through soundscapes to 
masks, a breath which the expression ‘stage design’, ‘scenic design’ and ‘theatre design’ 
cannot encompass’ (Allain and Harvie, 2006: 203).  
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discuss the conceptualizing differences between scenography and mise-en-
scene. For instance, Patrice Pavis (2012) in Contemporary Mise en Scene: 
Staging Theatre Today, defines mise-en-scene as ‘beyond the setting-up of 
the scenery, the passage from page to page, then the opposition of the visual 
and textual, and ultimately the semiotic system of meaning that the show 
implicitly carries’ (Pavis, 2012: 35) and scenography as ‘the visible and 
material part of the mise-en-scene. It is only one component among others’ 
(Pavis, 2012: 63). Then, he recognizes that, on the one hand, ‘there is an 
underground struggle between scenography and mise-en-scene’ (Pavis, 
2012: 63); and on the other hand, ‘scenography has grown so close to mise-
en-scene that they can no longer always be distinguished’ (Pavis, 2012: 78). 
Because of this, this research suggests that intermedial scenography is better 
understood, following Hann (2013), as the scenographic since the term 
presents the possibilities of including both. In this sense, we stress the 
networking process of the scenographic as an agential force of emergent 
aesthetic relations.  
 
Intermedial practices, this research proposes, emphasize the use of media to 
explore staging modalities, which, in turn, generate novel (semiotic and 
material) scenographic orchestrations. These orchestrations disrupt traditional 
existing critical positions such as Lavender (2004). This thesis suggests an 
understanding of the scenographic that moves towards a maximization of the 
theatrical space and a layering of both the physical and virtual space – one 
that, in the constant unfolding between the striated and the smooth, enables 
the haptic. It is this potential for creating transformative spatial processes that 
sees the making and constructing of dramaturgy through the scenographic as 
a process that cannot be assigned a single meaning, a single aspect and/or a 
single form. Rather, it radically conceives the intermedial scenographic as an 
unfolding and performative threshold with its own agency. In this context, this 
fluctuating, becoming and always-modulating scenographic space appears as 
a dynamic potential through which dramaturgy is constructed within a 
relational landscape of activity. 
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In Scenography or Making Space, scenographer and scholar Thea Brejzek 
(2012) discusses the dynamic aspect of scenography. She writes, ‘we have 
learned, and maybe always felt, that space is not one, but many … We are, 
however, always part of a spatial configuration. Space is a dynamic network 
of temporalities. (Brejzek, 2012: 16) 
 
Furthermore, in relation to the performative, she writes,  
[With t]he performative qualities of space-making in the here 
and now, it becomes apparent that “making” and “re-making” 
as constant and non-finite processes correspond closely with 
the notion of the heightened presence of the performative act 
of making space, of enacting and experiencing the practice of 
making space. (Brejzek, 2012: 22-23)  
 
Drawing on her definitions, we agree that the arrangements of the intermedial 
performance space can be no longer seen as a ‘container with fixed 
boundaries … to be filled with things and objects, furnished with a purpose 
and thus be given functionality and meaning’ (Brejzek, 2012: 16) for the 
dramaturgical development, in which the material design of the space – the 
scenographic set and the nature of the performance venue – functions as the 
structuring devices for the intermedial event. Rather, the place, the artwork 
and the participating subjects engage in a creative process, as intra-actions, 
that blurs established conceptualizing lines in relation to scenography such as 
those described by Fischer-Lichte and enables the onto-epistemic 
construction of the spatiality of the intermedial event.  
 
Scenography and mise-en-scene, in general, are obviously important in the 
construction of the spatial features without which no performance event would 
ever take place. With this in mind, in What is Scenography?, Pamela Howard 
(2002) describes the term scenography as a ‘seamless synthesis of space … 
that contributes to an original creation’ (Howard, 2002: 130). She continues, ‘it 
is a synthetic system of options and organizing principles’ (Howard, 2002: 
130). We suggest, in concurrency with Howard, that the consideration of 
space and time as a synthetic unit becomes central to intermedial 
scenographic practices. In doing so, the intermedial space becomes an active 
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agent in dramaturgical creation since it conditions the network of relations 
between the performance attending variables and the participating subject.  
 
It is hard to argue against the statement that intermedial work contributes to 
dramaturgical staging or mise-en-scene in straightforward and fluid ways in its 
challenge of traditional presentational strategies. As Wiens correctly 
describes, intermedial scenography opens up a potential territory in relation to 
scenographic positions. In this context, Greg Giesekam (2007) writes, ‘the use 
of recorded media and live relay multiplies the scope of possible incidents, 
source materials, interactions, intertexts and issues, and the ways of 
presenting and perceiving them’ (Giesekam, 2007: 10). According to him, 
intermedial work presents the possibility of playing with space and time, 
backstage and stage, and the interaction of spectators and performers. He 
describes,  
multiplicity of materials, view-points and styles is often also 
accompanied by a greater degree of simultaneity, more 
focused on visual imagery, and an increased self-reflexivity 
than is generally the case in theatre driven more by text, 
character or narrative. (Giesekam, 2007: 12) 
 
Regarding the above-mentioned multiplicity of presentational viewpoints, 
Giesekam also argues that performances become more presentational than 
representational. In this way, it can be argued that the different ways of 
executing the event in relation to the construction of spatiality become 
polyvalent and multiplied since the proposed generative characteristic affords 
a myriad of performative dramaturgical combinations. 
 
Within the context of the agency of intermedial spatial configurations, the 
introduction of the technological elements, as we find in Something American, 
provides new ways of presenting scenographic conventions – technology as 
spatializing. In this context, Giesekam aptly suggests that the inclusion of 
screens and visual imagery in theatrical productions ‘achieves the dynamic 
effect of cinematic dissolves’, creating a heterogeneity of temporal and spatial 
orchestrations (Giesekam, 2007: 10). This, in turn, re-negotiates the 
architectural aspect of performance where scenography shapes new modes 
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of theatrical expression and innovative relationships between the event’s 
participant subjects and the attending variables. In other words, Giesekam 
suitably points out that the collage-montage of intermedial temporal and 
spatial locations distributed across the stage space disrupts the usual 
expectations of space and time in a linear presentational manner. However, 
here it is argued that, although, following Giesekam, the presentational 
disruption of traditional scenographic linearity is acknowledged, Something 
American, and the work of Blast Theory in general, cannot be fully explained 
by only considering the presentational aspects of intermedial scenography. 
Rather, the intermedial scenographic elements in Blast Theory’s praxis are 
imperative to the formation of intermedial spatiality and overall dramaturgy. In 
other words, rather than using an intermedial presentational aesthetic to 
discuss Blast Theory’s performance, a constructivist aesthetic is needed to 
fully account for the specific kind of scenographic practice in the work of Blast 
Theory. 
 
The discussed characteristics of the onto-epistemic execution of the event 
radically conceive, we argue, the scenographic as a dynamic and 
transformable system of unfolding narrative potentialities. Instead of focusing 
on the static materiality of the set, the scenenographic in Something American 
is conceived as a becoming platform to create and facilitate the dynamics of 
the onto-epistemic fundamental encounter. Through the theoretical lenses of 
Deleuze and Whitehead in relation to potentiality, spatial agency and 
becoming, Something American’s scenography can be discussed as an 
enfolding platform that presents the becoming narrative structuring. 
Conceived thus, the scenographic articulations of the triadic execution of the 
event proposed here problematize some of the critical positions such as 
semiotic, materialist, formalist and phenomenological in relation to intermedial 
scenographic articulations. It is to these that we now turn. 
 
First, Erika Fischer-Lichte (2008) positions the functionality of the autopoietic 
feedback loop as the performative transaction and the emergence of 
materiality and meaning. In relation to materiality and semioticity, Fischer-
Lichte establishes mise-en-scene and the autopoietic aesthetic experience as 
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the constitutive conditions of a given performance’s materiality and 
semioticity. The specific performativity of the aesthetic event, she claims, 
disrupts classical aesthetic debates of the artwork, production and reception. 
She proposes,  
The concept of the work of art is accompanied by the terms 
production and reception, the notion of the event is 
complemented by mise-en-scene and aesthetic experience. 
This terminological triad constitutes the conceptual backbone 
of the aesthetics of the performative. (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 
182)  
 
However, Fischer-Lichte’s interpretation of both constitutive elements, mise-
en-scene and aesthetic experience, becomes blurry and problematic 
throughout her writings, because of what appears to be an unclear correlation 
between concepts such as event, theatricality and mise-en-scene. On the one 
hand, for her, mise-en-scene articulates a given performance in a temporal 
and spatial sequence – as with Phelan’s ontological claims also grasped 
within an essentialist reading of ontological vitalism. This articulation, she 
claims, is accomplished by staging strategies. In her understanding, the 
staging, bluntly put, decides what appears or disappears from the 
performance, and, ultimately, informs the processes of the autopoietic 
feedback loop, but ‘is nonetheless unable to determine or control [the final 
outcome of] the autopoietic process’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 188). She explains 
that the staging process of a given mise-en-scene determines the 
performative strategies for enabling semioticity and materiality.68 
Consequently, she posits, the staging process influences the effect of the 
autopoietic feedback loop. She describes how ‘the mise-en-scene provides a 
strong framework for the performance and the feedback loop’s autopoiesis, 
but is nonetheless unable to determine or control the autopoietic process’. 
(Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 188). On the other hand, Fischer-Lichte links the 
concept of mise-en-scene to the idea of the autopoietic event, but fails, this 
thesis argues, to establish an apt differentiation between either. Later in her 
                                                        
68 Drawing from Edward Gordon Craig (1911), Fischer-Lichte (2008) also sees mise-en-
scene as the platform to artistically compose a given performance. However, she aptly 
acknowledges that most definitions of mise-en-scene within semiotic backgrounds, for 
instance, fail to clearly distinguish between mise-en-scene and performance. 
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argument, she even links notions of theatricality with mise-en-scene. The lack 
of a clear distinction between mise-en-scene, theatricality, and event 
throughout her writing makes it rather difficult to classify mise-en-scene as a 
clear constitutive element of performance as she wishes to do. Having said 
this, one aspect becomes clear. That is, she rightly places materiality, form 
and semioticity in the performative liminality of the autopoietic feedback loop. 
In placing the constitution of scenography regarding materiality, semioticity 
and form within the feedback loop, she offers a more developed interpretation 
of semiotic and formalist approaches; that is, she does not rely, for instance, 
on fixed semiotic taxonomies or essentialist readings of form; she sees form, 
semiotics and materiality as process; and places the phenomeno-experiential 
encounter at the epicentre of scenographic constitution. However, as valid as 
these remarks are, Fischer-Lichte’s proposal does not fully capture the 
particularities of the scenographic intermedial execution in Something 
American because her phenomeno-experiential explanations of the 
autopoietic feedback loop place mise-en-scene, scenography, materiality, 
form and semiotics in the constant process of constitution occurring in the 
liminal and evental space between the attending spectators and performance, 
which still explicitly emphasizes the binary world/subject.69 
 
With Deleuze’s fold, the autopoietics of Fischer-Lichte’s feedback loop 
become reductive because, although the feedback loop does not 
predetermine an outcome, her reading is still steeped in a conventionality that 
attempts – in its performative sequencing – spatial dramaturgical resolution 
and stability. In the fold, contrary to this, we see intermedial spatiality as 
reaching across – transversally – and as intersecting several spatial 
                                                        
69 In relation to materiality, the autopoiesis, following Varela and Maturana, of a given being 
and entity can be understood as a mode of constant transformation whereby the material 
world can never be absorbed entirely by the subject because its ever-mutating and re-
adjusting manner requires a certain structure to be in a constant process of reconfiguration 
and search for stability. Autopoiesis places the emphasis on a materiality that can never be 
stable, and, as such, implicates the embodied dimension of subjectivity appropriately; that is, 
in a constant struggle and fight of adaptation between world and subject. By identifying the 
constant interactive crisis between subject and environment, Maturana and Varela state that 
autopoiesis is a system of temporal reconfigurations always tending towards (and struggling 
to achieve) stability. In opposition to this reading of autopoietic materiality, this research 
argues that intermediality cannot be conceptualized using Fischer-Lichte’s autopoietic 
perspective because, due to the intensive potentialities of the triadic execution, the event 
never tends towards the stability of materiality. 
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orchestrations. The activation of the fold is the creation of the new. Seen thus, 
the fold sets up the relational spatial intermedial environment, no longer 
creating linear separation and sequencing. Rather, it sets intermedial 
spatiality in the realm of variable intensities of movement – in the threshold of 
the interval where notions of spatial connection and separation collapse.  
 
Second, Andy Lavender (2004), in relation to intermediality, and, particularly, 
within the context of hypermediality addresses the specificities of mise-en-
scene, which he defines as ‘the arrangements of the stage and its spaces of 
performance’ (Lavender, 2004: 56). He argues that, undoubtedly, the 
hypermediacy of the intermedial staging ‘gives both structure and texture to 
the event … the same space as both flatly pictorial and fully scenic, two 
dimensional and three-dimensional’ (Lavender, 2004: 62). In the context of 
understanding mise-en-scene as, broadly, “everything” allocated on the stage, 
Lavender posits, the relationship and duration of this “everything” creates a 
theatricalized space (bodies, sets, costumes, lights and screens). 
Furthermore, the use of the screens, he explains, is coded in relation to mise-
en-scene and is contingent upon the use of the elements that make up the 
staging, the hypermedial mise-en-scene (Lavender, 2004: 56-58).  
 
From this perspective, Lavender notes that mise-en-scene not only organizes 
the theatrical event configured by both actors and spectators, but also 
explores meaning and effect, hence, generating a mode of experiencing and 
meaning-making. Additionally, in Mise en Scene, Hypermediacy and the 
Sensorium, he (2006) describes how mise-en-scene ‘organises space for 
spectatorship and thereby redistributes meaning and effect’ (Lavender, 2006: 
63). Crucially, Lavander locates the materiality and semioticity of scenography 
within the complex network of hypermediality. He follows, ‘in hypermedial 
performance, mise-en-scene is a network of mediations that are also re-
mediations, persistently playing to its spectators [and actors] both the modes 
of the piece and the culture’s modes of aesthetic affinity’ (Lavender, 2004: 
63). This is a type of mise-en-scene, according to him, that allows for 
spectators and actors to be fully aware of the remediation process that is 
taking place – a rather similar perspective to Bolter and Grusin’s. Interestingly, 
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Lavender’s proposition, in regards to mise-en-scene, can be categorized as 
one of presentational simultaneities where all the functional elements 
intertwine and where the virtual and the actual emphasize each other. 
However, on a close reading of his proposals, Lavender, as with Fischer-
Lichte, still privileges the phenomeno-experiential dimension in order to 
explore the evental nature of semioticity and materiality; and, in doing so, yet 
again places the emphasis in the subject-world duality.  
 
Third, the intermedial debate highlights the creation of hybrid spaces (and 
hybrid works) and draws attention to the impact of technologies and the “how” 
of creation rather than the “what” (see Benford and Giannachi, 2011; Davis 
and Harrison, 1996; Steuter, 1992; and Dixon, 2007). This focus on the “how”, 
Johannes Birringer (2010) proposes, has highlighted the process of creating a 
given performance’s phenomenal experience while engaging with 
dramaturgical aspects such as interactivity. Significantly, Birringer also points 
out that notions of agency have moved centre stage in the conceptualizing of 
standard scenographic parameters. As with Wiens, he also highlights how 
intermedial practices have been described as blurring the distinctions 
between the “here” and other spaces through their use of virtual 
presentational environments and the engagement with different levels of 
spatial representation. In this context, Birringer offers a basic but precise 
definition of digital scenography. He writes,  
the live performance architecture incorporates analogue, 
digital and networked dimensions; performers and audiences 
are inside and outside the digital worlds simultaneously; and 
the screen canvasses co-animate the localized movement 
narratives. Such hybrid spaces can evoke forceful and 
beautiful combinatorics [and] fusions. (Birringer, 2010: 99) 
 
Furthermore, Birringer notes that intermedial practice creates a ‘moveable 
world’ (Birringer, 2010: 91) through which three primary dimensions interplay. 
According to him, these are: ‘(1) movement environment (spatial design); (2) 
movement images (projections of digital objects and virtual spaces; and (3) 
movement of sound (from macro to micro levels)’ (Birringer, 2010: 91). 
Interestingly, he sees spatial configurations as movement and process, yet, 
once again, with a clear focus on the “how”.  
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As noted, this thesis sees no difference between the “what” and the “how” of, 
in this instance, spatiality in relation to the onto-epistemic. In the context of 
digital performance, this research highlights, following Boenisch, the 
continuous and evolving relations between the physical and the virtual worlds 
in space never stand still and have no dominant perspective. The use of 
mediatized scenography extends the performative space into the physical, the 
virtual (combining both pre-recorded geographical locations and computer 
designed virtual and graphic spaces), and even the symbolic. This, in turn, 
creates haptic and diegetic narrative spaces that enhance the spatial 
orchestration of the performance transaction as a whole. We observe here a 
non-separation of the “what” and the “how” and the mediation process that 
enables the scenographic to become, in which the layering of simultaneous 
spatial perspectives see the functionality and operativity of the creation of the 
generative spatial frame, the “how”, as equal to the qualitative and 
knowledge/concept-making aspect, the “what”, of the frame.  
 
At the heart of this argument lies the plasticity of the mediatized scenographic. 
Something American presents a heterogeneous spatial orchestration in which 
the agential scenographic, incorporating the media elements and the physical 
space, enables the complex wholeness of the haptic experiential and the 
intelligible. In relation to the above-mentioned plasticity, Birringer’s notion of 
the ‘moveable’ presents useful characteristics in relation to intermedial 
spatiality. First, it sees the process of spatiality linked to the temporal process. 
Second, it articulates the unfolding and rhythmic movements that see the 
physical and virtual spaces in a polyphonic manner. Third, and last, it 
emphasizes the non-static aspects of the scenographic execution.  
 
From these defining parameters, this thesis proposes that unfolding in 
Something American is ‘mise-en-abyme’, broadly defined here as a space 
within a space, an interior within an interior and a complex multiplicity of the 
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inside and the outside (Deleuze, 2005: 79).70 In this sense, intermedial 
scenography can be also positioned as an architectural mise-en-abyme that 
brings together an intensive, expressive, affective and effective relationship 
between agential interactions of the human and non-human. Drawing on 
Deleuze reading of mise-en-abyme, intermedial scenography operates 
between cross-functional relations of multiplicity. In Cinema 2, Deleuze (2005) 
discusses mise-en-abyme as an imbrication of multiplicities that contain many 
heterogeneous ends, and establishes relationships of different kinds, putting 
an emphasis on instances of spatial connectivity. Seen thus, the only thing 
holding the imbricated structures together is co-relation, or, in other words, 
symbiosis and mutual relations. In this sense, we are in the realm of ‘any-
space-whatever’ which gives rise to and expresses affect as centres of 
determination in the making.  
 
Something American, in its use of mediatized scenography, extends and re-
structures compositional elements. It is in a state of transformational 
becoming, creating scenographic compositions with a feel of a fluctuating and 
mutable state. Media technology in performance effortlessly creates, we 
suggest, multiple spatial iterations of images displaying similarity, 
differentiation and complex dimensionality. In Something American, the 
scenographic composition itself moves, becomes and unfolds as drapery 
interpenetrating different spaces while engulfing the striated and the smooth. 
As with the Deleuzian and Whiteheadian event, the fluctuating and enfolding 
spaces inhabit a model of constant, relational and intensive multiplicity of 
spatial units. As with Deleuze’s ideas of the fold, in particular, intermedial 
scenography’s virtuality never stops creating itself during the performance in a 
series of becomings where potential difference creates scenographic harmony 
– the univocity of the execution of the event. Intermedial scenographic, like a 
drapery space, creates a folding of becoming where the movement and 
variation of scenographic compositions becomes indiscernible. The 
generative compositional aspect of the intermedial scenographic throws its 
spatial compositions into a synchronic and diachronic landscape of smooth 
                                                        
70 Derrida and Foucault also use the term in their conceptualizations of postmodern notions of 
space. The notion was originally used by Derrida.  
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and striated space that, as mise-en-abyme, formally create a synthetically, 
both fractalized and united, scenographic space of intra-active potentials.  
 
With this in mind, the intermedial scenographic presents a variety of self-
organizing processes and an intense power of morphogenesis. The formation 
of materiality, semioticity and form metamorphoses through the generative 
entanglement of the scenographic planes of compositions. Here, we observe 
the processes of creating the scenographically new through the dynamics of 
the topological. In this way, 
 the intra-active topological dynamics reconfigure the 
spacetime manifold … [including] an analysis of the 
connectivity of the phenomena at different scales … The 
topological dynamics of space, time and matter are agential 
matter and as such require … knowing and being: Intra-
actions … the dynamics of the spacetime manifold is 
produced by agential interventions made possible in its very 
re(con)figuration. (Barad in Dolphijn et al. 2012: 112-113)   
 
Here, the generated scenographic structures cease to be the primary reality. 
Rather, the process of self-positing – and the transversality of scenographic 
morphogenesis – becomes the defining element. In Something American and 
within the proposed radical aesthetic, the scenographic incorporation of 
technological elements draws attention to the scenographic staging as a 
process in the making, constantly re-activating through vitalist mediation while 
exposing a mode of scenographic existence as plural both in relation to their 
coming into being and the manner in which their modality affords cross-
functionality in its relational complexity.  
 
In opposition to reductive readings of intermedial scenography as a modality 
of staging, in the work of Blast Theory in general, the media technologies 
scenographic structures, as noted, are fundamental to the forming of the 
piece’s dramaturgy; they are not simply presentational. From Viewfinder 
(2001) where a fixed view of a flat was shown constantly over twenty four 
hours in an art gallery, thus enabling the visitors to the gallery to do close-ups 
and zooms in/out and linking the everyday with, at times, even the 
pornographic; to Jog Shuttler (2013) where old VHS tapes containing 
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recordings of past Blast Theory performances were selected by participant 
subjects to be projected onto a series of screens on a big wall in mixes of up 
to nine simultaneous loops to visually, sensorially and intellectually re-purpose 
the archives in manners that were never intended originally; and to the 
handheld GPS systems of Rider Spoke (2007), where the participants 
subjects cycle through the streets of a city in search of the others, and the 
media technologies as part of the scenographic agentially activate the 
performances’ events from within, enabling reciprocal transformations 
between the narrative variables and the participant subjects through 
processes of generating dramaturgical mediality. In this instance, the screen’s 
agency of Something American, as a crucial dramaturgical element, needs to 
be fully accounted for because it enables and enhances the possibilities for 
perception and intelligibility afforded in this intermedial environment. As a 
tangible material interface between its own qualities as a physical element 
and the perceptual experience it generates, the screen becomes a mediatory 
element. It helps afford the experiential dynamics of narrative change. As part 
of the topological, the screen appears as continuously layering the 
stratigraphic modulations of the medial narrative interfaces and it is predicated 
on the prominence of the interval – in constant transformational movement, 
exploring the thresholds of intensity and capturing the potentialities that 
emerge between the amalgamations of different incorporated narrative forms 
such as the dance phrases and the theatrical monologues. Seen thus, the 
screen is both compositional and constructive at the same time. The use of 
the screen as a technological element in this piece can be extrapolated, we 
suggest, to the manner in which all Blast Theory’s work employs technology. 
Simply put, in the work of the company technology as scenographic elements 
becomes a mediatory constituent in the event-generating activation of 
medialities.  
 
The scenographic in Something American and Blast Theory, in general, 
needs to be repositioned as radical – it purely requires a novel manner of 
critically accounting for. In this sense, we ardently highlight the processes of 
mattering, forming and semiotizing; the thinking of the intensive and 
differential, instead of the chronologically linear; the functioning as the blurring 
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layering of the strata and nexusing through the transversality of the 
scenographic intertwining; and the search for the newly configured imbued 
with relationality, landscaping itself into unfolding scenographic forms.71 The 
intermedial scenographic in the work of Blast Theory escapes from 
essentialist and foundational readings of ontological form and matter, 
traditional readings of representation and classical aesthetic notions regarding 
static and completed works of art. Rather, it enters into the unfolding territory 
of the re-activating and the constantly created and re-presented, and in turn, 
to creates new scenographic territories and landscapes in the performative 
act of making, constituting co-experience and co-construction of material and 
semiotic environments through the creation of affective and intelligible 
narrative atmospheres. In this sense, the scenographic as a fundamental and 
agential component of the dramaturgical is always in processes of becoming. 
 
2.4. Something American:  Becoming, Final Thoughts and 
Problematics.  
 
In this final and short section, the becoming of spatial complexities is 
explored. The dynamic spatial combinations in Something American present 
an ongoing re-activation in which the link between spatial surfaces and 
temporalities points directly to relational sub-divisions and emphasizes the 
relativity of coming into being. Here, the creative and forward movement of 
the intermedial transaction, generated in synchronic and diachronic 
concurrent narrative orchestrations, enables the production of the structure 
emergence as the becoming of a plane of immanence.  
 
In their becoming, the agential inter-engagements of material design, 
embodied performance, 3D graphics, virtual world design and filmic 
geographical landscapes create the adequate conditions to explore spatiality 
as relational. In other words, the relationship between the “live” and the 
recorded projections stretches the correlation between the spatial and the 
                                                        
71 In this sense, intermedial scenography in the work of Blast Theory can be also discussed 
from critical backgrounds such as new materialisms and anti-representational positions (see 
Dolphijn and van der Tuin, 2012, DeLanda, 2006 and Braidotti, 2000). 
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temporal. These correlations are not understood here to be oppositional. 
Instead, they communicate, inter-relate and co-exist concurrently in the space 
of the narrative interval. There is continuity of becoming, as Whitehead says, 
between the far and the close, osmosis between the intimate and familiar and 
the determined and undetermined space while actively enabling the intelligible 
and the affective. Enfolded within these liminal intensities are the spatio-
temporalities of narrative relation, the topological, the interval, the transversal 
and becoming. To understand these, we have focused on Something 
American as an example of how the work of Blast Theory particularly stresses 
the dramaturgic intervening variables as a system of differential relations 
between the variables and the variables-to-come, as a landscape, creating 
forms of intensive succession and extension; pulverizing any essentialist 
reading of the “here”; and conceiving the synchronic and the diachronic as 
engaged with equally. These characteristics can be extrapolated from the 
historical arc of the company’s production. From Gunmen Kill Three (1991) 
where the “live” performance simply incorporated a video projector to The 
Thing I’ll Be Doing for the Rest of my Life (2013), where every member of the 
audience was encouraged to record, take pictures and document the 
performance as a crowd of volunteers dragged a trawler out of the water in 
Nagoya, Japan. The dramaturgical characteristics that this chapter has 
interrogated highlight the specificity of Blast Theory’s work and its original 
manner of enquiring about the very nature of intermedial performance. 
 
Now, the notion of emergent relationality, as noted, is central to the 
philosophical principles of a constructivist reading of epistemology, mainly 
because it implies a network of connections that shapes the flexibility of the 
emerging patterns whose structures multiply increasingly and are distributed 
extensively. Deleuze and Whitehead ask us to faithfully distinguish the 
progressive unfolding of a multiplicity through a relational continuum where 
everything happens at the boundary between positions that could move in any 
direction. Their reading of the relational constantly moves away from a clear 
specification of the continuous space formed by multiplicities as it enables a 
world of an all-encompassing, all-extending and all-reaching spatial 
structures. Deleuze and Whitehead require us to imagine a continuum of 
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multiplicities, which differentiates itself from our understanding of space as 
structured contents. From this perspective, relational emergence may be 
considered not to have a beginning and an end. Both philosophers, within a 
relational perspective, oblige us to think of time as an extensive continuum 
that expands in the relation between actual occasions as an intensive 
magnitude. 
 
However, when the notion of emergent relationality is applied directly to 
performance conceptualizations it becomes somehow problematic. In this 
sense, performance also informs a reading of a constructivist epistemology.  
First, performance is obviously a durational aesthetic – it has a starting and a 
final point. From this perspective the relational continuum can be rendered as 
being temporally bound – the dynamic system that emerges out of each 
performative intra-action is contained by the durational and dramaturgical 
aspects of the performance. Hence, the potentialities of the relational, while 
remaining open during the execution of each performative intra-action, still 
present, we suggest, a sense of limitation. Seen thus, theatrical performance, 
even in the most structurally open dramaturgy, may appear to reduce the 
possibilities of this ever-expanding relational continuum that both Deleuze and 
Whitehead devotedly highlight. Second, the processual interactions between 
the conceptualizations of the striated and smooth space may also need to be 
reconsidered in relation to dramaturgical parameters. Although Deleuze and 
Guattari clearly state the dynamics between these two types of space, it can 
be argued that, particularly in the final sections of A Thousand Plateaus, they 
appear to emphasize the smooth over the striated when considering 
processes of becoming and potentiality since they link the smooth to the 
virtual. Nevertheless, we suggest that in theatrical performance the striated 
needs to be given full consideration because the specificities of the physical 
space where a performance takes place cannot be disregarded during 
processes of actualization. The location is crucial in the construction of the 
dramaturgical structures. Simply put, theatrical performance cannot be 
disassociated from the physical space in which it takes place – the striated is 
a vital conditioning element and cannot be underestimated in relation to the 
smooth. What we suggest is a reading of the striated as being constantly 
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transversed into the smooth and the smooth as being immediately returned to 
the striated, creating a world that both homegenizes and differentiates in its 
relational concatenations.  
 
As a final thought in relation to the notion of becoming, intermedial 
orchestrations, as seen in Something American, act beyond the pure 
empirical succession of time and space and explore the co-existence of the 
generative presentational operatives of how they come about – their 
becoming. In their becoming, a constant deterritorizalization of all the 
attending variables occurs in all their actual and virtual relations, not as pre-
given to the event’s constitution, but as a given to the immanent processes 
during the triadic execution. The continuous reframing of the spatial inter-
relations is capable of creating a metamorphosis of the performative frame 
and, with it, the generative metamorphosis of the evental onto-epistemic 
relations.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Execution: Blast Theory’s Day of the Figurines (2006)  
 
 
 
 
This chapter interrogates the way in which the suggested constructivist 
aesthetic of intermedial work explores the structural complexity of the 
mereotopological aspect of the radical dramaturgy. In the previous chapters 
we highlighted the differential and relational characteristics of such an 
aesthetic. This chapter moves this research’s argument forward by particularly 
focusing on how such a radical dramaturgy needs to be grasped in terms of 
its activating attributes, paying specific attention to, on the one hand, the 
generating multi-linear narrative patterns as a complexity occurring between 
each narrative occasion, which retains, we suggest, its own singularity and 
how such singularities are connected to other narrative occasions within the 
relativity of their own existence; and, on the other hand, concentrating on how 
this mereotopological dimension impacts on the construction of dramaturgical 
mediality through the constant interplay between the Deleuzian actual and 
virtual within the argued reading of epistemology, thus, enabling a fielding of 
narrative potentialities. 
 
From this perspective, the chapter highlights how intermedial practices enable 
the generation of narrative landscapes in which the inter-layering of narrative 
strata rejects, on the one hand, any ontological reading, as foundational, of 
narrative, and, on the other hand, dramaturgical understandings of fabulation 
as linearity and notions of focalization as the specific relationship between the 
viewpoint and the explored mode of perception of a given narrative structure 
by the viewer/reader of such a structure. Instead, on the one hand, processes 
of fabulation, we argue, do not aim to correlate with any essentialist reading of 
a narrative “here and now”; rather, they bring to light how each dramaturgical 
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occasion is always associated through the creation of new relations – through 
such relations fabulation produces itself; and, on the other hand, focalization, 
this research emphasizes, is constructed at the very moment of the execution 
as internal to the construction of the diegetic frame, not synthesizing focal 
point relations into a final outcome, but as emerging in the process from within 
and opening up to a landscape of relationality. Put slightly differently, the 
exploration of media technologies in performance practices creates narrative 
environments that can be also grasped as liminal, differential and relational. In 
this sense, the agential and operative quality of the media, we suggest, also 
acts as narrativizing, enabling the construction of intermedial orchestrations 
that are mereotopologically mediated. Put in Deleuzian and Whiteheadian 
terms, as a set of constituted actualities that are activated through their 
immanent capacity of creating the new. Crucial to this view is the notion of the 
relational, self-positing and differential character of Being. In this sense, the 
constant execution of dramaturgical occasions has to do with the radical 
manner of being of the narrative next that, although clearly emerging within 
the contingency of how the dramaturgy is being activated through a series of 
parameters, as in Hendriks-Jansen’s proposals of emergent and situated 
activity, presents narrative openings immanent to the interplay between the 
conditioned, the conditioning and the about-to-be-conditioned fabulating and 
focalizing capacity. Conceived thus, this understanding needs to be 
categorized as radical because it calls for a repositioning of ontological 
debates around notions of narrative essence and rejects the ontological 
narrative primacy of the constituted. This is a repositioning that stresses the 
modes of being, manners of thinking and formation principles, emerging as a 
system of relations predicated on processes of narrative-in-practice and 
dramaturgical mediality in the making.  
 
Here, Blast Theory’s Day of the Figurines (2006) (hereafter DOF), in the 
Barcelona execution, is used to inquire into the proposed mereotopological 
aspect. The argument will show that some established positions such as 
those by Gabriella Giannachi and Steve Benford (2011) regarding notions of 
intermedial narrative need to be repositioned. The following paragraphs will 
demonstrate that although intermedial narrative participates in classical 
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narrative structures, it also radically challenges the idea of classical narrativity 
in unique ways. Drawing on Whitehead and Deleuze, this chapter proposes a 
network of notions such as ‘assemblages’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2003: 504) 
and Perrella’s ‘hypersurface’ used as instruments for narrative analysis when 
specifying the onto-epistemic functionality of the narrative event within Blast 
Theory’s intermedial praxis.  
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first introduces Blast Theory’s 
Day of the Figurines as a case study. The second one is divided into four 
internal sections. These incorporate and interrogate critical debates around 
narrative and digital contexts, particularly regarding notions of, for instance, 
intertextuality. The fourth and final section interrogates intermedial narrativity 
within the context of process philosophy and engages with the concept of 
becoming while presenting some problematics in relation to a literal 
application of a constructivist reading of epistemology.   
 
1. Day of the Figurines: Description of Practice.  
 
Day of the Figurines is a performance that blurs the parameters between 
theatrical performance and games. In discussing the performance, the 
company highlights the role-playing game aspect of the piece, where the 
players/participant subjects create a character within a fictional world imposed 
over a real setting – a city, Barcelona in this instance. As such, the creation of 
the dramaturgical structure unfolds in the format of a multiplayer board game 
for a high number of participants who interact via SMS messages using their 
mobiles.72 Blast Theory describes it as an, 
                                                        
72 The writings of Gabriella Giannachi and Steve Benford (2004, 2008, and 2011) in relation 
to the collaboration between Blast Theory and The Mixed Reality Lab, and particularly their 
analysis, descriptions and discussions of this performance practice, have been highly 
influential. In relation to Day of the Figurines, they describe the piece as an interactive 
performance in their extensive writing regarding the collaboration between Blast Theory and 
The Mixed Reality Lab at the University of Nottingham. There is a wide diversity of practices 
and forms that could be included under the category ‘interactive theatre’. Here, we explore 
the term in relation to theatrical events that bring together a combination and/or a certain 
degree of dramaturgy, narrative, and interactivity or participation. By this, we mean events 
where the guests/audiences present are simultaneously spectators and co-creators of a 
fictional theatrical world. According to Gary Izzo (1997), in ‘participatory theatre […] there is a 
fixed outcome to the story […] arrived at through a finite number of scenes that must be 
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enquiry into the nature of public participation within artworks 
and within electronic spaces (here, through SMS). It uses 
emergent behavior and social dynamics as a means of 
structuring a live event. It invites players to establish their own 
codes of behavior and morality within a parallel world. It plays 
on the tension between the intimacy and anonymity of text 
messages. (www.blasttheory.com. Accessed 25-08-2914) 
 
 
Figure 1: Day of the Figurines. Production poster. Copyright: Blast Theory.  
 
The performance takes place over a period of 24 days in a virtual setting 
based on an imaginary town within which players can reach a number of 
destinations that are the equivalent to 24 hours of the game. The players are 
given missions as tasks while interacting “live” with the other players. In this 
                                                                                                                                                              
presented in a certain order, one after the other’ and the ‘audience participant responds or 
reacts to the production but does not alter it’ (Izzo, 1997: 22). In interactive theatre, on the 
other hand, ‘the participant co-creates the scene with the actor, but on the actor’s terms, and 
within the general goals of the performance’ (Izzo, 1997: 26). While it is true that the word 
‘participation’ can imply a more localised and circumscribed role, in which audience members 
are invited to take part in something that has already been prepared or fixed and does not 
belong to them, the continuum is clearly quite fluid. Further, in DOF, the relationships 
between participant subjects, actors and spectators, change continuously in the making of the 
narrative structure and the configuring dynamic between interaction and participation blur. 
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sense, the performance was designed to interrogate the specificities of 
embedding a dramaturgy into the worldly structures that emerge in daily life.  
 
The piece was developed by Blast Theory in collaboration with the University 
of Nottingham’s The Mixed Reality Laboratory as part of a research project 
(IPerG) to investigate the possibilities of interactivity and participation in 
intermedial performance within the context of pervasive games – ‘games that 
are no longer to be confined to the virtual domain of the computer, but 
integrate the physical and social aspects of the real world’ (Magerkurth at al., 
2005: 2). After its first showing, it was commissioned by a large number of 
European institutions such as Sony NetServices and the Fraunhofer Institute 
and presented in various countries, including Japan and Spain. 
 
The work can be considered as a clear example of the type of practices that 
Blast Theory engaged with after the collaboration with The Mixed Reality Lab 
started and that, we suggest, continue informing Blast Theory’s mode of 
creation to the present day. These practices explore theatrical performance 
via the creation of complex systems whose patterns maximise dramaturgical 
openness in their executions. In doing so, Blast Theory investigates how a set 
of pre-given dramaturgical parameters can evolve into unexpected forms 
within the contingency of the constantly emergent dramaturgical conditioning, 
stressing, for example, multi-linearity and fragmentation in their compositions. 
In other words, DOF can be categorized as an unmistakable exponent of the 
dramaturgical openness that is relevant in the manner in which the work of 
Blast Theory enquires about the nature of intermedial performance. In this 
sense, the piece shares fundamental similarities with Can You See Me Now? 
(2001), a chase game played online and on the streets; with Uncle Roy All 
Around You (2003) in which participants engaged in a search for Uncle Roy 
using handheld computers and roaming through a virtual city; with Rider 
Spoke (2007) conceived as a participatory work in which participants cycled 
around a city; and with I Like Frank (2004), described as the world’s first 
mixed reality game that incorporated the use of 3G phones. Also in relation to 
the creation of complex and open dramaturgical structures through the 
collaboration with the University of Nottingham, Blast Theory has explored 
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notions of augmented reality by combining the use of digital broadcasting and 
theatrical performance, for instance, in Kidnap (1998), in which two members 
of the public were kidnapped as part of a lottery and the resulting event was 
streamed online and in Desert Rain (1999), designed as an installation, 
performance and game using virtual reality to explore the ramifications and 
boundaries between art, performance, everyday life and digital paradigms.  
 
DOF actively focuses on the use of mobile phones as a mediatory platform 
that weaves together the participants’ experience of the performance and the 
worldly structures in which the performance occurs. In doing so, the 
performance highlights the manner in which time, space and narrative present 
relational and differential characteristics. It is through the use of text 
messaging (SMS) that the participants are given tasks as multiple-choice 
problems and missions, creating a network of activities that expand 
throughout the city in which the performance takes place. Events are 
communicated by text, for instance, pubs open, or players twist an ankle and 
have to go to the hospital.  
 
In this performance, Blast Theory explores areas of spatial extension and 
temporal differentiations by including Global Position Systems (GPS) to create 
a model of performance that maps the locations of its participants. In this 
sense, the hosting city itself as a spatial structure becomes a part of and an 
active agent in configuring the game. Without entering into the socio-political 
and ethical aspects of the piece regarding pervasive games, what is crucial to 
DOF is its social extension, understood here as the exploration of the 
interlinking of a fictional narrative world set up through a game and the 
physical reality of the city where it takes place. In other words, the 
performance frames the dramaturgical narrative with both scripted-fictional 
and factual information about the context in which the piece is performed, 
creating a liminal narrative space that intensively and relationally blends both 
narrative worlds; that is, the world that the game creates is extended and 
superimposed upon the social world in which it operates.  
 
 214 
DOF executes a dramaturgical articulation that interlaces a trinity of operative 
spaces. First, we have the streets of the city. Second, there is an operating 
room where the participant subjects/operators navigate through the 
development of the performance and constantly respond to how the 
dramaturgical parameters evolve. Third, the incorporation of another room 
where a board has been placed, showing how the figurines that represent the 
players move throughout the city. From this perspective, the dramaturgy of 
the piece activates a myriad of medial constructions between the three 
spaces; that is, the generation of dramaturgical mediality is not confined here 
to a “here and now”. Instead, mediality comes into being by the constant inter-
relation between the three activating areas, creating a relational and 
differential landscape of narrative structural orientations.  
 
One of the key aspects of the performance is its treatment of and balance 
between the pre-scripted narrative materials and the emergence of a narrative 
structure when the tasks are being executed. The combination between the 
scripted and the non-scripted allows for the creation of narrative patterns that 
highlight the connectivity between the participant subjects activating the tasks 
throughout the city’s streets who have been chosen randomly after submitting 
an application to enter the game – the number of selections varies depending 
on the specific city where each version of the game occurs (in the Tokyo 
version there were more than 1000 participants); the operators of the 
performance who set and create new missions in response to how the tasks 
have been explored; the participant subjects/audiences who interact 
(knowingly or unknowingly) with performers on the actual streets – what in 
traditional readings of dramaturgy is discussed as a diegetic agent; and the 
participant subjects/audience who attend the performance to watch the 
movement of the figurines on the game board and/or see the development of 
the operating room – this type of spectatorship would be the equivalent of a 
traditional audience in an auditorium (or, as in classical dramaturgy, an extra-
diegetic agent). Conceived thus, the emergence of the performance responds 
to the mutual communicative interface between them, creating location-based 
experiences and enabling an architecture of temporal orchestrations and 
spatial extensions that combine different forms of narrative communication. 
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Put slightly differently, the relationship between the scripted and the non-
scripted mereotopologically superimposes the fictional narrative that is being 
created through the information and tasks that the SMS provide within the 
“real” narrative that emerges through the everyday city life. Simply, the 
fictional and non-fictional blur in the development of the narrative.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Day of the Figurines. Still image showing the operating panel. Photo taken 
at SONAR, Barcelona. Copyright: Blast Theory.  
 
At the very start of the performance each participant selects a plastic figurine 
that will represent him throughout the duration of the performance. The 
figurines are meant to portray the physical characteristics of the human player 
typically found in the town where the game takes place. For example, some of 
the figurines for a version of the game that took place in Barcelona had dark 
hair, an obvious tan, and wore beach outfits. When the players are introduced 
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to the figurines, the game operator asks the participant subjects to name the 
figurine and give them certain attributes such as personal and characteristic 
traits; that is, the players endow the figurine with their personal 
characteristics, yet again mixing the fictional with the non-fictional.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Day of the Figurines. Still image showing the figurines. Copyright: Blast 
Theory. 
 
When the game starts, the figurines are placed on the edge of the board by 
the player, who is able to stay there (next to the board) as long as they want, 
leave and return to the board if they want to see how the figurine has been 
moved, go and observe the operating panels in the other room, or never come 
back to the board and see the figurine again. In doing so, the relationship and 
correlation between the participating subjects, operators and game players, 
and the figurines enables the construction of the dramaturgical experience to 
emerge differentially both temporally and spatially.  
 
In relation to the narrative of the fictional town that is superimposed within the 
real town’s everyday narrative, the players use a large metal model of an 
imaginary town. On this metal board, the players find destinations that could 
be familiar to any contemporary modern city such as El Palau de la Musica, a 
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city landmark in Barcelona, but it also includes fictitious locations. On the 
board, there are cut out silhouettes of the physical locations that are used 
throughout the game. Also, there are two video projectors under the board 
that present information regarding the development of the performance, 
creating a sense of augmentation in the manner in which the information is 
shown on the board; that is, the combination between the live projection and 
the punctual location of the figurines on the board’s surface. At times, these 
projectors are turned off so the operators can update the information and 
manually move the figurines to capture the narrative movement of each 
participant/figurine. In this sense, there is a clear sense of narrative 
correlation between the three operating and activating spaces.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Day of the Figurines. Still image showing the metal cut out surfaces of the 
locations. Copyright: Blast Theory. 
 
The board presents another specific characteristic; that is, the augmentation 
system also projects a line, presenting the narrative trajectory of each figurine 
from their current location on the board to its new location, hence, establishing 
an intrinsic correlation between the different layers of the narrative.   
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Figure 5: Day of the Figurines. Still image showing the augmented board. Photo 
taken at SONAR, Barcelona. Copyright: Blast Theory.  
 
 
In a sense, these lines also show the incremental and intensive aspect of the 
narrative that is being played out physically on the city’s actual streets by its 
players.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Day of the Figurines. Still image showing another angle of the augmented 
board. Photo taken at SONAR, Barcelona. Copyright: Blast Theory.  
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Figure 7: Day of the Figurines. Still image showing the figurines on top of the board. 
Copyright: Blast Theory.  
 
 
 
The board also presents what may be called traditional theatrical elements. It 
can be considered as a theatre-in-the-round piece since the audience 
watching the developments on the board – how the figurines are moved – can 
circumnavigate it to get different views and perspectives, but they can never 
alter it. However, the theatrical articulations of the “outside” event can be 
entered and altered – an audience member who has been watching the board 
developments may decide to meet one of the participants and interact with 
him. This creates a generating dramaturgy through the interaction of the “real” 
time of the players/viewers and a narrative time of the game, thus, capturing 
different layers of relational connectivity between the elements and enabling 
inter-composing modalities. 
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Figure 8: Day of the Figurines. Still image showing audiences observing the board. 
Photo taken at SONAR, Barcelona. Copyright: Blast Theory.  
 
 
It must also be clarified that there is no winner in this game, nor is there a 
clear conflict-resolution outcome, which generally occurs in games. The 
construction of the narrative in DOF within game parameters is an exploration 
of how the participants experience a situation that requires co-ordination and 
collaboration between the players in the execution of the tasks. In fact, when 
participants enter the game, they are informed that the game is about creating 
a narrative through technology that encompasses interactive elements, but 
that has no definable outcome. From this perspective, the game as a narrative 
structure could be durationally infinite. What limits the game – and makes it a 
finite structure – is that this interaction lasts for exactly 24 days – if the game 
started at 7pm, it will finish at 7pm, 24 days later. During these 24 hours the 
players/performers are free to participate as many times and for as long as 
they wish. When the game finishes, participants are not even required to 
return to the board.  
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The game adopts different temporal conventions in its execution; that is, 24 
days of the game equate to 24 hours on the board. In this sense, the temporal 
articulation of the board is expanded because what happens outside does not 
get inputted immediately on the board. Seen thus, the temporal and spatial 
nature of the narrative reinforces a sense of narrative doubling; that is, this 
double structuring functions in a plane of “dislocated” spatio-temporalities. In 
other words, each 24-hour day (“real” time) of the game corresponds to one 
hour of the 24-hour day of the game. In this sense, DOF participates in 
traditional narrative notions since the narrative time condenses “real” time. 
Moreover, it executes different narrative temporalities because of the 
intertwining between game engagement and non-engagement within the 24-
day game structure. 
 
In this context of the different engagement between the participant subjects 
and the correlations between the intricate layers of narrative development, 
DOF disrupts classical narrative conceptualizations because this is neither a 
narrative where cause and effect are in place; nor is it a narrative where 
traditional teleological notions apply; nor does it reflect a set and static lineal 
sequence of narrative events by which its story is unfolded. Rather, we 
radically find here a narrative that creates a fabula that is always context-
specific (in the case of DOF, each performance takes place in a different city), 
presents an open structure, and accommodates a diverse range of interests. 
Further, DOF presents a narrative that can be also categorized as aleatoric: it 
employs chance and is open to the unplanned event because of the multiple 
possibilities through which the narrative can develop. In this way, DOF 
disrupts the causal normative logic of lineal narrative by multiplying narrative 
spaces and temporal orchestrations. To borrow from Nelson, here we inhabit 
the narrative space of the ‘both-and’ (Nelson, 2010: 15), as opposed to the 
‘either-or’, in which the ‘experiencer’ takes decisions in order to make the 
story and, in complying with the logic of the nature of the game, produces a 
narrative. This narrative aspect enables a fluidity of narrative between 
performers, audience, and passers-by, and, in this sense, DOF as a 
performance event encompasses a series of intra-events, as in Deleuze and 
Whitehead, that interrelate, expand and contract, creating a non-linear fabric 
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of narrative experience and construction. The fundamental composition of 
DOF is the functional mechanism that blends life and game, art and 
technology, and “real” and representation. The players constantly move from 
different narrative realities, and, in doing so, create a multi-compositional 
structure in the constant generating of the intra-active dramaturgical mediality.  
 
2. Day of the Figurines: The Complex Mereotopological 
Aspect of the Radical Dramaturgy.  
 
The articulation and creation of intermedial narratives can be described as an 
emergent complex system of interrelated and interactional elements. In 
relation to these complex narrative systems within the context of interactivy, 
Benford and Giannachi (2011) discuss how these systems operate through 
‘trajectories’ in which the narrative construction is created by ‘a complex 
mixture of space, time, interfaces and performance roles that are connected 
to a sophisticated structure’ (Benford and Giannachi, 2011: 14). This is a 
narrative machinery of diverse agents that lay open its functionality and 
structuring, and explores itself in constant self-positing of narrative flows as a 
field of narrative relations. As such, the discussion of narrative in DOF 
focuses on how a narrative environment arranges a series of narrative 
‘tangible interfaces’ (Crabtree et al., 2010: 1). These tangible interfaces 
explore communication modalities, 
The artwork reveals that the tangible … interface is designed 
to frame interaction and define distinct interactional 
trajectories that extend beyond the interface itself to foster 
engagement, [and] support performance … [the tangible 
interface] create[s] a powerful sense of direct … interaction 
amongst the distributed participants in an artistic narrative set. 
(Crabtree et al., 2010: 1-2) 
 
The following demonstrates the ways in which such interfaces create a 
narrative in which the interfacial and in-between structure of the narrative 
presents generative characteristics. As described previously, DOF presents 
several kinds of interfaces between the triad of operating spaces and the 
different modalities in which the participant subjects activate the intermedial 
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event as diegetic agents, hence, stressing the differential and the relational. In 
doing so, the different modes of narrative mediality disrupt classical 
narratological positions such as the relationship between the intra-diegetic 
and extra-diegetic specifically regarding the compositional narrative frame.   
 
In relation to the participant subjects in the creation of the narrative in the 
urban setting, we see: 
1. Participant subjects as performers. These are the participants who 
receive texts and engage with the assigned tasks (intra-diegetic to the 
compositional narrative frame). 
2. Participant subjects as knowing-spectators. These are the participant 
subjects who are aware that a performance is taking place and are 
able to interact with the participant subject as performer (both extra-
diegetic and intra-diegetic to the compositional narrative frame). 
3. Participant subjects as not-knowing-spectators.73 These are the 
participant subjects who are not aware that a performance is taking 
place, but whose, at times accidental, not-knowing interaction also 
participates in the creation of the narrative (both extra-diegetic and 
intra-diegetic to the compositional narrative frame). 
In relation to the participant subjects in the creation of the narrative on the 
board and operating panel, we see: 
1. Participant subjects as operators. These are the participant subjects 
who send the SMS texts and move the figurines on the board. They are 
the link between the two narrative orchestrations: the urban and the 
board (intra-diegetic to the compositional narrative frame). 
2. Participant subjects as knowing-spectators. These are the participant 
subjects who know that a performance is taking place, but they are not 
allowed to interact with the development of the board narrative – as in 
traditional audiences (extra-diegetic to the compositional narrative 
frame). 
                                                        
73 The not-knowing spectator further problematizes Fischer-Lichte’s co-bodily presence of 
actors and spectators as the principal and intrinsic constituent element of the autopoietic 
feedback loop.  
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In relation to these different modalities, this thesis radically proposes that a 
constructivist reading of intermedial narrative would make no difference 
between the intra- and the extra-diegetic. The synthesising and capturing 
nature of the frames proposed here intrinsically highlights the manner, 
through which immanent processes catalyze the human and non-human 
developing intra-active entanglements. The very nature of these 
entanglements pulverizes any differentiation within the narrative process of 
the frame coming into being. Put simply, the mediated constructivist frame 
amalgamates the intra- and extra-diegetic into onto-epistemic concatenations 
and, hence, disrupts traditional understandings of narratology.   
 
In this context, Giannachi’s notion of the tangible interface needs to be 
repositioned because it is still reliant on the exploration of communicative 
modalities between an artwork and the participant in such a work in its 
participatory mode of engagement. Simply put, we suggest that, instead of 
considering the compositional mode in which the interactive narrative 
develops as Giannachi does, the tangible interface needs to be conceived as 
activating the work from within. Seen thus, the notion of the intra-action offers 
a more substantial defining perspective because it fully accounts for the mode 
in which the narrative comes into being. In this sense, the now repositioned 
notion sees the narrative interfaces of DOF as the constitution of tangible 
interfaces both in terms of the different types of engagement between the 
participant subjects and the twofold narrative configuration. In this manner, 
the nature of this tangibility establishes from within the constructive intra-
active sequences such as the physical form of the board, the physical and 
manipulative interaction with the phones, the figurines, the operators’ panels 
and the participant subjects, all of whom determine the development of the 
narrative interface.  
 
One aspect that Benford and Giannachi highlight regarding the tangible 
interface is the concept of ‘affordance’ as a ‘kind of interaction that 
communicates to its users’ (Benford and Giannachi, 2011: 122). They also 
write,  
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Originally developed by J. Gibson (1979), the concept of 
affordance implies the object potentiality for action (1979) and 
constitutes what has been described as a “three-way 
relationship between the environment, the organism, and the 
activity” (Dourish 2001: 118). Creating in William Gaver’s 
words “a direct link between perception and action” (1991: 79) 
and connecting technologies to people who use them (80), 
affordances are useful in drawing out possible trajectories of 
interaction, but also, if organized in sequences, creating 
situations in which acting on and affordance may reveal 
information leading to new affordances (82). (Benford and 
Giannachi, 2011: 122) 
 
Furthermore, they write,  
The interlocking of data, objects and environments implies the 
possibility of not only designing paths that interconnect 
physical and digital data, but also designing physical 
environments, which prompt specific sequences of 
affordances that establish trajectories through a collection of 
interfaces. (Benford and Giannachi, 2011: 125) 
 
The tangibility of the narrative interface creates and forms the narrative 
experience: ‘the experience is framed in fine detail through careful attention to 
the built details’ of each interrelated narrative interface. (Crabtree et al., 2010: 
4). In shaping the narrative experience, the tangible interface also designs the 
emergent functionality of the narrative construction ‘articulating a distinct 
interactional trajectory’ for the participant subjects. (Crabtree et al., 2010: 6). 
Furthermore, ‘the design of the interactional trajectory extends beyond’ any 
specific physical space and amalgamates a series of different temporal and 
spatial narrative elements (Crabtree et al., 2010: 6). From this perspective, 
narrative construction as a tangible interface is ‘explicitly designed as 
artefacts-in-collaborative-space and as artefacts-visibly-affording-embodied-
interaction’ (Crabtree et al., 2010: 6).  
 
From these conceptualizing parameters, we can discuss how the intermedial 
narrative in DOF works as a differential amalgamation of tangible interfaces 
that combines and interlinks the participating human and non-human 
elements, forming mereotopological engagements; fostering collaboration; 
and supporting the functioning of interactional narrative trajectories. However, 
although we agree on this reading of the tangible interface as a manner of 
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enabling narrative communication through trajectories, we suggest, in 
opossition to Crabtree, Benford and Giannachi’s proposals, that the 
affordance of such trajectories activates the field itself from which the 
trajectory happens; that is, it is activated as it happens, changing the 
configuration of the narrative experience and entering into complex relational 
patterns from within; these are affordances that emerge from the agential 
impact of both the human and non-human, integrally co-composing 
themselves. Such a now-repositioned understanding of affordances enables 
us to conceptualize a mode of existence that pays attention to the emergence 
of the affording fielding – it is a generating that modulates narrative 
construction in its integral relationality, activating platforms for new 
affordances that may potentially develop. In this sense, the re-interpretation of 
the notion of affordance that we follow here sees the Deleuzian actual and 
virtual in a constant executing interplay and opening up to the newness of 
new medial interactions. Shifting away from seeing affordances as a 
communicative and compositional strategy as the three of them imply, we 
observe them now as holding the potential for recombination, as nexuses, 
with a tendency to narrative movement created as it is creating itself. Each 
affordance here inhabits the territory of agential activation, positing itself in the 
actual-virtual realization that each deterritorialization brings forth. From this 
radical perspective of affording from within, the manner in which the different 
inter-relations between the three activating spaces can be conceptualized in a 
much stronger manner because it fully accounts for the manner in which the 
emergence of the structural composition of the narrative happens. 
 
From this perspective the relational activation of the affordances from within 
operates as a hypersurface, as places of differential exchange between strata 
in which the unfolding of the attending elements is overlaid – hence, 
highlighting the proposed mereotopological characteristic. As with Deleuze’s 
fold, our reading of the tangible interfaces, as hypersurfaces, also bridges the 
spatial and temporal elements of any given narrative composition as an entity 
where the complexity of the many become one in the always-in-transition 
aspect of the emergent dramaturgical structure. This is evident in the case of 
DOF through the inclusion of the board, the operating panel, the 
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communication channels and the attending variables of the urban narrative. 
As a hypersurface, the processes of medial construction that are suggested in 
DOF are in a continuous connecting structural form. DOF as a narrative 
entanglement encompasses the spatio-temporal inter-penetration that the 
narrative articulates: the configuration of the material objects that affect the 
narrative interfaces; the multilayered urban and non-urban systems in which 
the narrative develops, creating mereotological narrative relations; the 
materiality of the inter-layering environment, as striated space, that supports 
the narrative; the different relationships and engagements between the 
participant subjects; the different shapes, durations and scopes of the 
narrative actions; and the created temporal narrative sequences and 
affordances. 
 
This is the narrative world of DOF as an intermedial instance. A world of 
mediating narrative intra-actions, in which the operative connections and 
narrative conditions see the onto-epistemic nature of the execution of the 
event presented as generative immanence of spatio-temporal narrative 
configurations that highlight (and heighten) notions of the immediacy of the 
active narrative engagement.74 The generative becoming of each attending 
narrative variable creates a matrix of orchestrations between different 
narrative realms in constant becoming, whose onto-epistemic creative 
functionality, its being and functioning, is executed in a myriad of polyphonic 
narrative occasions. In this manner, the third onto-epistemic condition, 
                                                        
74 Birgit Wiens (2010) discusses that immediacy is heightened in intermedial theatre because 
the intermedial phenomenon, in its performative manner, asks its participants to fully focus 
their attention on specific moments that need to be made sense of in the altered perspectives 
of space and time. Robin Nelson (2010) links the concept of immediacy to mediation and the 
‘increasingly hybrid’ (Nelson, 2010: 123) environment that the intermedial phenomenon 
achieves. He also posits immediacy in relation to areas of transparency (Nelson, 2010: 141), 
that is, the manner in which the intermedial event draws attention to itself – as a self-
referential aesthetic construction of elements. Andy Lavender (2010) presents the concept in 
relation to notions of speed, movement and the interactive manner of the communication 
processes occurring during the intermedial event. In the context of a Deleuzian vitalist reading 
of dramaturgical mediality, immediacy is intrinsic to the constitution of the narrative medium 
as a vital process. One could argue that the performative and creative engagement of the 
participant subjects in the onto-epistemic constructive dramaturgical aesthetic enables a 
sense of immediacy that is at its most heightened in the radical aspect of dramaturgy 
proposed here.  
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narrativity, amalgamates and includes, in its becoming, the other two onto-
epistemic conditions, spatiality and temporality, proposed here.  
 
2.1 Day of the Figurines: Intermedial Dramaturgy as Spatial 
and Temporal Inter-engagements of Narrative Occasions and 
Dramaturgical Assemblages.  
 
The notions of emergence and complexity in intermedial narrative have been 
linked to chaos and complex systems theory, particularly by Andy Crabtree 
and Steven Benford among others (2004, 2007 and 2010), in relation to 
network activity and aesthetic experience. It is well beyond the scope of this 
chapter to deeply enter into a fully engaged discussion of such backgrounds. 
However, DOF, and the work of Blast Theory with The Mixed Reality Lab, 
shares some of the characteristics of both theoretical paradigms due to the 
articulating openness of the dramaturgical structure and how they highlight 
notions of emergence and process.  
 
Zachary Dunbar (2007) describes how chaos theory, very broadly defined, 
explores notions of behaviour and patterns that appear in deterministic and 
non-linear systems, specifically focusing on the dynamics of such systems. 
Chaotic behaviour is not completely defined as random, but the theory 
highlights the non-predictable aspect of the system’s dynamism. Complex 
theory stresses how the independent elements that interact within a system 
constantly reorganize, developing more elaborate structures as the system 
advances. The self-organizing complexity of the system continuously adapts 
to new situations and inputs. It also pays attention to the control parameters 
that affect the system throughout its adaptiveness (Dunbar, 2007: 235-236). 
 
Dunbar also explains that in chaos-complex systems the organization of the 
internal elements constantly develops new complex structures from previous 
ones. He writes,  
[T]he newly evolved structures may not prove successful in 
the end and eventually disintegrate, or they may continue 
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towards new forms of organization, reaching other critical 
points at indeterminate moments of time … emergence and 
self-organization are the common terms in complexity for 
understanding the way ordered systems move far away from 
equilibrium. (Dunbar, 2007: 236).  
 
Seen thus, as with chaos-complex theory, the participating elements within a 
system present a sense of emergence, self-organizing and self-referential 
characteristics. This process of constant re-formation can be extrapolated to 
the structures that we observe in the intermedial event. From this perspective, 
the overlapping and interrelatedness of the attending elements create 
narrative and dramaturgical architectures. As an architecture, it activates a 
narrative space-time relational and differential continuum where the present 
elements maintain an independent status while only being able to be 
explained as part of a system. Within these parameters, the intermedial 
performance event constructs a performative organization with emergent 
spatio-temporal narrative characteristics. 
 
Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (2010) point out some other characteristics 
of such chaos-complex systems. They explain,  
While for chaos theory apparently random effects have an 
extremely complex, non-linear provenance, for complexity 
theory the emphasis is on unpredictable events that can 
catapult systems into novel configurations. For both, the 
physical world is a mercurial stabilization of dynamic 
processes. Rather than tending towards inertia or a state of 
equilibrium, matter is recognized here as exhibiting 
immanently self-organizing properties subtended by an 
intricate filigree of relationships. (Coole and Frost, 2010: 13) 
 
Furthermore,  
Such phenomena are now understood as emergent systems 
that move with a superficially chaotic randomness that is 
underlain by patterns of complex organization, which in turn 
function as foci for further organization and development. 
Such systems are marked by considerable instability and 
volatility … there is a continuous redefining and reassembling 
of key elements that in systems’ capacities to evolve into new 
and unexpected forms … there is no longer a quantitative 
relationship between cause and effect. (Coole and Frost, 
2010: 14) 
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John Urry (2005) also discusses how in such systems,  
the sum is greater than the parts – but that there are systems 
effects that are different from their parts … [The] components 
of a system through their interaction spontaneously develop 
collective properties or patterns … These are non-linear 
consequences that are non reducible to the very many 
individual components that comprise such activities. (Urry, 
2005: 5) 
 
Now, although some aspects of these definitions clearly describe the 
suggested narrative parameters of DOF such as the constant development of 
the narrative as a complex system of inter-related variables, particularly the 
relation between the three activating spaces and the surperimposing of the 
double articulating narrative, there are, however, some facets of these 
definitions that present some problematics regarding a full account of the 
narrative specificities we have emphasized. 
 
First, we have drawn attention to the interactions between the attending 
elements to the system and how these elements develop constantly, making 
rather difficult to predict an outcome in advance. Nonetheless, we argue that 
in relation to intermedial dramaturgy it is important to stress the manner in 
which the initial conditions of the dramaturgy were set out and how the 
physical sites and the relation between the activators – operators, performers 
and spectators – give re-configuring shape to the development of these initial 
conditions as well as the effect they have in what the performance does in 
relation to the possibilities of knowledge creation and structural unfolding.  
 
Second, Coole and Frost highlight the continuous volatility and instability of 
the system; nevertheless, we suggest that the constant self-positing of the 
dramaturgical parameters, for instance the cues that the operators in DOF 
provide for the activation of the tasks limit the scope of such a volatility. For 
chaos theory, the non-predictability of the system means that the system 
cannot be controlled. Yet, to some extent, the narrative system becomes 
predictable because of the constant influence of the dramaturgical control 
parameters. In the work of Blast Theory, these control parameters present 
different degrees of openness and rigidity. For instance, in Something 
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American and 10 Backwards these parameters are much more tightly 
controlled by the initial conditions that the dramaturgical structures provide 
than in DOF.75 In this sense, a literal application of chaos and complex theory 
would only offer a very partial account of the specificities that Something 
American and 10 Backwards present. These control parameters give the 
emergence of the system a sense of consistency. Eugene Holland (2013) 
explains how, using the analogy of a jazz improvisation musical composition, 
Deleuze and Guattari, in A Thousand Plateaus, note that even in the most 
non-predictable of the sequences a sense of organization can be observed.76 
In this sense, without imposing a sense of rigidity and static unification and 
uniformity, they, Holland describes, using some complex theory terminology, 
state that some “attractors” hold the improvisational system together. The 
challenge of such systems, they argue, is to maximize the degrees of 
intensity, relationality and difference in relation to activating processes of 
deterritorialization and the experience of variation. From this point of view, the 
emergence of the structures within complex systems can be given a 
Deleuzian reading. Deleuzian scholar John Protevi (2006) defines the concept 
of emergence within Deleuzian backgrounds as ‘the (diachronic) construction 
of functional structures in complex systems that achieve a (synchronic) focus 
of systematic behavior as they constrain the behavior of individual 
components’ (Protevi, 2006: 19). In relation to complex theory and Deleuze’s 
Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, we can aptly say that 
Deleuze establishes the ontology of a given world within a complex theory 
framework. Protevi writes,  
complex theory models material systems using techniques of 
non-linear dynamics, which, by means of showing the 
topological features of manifolds (the distribution of 
singularities) affecting a series of trajectories in a phase 
                                                        
75 In the 1960s, meteorologist Edward Lorenz established some mathematical equations 
regarding the manner in which some weather patterns can develop, in order to investigate the 
conditions of the weather changes over time. His proposals had a great impact on the 
theoretical development of chaos systems. One of his key papers, Deterministic Nonperiodic 
Flow (1963), put forward a position explaining that even in the most chaotic of the systems, 
an acknowledgment of the initial conditions and how these initial conditions vary must be 
considered if any patterning is to be deciphered.  
 
76 Eugene W. Holland (2013) provides a comprehensive and extended discussion on the 
complex notion of consistency in relation to differentional variation in A Thousand Plateaus.  
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space, reveals thresholds and the necessary intensity triggers 
(events that move systems to a threshold activating a 
patterns) of these systems. (Protevi, 2006: 20) 
 
In this manner, the functional aspect of the system activates the spontaneous 
and becoming model of being and behaving of such complex systems. As 
such, Protevi explains, complex theory enables us to think of material systems 
in terms of their power of immanent self-organization. Difference and 
Repetition, Protevi discusses, allows us to think of ‘synchronic emergence 
(order) and diachronic emergence (novelty)’ (Protevi, 2006: 20), but it is, we 
stress, the onto-epistemic constructive work of the emergent unity that 
enables us to speak of an emergence that situates the subject as one 
emergent unity in a field of such entities. With all this in mind, the proposed 
aspect of the radical dramaturgy here does not deny the configuration of 
emergent multiple and non-linear structures as chaos-complex theory bring to 
light. Rather, we claim that, on the one hand, these structural complexities are 
more appropriately conceptualized using the paramerters of the 
mereotopological, particularly emphasizing its synchronic and diachronic 
emergence instead of the chaos-complex positions; and, on the other hand, 
these complex structures in relation to intermedial practice are better 
understood as an emergent activity that can expand into a complex system of 
possibilities within the positionality of each narrative emergence. This 
perspective will provide, we argue, a stronger conceptualization of, for 
instance, the relation between the execution of each task in a specific area of 
Barcelona and the texts sent from the operating pannel.  
 
Third, and final, Urry highlights that the sum is greater than the parts of the 
system in relation to its dynamics. However, we argue that to fully capture the 
particularities of intermedial narrative and dramaturgy the relationships 
between the parts and the whole need to be grasped as non-hierarchical. In 
this sense, a mereotopological reading of intermedial dramaturgy and 
narrative provides, we claim, a more competent reading of such dramaturgical 
systems in relation to generation of narrative inter-layering between the 
pannel, the board and the streets of Barcelona within the overall creation of 
the dramaturgy. In this context, Whitehead’s philosophical vocabulary 
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becomes useful in understanding the potentials of each single actual occasion 
as a collaborative creation of nexuses that combines different elements in a 
“togetherness” of occasions. In this sense, in DOF every dramaturgical actual 
occasion, in its spatio-temporal articulation, encapsulates the many, diverging 
and connecting mereotopological potentials.  
 
Regarding this connectivity, we suggest that the many narrative units become 
one in the interlocking of the elements and the co-working of conjuncted and 
disjuncted parts allows for the formation of multiple and potential narrative 
perspectives. As such, the creation of the narrative in DOF is also the creation 
of the in-between in the relational and generative characteristic of the 
dramaturgical unfolding. Starting from the composing elements and arriving at 
the composed whole, and all the possible narrative modulations in-between, 
the generativity of the narrative liminal takes into account every single 
attending and structural aspect of the narrative construction including both the 
relation and the relating parts, such that the parts, as a mereotopological 
structure, cannot be concretely given beyond their relations and manner of 
functionality. Simply, the “what” that defines a part’s identity and the “how” the 
part becomes what it is, constitutes an equal binary in the evolving and 
complex narrative mereotopological dynamic. 
 
Drawing on the theoretical mereotopological notions by Stamina Portanova 
and Luciana Parisi as discussed in chapter one, we can extrapolate that the 
creative collaboration of the mereotopological better highlights the 
significance of the narrative relation, which organizes the parts as co-
constituent elements: the narrative parts as always emerging from the 
mereotopological relations between themselves, which, in turn, dismantles 
any notion of narrative linearity and any essentialist and formalist readings of 
narrative. In this context, as narrative singularities with their own potential, 
and as distinguishable elements of a given relation, a narrative schema of co-
existing spatio-temporal narrative multiplicities emerges, creating a space of 
narrative trajectorial relationality. In this sense, the mereotopological 
continuity forms an immanent spatio-temporal narrative system. The virtuality 
of a concrete narrative collaboration between the parts, therefore, 
 234 
corresponds to a narrative reality exceeding its own actualization – the 
potential of connectability, as Whitehead would say.  
 
Collaborative relationality is implicit in both Deleuze’s fold and Whitehead’s 
actual occasions. From this theoretical position, we can argue that each 
narrative actual occasion can be seen as revealing itself as already composed 
of many narrative occasions, converging into a collaborative nexus of 
narrative actual occasions and allowing the creative emergence and 
connectivity of the narrative new. Following Deleuze and Guattari, here no 
central narrative point is established. It is, however, primordial to see in the 
construction of a given narrative a weaving of relations and series of potential 
connections between the narrative elements that are internally constituted 
within each narrative occasion. This is a narrative opening as a system of 
polytonalities – narrative as a ‘polyphony of polyphonies’ (Deleuze, 2006: 93). 
Potentialities are actualized in the creative experience, understood in a 
Whiteheadian manner, as a process of conjunctive synthesis.77 This, in turn, 
creates a sense of narrative “togetherness” within singularities and 
individualities. As such, a process of composition, a continuity of becoming, 
as Whitehead discusses, through articulating nexus into an increasingly 
complex form creates the becoming conditions through which each narrative 
                                                        
77 Intermediality, Nelson discusses, can be defined as demonstrating syntheses of co-
existence of the “live” performers and the co-present audience with the media (Nelson, 2013: 
16-02-2013, interview notes). At the heart of this precise definition is a co-existence of 
elements, both digital and human, that creates a “live” event. In Intermediality in Theatre and 
Performance (2006), Freda Chapple and Chiel Kattenbelt, describe “liveness” as hybridity. 
They write, ‘media objects have a different ontology from non-media objects on the stage, so 
there is an empirical and qualitative difference between the digital and non-digital objects 
operating on the stage. Thus, digitization plays a part in conceptualizing the changing space 
of theatre performance. It creates junction points where the different media meet and it is 
there – at the point of their meeting – that locates intermediality in theatre and performance’ 
(Chapple and Kattenbelt, 2006: 18). The use of the words ‘trigger’ and ‘junction’ presents 
useful possibilities. It can be extrapolated that, on the one hand, triggering can be equated to 
activation and execution; and, on the other hand, the word junction can imply a sense of 
transit, an operational move, process, and a re-positing of elements. Further, these two words 
can be also articulated from the point of view of syntheses and performative re-configurations. 
Peter Boenisch (2006a) also suggests that theatre can perform media: ‘Compared to other 
media that transmit objects to another space and/or another time, or store them to make 
worlds out of them there and then, theatre processes these objects into worlds here and now, 
while simultaneously leaving them as they are … Any theatrical performance, thus, negotiates 
a multiple range of potential perspectives’ (Boenisch, 2006a: 114). As Boenisch points out, 
theatre becomes an art of synthesis, whose essential nature is flexibility and mutability that 
imply changeability and flux.  
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actual occasion is capable of articulating intensive forms of onto-epistemic 
experience.  
 
In the context of the above-mentioned relational “togetherness”, Whitehead 
discusses that each becoming is situated within and emerges from a wider 
complex of becoming. This complex, according to Whitehead, is an ‘extensive 
continuum’, defined as ‘one relational complex [system]’ (Whitehead, 1978: 
66). For Whitehead, this continuum determines the becoming of all actual 
occasions. In this respect, the extensive continuum operates as a field of 
potentialities for the becoming of actual entities, which informs the process 
and creativity of the narrative landscape. In this sense, each task in DOF as 
an actual occasion and as a singularity is actualized in a becoming world of 
potentialities; that is, the activation of each text-sent task has the actualizing 
potential to impact on how the other tasks may be actualized and how the 
communication between the different spaces can virtually develop. Seen thus, 
the task is relationally extensive in its potentiality because, although it is 
executed in a very specific location such a street in Barcelona, in this 
instance, it is also extensively connected to board and the operating panel. 
Whitehead sees this continuum as an infinite extension, however, we argue, 
that the set parameters of the dramaturgy limit the possible scope of this 
extension.   
 
This complex inter-relation of immanent actualizations of narrative 
singularities is the process by which narratological materiality, semioticity and 
eventfulness is attained. We can claim that narratological materiality and 
semioticity are something that is attained through processes of actualization 
of given narrative singularities and in relation to the real conditions within and 
from which actualization arises – a radical narrative universe of potential and 
generative creation afforded from within. In other words, narratalogical 
materiality and semioticity are not something pre-established waiting to be 
actualized. Rather, there are emergent at the same time – conditioned while 
conditioning – that the narrative patterns become. In the context of DOF, each 
task creates its own material and semiotic emergence. Yet, we can also add 
that semioticity and materiality are extensively relational in relation to the 
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above-discussed perspectives; that is, the activation of a narrative task, for 
instance, can happen in a specific street in Barcelona involving one or more 
participant subjects; yet, the semioticity and materiality of that task also 
relationally involves the operating panel and operators because the execution 
of the task can be said to start at the very moment in which the text is sent. In 
this sense, semioticity and materiality are also differential and 
mereotopological. 
 
Regarding the mereotopological, we can describe how the heterogeneous 
narrative universe of elements informs the compositional aspects of the 
narrative and becomes ‘assemblages’ (Deleuze, 1987: 7-10) when each 
constructive frame transforms both attending variables and subjects into a 
becoming of multiplicity through processes of narrative formation – the 
creation of a singular narrative occasion during the process of becoming. 
Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari explain that, although multiple and 
heterogeneous in their composition, these assemblages maintain a univocity 
in their becoming: ‘An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions 
of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its 
connections’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 8). Extrapolating from this 
definition, we can infer that each narrative assemblage is in a constant 
process of becoming-multiplicity. In this sense, a multiplicity such as the 
board, the operating panel and the extended narrative throughout the city 
designates the set of narrative relations, which produce the mechanism that 
informs the radical dramaturgy of the execution of the event, including the 
production of affects and knowledge in its activation. Conceived thus, the 
assemblage can be also seen as a platform for knowledge making, presenting 
mereotopological characteristics. In the dramaturgical world of DOF, 
heterogeneous narrative elements such as the interaction of the pre-scripted 
narrative and the everyday life narrative or multiplicities such as the ecology 
of tasks articulations can be considered to become assemblages in the 
relation between the attending variables to the becoming system and the 
participating subject when they take up a relation to life. In this sense, a 
narrative assemblage, as seen in DOF, is a mereotopological system of 
knowledge and affect creation. From this perspective, epistemic processes of 
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intelligibility become relational and differential. Also in the context of DOF, a 
narrative task, as a narrative assemblage, can incorporate other tasks and a 
varying number of participants within it and develop in different manners. The 
assemblage, in this sense, is the narratological enabling of semioticity – and 
materiality – as always being constructed and emergent at the executing 
moment of practice. In this way, hermeneutic processes of interpretation and 
semioticity result in multiple signifying sequences and concatenations since 
the narrative content of each intra-action is being created at each emergent 
moment – a moment that can present a complexity, as an assemblage, in 
terms of, for instance, how many participants engage in the activation of a 
single task; how the tasks enter into processes of narrative inter-layering 
when they combine; and how many participants execute through 
collaborations more than one task at the same time.  
 
With all this in mind, we can radically claim that DOF cannot be categorized 
as narratological linearity. Here, we can no longer speak of a single narrative 
assemblage but of a myriad of relational assemblages being constituted at the 
same time as narratological multiplicity – as a hypersurface. In this sense, 
DOF cannot be explained by the “here and now” vitalist ontological 
frameworks as described by Phelan. Nor can it be theorized by “simplistic” 
interpretations of autopoietic feedback loops, as theorized by Fischer-Lichte. 
Nor can it be conceptualized by expressions of ephemeral actualism and 
“here and now” presentness as in Power. Nor it can be described as ‘trading 
in nowness’ as in Lavender. Instead, these narratological constructions must 
be considered as ‘any-instant-whatever’ and ‘any-space-whatever’. This is 
narrative-en-abyme. Blast Theory’s radical praxis requires a different 
explanation because the company engages with narratives that are the result 
of spatio-temporal narratological heterogeneities, whose development re-
activates mereotopologically. Moreover, the spatio-temporal, the semiotic, the 
hermeneutic, and the material aspects of the narrative are the syntheses of 
the multiplicity of elements that enter into immanent equations within a given 
narrative assemblage. In the work of Blast Theory, intermedial narrativity 
knows nothing of notions of pre-established form, content, ontological 
essence, fixed semiotic taxonomies, and/or pre-given materialities. These 
 238 
aspects are always affected by continuous modulation in a multi-temporal flow 
that places the attending variables into continuity, which realizes, in itself, the 
immanent nature of each assemblage. In this context, not only does the 
mereotopological characteristic of intermedial narrative activate a myriad of 
spatio-temporal narrative modulations, but it also presents a sense of 
narrative intensities within structural complexity. 
 
As discussed in chapter one, Deleuze (1994) explains the idea of intensity as 
comprising a structure that is both vertical and horizontal (Deleuze, 1994: 
230). In understanding the intermedial narrative, the introduction of intensities 
provides us with another qualitative aspect by which to understand the 
navigational process at play in intermedial narrative and the complex fabric of 
narrative experiences it creates. DOF presents a narrative that needs to be 
categorized in terms of entanglements and engagements. This is a narrative 
that can be also presented in the shape of a network of interactions, which in 
most cases show a matrix aspect because it can be entered at any time, from 
any point, has no centre. As the following diagrammatic maps illustrate,78 
 
 
Figure 9: Day of the Figurines. Diagrammatic map showing patterns of narrative 
orchestrations. 
 
                                                        
78 These diagrammatic maps have been inspired by the work of Paul Baran (1964) for the 
RAND Corporation in relation to how distributed communication and Internet strategies are 
affected by the functionality of networks. Baran also observes these centralized, 
decentralized and distributed morphological aspects.  
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In the context of seeing how some of these networks were articulated, we 
have observed three major patterns in relation to DOF as a spatio-temporal 
dramaturgy: (i) the centralized pattern, where all participants engage in 
activities determined by a central point (the main hub could be an example); 
(ii) a decentralized pattern, where we observe patterns of different tasks being 
engaged by different groups of participants, independent to any hub; and (iii) 
a distributed pattern, where most of the participants engage with the same 
task throughout the city. This is a myriad of possible inter-layered connections 
as a narrative with no-centre and dramaturgical mediality as inter-layering. 
Through the execution of the event, these identified patterns combine, as an 
assemblage, presenting other possibilities such as distributed and centralized 
and/or distributed and decentralized. In this way, the construction of the 
narrative creates a series of narrative multiple dimensions defined by its 
changing nature. Beyond the distributed, centralized and decentralized 
patterns governing participant behaviour, an intrinsic characteristic of DOF is 
that it gives rise to a physical and spatio-temporal and an intensive expansion 
of the narrative that could re-configure these patterns into different 
structurings and re-modellations. 
 
Here, against the backdrop of the city of Barcelona’s performance, the maps 
visualize how the execution of the event expands throughout the city. The 
grey area of the map below presents an outline of Barcelona’s metropolitan 
area; inside this grey area, the black section – the city centre – represents the 
location of the interrogated fragment of DOF. 
 
 
Figure 10: Day of the Figurines. Diagrammatic map showing the metropolitan area of 
Barcelona. The city centre is highlighted.  
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The following expands the selected fragment, outlining the configuration of the 
streets in Barcelona’s city centre. It shows one of the districts of the city in 
which the game was played. However, the execution expanded throughout 
the whole of Barcelona. Here, we only focus on the centre of the city because: 
(i) the majority of the tasks related to the city landmarks, and (ii) it was the 
only district engaged with throughout the whole duration of the performance 
(some outer districts such as Poble Sec were only used a couple of times). 
 
 
Figure 11: Day of the Figurines. Diagrammatic map showing the configuration of the 
streets in Barcelona’s city centre.  
 
The following four diagrammatic maps show the daily occurrences of the 
performance – a performance execution over three days – as executed in the 
central district. This first diagrammatic map represents day one, 15th June 
2006, at 3pm. 
 
 
Figure 12: Day of the Figurines. Diagrammatic map showing the development of 
DOF narrative in relation to Barcelona’s landmarks. The lines represent the narrative 
development and expansion – 15th June 2006.  
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The stars on the map mark some of the city’s landmarks such as the gothic 
cathedral and El Liceu, the music palace and opera house. As it can be 
already seen, the nascent narrative has started to be articulated in relation to 
the city centre, Plaza Catalunya.  
 
The following diagrammatic map represents day two, 16th June 2006, also at 
3 pm, and shows an already developed narrative in its spatio-temporal 
expansion: a bigger area of the city centre has been covered. This 
diagrammatic map builds on the prior one and shows how this particular type 
of performance transaction stages performance as an expanding architecture 
of multiple experiential complexities.  
 
 
Figure 13: Day of the Figurines. Diagrammatic map showing the development of 
DOF narrative in relation to Barcelona’s landmarks. The lines represent the narrative 
development and expansion – 16th June 2006.  
 
It is interesting to note how this distributed network of game and performance 
creates an immediate environment by a series of trajectories that position its 
participants on different points of the performance.  
 242 
 
The following diagrammatic map is day three, 17th June 2006 at 3 pm. It can 
be clearly observed that the orchestration of the narrative continues to 
develop the ubiquity of the network immersing its participants in a wider 
section of the city and clearly portraying the temporally extended 
performance. 
 
 
Figure 14: Day of the Figurines. Diagrammatic map showing the development of 
DOF narrative in relation to Barcelona’s landmarks. The lines represent the narrative 
development and expansion – 17th June 2006.  
 
Within the same city backdrop used to create the prior three maps, this one 
(17th June 2006 at 3 pm) shows how some areas presented a richer intensity 
of encounters. The map is made showing four different tones of black: the 
lighter tone specifies the less used areas of the city where less than 10 
participants executed the event during the three case study days that this 
research is interrogating; whereas the darker tone implies a higher usage, 
density and intensity of interaction.  
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Figure 15: Day of the Figurines. Diagrammatic map showing the development of 
DOF narrative in relation to Barcelona’s landmarks. The lines represent the narrative 
development and expansion – 17th June 2006. The different tones in the colours 
represent the different intensities in narrative execution.   
 
The following, and last diagrammatic map, 17th June 2006 at around 3.30 pm 
between Plaza Catalunya, Via Laietana and Passeig de Gracia, presents an 
articulation of narrative as a web of actual, virtual and potential narratives. 
The diagrammatic map shows the black point as the execution of the actual 
narratives, in which the participants were given different possibilities and/or 
different tasks to execute. The grey points show the potentialities – the 
alternative narrative possibilities: the Deleuzian virtual. Interestingly, and as a 
defining characteristic of DOF, some of the virtual potentialities for a 
participant become the actual narrative for another participant creating a 
temporal and narratological articulation of actualities and virtualities. It also 
shows how some participant subject’s narratives combine with other 
narratives, hence, highlighting the mereotopological aspect. 
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Figure 16: Day of the Figurines. Diagrammatic map showing the virtual and actual 
realization of the narrative. Each black dot represents a participant activating a task 
around Barcelona’s city centre – 17th June 2006 at around 3.30pm. Each grey dot 
represents the different narrative alternatives as virtual potentialities that each 
participant was given.  
 
These diagrammatic maps have visually amplified the most defining and 
radical traits of DOF as an intermedial emergent narrative: the use of media 
technologies as a narrativizing element; the blend of everyday life and 
performance; the creating of a performance that is temporally, spatially and 
socially expanded; and the creation of a narrative of virtualities and actualities 
that is emergent at the moment of execution.79 In short, the structural reality of 
the dramaturgy in activating the three onto-epistemic conditions depends on 
generating a constellation of dramaturgical occasions that activates the 
singular modality of each encounter as it conditions the emergence of the 
                                                        
79 These diagrammatic maps have been designed using the information provided by Blast 
Theory regarding the number of participants and interactions in the Barcelona performance. 
Blast Theory has an archive showing the records of how the operating panel processed the 
information. Although the diagrammatic maps present an accurate picture of the performance 
development, these are only an approximate quantitative estimation. 
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overall structure through the interlacing of spatio-temporal narrative strata 
immanent in the shaping of the experience of dramaturgy across all its 
material, semiotic and formal aspects.  
 
2.2. Day of the Figurines: Spatial and Temporal Expansions in 
the Generation of Intermedial Narrativity. 
 
In relation to intermedial narrative discussions within the context of 
interactivity, Benford and Giannachi (2008b) coined the term ‘temporal 
trajectory’. They define it as ‘the complex mappings between story time and 
clock time that are to be found in shared interactive narratives such as 
computer games and interactive performances’ (Benford and Giannachi, 
2008b: 73). In relation to this notion, Benford and Giannachi discuss that the 
interaction between narrative and time is intrinsic in ‘synchronizing different 
participants and enabling encounters … [creating the narrative’s] pace and 
interaction, revealing and communicating delays and visualizing, browsing 
and synchronizing convergent and divergent histories of interaction’ (Benford 
and Giannachi, 2008b: 73). Furthermore, they explain that his temporal 
framework identifies the different kinds of narrative transitions in relation to a 
network of narrative ‘mobile experiences’ that may occur along a narrative 
trajectory (Benford and Giannachi, 2008b: 73). In this sense, time and 
narrative interaction, they explain, also shows how inter-linking trajectories 
describe important aspects of multi-participant experiences (Benford and 
Giannachi, 2008b: 73-74).  
 
Viewed in this way, DOF can be categorized as a multi-dimensional narrative 
configuration of converging and differential spatio-temporal orchestrations, 
synchronizing the modes of interaction. This narrative presents aspects of 
multi-linear narratological intervening elements.80 This multi-linearity is 
                                                        
80 As noted in the introduction to this thesis, the work of Blast Theory presents social, political 
and ethical implications that this dissertation decides not to engage with. In the context of 
DOF, the execution of each interactive narrative task can be also grasped as an ethico-
political act within discourses of power and knowledge. Drawing from Foucault (1982), 
Deleuze also engages with ethics within the processes of individuation. In relation to 
interactive narrative, John Winslade (2009) describes that Foucault discusses notions of 
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created as an amalgamation of narrative experiences that is being informed 
by the decisions that the participant subjects take; that is, the multi-modal 
manner through which each activation may take place in the inter-relating of 
the game and personal lives of the participants as co-informing each other.81 
Interestingly, in activating the tasks, the participants, when they meet, learn 
about each other’s experiences such as what a past experience may have 
entailed through collaboration. In this sense, past narrative experiences can 
be brought back and may inform how a present experience/task is executed. 
In this sense, the activation of a given task enters into the realm of memory, 
learnt knowledge and the temporally differential through the synthesizing of 
time as seen in 10 Backwards; that is, this is a synthesizing narrative that 
refers back to the past, is situated in the present, and is projected into the 
future as a result of the decision-making and self-reflexivity of the participants. 
 
Consequently, the creation of DOF’s intermedial narrative plot presents a 
sense of ‘transcoding’ (Boenisch, 2010a: 189); that is, each participant subject 
transfers the informational and cultural codes82 of a different – everyday life 
and narrative aesthetic construction – environment as both a strategic 
dramaturgical tool and a constant self-reflexive dialogue to account for the 
‘structural principles of data organization and processing … [w]here 
established conventions and concepts (aesthetic as well as everyday) are 
thus reconfigured along the logic of transcoding’ (Boenisch, 2010a: 189). In 
                                                                                                                                                              
power-knowledge regarding to the political implications of ‘actions upon other actions’ 
(Foucault in Winslade, 2009: 336); actions that are executed from the specific ethico-political 
point of view of the subject. Instead, for Deleuze, ‘the subject, the person who comes to know 
something, does not have a point of view (which would necessarily imply both a pre-existing 
subject and that truth is relative), but it is a point of view and this point of view is a condition of 
variation rather than universality’ (Winslade, 2009: 334). 
 
81 John Winslade (2009), following Deleuzian scholar Todd May (2005), explains that in 
interactive narrative practice, the subject asks himself the question How might one live? – as 
opposed to How do I live? This question has also political, social and ethical implications 
because what is implicit is the presentation of the subject’s concerns about his own life. In 
asking the afore-mentioned question, and in activating the narrative’s trajectories, the subject 
will play each task according to the ethical, political and social parameters of his own life and, 
therefore, integrating the interactive narrative into his own understanding of power-knowledge 
strategies and ethical discourses.  
 
82  Peter Boenisch (2010a) explains that ‘in computing, to “transcode” refers to the conversion 
of data from one (digital) format to the other. Facilitated by shared structural principles of data 
organization and processing … it allows digital media to copy, convert, blend, store and 
reproduce any kind of contents and information’ (Boenisch, 2010a: 189). 
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this way, the participants create a narrative that can be described as a 
polyphony of affects and temporal convergences. In other words, the creation 
of the narrative expands the presentness of time into a network of differential 
narrative temporalities: the temporalities of the game life and personal life 
overlap. Seen thus, the temporal articulation of temporality enters into the 
mereotopological space of the dramaturgically multiple, the interval and the 
differential. 
 
Moreover, in relation to the treatment of time, DOF presents another 
characteristic: the duality between the 24 hours of the game and the 24 days 
of the performance. In this sense, the linearity of the 24 hours of the game is 
expanded into the multi-temporality of the 24 days. These 24 days of the 
performance can be discussed as multi-temporal because the participants 
decide when (and if) to take part in the executing dramaturgical process, 
therefore, unfolding layers of multi-temporality. Contra traditional readings of 
narrative theory, here the time of the game is expanded and transverses 
differentially, affecting the time and the manner is which the audience can 
access the work. The execution of the narrative here requires the participants 
to constantly transverse between different scales of time, hence, yielding non-
linear temporalities produced by the encounter between game and everyday 
life executed in the multiple registers of the temporal. As we saw in 10 
backwards, here the multi-modal temporality of the complex emergent 
processes affords the constant reconditioning of temporal layers in a scalar 
manner and calls attention to its own manner of functioning.  
 
Also in relation to the suggested scalar treatment of temporality as discussed 
in chapter two, in DOF we observe the layering between the “programmed” 
time of the tasks by the operators and the “activating” time of the tasks by the 
participants. In this sense, the process of fabulation also enters into the realm 
of the scalar because of the convergence of both types into the creation of the 
narrative structure. Seen thus, we suggest that a conceptual approach from a 
scalar perspective offers a more accurate description and critical position than 
Giannachi’s ‘temporal trajectory’ because it fully accounts for the radicality of 
the functional and compositional conditioning from within of the narrative. The 
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relationship between the modes in which the plot is made available to the 
participants and the manner in which the plot may be executed enables a 
constant correlation between the processes of fabulation and focalization and 
the spatial and temporal expansion of the narrative. Such correlation 
processes place the creation of narrative in DOF in a scalar landscape of co-
interacting planes, which, as a hypersurface, demands constant consideration 
of the responses to the narrative engagement; that is, the temporality in which 
the operators function and the temporality of the participants in the game is 
co-informed in the nested complexity of the intensity of the phenomenon.  
 
2.3. Day of the Figurines: Intermedial Narratives as Multiple 
Intertextual Worlds. 
 
In Ontological Plotting: Narrative as a Multiplicity of Temporal Dimensions, 
Hilary Dannenberg (2004) explores narrativity as a multiplicity of spatio-
temporal dimensions and establishes an account of the possibilities of the 
‘multiple worlds’ approach to ontological plotting (Dannenberg, 2004: 159). 
Widely used in critical literary studies, the concept of ontological plotting can 
be used to review some of the constitutive narratological elements of DOF. 
Dannenberg defines ontological plotting as ‘the analysis of narrative fiction’s 
coordination of the alternate possible worlds which give it depth and interest’ 
(Dannenberg, 2004: 159). Conceived thus, the use of ontological plotting 
creates a structure that cannot be traced to causal-lineal sequences of events 
through fictional time. Ontological plotting creates an orchestration of spatio-
temporalities. In this sense, DOF could be considered an ‘ontologically 
multidimensional fabric of alternate possible worlds’ since each participant 
decides and acts upon the ‘tellability’ of his individual narrative (Dannenber, 
2004: 160). The participant, Dannenber discusses, takes an active role in the 
proliferations of spatio-temporal multiple-world structures. In this way, DOF’s 
plot is a dynamic interaction of differential possible worlds always in ‘a state of 
ontological flux’ (Dannenberg, 2004: 161). Each single world created by the 
participants of DOF forms part of a ‘plurality of worlds’ (Dannenberg, 2004: 
162) that push the reader/participant ‘into a new system of actuality and 
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possibility’ (Dannenberg, 2004: 161). Drawing on these remarks, the narrative 
that DOF creates is an activity of interlacing narrative constructions in which 
the participant is invested, immersed and deals, as an intra-action, with the 
multi-layered narrative that DOF creates through the narrative of his 
engagement with both the game narrative and the narrative of everyday life 
events through feedback loops that rely on a series of constant 
mereotopological narrative re-orchestrations.83 In short, drawing on 
Dannenberg, DOF can be described as an intermedial performance where 
communication between the different colliding, multiple and temporally 
differential narratives occurs through a multitude of channels that constantly 
redefine the intervening narrative frameworks. As Boenisch (2006a) explains, 
‘intermediality manages to stimulate exceptional, disturbing and potentially 
radical observations, rather than merely communicating or transporting them 
as messages, as media would traditionally do’ (Boenisch, 2006a: 115). From 
this parameter, each communication and interaction channel is a narrative 
medium that does not function in isolation, but in a choralilty of level-crossing 
medial frameworks.  
 
Now, although we have suggested that Dannenberg’s positions can help 
discuss the textual specificities of DOF, some remarks need to be considered. 
Admitting that Dannenberg’s proposals suitably describe, on the one hand, 
                                                        
83 Gareth White (2012) explains that the term ‘immersive’ relates to the configuration of 
dramaturgical spaces and the re-configuration of audience-performer duality. He also points 
out that ‘Immersive theatre has become a widely adopted term to designate a trend for 
performances which use installations and expansive environments, which have mobile 
audiences, and which invite audience participation’ (White, 2012: 1). For him, ‘Immersion 
implies access to the inside of the performance in some way’ (White, 2012: 221). Drawing on 
performances by two London-based theatre companies, Shunt and Punchdrunk, he describes 
how the use of architectural interiors, extensive and large environments at times, ‘in which 
audiences explore in order to find the performance, and sometimes to give performances 
themselves’ (White, 2012: 221), inform the conceptualization of the work. He posits that the 
use of these physical interiors and the audience member’s movement through them becomes 
part of the dramaturgy of the work. This thesis proposes that the term ‘immersive’ refers to 
two aspects: on the one hand, it transforms the performer and the individual audience 
member’s experience of theatre; on the other hand, the term ‘immersive’ can be also 
described as being part of, dwelling within, a distinct and constructive environment; that is, 
the mediated performance phenomenon re-orders the relationships and experiences that the 
performance event explores, in such a way that the participant subject and the mediated 
attending variables’ agency in participatory and immersive performance is significant; it 
shapes, moderates, and configures the event. The kind of technological mediation and the 
use of everyday spaces in the manner of Blast Theory’s Uncle Roy All Around You (2003) 
and DOF are examples.  
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the complexity of multi-linear narrative perspectives and highlight the 
inadequacy of the traditional readings of narratological tellability and causal-
linear sequences that can be clearly applied to DOF and, we suggest, to 
intermediality in general as a new digital medium; and, on the other hand, the 
active engagement of the participant in developing the narrative. Nonetheless, 
one aspect that she discusses becomes problematic. She explains that ‘a 
multiple-worlds approach views narrative fiction in its ontologically unresolved 
state before (at least in the single world ontological hierarchy of realist texts) 
the finality of closure imposes a single story version on the discourse’ 
(Dannenberg, 2004: 161). Contra this position, we can claim the radicality of 
DOF because at the end of the performance/game, there is no winner; that is, 
there is not a final position arrived at. Further, when the performance finishes, 
a large number of tasks and missions may be still unresolved and, therefore, 
narrative threads are left incomplete. Moreover, in the above-quoted 
definition, Dannenberg seems to imply that at the very end, due to the fact 
that a single story version is imposed to enable closure, all the participant 
subjects are able to grasp the narrative articulation in its totality. However, 
one aspect that becomes obvious in DOF, and points to its radical aspect, is 
that because of the positionality of the subject within the overall dramaturgical 
structure, the participant is rendered incapable of reaching an overall and 
conclusive perspective on the totality of the performance event – we will 
return this positional aspect on the following section regarding some 
suggested problematics.  
 
Conceived as an interrelation of narrative texts, DOF presents an intermedial 
narrative that is a constant flow of performative textual potentialities, which 
are always interconnecting frames and strategies and fluctuating and 
constructing signifiers. In this way, this is also a narrative that can be 
explained within the framework of the notion of ‘hypertextuality’. In Virtual 
Theatres, Giannachi (2004) defines hypertextualities as, 
forms of textualities that are rendered through HTML, an 
abbreviation of hypertext mark-up language. Whether textual 
or hypermedial, hypertextualities are fluid and open forms that 
allow the reader or viewer to move beyond the world of the 
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interface and penetrate the realm of the work. (Giannachi, 
2004: 13)  
 
The viewer, Giannachi explains, becomes an active constitutive element of 
the textual process and, therefore, activates the work of art, allowing the 
participant to live in both the virtual and the actual world, which multiplies the 
participant’s narrative position (Giannachi, 2004: 14). She further explains,  
to read a hypertext entails reading the text as well as the 
space within which the hypertext is encoded. In this sense, 
hypertext is each text forming the hypertextual structure, but 
also the path of interrelatedness connecting each segment to 
other segments. (Giannachi, 2004: 14) 
 
Also, Giannachi adds, 
reading a hypertext not only implies actively moving through 
space to find content and to explore the space containing the 
content, but also to observe the structural and formal patterns 
characterizing each fractal section and to study the potential 
interrelatedness to the fleeting whole. (Giannachi, 2004: 14) 
 
 
In relation to these hypertextual actions, DOF creates a multitude of possible 
texts as an encoded web.84 Drawing on her definitions, we also conceive the 
reading of the text and the meaning and knowledge that comes forth from that 
reading as a process of encounters and highlight the formation of patterns 
that come about between a given text and the potential textual references that 
may spring from a text. As she suggests, the reading of a text also implies a 
variety of performative context-dependent activities. From this perspective, we 
                                                        
84  From this point of view, DOF participates in the post-dramatic. In his description of post-
dramatic space, Lehmann argues that this space should be understood as a chora, that is, as 
a multiplicity of spatial and textual articulations. In relation to post-dramatic text and narrative, 
he uses the term chora and positions narrativity in a manner reminiscent of Derrida – as 
‘chora-graphy’ (Lehmann, 2006: 145). From this perspective, post-dramatic narrative 
operates, according to him, from the principle that narrativity can be considered as a mode of 
critical and practical discourse. Placing an emphasis on processes and practices over 
narratological products, Lehmann seeks to engender dynamic relationships between the 
articulation of narrative as postmodern literary text and the presentational and compositional 
theatrical configurations of such particular texts according to their principles of staging. For 
him, the narrative chora can be described as ‘a space and speech-discourse without telos, 
hierarchy and causality, without fixable meaning and unity’ (Lehmann, 2006: 145-46). Further, 
he says, ‘in this sense, we can say that theatre is turned into chora-graphy: the 
deconstruction of a discourse oriented towards meaning and the invention of a space that 
eludes the laws of telos and unity’ (Lehmann, 2006: 145).  
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can extrapolate from her ideas that each of DOF’s sent-text topics is written 
and spatially and temporally realized. In this web of messages where each 
SMS text is a path to another entry, and each entry is a door to another 
spatially and temporally realized text, the structuring of the text can be 
constituted by the functioning of narrative portals. Conceived thus, DOF is set 
as a series of portals of interconnecting structures of an invisible architecture 
of spatially and temporally realized links.  
 
From this point of view of interconnecting structures, the hypertext can be 
considered as a rhizome. Taking from biological backgrounds that define a 
rhizome as a root with no clear structure and no main channel/filament as in a 
tulip or a mushroom, Deleuze and Guattari (2001) in A Thousand Plateaus 
discuss how the rhizome ‘has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle 
(milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
2001: 1605). For them, the rhizome is a ‘self-vibrating region of intensities 
whose development avoids any orientation toward a culmination point or 
external end … [it] brings into play very different regimes of signs’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 2001: 1605-1606). Drawing on these remarks, the 
hypertextuality of DOF creates a complex system of textualities in which the 
text enters a world of narrative action, pragmatics and functionality. The 
hypertext enters, in this manner, into processes of variation and intensity, 
establishing patterns between its own singularity and the connecting variety of 
its own existence. Seen thus, the hypertext is also relational and differential 
because the manner in which it is engaged with enables constant relations 
between each section and/or pattern of the hypertext and the overall 
structure. In other words, the hypertext is mereotopological.  
 
Now, some of the proposals put forward by Giannachi in relation to 
hypertextuality need to be repositioned in relation to the argument that this 
thesis follows. First, the constructivist perspective argued for here sees no 
difference between a text and the subject engaging with such a text. Rather, 
the entanglement of agencies conceives the moment of intra-action as the 
very moment of hypertextuality. Radically put, the human subject is also 
hypertext. So when she writes that ‘in hypertext, the reader controls these 
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links’ (Giannachi, 2004: 14), she is also implying an anthropocentric 
perspective in conceptualizing it and seems to overlook the agential qualities 
that the hypertext itself possess. Second, she sees that hypertext as a 
temporal infinitum of textual possibilities. However, we suggest that the 
processes of hypertextuality come to life with the emergence of the situated 
activity that the dramaturgy as a scaffolding of inter-related elements enables. 
Seen thus, hypertextuality is imbued in processes of temporality. Following 
this argument, we can understand how DOF radically presents the participant 
with an ability to negotiate the text from the point of view of form, content, 
medium, and message from within. In this manner, the participant actively and 
hermeneutically interprets the constant development of the narrative as a kind 
of hermeneutics of active creation as learning-in-action – here the 
hermeneutic operation actively creates the text at the same time as disrupting 
traditional hermeneutic binaries such as the intra- and extra-diegetic relation 
between text and reader (see Bryon, 2006).85 In the context of DOF, the 
participant subject decides their own manner of participation and experiences 
the hypertext as an interrelated zone of narrative structures, as an 
assemblage. In this sense, the participant in DOF not only is inside a meta-
architecture, inside the work of art, an architecture that is being created at the 
moment of performance, but onto-epistemically creates the narrative structure 
and is aware that it is being created86. It is in the participant’s engagements – 
                                                        
85 In the context of classical hermeneutics, broadly defined as the art of interpretation, 
meaning was attached to a text, bound up to a text – independently of the nature of the text – 
and awaited the interpreter to extract meaning out of it via proper exegetical method. 
Departing from this, David Allen and Jerry Vines (1987) explain that: ‘modern hermeneutic 
theory is characterized by a two fold transition: the shift from a spatial/regional hermeneutical 
approach to that of general hermeneutics, and the shift from a primarily epistemological 
outcome to an ontological one’ (Allen and Vines, 1987: 310).  
 
86 The complexities of DOF’s narrative construction can be viewed from the framework of a 
metanarrative; that is, broadly defined, a narrative that refers to its own manner of making, 
paying attention to the operative manner in which the technological elements enhance the 
agential elements of the dramaturgy and the temporalizing, spatializing and narrativizing 
elements of the technology. Intermediality, as Chiel Kattenbelt (2010) fittingly states, always 
engages in process of self-interrogation and self-referentiality (Kattenbelt, 2010: 32). Robert 
Alter (1972) has shown that metanarrative always includes reflexive elements. In this sense, it 
is a self-conscious narrative in the context of its structure, meaning and purpose. The term 
metanarrative appears often in narratological studies. In Narrative Discourse (1980), Genette 
uses the term in two different senses: on the one hand, it refers to narratives inside narratives 
which can imply a sense of hierarchy; and on the other hand, he also uses the word to specify 
the internal organization of the text, in the sense of a self-reflexive narration. Seen thus, the 
self-reflexive and self-referent elements of DOF as a metanarrative allow for the participants 
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as intra-actions – with the text that both the text and the participant manifest 
and emerge themselves. In other words, the hypertextual narrative creation 
suggested here radically resides in the interface between the “just created” 
text and the action that created it. Seen thus, the hypertext can be defined as 
a process of creating different medial articulations. The intra-action captures 
the contingencies of the emergent hypertextual activity. Simply put, it is the 
intra-action that creates the interface through which the narrative text and the 
dramaturgy is created: the work of art and its narrative reside in the interface 
between the participant and the “participated in” through processes of onto-
epistemic mediality that as a hypersurface operates in the inter-layering of 
different planes of composition.   
 
2.4. Day of the Figurines: Becoming, Final Thoughts and 
Problematics. 
 
DOF is a trajectory that presents a multiplicity of elements, which create a 
narrative structure with generative characteristics. Areas of narratological 
structuring have fittingly put an emphasis on aspects of the performative event 
and the spatio-temporal structuring of narrative as a process. These are 
narrative events that interpenetrate and influence each other, where 
materiality and semioticity are not pre-given, but are also facets of a nascent 
event; that is, each event is the embryonic point that generates the next one, 
exploring mereotopological relations of structural complexity. The 
Whiteheadian and Deleuzian theory of the event helps, once more, 
understand the elusive complexity of DOF as a narrative architecture of 
complexity. Whitehead and Deleuze help articulate the inter-connectedness of 
the narratological structure that DOF constructs – a radical structure of ever-
changing patterns of narrative events and an affirmation of operativity and 
process.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
to be engaged in a process of constructivist creativity; that is, the participant subject is 
intrinsic and internal to the functioning and development of the diegetic frame. 
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This theory of the event, provided by Deleuze and Whitehead, enables us to 
encompass the more conventional narrative definition of the event as a 
complete and defined happening, but also it extends this narrative definition to 
incorporate a structured sequence (not necessarily chronological) that 
includes a spatio-temporal framework and provides the individual event with a 
larger evental environment. Deleuzian scholar Constantin Boundas fittingly 
explains this non-linear characteristic. He says, 
Becoming, instead of being a linear process from one actual 
to another, should rather be conceived as the movement from 
one actual state of affairs, through a dynamic field of 
virtual/actual tendencies, to the actualization of this field in a 
new state of affairs. This scheme safeguards the relations of 
reversibility between the virtual and the actual. (Boundas, 
2006: 5)  
 
From this perspective, DOF can be said to embrace this narrative non-linear 
structure of space and time. DOF exists as a narratological event and as a 
structure of internal events, which emphasizes the creative, the generative, 
and the complexity of medial narrative intra-actions. This definition also entails 
the constantly changing condition of the event as intensity and the coalescing 
of connections between the agents, the world, the objects and the formation 
of a narrative. DOF produces a plural range of events on all levels, which, as 
operating patterns, construct the narrative structure. Given the emphasis on 
becoming, the evental interconnection of space and time provides a useful 
platform for describing the complexities of DOF. Further, DOF creates a web 
of structural interconnectivity where events generate and become more 
events; that is, a creative and compositional aspect of the structure of the 
event linking the generative aspect of the event with those who experience it. 
 
Throughout his writings, Deleuze, particularly in Difference and Repetition, 
emphasizes the relationship between the actual and the virtual in the 
processes of actualization. The focus on the virtual allows Deleuze to highlight 
the activations of new potentialities and, thus, the creation of new 
singularizations. From this perspective, the relation between the created and 
the vital creating is in a constant renewal – the unlimited virtual creatings in 
their differential being. Deleuze stresses a field of potentialities that are all-
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reaching and encompass all possibilities as a totality of potentialities. Simply 
put, Deleuze sees no limits in the manner the virtual can affect the actual in its 
realization. However, we suggest that a literal application of this theoretical 
position to the intermedial performance backgrounds becomes problematic. In 
this sense, intermedial performance also informs a constructivist reading of 
epistemology, particularly in relation to how the structures and scaffoldings 
that a dramaturgy establishes limit the scope of such possible virtualizations. 
We have seen in DOF that the coming into being of the complex 
dramaturgical system presents an open structure. However, even in the most 
open structures, there are initial set parameters and these parameters evolve 
throughout the development of the dramaturgy. In this sense, the range and 
scope of the processes of virtualizations are always contingent to how the 
situated activity of each intra-action may emerge. The emergent dynamics of 
the dramaturgical system enable processes of actual-virtual realization, but 
the context-dependency of such an emergent dynamic actively informs their 
modality of emergence. Deleuze conceives each actualization as a “captivity” 
that is immediately deterritorialized by its virtual counterpart. In this sense, the 
dynamics of creation instantly escape from the mediation of the created. In 
fact, for Deleuze, creativity takes place in the virtual dimension. Although 
Deleuze clearly rejects any notions of hierarchy, we may even suggest that in 
conceptualizing the processes of creativity, he places the emphasis on the 
virtual rather than the actual, particularly in terms of the immanence of 
creation. Yet, what intermedial performance suggests to us is that it is 
impossible to deny the mediality of the created and its spatio-temporal 
dynamics of morphogenesis. The movement between actualization and 
virtualization, for Deleuze specifically in the final chapters of Difference and 
Repetition, has no intermediaries. However, we argue that the dramaturgical 
scaffolding acts as an intermediary because it constantly repositions the 
created as mediated and, hence, it evidently determines the processes of 
virtualizations.  
 
Another element that becomes problematic in relation to intermedial 
performance is the notion of the rhizome regarding hypertextualities. In A 
Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari discuss that the rhizome presents 
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no temporal aspects. It is even described as “suspended” in temporality, only 
engaging with genealogies of knowledge and differentially expanding in a web 
with no centre. This research has simply presented a miniscule discussion of 
the concept of the rhizome. Nonetheless, in the context of intermedial 
performance it is impossible to overlook the contextual aspect in which a 
given performance may take place and its durational aspect. From this point 
of view, although the rhizome becomes a helpful concept to examine and 
capture the specificities of hypertextuality, the temporal specificity of the 
situated activity must be acknowledged in the constant exchange that enables 
the emergence of hypertextual relations.   
 
One aspect, we suggest, that cannot be ignored is the positionality of the 
subject in a given context. Readings of Deleuze such as Stuart Elden (2006) 
and Ronald Bogue (1997, 2005), particularly emphasizing notions of 
nomadism, territorrialization and deterrotiarrialization, have highlighted critical 
accounts of globalization, specifically within philosophical and political notions 
of space, nationality and territory while stressing a complex and abstract view 
of political territories, the overlapping of political, social and economical 
regimes as nomadic distribution, and their ontological shift as their manner of 
being from the purely localized to the flow of the global. In general, these 
readings and applications of Deleuzian philosophy have entailed a 
subordination of notions of positionality to what we can consider as a 
“secondary” plane of importance. It is completely beyond the scope of this 
research to engage with such readings. However, we would like to argue that 
when applied to intermedial performance – and theatrical performance in 
general, we would suggest – the positionality of the subject cannot be put on 
the “back burner” because the situated emergence of the aesthetic event 
always implies a position to be taken and a positioning within it. We stress 
that the intermedial narrative ‘plane of composition’ can be understood as a 
constructed event of internal frames that render the dramaturgical whole as 
an unreachable totality – particularly stressed, as noted, in more open 
dramaturgical structures such as DOF – and forces the participant to become 
aware of his own positionality within the execution of the dramaturgical event. 
Simply put, the participant, in his positionality within the dramaturgical system, 
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can only grasp a part of the overall structural unfolding and is, therefore, 
unable to synthesize the entirety of the dramaturgical construction as a whole.  
 
As a final thought, if DOF can be articulated in terms of a web of structural 
interconnectivity, then DOF can be also categorized as a collective creation. 
This is a creation that is enabled at the moment of practice within several 
planes of articulation and composition. Within this perspective, the work of art 
is thought of as a differential construction constituted by specifically immanent 
rather than transcendent relations between a given creator and the created. 
Following Deleuze, DOF can be discussed as being generated as an overall 
narrative plane of composition made of internal and generative planes of 
composition. A plane in which subject and object co-constitute each other, 
and where the relationship, between subject and work of art, dissolves in the 
construction and becoming of the collective narrative event.  
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Chapter 5 
 
The Execution of the Intermedial Performance Subject 
in the Construction of the Event 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to conceptualize the intermedial subject in relation 
to the notion of the constructivist intermedial event where the onto-epistemic 
constructive aesthetic comes into being by the creative realization of each 
spatio-temporal narrative frame due to its always becoming-other – becoming 
the new and tending towards dramaturgical novelty in the constant 
synthesizing and generative processes of activation occurring through the 
triadic execution of the event. Here, it is argued that there is no “epistemology 
of the subject”, but, rather, there is an onto-epistemology of the event, which 
explains the mode of appearance of the intermedial production of subjectivity; 
that is, the activation of the event constitutes the subject in a process of 
continual renewal. If for Kant the world finds its foundation within the subject, 
as a transcendental structure, in agreement with Deleuze and Whitehead, this 
thesis claims that the intermedial subject is not transcendentally constituted 
as Kant proposes in the First Critique, but emerges transcendentally within 
the intermedial transaction. In other words, this thesis proposes a notion of 
the intermedial subject as transcendentally possible, albeit not in a 
substantive sense, as Kant implies, but viewed as a model of subjectivity that 
can be analyzed by the transcendental conditions that determine the 
possibility of such intermedial performance subjectivations. Simply put, they 
both emerge from within.  
 
In opposition to what Mock, Phelan, Fischer-Lichte, Nelson, Lapage, Causey 
and Schechner have proposed, this research seeks to produce a radical 
understanding of constructive aesthetic co-dependence as one that is non-
anthropocentric. As noted in the introduction, Phelan, Schechner, Mock and 
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Fischer-Lichte have articulated their understanding of the type of subjectivity 
enabled in performance in relation to their postulates around the ontological 
and liveness debates, particularly emphasizing the subject’s ephemerality, 
ontological actuality, self-erasure, constant re-presentation and aspects of 
being determined by but also determining the performance transaction – the 
subject as co-dependent within Fischer-Lichte’s autopoietic feedback loop. 
Furthermore, recent intermedial performance scholarship such as Lapage 
(2008), adopting a terminology inspired by “simplistic” readings of Deleuze 
and a post-humanist philosophical framework, calls the intermedial 
performance subject a ‘schizzo subject’ (Lapage, 2008: 143), actively 
negating the possibility of a transcendental subject in intermedial work. In 
relation to subjectivity and digital performance, Matthew Causey (2002) 
writes,  
The question that needs pursuing is the construction of 
subjectivity … live performance that incorporates digital and 
interactive media is uniquely situated to represent the 
conflicts and convergences of the human and technology … 
the dramatic struggle between the material body within virtual 
and televisual space can create a dialectic that reveals the … 
changing positions of the subject in mediatized culture. 
(Causey, 2002: 180-182) 
 
Interestingly, he acknowledges the need for a clear conceptual position of 
notions of subjectivity within digital performance backgrounds and the relation 
between human and technology. However, in identifying that the position of 
the subject needs to be addressed when encountering the digital transaction, 
he still refers to an aprioristic subject that is “placed” in a technological 
performance environment. 
 
Not without merit, all these ways of conceiving the subject connect the subject 
to theatrical performance and establish some valid points such as the linking 
of subjectivity in relation to the specificities of a given performance 
transaction. However, they are all anthropocentric conceptualizations and all 
rely on the primacy of the subject as an experiential entity that tends towards 
the phenomenon, implying a model of subjectivity that posits the subject as 
distinct from the performance transaction, although it is influenced by it. 
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Whereas Nelson – in what is a closer understanding of the intermedial subject 
to the one proposed here – uses the term ‘experiencer’ aptly encompassing 
both the spectator and the performer. The term ‘experiencer’ describes the 
subject as performative and phenomenal. In doing so, Nelson endows the 
subject with performative creative aspects in relation to the performance 
event, but, once more, this is a conceptualization that is still reliant on a notion 
of a subject as pre-existing the performance encounter. 
  
Contra these above-mentioned positions, this chapter argues for a radical 
conceptualization of the intermedial subject. The following develops a critical 
position against these, we may say, post-modern models of subject 
fragmentation, co-dependence and erasure. The proposed intermedial subject 
is not the fractured subject of post-modernity, but on the contrary possesses 
an onto-epistemic unity; it is a subject that is immanent and instantiated, in a 
Deleuzian sense, at the moment of the execution of the event; and one that is, 
as Whitehead would say, always in a process of subjectivations – a process 
that pays attention to emergent processes and to how subjects are actualized 
and individuated through a set of diverse practical relations and 
interconnections. Interconnections, this thesis argues, that enable a constant 
process of knowledge making and learning. 
 
The suggested radicality will show that the intermedial subject is a subject 
with constructivist characteristics, emerging coterminously with the event and 
whose identity is constantly performed in processes of onto-epistemic 
construction. The following sections will demonstrate that: (i) the intermedial 
subject is self-conscious (in performatively activating and executing the 
event); (ii) presents autonomy, univocity, and unity; (iii) is heuristic-
hermeneutic (in its self-reflexive, concept-making and learning aspects); (iv) 
can be understood as intersubjective; and (v) is transcendentally constituted 
(through syntheses, not understood here in the categorical imperative of the 
Kantian framework, but in the empirico-transcendental emergent sense, as 
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described by Deleuze).87 The notion of the onto-epistemic intermedial subject 
that this research proposes borrows from Nelson’s ‘experiencer’, but puts 
forward a new and distinct conceptualization by focusing on the constant 
process of performative identity formation and the situatedness of the qualities 
of the production of subjectivity (its consciousness, perception and 
experiential interpretation) in constructive dramaturgical assemblages of 
spatio-temporal narratological structures and evental experience. 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first puts forward this research’s 
proposal of the onto-epistemic intermedial subject in relation to the findings 
observed throughout the case studies in chapters two, three and four, and 
claims the unity and univocity of the intermedial subject’s Being. The second 
one describes the subject as a learner within a dramaturgical world of affects 
and intensities. The third section explores the intersubjective manner in which 
the subject activates the event. The fourth and final section offers some final 
thoughts and opens up some problematics regarding the notion of intermedial 
subjectivity and intermedial dramaturgy. 
 
1. The Intermedial Subject: The univocity of Being.  
 
This section engages with the philosophical positions that enable this thesis to 
radically claim the transcendentality, unity and univocity of the intermedial 
subject. The Deluzian and Whiteheadian scholar Keith Robinson (2008) 
explains that for both Deleuze and Whitehead the dynamisms of becoming, 
Being and the production of subjectivity are clearly articulated through the 
compositional movement enabled by creativity. Put simply, Being, thinking 
and creativity are one. Processes of creativity enable subject and world 
formation within dramaturgical orchestrations..88 In this context, the production 
                                                        
87 Whitehead would term this the empirico-ideal aspect. Similar to Deleuze’s notions, for 
Whitehead, experience is the constructive base of ideas and thought.  
 
88 Relative to Deleuze’s understanding of the term creativity, two aspects also need to be 
considered. First, philosophy, for Deleuze, can be broadly defined as the novel creation of 
concepts. Philosophy, for him, is functionally creative and pragmatic. That is, broadly, truths 
are constructively made, not found. And, second, Deleuze and Guattari differentiate between 
three domains in which creativity occurs: (i) philosophy regarding the creation of concepts, 
 263 
of subjectivity, for Deleuze, constitutes a move to create a plane of 
consciousness within the plane of composition. In his understanding, the 
subject is the unfolding process of creativity. The subject participates in an 
ongoing creative process on the basis of its creativity, the created and the 
process of creating. In this way, the subject, for him, is the functioning of 
relations – or forces – that articulate the process of creativity. This functioning, 
according to Robinson, comes into existence by subtracting the multiple 
aspects of a given experience in a counting-as-one; that is, the multiple 
amalgamates as one. Through this counting-as-one, Being can be grasped in 
a single and univocal sense; the one is made of internal multiplicities that co-
emerge out of multiplicities. As Paul Bains (2002) describes, the Deleuzian 
understanding of the subject places its production within a world of 
multiplicities. He writes,  
The multiplicity of heterogenous components can emerge as 
a process of subjective self-reference through a kind of … 
existential grasping … whereby a fragmentary whole 
emerges, a unitas multiplex, a unity in multiplicity …  a plane 
of consistency … a whole in all its parts … an endo-
consistency in which the components are distinct but 
inseparable. A composite unit. (Bains, 2002: 103-104) 
 
Put slightly differently, the individual’s identity is to be understood as the 
synthesizing aspect of creativity, emerging as becoming. In this sense, we 
can infer, each of the counting-as-one can be read as a temporal state of 
equilibrium about to be deterritorialized; that is, a comprising moment of 
linearity that encompasses the non-linear and a unique moment of complexity 
when the potentialities for a new singularity co-exist with what happens to be 
actualized.  
 
The Whiteheadian scholar Isabelle Stengers (2011) argues that the 
production of subjectivity must be understood as part of a milieu (see 
                                                                                                                                                              
defined as abstract systems of actual and virtual worlds; (ii) art in so far as creativity is 
involved in the creation of affects, defined for now, as sensory embodiments of actual and 
virtual worlds; and (iii) science in so far as creativity is involved in the creation of percepts, 
defined as the embodiment of functional worlds. In What is Philosophy? (1991), they write, 
‘the three modes of thought intersect and intertwine … [articulating] a rich tissue of 
correspondences [that] can be established between the planes’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991: 
198-99).  
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Manning, 2013a). She proposes that subjectivity can never be understood for 
itself – independently of its milieu; rather, for Deleuze and Whitehead, it is 
always part of an assemblage in which it is enabled. As Whitehead (1968) 
writes in Modes of Thought,  
The notion of existence involves the notion of an environment 
of existences and of types of existences. Any one instance of 
existence involves other existences, connected with it and yet 
beyond it. This notion of the environment introduces the 
notion of the “more or less” and of multiplicity. (Whitehead, 
1968: 7) 
 
Drawing on this, the identity of the subject, in terms of creativity, is the 
production of novelty, which is the effect of multiplicity and repetition whereby 
an event is produced out of the chaotic multiplicity available within the pre-
individual field and becomes an individual singularity within an environment of 
other individuals.  
 
Extrapolating from these philosophical positions, here, contra the above-
mentioned subject-of-performance positions, the radical conceptualization of 
the identity of the intermedial subject is understood as the evental production 
of subjectivations – as the subject’s own evental self-production. As such, 
rather than an identity per se, as an essentialist entity, we consider identity as 
a performative strategy between and within practices; that is, it is through 
constant creative practice that the notion of identity, as highlighted in this 
thesis, comes into being. Looked at in this way, the processes of 
ephemerality, highlighted by Phelan and Fischer-Lichte, are rendered 
inadequate to discuss the particularities of the type of subject’s production 
that the triadic execution of the event actualizes. Each instantiation is not 
seen as an erasure and ephemeral disappearance; rather, each one is 
conceived as a moment of temporal synthesis that, simply put, differentially 
amalgamates the previous processes of actualization. Furthermore, the focus 
on singularities and assemblages offers possibilities to reconsider the 
conceptualization of the notion of the intermedial subject. Following Deleuze 
and Guattari, we can then suggest that the identity of the intermedial subject 
is de-centred from any essentialist ontological notions framed as the “here 
and now” and showing unity, and is part of an assemblage of dramaturgical 
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multiplicities, as seen, for example, in DOF or the interactions between Niki 
and the two screens in 10 Backwards, an emergent conjunction and an 
evolving inter-twining of self-ordering aesthetic forces. In this sense, the 
radical identity of the intermedial subject and all the attributes that enable 
processes of subjectivity to emerge such as consciousness, perception, 
experience and interpretation are activated at the very moment of the 
emergent situated activity as life in the making.   
 
As Simone Brott (2011) writes, ‘subjectivity is, for Deleuze, not a person, but a 
power given to immanent forces to act and to produce effects in the world’ 
(Brott, 2011: 1). As such, rethinking the subject-object binary as belonging to 
one creative composition in the contingency of a given situated activity. In 
addition, in understanding subjectivity as constructed and realized in the 
intermedial event, intermedial subjectivity is always active.89 
 
For Deleuze, consciousness, activity and actuality cannot be disconnected.90 
They are always connected at the point of intersection of actualizing 
responses at each present moment. Applying Deleuzian thought, the 
intermedial subject, in activating the intermedial event, is open, dynamic and 
productive – an open whole defined by relations between materiality and 
temporality, experiential perception, action and response and influenced anew 
by each new dramaturgic stimulus within the mereotopological aesthetic 
complexity. This is a subject that is open to a dramaturgical totality, a 
conscious being that exists, experiences and perceives in order to change – 
where change is understood in terms of its specific temporal dramaturgical 
actualizations occurring through the generative activation of the intermedial 
event. 
 
                                                        
89 In Semblance and Event, Brian Massumi (2011) discusses what he terms ‘activist 
philosophy’ (Massumi, 2011: 1-28) in relation to processes of individuation and Whiteheadian 
understandings of creativity.  
 
90 Deleuze’s understanding of consciousness is highly influenced by his readings of 
Bergson’s notions of time and memory and Hume’s notions of experience.  
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In their proposals, Fischer-Lichte and Lapage have negated the possibility of 
conceptualizing the subject of performance as a transcendental entity. Here, 
instead, we radically propose that the intermedial subject can be considered 
as transcendental. This conceptualization of subjectivity can be understood in 
relation to Deleuze’s postulates regarding ‘transcendental empiricism’. 
Deleuzian scholar Marc Roberts (2006) explains that within Deleuze’s 
theoretical framework the subject transcends the empirical sequences of 
instantiation, it remains immanent to the series of such instantiations and, 
therefore, shows a sense of transcendental continuity. For Deleuze, the 
subject, in transcending the given, is constituted empirico-transcendentally in 
the given (Roberts, 2006: 191-194). The subject is rather like the emergence 
or immanence of a melody; that is, as it emerges it transcends the single and 
logically independent moments/musical notes where both the virtual and 
actual are immanent. The sense of continuity and of our enduring self 
transcends the empirical series of the ‘lived states’ – as a musical note – 
creating a sense of self that remains immanent to that series. Roberts also 
points out,  
Rather than existing in some transcendental realm … our 
sense of self emerges from the manner in which the lived 
states that have passed are continually contracted and 
synthesized, and therefore virtually contemporaneous, with 
the actual present lived state, creating the passive 
expectation of future lived states, and the ongoing continuity 
of our subjectivity. (Roberts, 2006: 197) 
 
Extrapolating this transcendental characteristic to this research’s discussion of 
the intermedial subject, we can argue then that the intermedial subject can be 
radically categorized as transcendental because the subject transcends the 
dramaturgical series – for instance, the constant executions of the tasks in 
DOF and/or the dynamism of the dramaturgical structures of Something 
American highlighted by the seriality of the fading strategy – experienced 
through performative intra-actions; that is, in his constantly transcending the 
intra-actions, the intermedial subject can be described as transcendental. In 
other words, the onwards production of subjectivity in the execution of the 
event consistently transcends the pre-given.  
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In relation to the above-mentioned series of empirical instantiations, Deleuze 
presents the lived experience of subjectivity as a continuity that emerges as 
part of an organized system: the intermedial event in this instance. Defining a 
system as an autopoietic self-organization with interaction between the 
elements, Deleuze also speaks of the self as an emergent system, hence, 
equating the self with the generating qualities of an organism, or of a system. 
He suggests, ‘the given is no longer given to a subject, rather the subject 
constitutes itself in the given [as part of a system]’ (Deleuze, 1991: 87). So, if 
the given is organized as an emergent autopoietic system, the production of 
subjectivity has to be also accounted for as an autopoietic and self-referential 
creation in itself, which, in turn, pulverizes Fischer-Lichte’s notion of co-
dependence.   
 
In relation to this autopoietic understanding of subjectivity as a system, Bains 
explains that the subject is internal to a world of immanence – as noted in 
chapter one, the plane of immanence is a complex system that incorporates 
both the subject as a system and the worldly structures as a system. Bains 
writes, ‘a self-referential, autopoietic immanence that is not immanent to 
something (as to a purely ideal transcendent ego-onto-theological plane or 
Subject/Eye) but rather an autopoietic or self-producing/positing immanence 
of subjectivity’ (Bains, 2002: 102). This is a process of the realization of the 
subject’s autonomy that can be grasped as ‘an event that is in-itself and for-
itself, and not as for its aspects in the essence of another such occasion’ 
(Whitehead in Bains, 2002: 102). For Bains, the subject can be only 
understood as part of ‘an autopoietic event [that] has an endo-consistency 
that is lacking in a vortex or dissipative structure defined only by its relational 
flows within the surrounding medium’ (Bains, 2002: 102).  
 
Also, regarding the intrinsic relationship between autopoiesis and the 
production of subjectivity, Alberto Toscano (2006) explains that there is no 
individuation happening apart from an environment. In this way, both 
environment and individual are co-individuated as a constant “double” self-
positing. In Toscano’s sense, the internal relation between the pre-individual – 
the given – and the individual is constantly renewed by its ongoing self-
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positing individuation (Toscano, 2006: 140). Seen thus, Toscano’s reading of 
autopoiesis specifically regarding the production of subjectivity becomes more 
useful than Fischer-Lichte’s discussions of subjectivity within the co-
dependence of the feedback loop to explain the proposed radical intricacies of 
the intermedial dramaturgy. From this perspective, the individual’s identity is a 
complexity that amalgamates both the human and non-human through the 
dynamics of autopoiesis.  
 
Furthermore, the individual, for Toscano, must be thought of as an event – 
rather than as a fixed entity – of ongoing processes within the system as a 
complex network of relations. As Toscano puts it,  
[if] we consider individuals themselves as … relational nodes, 
as opposed to discrete atomized entities, we can see how 
their potentiality, while constrained by relation, can never be 
delimited. In other words, potentiality cannot be removed from 
the becoming of relations. (Toscano, 2006: 128)  
 
In short, individuals, for Toscano, are not to be thought of in isolation, but as 
developing in a vast field of inter-relations, from which they emerge as a local 
point within the relational continuum. In this sense, the process of 
individuation is emergent to the becoming of the situated activity, as in 
Hendriks-Jansen. Most importantly, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that our 
subjectivity is a ‘product, produced as nothing more than a part alongside 
other parts which it neither unifies nor totalizes’ (Deleuze and Guattari in 
Roberts, 2006: 197). The self is a whole that unifies and emerges, 
differentiating itself from parts, becoming a plurality that experiences itself as 
a unity, a differential continuous multiplicity that fuses the collection of parts 
into one – from this perspective, for instance, the self can be conceived as the 
synthesizing of all the experiences that the tasks in DOF bring forth.91 
                                                        
91 In Deleuze and Sex, Frida Beckman (2011) explains that, in equating the given with the 
subject, Deleuze uses the metaphor of the orchid and the wasp. Deleuze explains that in the 
relationship between the wasp and orchid, their interaction and interconnectivity, each is 
involved in a systematic network of becoming. The wasp becomes the orchid as the orchid 
becomes the wasp. In interacting with each other, a fundamental encounter and exchange 
takes place, but this is also an encounter in which each other’s codes become entangled. The 
connectivity of the eco-biological codes blurs and a multiplicity of connections appears. As 
with the orchid and the wasp, the performance subject and the performance itself are co-
dependent and generated at the moment of the execution of the event. 
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Moreover, the self as a system can be thought of as the one encompassing 
differential multiplicities, where the organization and combination of the many 
form the unity of the system. Viewed in this way, the process of producing 
subjectivity radically engages in mereotopological relations, imbued in the 
complex flow experience that, in this instance, the dramaturgies of Blast 
Theory enable.  
 
The organization of the many is what Deleuze and Parnet (2002) refer to as 
‘the state of things’, understood as ‘neither totalities nor singularities but 
multiplicities’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: vii). As multiplicities, the state of 
things is relational rather than a sum of substantial entities. In this context, 
Brott writes, ‘for Deleuze, the world is composed of so many singularities 
[forming multiplicities], which together resonate silently towards a mystery of 
something always already yet to come’ (Brott, 2011: 1). The analysis of 
multiple relations leads to the creation of the new, experimentation and the 
construction of novel concepts – the new as a dynamic field of forces that 
combine to create immanent planes of composition. In this sense, it is through 
these dynamic creative and compositional forces that multiple spatio-temporal 
narrative boundaries are crossed always at the limit of the experience, hence, 
creating the new – an aspect that, as discussed throughout the case studies, 
the work of Blast Theory radically stresses.  
 
Such a limit-experience is equivalent, for Deleuze, to becoming-other in the 
process of individuation – ‘the other in me’ (Deleuze, 1988: 98). Applying 
Deleuzian thought to the intermedial subject, the other is not meant to be 
grasped here as an othered “other”, as deconstruction backgrounds suggest, 
nor is it a Lacanian mirror, as Dixon (2003) discusses in his proposals 
regarding intermedial subjectivity. Instead, it is a moving horizon within 
intermedial narrative exchanges and becoming towards a new creative 
dramaturgical exchange (see Braidotti, 2000). From this perspective, this 
constantly moving intermedial subject – as a nomad – is neither about fixed 
representation, nor recognition of pre-established dramaturgical structures, 
but rather is about affects, expressions and knowledge-making choices 
activated throughout the narrative actualizations of praxical intermedial 
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dramaturgies. In this sense, the work of Blast Theory aptly optimizes the 
speed and intensity of engagement at which the intermedial subject moves 
because the artwork is in a constant manner of performative nomadic 
transformation, as seen, for example, in the discussed fragment of Something 
American. In dealing with the newness of each intermedial plane of 
composition, the nomad intermedial subject radically activates his own 
producing processes of subjectivity because he needs to create new concepts 
and new knowledge, interpret the given and self-reflect on the aesthetic 
experiences, whilst responding to and executing the dramaturgical attending 
intermedial variables; that is, his identity is being autopoietically created at the 
same time as the response is performatively activated – a life in constant 
processes of execution. 
 
Here, following Deleuze, we do not presuppose a static identity, but one that 
is produced in the process of individuation, which is always already collective; 
that is, made of multiplicities. As a multiplicity, the identity of the intermedial 
subject can be also considered as relational. Unfolding through these 
relational processes of subjectivity formation, the intermedial subject draws 
from a multiplicity of connecting and conflicting given dramaturgical 
experiences, such as the narrative tasks in DOF and the temporal multiplicity 
in 10 Backwards, constituting immanent consistency within an immanent 
plane of composition. In this sense, the intermedial subject is pragmatic and 
always in a process of movement, as a nomad, to become-other.92 The 
intermedial subject, in a process of becoming-other, is open to a myriad of 
dynamic, intellectual, affective and intensive forces that manifest in 
dramaturgically mediated encounters and diverse dramaturgical assemblages 
such as the moment in which Niki in 10 Backwards is engulfed in a world of 
                                                        
92 In the context of process philosophy, Brian Massumi (2011) discusses how the term 
pragmatic ‘doesn’t mean practical as opposed to speculative or theoretical. It is a synonym for 
composition: “how” processual differentials eventfully play out as co-composing formative 
forces. This pragmatic playing out is always speculative in the sense of what will come out of 
the process is to some degree an open question until its “final characterization” of itself at its 
point of culmination. En route, it is speculatively anticipating what it will have been. That 
speculation is entirely active. It is the “how” of the experience getting where it’s ultimately 
going with itself. The co-composing of formative forces constitutes in each exercise of 
experience a novel power of existence: a power to become’ (Massumi, 2011: 12).  
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temporal loops and repetitions while engaging with both screens at the same 
time. The thinking the intermedial subject produces over a background of 
affects is both experimental and experiential.  
 
Deleuzian subjectivity is always collective; that is, multi-vocal. Nonetheless, at 
the ontological level it indicates the univocity of Being. Individuation, for 
Deleuze, ‘has little to do with any [pre-given and fixed] subject. Rather, it is to 
do with an electric and magnetic field, an individuation taking place through 
intensities … it’s to do with individuated fields, not [pre-established] identities’ 
(Deleuze, 1995: 98). In this sense, subjectivity manifests itself by one’s 
becoming capable of expressing oneself so as ‘to bring something to life, to 
free life from where it’s trapped … for doing so [is] something unstable, [and] 
always heterogeneous’ (Deleuze, 1995: 141). Drawing on this, we can 
propose that in the fundamental intra-active encounter between the outside 
and the inside, individuation is produced. The process of individuation may be 
described by a transfer function, the outcome of which is the emergence of 
the new. This transfer takes place at the moment of the experiential limit and 
its mode is the in-between such as, for instance, the activation of the tasks in 
DOF.  
 
The process of subject-formation, or individuation, depends on the dynamics 
of unfolding. ‘Being as fold’ (Deleuze, 1998: 110) is to be understood as the 
process that unites the outside (the-pre-individual) and the inside (the 
individual) as a ‘feedback loop’ (of processes of individuation as an event) 
(Deleuze, 1995: 139). In other words, this conceptualization of the feedback 
loop does not see the outside and the inside as different, but as a constructive 
process of world-subject unfolding making, where the given (the pre-
individual) and thought (the individual) are constructed in a process that tends 
towards novelty in a constant process of self-positing. The constant folding 
and unfolding in the process of individuation brings forth novelty and presents 
‘life as a work of art’ (Deleuze, 1995: 94).  
 
Here, there is no return to the “already-constituted” Kantian transcendental 
subject that attends to a given experience and makes sense of it. Instead, the 
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radical invention and creation of new possibilities of life are intra-actively 
mediated by means of going beyond from the “already-established” to the 
“about-to-be-established” to the potential “will-have-been-established”, hence, 
stressing his relational differentiality. For Deleuze, the world is folded and as 
such,  
There is no subject, but a production of subjectivity: 
subjectivity has to be produced, when its time arrives … The 
time comes once we’ve worked through knowledge … [to 
work towards new knowledge] is that work that forces us to 
frame a new question … [that] couldn’t have been framed 
before. (Deleuze, 1995: 112-114) 
 
What is implicated in the fold is the process of becoming-other. As in the 
dramaturgical assemblages of Blast Theory’s work, this is a process that 
involves complication; that is, a new level of organization in a complex system 
where the actual and the virtual give position for a new possibility of 
becoming. In this sense, the dynamics of individuation describe a process of 
complex synthesis, which is always happening in the middle and ‘tending-
towards’ (Manning, 2013a: 2) of the next process. Deleuze highlights that this 
process of becoming-other is bound to collective assemblages as multiplicity, 
difference and repetition.  
 
From this becoming-other perspective, we can suggest that the intermedial 
subject is a transitive process of self-realization as an activating process in 
which each occasion performatively feeds into the next occasion in a process 
of continuity of becoming. In Process and Reality, Whitehead (1929) makes 
clear that an actual entity is an act of experience as conscious transitions in 
univocity. It is this univocity, he explains, that bridges the conscious 
experience of an actual occasion and the full variety of events that compose 
the universe; univocity brings the actual occasions into enduring forms of 
order. Here, there is no ephemeral erasure; rather, there is univocity in the 
making. Through this act the subject becomes itself through the conjunctive 
synthesis of many things that are other than itself. This is a constant process 
of production of subjectivity with a clear temporal connotation of being 
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instantaneous through processes of experimentation.93 In this sense, each 
task in DOF; Niki, trying to understand her identity in 10 Backwards; an all the 
different modes of articulations in the monologues and dance sequences in 
Something American place the participant subject in a process of affective, 
knowledge-making and performative experimentation that enable the process 
of his own production of subjectivity. 
 
In relation to the above-mentioned experimentation through creativity, this 
thesis argues that the onto-epistemic intermedial subject incorporates aspects 
of learning; corporeal literacies as multiple literacies; heuristic self-reflection 
as a constitutive part of the execution of the event; and a sense of collective 
identity. The intermedial subject also explores active hermeneutic 
interpretations, not understood here in the classical sense as exegesis but as 
active hermeneutics afforded from within. In this manner, the onto-epistemic 
intermedial subject becomes transcendental and shows unity. In what follows, 
we will explain why. 
 
2. The Intermedial Subject as a Learner: Hermeneutics, 
Multiple Literacies, Learning, and Affect. 
 
This section interrogates the self-reflexive and heuristic-hermeneutic aspect of 
the proposed notion of intermedial subjectivity. If Chiel Kattenbelt (2010) 
explains that self-reference and self-reflexivity ‘are not only characteristics of 
the [intermedial] performance itself, however, but also of the perceiver who 
assumes the position of the spectator, of the audience … which is made 
perceivable through engagement with the aesthetic object’ (Kattenbelt, 2010: 
                                                        
93 Keith Robinson (2010) suggests, ‘Deleuze theorizes an evanescing subject that disappears 
behind the vanishing point of human experience; Whitehead constructs an expanded or 
extended subject that enlarges the human experience beyond itself. Deleuze seeks the non-
human becomings in the human whereas Whitehead looks for humanlike becomings in the 
non-human … Deleuze finds the non-organic in the organic and Whitehead looks for traces of 
the organic in the inorganic’ (Robinson, 2010: 123). In this context, Robinson explains that in 
a process of self-formation and individualization, the subject is the actualized product of an 
individuating genesis – a genesis that is the complete expression ‘of the two functions of the 
subject: both to universalize and to individuate’ (Robinson, 2010: 123). In this manner, ‘the 
individual for Deleuze becomes contemporaneous with its individualization’ (Robinson, 2010: 
123).  
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32-33); and if, as he goes on, ‘I ultimately consider intermediality mainly in 
terms of staging the arts for the sake of self-reference and self-reflexivity’ 
(Kattenbelt, 2010: 37), the description of intermedial subjectivity in relation to 
self-reflexivity as a manner of staging the performance transaction and as an 
attending subject to an aesthetic object that hermeneutically reflects on both 
the staging and on himself does only offer a partial account of the way in 
which the intermedial subject, particularly stressed in Blast Theory’s 
dramaturgies, engages with self-reflexive processes.   
 
In relation to self-reflexivity, this research proposes that when the intermedial 
discourse speaks of self-reflexivity and hermeneutic interpretation, notions of 
interpretative reading should be understood in relation to an active 
engagement with multiple literacies. In this sense, the active hermeneutics 
implied here during the execution of the event may not mean ‘exegesis’ in the 
classical sense of the hermeneutical interpretation of texts, but in relation to 
the affective and knowledge-making dimensions of the generative frames. In 
this sense, hermeneutical processes are radically afforded from within. 
 
Described as an evental dialogue, the intermedial text and the participating 
subject co-constitute each other as a process of constructive aesthetic 
actualizations. Each actualization raises a new question, unfolds a new 
horizon, takes a new shape, and assumes a new position.94 In this way, the 
intermedial subject is opened to a process of deterritorialization in which 
learning; active hermeneutic processes; and heuristic self-reflexivity take 
place through creativity. Because the subject is immersed in a haptic 
dramaturgical environment of affective dimensions, particularly emphasized in 
the work of Blast Theory, the fluidity of the performative engagement, in its 
generative aspect, is highlighted. 
 
                                                        
94 From this point of view, the conceptualization of the intermedial subject can be also 
described within the parameters explored by the critical background of new materialism (see 
Dolphijn and van der Tuin, 2012).   
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2.1. The Intermedial Subject: Learning as Engaging with 
Multiple Literacies.  
 
Creatively and constructively invested in a dramaturgical world that functions 
as an origami, the intermedial subject, in its continuous passage from fold to 
fold is engaged in, within and through dramaturgical orchestrations. In doing 
so, intelligibility and knowledge-making arise out of each intra-active 
fundamental encounter, out of each creative and performative aesthetic 
composition where ‘the forces of thought’95 (Portanova, 2008a: 2) activate, 
overcoming ‘the dichotomy between concrete production and abstract thinking 
…  that thought (as a generative matrix of creation) is not conceived by, but is 
in and of the [participating subject]’ (Portanova, 2008a: 2). In relation to 
Deleuzian critical backgrounds, Stamina Portanova (2008a) explains that 
Deleuze’s understanding of the thinking subject is,  
intended not as the phenomenological subject manipulating, 
rationalizing and dominating an external world, but as a 
“processual entity that transforms and is transformed by the 
relational sensing matrices it instantiates through its 
movements” [Manning, 2008]. In other words, thought can 
only be generated in the … creating and being created 
elastically, folding and being folded by its environment. 
(Portanova, 2008a: 2)  
 
Drawing on this theoretical position, we can describe thought and thought-
making as movement in and through creative and becoming changes. 
Thought as becoming-other thought; ideas as generated at the moment of 
creative practice – at the creative moment of violent disruption, in Deleuze’s 
terms, which calls for a new creative engagement; for a new idea to be 
formed; for a new concept to be applied; for a new solution; and for a new 
                                                        
95 For Deleuze, the engagement with the experiential process is that which makes us think – 
that which ‘forces thought’ (Deleuze, 1994: 135-139). For Deleuze, thought is the product of 
what he calls a ‘fundamental encounter’ (Deleuze, 1994: 139) – not a product of language. He 
posits that something in the experiential encounter: ‘forces us to think. This something is an 
object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered may be 
Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective tones: wonder, love, 
hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary characteristic is that it can only be sensed. In 
this sense it is opposed to recognition’ (Deleuze, 1994: 139). In this regard, the fundamental 
encounter is the creation of the new – as opposed to recognition.  
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position within the point of view the subject is.96 Here, we highlight the 
creation of thought as thinking-in-practice emerging from within in the 
heterogeneity of germinal forms of thinking and attuning of the mutually 
composed activities that capture the learning and knowledge-making 
processes that are being applied, as seen in DOF, for instance. The emerging 
of new learning and thought cannot be separated, we argue, from the evolving 
dynamics of the dramaturgical scaffolding. To quote Hendriks-Jansen in 
relation to the emergence of thought,  
The notion that thought is given a structure before it is 
actually executed, that it must exist in some predefined form 
prior to actually being thought … we feel that structure cannot 
simply emerge, that it has to be specified before it actually 
happens. But intricate structures cannot simply emerge in 
nature without the need for an explicit plan, and it emerges 
also in our thoughts. (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996: 338) 
 
In this sense, the creation of thought, its application and learning develops, 
builds up and structures itself as the edifying of a scaffolding. The learner’s 
lived experience and acquired knowledge recognizes the context-dependent 
features, tasks and objectives and is able to modify knowledge and 
performatively activate the increasing complexity of the emergent context, 
developing the practicality and pragmatics of each experience into knowledge.  
 
In this sense, thought, we claim, is haptic thinking; that is, the thinking-in-
process activates the whole human sensorium producing affectual reactions 
that help model the yet-to-come structures of potential learning. Thinking finds 
itself in the fold of the experience relationally activating the potential for new 
thinking and affording itself a variety of executing modalities, folded 
backwards and forwards in the spatial and temporal experiences of its own 
creating – as Brian Massumi (2002) says: ‘anything that varies in some way 
carries the continuities of its variation’ (Massumi, 2002: 201).  
 
                                                        
96 For Deleuze, the subject does not have a point of view to observe and make sense of in an 
outside world, but is a point of view in, through and across an emergent subject-world territory 
– or cartography, as he sometimes puts it.   
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The creation of concepts is itself experimentation with thinking within each 
new dramaturgical occasion, constructing topological modulations of space, 
multiple orchestrations of time, and mereotopological narrative structures. 
Consequently, in conceptualizing the intermedial production of subjectivity 
from a constructivist aesthetic, grasped within a Deleuzian reading of vitalism, 
the intermedial subject’s thinking can be categorized as both grounded and 
flowing and, thus, transcends the very dramaturgical intermedial variables 
which structure it (whilst structuring themselves). As with the attending 
dramaturgical variables in intermediality, the thinking process of the 
intermedial subject is multi-functional and complex – as seen throughout the 
case studies and highlighted in the work of Blast Theory – and must be 
understood in terms of flows and intensities between affect and concept-
making.  
 
This thinking-in-practice is, as pedagogical theory describes, active learning in 
process. Active learning process, roughly defined, challenges conventional 
thinking regarding learning as imparted by a master to a learner. Instead, it 
places the processes of learning in the midst of experiential processes. In this 
context of purposeful experiencing, David George (1996) discusses how, 
The term experience is crucial … the traditional task of 
making sense is then replaced by unique experiences, which 
are both cognitive operations and forms of emotions. The 
word experience derives etymologically from the French “to 
put to test”. Experience is an experiment. (George in Nelson, 
2006: 111)  
 
Most importantly, it places learners as reflective practitioners/executers. As 
Gillie Bolton describes, ‘reflective practice is positioned firmly as a dynamic 
developmental process … it clearly delineates processes of critical reflection 
upon the forms, values and ethics of … structures … [it] result[s] in radical 
movements for change’ (Bolton, 2005, 1). Furthermore,  
reflective practice is learning and developing through the 
examining of what we think happened on any occasion, and 
how we think others perceived the event and us, opening our 
practice to scrutiny by others … reflexivity is finding strategies 
for looking at our own thought processes, values, prejudices 
and habitual actions, as if we were onlookers. (Bolton, 2005: 
7)  
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In short, learners are involved in action learning processes. The pedagogs 
Chris Argyris and Donald Schon (1974) describe these types of learning as, 
Action learning is a continuous process of learning and 
reflection that happens with the support of the group or ‘set’ of 
colleagues, working on real issues with the intention of getting 
things done. The voluntary participants in the group or ‘set’ 
learn with and from each other and take forward an important 
issue with the support of the other members of the set. The 
collaborative process, which recognizes set member’s social 
context, helps people to take an active stance towards life, 
helps overcome the tendency to be passive towards the 
pressures of life and work, and aims to benefit both the 
organization and the individual. (Argyris and Schon in McGill 
and Brockbank, 2004: 185)  
The learner is invested in a process of reflection in action, a process wherein 
the participant is never sure of what it is that one thinks until those thoughts 
are transported into a mode of creation and execution. As Ian McGill and 
Anne Brockbank (2004) describe, ‘action learning builds on the relationship 
between reflection and action. Learning by experience involves reflection. i.e. 
reconsidering past events, making sense of our actions and possibly finding 
new ways of behaving at future events’ (McGill and Brockbank, 2004: 12). In 
doing so, the learners ‘confront the challenge to think about how they make 
judgments; choose criteria which are of relevance to them, when judging the 
quality of their own work; [and] think about the strengths and weaknesses of 
their work in relation to these criteria’ (Cowan, 2006: 25). 
Learning as active-self-reflection can be also understood as both processes of 
heuristic-epistemic learning and processes of self-development and 
learning.97 Moreover, the learner, in activating reflexivity through active 
practice,  
                                                        
97 Heuristic epistemology appears as a distinct approach to epistemology in order to 
interrogate an epistemic process of enquiry. Malcolm Armstrong (2008) explains heuristic 
epistemology as a methodology to describe and interpret what we think about a phenomenon 
and how we think about it. Heuristic epistemology can be explained as more than an 
epistemological rational approach to a given enquiry. Armstrong fittingly explains that 
knowledge is not simply arrived at via ratiocination. Plainly, knowledge and knowing are equal 
parts of the equation. Armstrong writes, ‘heuristic epistemology appears as an approach to 
epistemology that is independent of any worldview, a priori category or concept. It acts, 
rather, as a handmaiden for epistemology … [heuristic epistemology] functions as an aid in 
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involves [himself] not only [in] a focus of the validation of data 
and outcomes, but also the positioning of oneself in relation to 
other fields in order to reveal the character and source of 
one’s interest … As a result of this reflexive process, [practice 
and knowledge] are necessarily emergent … rather than 
remaining fixed throughout the process of enquiry … The 
juxtaposing of disparate objects and ideas has, after all, often 
been viewed as an intrinsic aspect of creativity … [which, in 
turn,] creates conditions for the emergence of new analogies, 
metaphors and models for understanding objects of enquiry. 
(Barret and Bolt, 2010: 6-7) 
Drawing on all these pedagogical positions, we suggest that navigating across 
and within Blast Theory’s intermedial environments, the intermedial subject 
actively learns as thought is being created and concepts are being applied in 
intellectual, pragmatic, and affective manners. Involved in the radical 
dramaturgies of Blast Theory, the intermedial subject is thought in movement, 
where, drawing on Deleuze, practicality, intelligibility, expressivity, vivacity and 
imagination are always at the limit of new critical and intellectual 
compositional possibilities (see Manning, 2008).98 Whether deciphering the 
spatio-temporal orchestrations of Something American and 10 Backwards, or 
making sense of the activation of the tasks in the narrative processes of DOF, 
the intermedial subject thinks thought and makes concepts generatively 
during the execution of the event, engaging in a constructive aesthetic as ‘the 
art of forming, inventing and fabricating concepts’, encompassing affects and 
connectivity where each new activation is a field of affect and thought 
                                                                                                                                                              
the quest to know by installing a desire for authenticity, empathy and appropriation’ 
(Armstrong, 2008: 6). In this sense, it can be inferred that heuristic epistemology adds 
knowledge appropriation (and the process of appropriation) to ratiocination: the process of 
doing the knowing – the known (the “what”) and the process of knowing (the “how”) as 
equivalent and concurrent.  
 
98 In Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Deleuze (1984) offers a detailed account of the role of the 
imagination in relation to concept-making processes. For Deleuze, imagination is a synthesis 
of time within life’s immanent creative powers. This position contradicts Kant’s primacy of the 
understanding in the categorical imperative of the First Critique and the application of the 
faculties of reason of the Second Critique. Moreover, Deleuze’s understanding of the role of 
the imagination problematizes Kant’s positioning of aesthetic judgment and the aesthetic 
sublime of the Third Critique. In Kant, Deleuze and Architectonics, Edward Willat (2010) 
offers a thorough and comprehensive discussion of Kant and Deleuze’s understanding of the 
role of the imagination in relation to the Deleuzian virtual-actual and the Kantian categorical 
imperative.  
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(Deleuze and Guattari in Portanova, 2008a: 4).99 From this perspective, the 
making of thought is active and interested aesthetic practice. The 
dramaturgical orchestrations that we have examined here help us see how 
one activated and learnt thought is the seed for future thinking through the 
constant performative transitions between the phases of the event and the 
affective intensities of the dramaturgical scaffolding where ‘the elucidating of 
the immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought; and the 
starting point for thought is the analytic observation of the components of the 
experience’, giving way to new situational demands for new learning 
(Whitehead, 1979: 4). Viewed in this way, we can discuss, following Hendriks-
Jansen, that the emergence of human behaviour and knowledge is intrinsic to 
the realization of process of constructive scaffolding between the worldly 
structures and the human subject as effective and operating co-composing. 
As he states,  
Human behaviour is affected by the emergent concepts that 
result from our typically human patterns of interaction … It is 
shaped, deflected and integrated by such concepts in the 
sense that a person who has acquired a particular concept 
will be capable of acting in ways that she could not have 
acted before. (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996: 316) 
 
Taking from this definition, we suggest that the intermedial subject’s 
behaviour develops through the activation of learning processes in the 
performative and transitional mechanisms of vitalism, catalysing relational 
variations that are executed as life in motion. Seen thus, his learning, thinking 
and behaviour adhere to a direct set of aims and principles within the 
complexity and the prevalence of the thinking-feeling occurring across the 
making and activating, and capture the co-existing realities of the emotionally 
complex and the intellectually intriguing, as seen, for instance, in the analyzed 
section of Something American when the dramaturgical changes move very 
rapidly. In this context of constant creative and dynamic dramaturgical 
variations, the intermedial subject can be also understood as being open to 
                                                        
99 Stamina Portanova (2008a) fittingly describes, ‘Having lost its primacy as a pre-determined 
source of thought, subjectivity becomes a comprehensive force which can recognize and 
define (or conceptualize itself) as a thinking subject (a sufficient reason for thought to develop 
itself) only after including an event as its predicate in this case, an event of an idea crossing 
the body, the event of forces thinking in it)’ (Portanova, 2008a: 5). 
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development. In its creative characteristic, the intermedial subject overcomes 
the spatio-temporal narrative “difficulties” of each performative activation – as 
seen in DOF, for instance – by applying knowledge, learnt habits and 
explored skills; applications that are always in motion and open to new 
creations. Bluntly, learning is the changing process of producing subjectivity – 
the movement happening between, at the interstice of consolidation and 
development. 
 
In Mapping Intermediality in Performance, Nelson (2010) applies notions of 
corporeal literacy to the ‘experiencer’. In the same book, Maaike Bleeker, 
describes how ‘corporeal literacy points to the bodily character of these 
perceptual, cognitive practices and draws attention to the relationship 
between bodily practices and modes of thinking commonly associated with 
the mind’ (Bleeker, 2010: 40). Although this thesis fully agrees with their 
proposals, we find that the notion of corporeal literacy offers only a partial 
view when applied to the problem of accounting for the way in which the 
intermedial subject engages in learning through intermedial praxis, 
particularly, in the intermedial work of the kind found in Blast Theory. The 
‘experiencer’, or creative exegete, engages, we suggest, in a process of 
multiple literacies, as each performance unfolds. 
 
The notion of corporeal literacy can be also given a Deleuzian spin. The 
concept of literacy has been much debated and has come to broadly mean 
reading, writing, speaking and listening – as Bleeker fittingly points out. As 
such, this term has been extensively explored in pedagogical and educational 
backgrounds. This is not the way in which literacy should be understood in 
this research. A Deleuzian perspective is more in line with notions explored in 
multiple literacies theory. For instance, multiple literacies theory posits 
multiplicity and the relation between the different elements that enter into the 
learning process as a performative “doing” at the very heart of its 
conceptualizations. Seen thus, multiple literacies theory can be also grasped 
from a mereotopological perspective.  
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In the context of Deleuzian philosophy, Diana Masny and David Cole (2009) 
explain that ‘the critical notion of his thinking through multiplicity comes when 
he expands the notion of quantitative multiplicities to include qualitative 
multiplicities … [in order to] establish differences in nature’ (Masny and Cole, 
2009: 2). They define multiple literacy theory as, 
a framework and lens for understanding empirical evidence 
that consists of words, gestures, attitudes, speaking, writing 
and valuing … and ultimately examines the processes and 
manners in which these literate behaviours come together 
through becoming with the world. (Masny and Cole, 2009: 6) 
 
Moreover, they note that it is important to differentiate between multiliteracies 
and multiple literacies theory. In relation to multiliteracies, Masny and Cole 
write,  
at the heart of the multiliteracies framework is a concern for 
design, and a specific focus on designing social features … 
This central conception of design in multiliteracies may be 
built upon and makes up the multimodality of textual use – 
that includes gestural, spatial, audio, visual and linguistic 
meaning. (Masny and Cole, 2009: 4)  
 
In articulating these modalities, a sense of social experience is substantially 
important – this would include aspects such as the use of SMS messaging 
and social media and Internet sites. Masny and Cole argue that multiliteracies 
are philosophically based in phenomenology, whereas multiple literacies 
theory is based in transcendental empiricism. Masny and Cole further explain,  
the multiliteracies framework argues that the social agenda 
for literacy should be in experience. Multiple literacies theory 
would counter that the social agenda of literacy is in the many 
aspects of life that flow through the subject and that constitute 
memories, desire and mind. As such, experience is extremely 
difficult to render a stable category when examining exactly 
what aspects of life determine literacy. (Masny and Cole, 
2009: 4) 
 
If multiliteracies encourage communities of learners through design and 
experience, multiple literacies theory, they explain, promotes learning as 
action and creativity emphasizing the performative and creative flows that 
include non-lineal modes of learning. Masny and Cole explain that multiple 
literacies theory shifts the focus from organized learning to random collisions 
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of affects that work through local and pre-existing knowledge to produce, 
paraphrasing Deleuze (1995), moments of inspiration, experimentation, 
critique and art – a definition perfectly in line with the narrative articulations of 
DOF because of the discussed creative aspects of narrative construction 
(Masny and Cole, 2009: 4-6).  
 
Given this context, difference and multiplicity become vital in the learning 
process occurring within the radical dramaturgies of Blast Theory. Further, 
multiple literacies theory performatively constitutes text – text understood 
within this critical position in its broadest sense and including performance – 
as a dynamic and differential process: learning and text are immanent to the 
learning process. For example, in DOF, the execution of each task is not pre-
planned; the narrative task and the learning that accompanies it emerge at the 
moment of the execution. As such, the engaged and invested intermedial 
subject learns and creates concepts at the same time that learning “the 
problem” is encountered and engaged with and the possible “solution” 
activated. In this sense, learning is the creation of the new. The intermedial 
subject, in this sense, explores an ontogenetic learning manner; heuristic-
epistemically reflects on the process and on himself through the active 
compositional activations; and moves the learning forward. In short, the 
learning epistemic subject is always at the threshold of becoming more 
literate, constantly aggregating learnt skills and praxical habits and open to 
other learning influences.100 Most importantly here, from the perspective of 
multiple literacies, the intermedial subject is immersed in mereotopological 
learning processes; that is, learning is not considered as a linear process. 
Instead, learning unfolds through fields of multiplicities and potentialities in 
which each learnt fragment correlates with a pool of learnt resources and 
skills. Such a correlation highlights learning as an operative system, in which 
                                                        
100 The concept of ‘habit’ presents a myriad of describing possibilities in both Deleuze and 
Whitehead. In general, the concept incorporates notions of temporality and memory (Deleuze 
being influenced by Bergson), practical skills, and acquired practical and critical knowledge. 
Also, both Deleuze and Whitehead see habits in relation to ethics and politics. Habits, for 
Deleuze, are also processes of bodily desire and sexuality. For Deleuze and Guattari, habits 
are formed at the heart of social milieus. Whitehead discusses the term in relation to 
processes of repetition, intentionality and prehensions. Finally, for Deleuze, habits are also 
affects and expressions in-themselves and for-themselves.  
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the systematic constituent elements such as the dramaturgical parameters 
and the different levels of collaboration between the participating subjects are 
integrated. The operational manner of this system can be discussed as a 
constructive alignment; that is, a functional and operative scaffolding, 
intertwining thinking-as-doing and learning-as-reflecting.  
 
Within the context of multiple literacies as performative interactions self-
reflectively executed in flows, the possibilities of categorizing these flows as 
learning become viable. Anna Cutler and Iain MacKenzie (2011) describe how 
a section of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition considers what is involved in 
learning to swim. For Deleuze, they explain, learning to swim is not a passive 
process in which knowledge is received from an expert. Rather, learning to 
swim is a process that requires the full engagement of the learning subject 
with the body of water. If we have seen that the Deleuzian subject is made out 
of a series of differential relations, the body of water shares the same 
characteristics. Both are composed of particular variations within a system of 
relations encompassing subject and water. Deleuze develops this further. He 
explains that in learning the body of the subject-learner, the body of water and 
the body of knowledge of how to swim are indistinguishable; they form a trinity 
(Cutler and MacKenzie, 2011: 53-54). Simply, knowledge is not superior to 
learning. Learning to swim is the formation of bodily habits and in the activity 
of learning we form knowledge of our bodies, our capacities and ourselves, 
Cutler and MacKenzie explain. This self-reflexive and practical knowledge, 
subsequently, becomes conscious to us as a body of learning language that 
can be reapplied if needed.101 In this learning sense, the intermedial subject is 
pragmatic, self-reflective and engages in constant processes of heuristic-
epistemic learning and personal development. Each aesthetic activation is a 
                                                        
101 The Deleuzian perspective moves away from Kantian conceptualizations of the knowing 
subject, whose synthesizing activity makes him knowing and transcending the world. Cutler 
and MacKenzie (2011) explain how Deleuze argues that ‘we must not conceptualize human 
learning as the activity of a subject but the subject as the result of a process of learning that is 
in itself characterized by passivity: the passive synthesis of the sensible’ (Cutler and 
MacKenzie, 2011: 57). The relationship of these three bodies is one of co-emergence, not 
one of hierarchy. Co-emergence is what Deleuze terms, in relation to learning ‘forms of 
thought or creation’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 208). As such, learning becomes an active 
engagement, but one that does not reinstate the primacy of the knowing subject; it links the 
emergence of the learning experience and the learning subject as co-emergent. 
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learned experience; a new concept activated. Each one is a self-reflexive 
moment. Each activation is a lesson learnt about life.  
 
2.2. The Intermedial Subject: The Affective Dimension. 
 
Engaged in the constructive characteristic of the generative frames, the 
creative intermedial subject utilizes affectivity to connect with the analogue 
and digital processes of spatio-temporal narrative creation, which serve as a 
catalyst – as an affective medium – for processes of individuation as a 
response to the performative choices in constructing and structuring a 
narrative solution to the problematic posed by each plane of composition. In 
the work of Blast Theory, the intermedial subject confronts the experiential 
given and has to find creative solutions for it. For instance, an SMS narrative-
making task in DOF, or a multiplicity of relational configurations in Something 
American, in its intensifying moments of dramaturgical unfolding affectively 
maximize the triadic execution’s forces of relation and the mediated fielding of 
affective thresholds. Such works intensify the affective attending force as a 
vehicle for the construction of intra-active mediality, enabling affective 
reaction, and, in turn, generating new hermeneutic interpretations and 
concept-making, and, therefore, showing the radical potential of Blast 
Theory’s intermedial dramaturgies.  
 
The dynamic intermedial subject suggested in this thesis is enabled by 
dramaturgical complexity in its formation, which is defined by the capacity of 
the subject ‘to affect and be affected’ (Deleuze, 1987: xvi). In this sense, the 
production of intermedial subjectivity is based on the autonomy of affect and 
processes of being affected by the multiplicity of a creative and constructive 
experience (see Massumi, 1996). As Rosi Braidotti (2000) explains in relation 
to the philosophical link between being affected and subjectivity, the subject 
is, 
rather an in-between: it is a folding-in of external influences 
and a simultaneously unfolding outwards of affects. A mobile 
entity … [that is] capable of lasting through sets of 
discontinuous variations, while remaining faithful to itself. 
(Braidotti, 2000: 159) 
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Also, as Simon O’Sullivan (2010) discusses in relation to Deleuze’s positions 
regarding affects, ‘[a]ffect names the intensive quality of life. The risings and 
fallings, the movement from one state of being to another, the becomings’ 
(O’Sullivan, 2010: 198). In the same context, Melissa Gregg and Gregory 
Seigworth (2010) explain, ‘affect is born in in-between-ness and resides as 
accumulative beside-ness … a supple incrementalism of ever-modulating 
force-relations’ (Gregg and Seigworth, 2010: 2). From these positions, we can 
extrapolate that affectivity must be grasped within the intermedial 
conceptualization proposed here as the “capacity of” creating, modifying and 
experiencing a dramaturgical radical aesthetic as an active and 
multidimensional creation. 
 
In The Affective Turn, Patricia Ticeneto Clough and Jean Halley (2007) also 
highlight how the concept of affect is central to the philosophy of Deleuze. 
Broadly, they explain how, for him, affect can be defined as a passage that 
only exists between the states it creates. In considering affect as an interface, 
a form of space and time is implied in the writings of Deleuze and Whitehead. 
For both, affect is treated as a ‘substrate of potential bodily responses, often 
autonomic responses, in excess of consciousness’ (Ticeneto Clough and 
Halley, 2007: 2). Having said this, affection is an effect that is not strictly 
limited to emotion or perception. Rather, as Ticeneto Clough and Halley 
explain, affects also imply a capacity for action, agency and engagement with 
any given experiential phenomena. In this context, Whitehead explains that 
through affectivity the human subject in its creative interaction with the world 
is in a constant flow of variation that combines the intellectual with the 
emotional. With this in mind, there is, this thesis argues, a clear sense 
between ideas and intelligibility and emotional reactions. Also, Ticeneto 
Clough and Halley explain that affect ‘constitutes a nonlinear complexity out of 
which the narration of conscious states such as emotions are subtracted’ 
(Ticeneto Clough and Halley, 2007: 2). In this understanding, affect is not only 
considered in terms of the human subject, but also in regards to the 
technologies that allow the affective capabilities of the subject – the intra-
active constructions. In this sense, affect ‘transverses the opposition of the 
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organic and the non-organic; it also inserts the technical into felt vitality’ 
(Ticeneto Clough and Halley, 2007: 2). The affective turn, they discuss, 
‘express[es] a new configuration of bodies, technology and matter’ in the 
constant engaging with the complexity of each given encounter (Ticeneto 
Clough and Halley, 2007: 2) . Furthermore, affect, according to them, makes 
‘an intensification of self-reflexivity (processes turning back on themselves to 
act on themselves) in information/communication systems including the 
human body’ (Ticeneto Clough and Halley, 2007: 3). As such, affect, as self-
reflexivity, becomes intrinsic to and, 
internal to these systems, an ongoing and readily available 
feature of their functioning, it is increasingly realized in 
feedback loops, which shoot off with varying speed, in 
multiple directions, and in multiple temporalities, emerging by 
chance out of control … [it] is at this time the condition of 
possibility. (Ticeneto Clough and Halley, 2007: 3) 
 
In this context, Blast Theory’s artworks enhance the potential modalities – 
texts, images, sounds, analogue and digital forms and even tactile qualities – 
in and through which each dramaturgical singular engagement – each 
generative frame – can be affectively realized, as a hypersurface, in a myriad 
of possible ways from the in-betweenness of the dramaturgical encounters to 
the movement of the planes of composition always in process rather than in 
punctual positions.  
 
From this perspective, affect, we argue, is radically mereotopological when 
activated in intermedial work. It expands in the openings of fields of 
potentiality as the virtual, enabling affective responses in the not-yet of the 
knowledge-making process. Affectivity is not understood here as linearity; 
rather it inhabits the landscape of the multiple and the differential where the 
capacities to affect and be affected constantly deterritorialize in the nomad 
space of the interval. Affect here is the topology of the always more-than-
human in the undulations shaped in the transitory forms of relation. 
Affectability is at the core of the conceptualization of dramaturgy we argue for 
here; it intersects and transverses the different planes of experiential 
composition through the entanglement of agential impacts. Affects call for 
responses, expressions and emotions. They emerge in the performative 
 288 
interactions of dramaturgical investment and afford from within the manifold 
processes of learning. Affectivity, as Mark Hansen (2006) proposes, becomes 
a vehicle: ‘affectivity as a potentially fruitful medium of the interface … [w]hat 
this means is that affectivity actualizes the potential’ (Hansen, 2006: 130). In 
this sense, affectivity apprehends the very entanglement of the intra-actions, 
their agential multi-modalities that bring about the capacities to become the 
medium of experience. Insofar as these affective forces emerge from the 
mediatized aspect of the intermedial event, the processes of creativity are 
imbued with affective correlations in the proprioceptive space of the mediated 
and mediatized interval.  
 
In the context of affectivity, Whitehead explains that ‘the basis of experience is 
emotional’ (Whitehead, 1933: 176). It is, for him, through emotions and 
questions regarding what is affecting us, that we can base an account of 
human experience.102 From this perspective, we can infer that Whitehead, in 
highlighting personal self-reflection and its affective capacity is also implying, 
although he never mentions it, a sense of learning and personal development.  
For Whitehead, Shaviro explains, affective reactions are both cognitive and 
immanent. Interestingly, he observes that on each prehension there is always 
some indeterminacy, which allows for a feeling-thinking to emerge; this is, 
broadly explained, how the thinking subject feels about experience, as a 
datum, that each actual occasion brings forth.   
 
Remarkably, this undefined margin for creation can be also read to imply a 
novel manner of creating thought and affectivity. Put slightly differently, 
novelty is a manner of affection-learning. In perceiving the datum, the subject 
executes novelty and renews himself. We have seen through the explorations 
and findings of the case studies that the datum in intermedial performance is 
one of multiplicity, expansion, and interfaces. From the temporal 
orchestrations of 10 Backwards, to the spatial intricacies of Something 
American, and the narrative web of DOF, the intermedial datum presents 
                                                        
102 Steven Shaviro (2009) explains that the Whiteheadian emphasis of feeling and affect 
leads Whitehead to a new account of subjectivity as ‘affect-laden’ (Shaviro, 2009: 47). This 
new account of subjectivity departs from the Kantian postulates of the First Critique. 
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clear spatio-temporal complexities bound into an unfolding unity through the 
dramaturgical radical structure. Complexities are articulated by the being-
affected, grasped as a process of becoming and connectivity, which 
articulates the human subjective experience as an influx of sense data in 
space and time, which for Whitehead, as Shaviro explains, are in themselves 
forms of affectivity. Drawing on this, the intermedial event as a systematic 
environment of interconnections produces an affective and learning subject in 
multiple and inter-connected ways, as ramifications of differential affects that 
are united by the perceiving and learning subject at the moment of each intra-
active encounter. In this sense, the triadic encounter of the intermedial 
execution is an act of feeling and affection, contingent to the emergence of 
the situated scaffolding activity, rather than a predetermined relationship. The 
multiplicity of the intermedial datum is subjectively synthesized as a process 
of being affected, expanding within a topological complexity of multiple “heres 
and nows”; that is, an affect creates, alters and conditions other affects in 
relation to all of its temporal actualizations as an affective multidimensionality. 
Engaged in the mereotopological dramaturgy of Blast Theory, the intermedial 
subject is involved and invested in a world of affects that are intrinsic to his 
learning process. In this environment, the result of the affective forces enables 
the dramaturgical constructive making. This making includes the 
dramaturgical form and content of what will come to be as well as the 
functioning of its being and the functions to come through affective virtuality. 
In this compositional world, the span of the subject’s dramaturgical being is 
broader than any actualized moment it transverses through. In this context, 
the intermedial subject is always becoming-subject by means of establishing 
actual and virtual affective relations that are embodied in the situational 
emergence of each intra-action.  
 
Erin Manning (2013a) explains, in relation to choreographic practices, that the 
participant is always in a ‘tending-towards’ world of pre-individual 
potentialities. She describes that the participant’s self ‘expresses itself, but 
never towards a totalizing self – always towards continued individuation … 
always on the way towards new foldings … these foldings bring into 
appearance not a fully constituted human, already-contained, but constitutive 
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strata of matter, content, form, substance and expression’ (Manning, 2013a: 
2-3). In this way, the participant, according to her, is ‘a fold of immanent 
expression’ (Manning, 2013a: 3). For Manning, affect is central to subject 
formation. Drawing on Daniel Stern (1985), she develops the idea of a ‘vitalist 
affect’ as the modality in which forces of expression, intelligibility, and feeling 
come into being, incorporating a full activation of the human sensory-motor 
schema (Manning, 2013a: 5). For Manning, affect is experience in motion. 
She writes, ‘affect moves, constituting the event that [becomes subject]’ 
(Manning, 2013a: 5). A vitalist affect reading, as a modality, can be also 
grasped as a medium – the channel of the coming-together, of ‘the immanent 
becoming-present [and immediate] of the [constructive] experience in 
experience’ (Manning, 2013a: 6). Manning describes how, 
in the experience of ontogenetic worlding, we have not yet 
succumbed to the promise of linear time, living instead in the 
active topology of spacetimes of experience … species of 
affects, an affective tuning that operates as … an event 
across myriad actualizations … a fielding of relations. 
(Manning, 2013a: 6). 
 
Vitality affects, for her, are a ‘co-constitutive qualitative infrastratum that 
provides a tending-towards immanent feeling in the constitution of the event’ 
(Manning, 2013a: 6). The participant, according to Manning, ‘is fed by vitality 
affects … a living of feeling [which] creates a taking-form of expression. This 
taking-form of expression is the dynamic of becoming-selves’ (Manning, 
2013a: 7).  
 
Drawing on her understanding of vitalist affects, we can then describe the 
intermedial subject as a complex organization that is always experiential and 
affective across scaffolding modalities that enhance the affective intensity of 
thinking-in-action. Nonetheless, we add to Manning’s vitalist proposals by 
offering that this constant being affected by the radical aspect of the 
intermedial dramaturgy implies an endless process of decision-making as a 
learning practice through exploration and experimentation as the creating of 
the new in the course of active learning action. Learning, we suggest, occurs 
in the embodied and installed emergence of affective cognition, thinking in 
terms of the ontogenetic production of knowledge within the complex interplay 
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of the conditions of intelligibility that the dramaturgy affords from within. Here, 
emotion and cognition must be thought as co-emergent in the dynamic 
system. Put in Deleuzian terms, the actualization of any learning as the 
realization of a state of affairs sees feeling and thinking as correlated in the 
immanent processes of virtualizing learning. These learning processes, 
however, do not happen in isolation; rather the subject is learning as part of a 
community of learners – the other participants in the execution of the event. In 
doing so, the intermedial subject must be also grasped as intersubjective. 
 
3. The Intermedial Subject as Intersubjective. 
 
Intersubjectivity is broadly understood here as a mutual co-engagement of 
independent subjects, which creates their respective experiences. Chiel 
Kattenbelt (2010) describes intersubjectivity in intermedial backgrounds as ‘an 
orientation towards one’s own subjectivity, particularly towards oneself as an 
experiencing subject and subject of experience, [and] creates the possibility of 
perceiving and experiencing oneself both within the aesthetic framework and 
in relation to the lifeword’ (Kattenbelt, 2010: 31-32). Although this reading of 
intersubjectivity aptly places the experiencing subject in relation to himself and 
the others who share the same experience, presupposing a communality of 
experience, it is clearly imbued in a reading of intermediality as a staging 
modality and a subject attending to a phenomenal world. This section will 
demonstrate that, in the context of intermedial performance and within this 
research’s argument the notion of a pre-established consciousness as 
intending to a lifeworld/wordly structure and other consciousness, also 
considered as pre-given to the experience, needs to be drastically 
reconsidered. In fact, the notion of intersubjectivity is intrinsic to the 
understanding of the proposed empirico-transcendental onto-epistemic 
intermedial subject.103  
                                                        
103 Daniel Smith (2007) explains that Deleuze, by giving an account of the subject itself, 
simultaneously provides an account of the constitution of the other as arising at the same 
time as the subject. Deleuze shows that, in contra phenomenology, there is in fact no 
separation between subject and other. Deleuze proposes that the problem of intersubjectivity 
as posed by phenomenology is false. His philosophy shows the subject to be the product of 
an underlying network of relations – relations that also include other subjects. 
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In relation to the conceptualization of intersubjectivity in theatrical 
performance, Fischer-Lichte defines the performance subject as co-
dependent and intersubjective, which can be understood as implying an idea 
of collective consciousness in the performance event. She aptly argues 
against the Cartesian model of subjectivity, as an irreducibly private model, 
and establishes the performance subject as not “blocked” by a thick and 
impenetrable wall, but as perceptive co-creator, and aware of others’ 
experiences. Her argument is not against the possibility of a single act of 
consciousness; but, rather, that the act of consciousness can be interpreted 
as a sense of collective individuality within the framework of the 
performance’s autopoietic feedback loop, grasped as a shared experience. As 
with Fischer-Lichte, the model of intermedial subjectivity proposed here also 
sees the Cartesian model as inadequate, but this thesis finds her 
intersubjective understanding partial in explaining the specificities of the 
intermedial event’s shared experience because (i) her model of 
intersubjectivity (as well as her performance subject model) relies on an 
aprioristic conceptualization of the subject; and (ii) regarding the questions of 
shared experience, her postulates seem to imply that all participating 
individuals who shared the same performance experience, experience it in the 
same manner and, as we have seen in DOF, for instance, this is not the case. 
 
So far, we have described the non-separation and co-dependency between 
subject and transaction where consciousness is not a purely individual, nor a 
pre-individual phenomenon. What we propose here is a reading of 
intersubjectivity as one in which the sharing of a given experience has an 
impact on how that experience is lived by the group that takes part in that 
experience. In this sense, the individuality of each experience also presents a 
plural aspect. In other words, how one may experience a given phenomenon 
is informed by the interaction with the group and the being aware that there is 
other participating subject in such an experience. Simply put, the term 
intersubjectivity refers to what happens between subjects at the moment of 
evental activation as a collectivity. 
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The philosopher David Midgley (2006) explains that in relation to philosophical 
accounts of intersubjectivity as a collective experience, a collectivity is not a 
mere chance aggregation of individuals, but one that is bound together by a 
common purpose – the performative activation of the event, in this instance – 
and a collective identity in the sense of many individuals participating in a 
common emergent experience with a sense of identity and empathy.  
 
In relation to the empathetic aspect, Midgley writes,  
an empathetic awareness of someone else’s experience is a 
matter of my having an experience which is not only (in 
certain respects, not in all) qualitatively identical with that of 
the other, but which is identified as that very experience which 
they are having. (Midgley, 2006: 104) 
 
In this sense, each participating subject establishes empathetic relations with 
other participating subjects since they stand equally in the relation to the 
subject of the experience as a collectivity: ‘the empathetic relationship … 
consists in my standing in some sense in the relation of subject to the very 
same experience that they [the other subjects] are having’ (Midgley, 2006: 
104). Although we find these definitions appropriate to discuss 
intersubjectivity in intermedial performance backgrounds, some aspects need 
to be reconsidered. First, in the work of Blast Theory as seen in DOF, for 
instance, these empathetic relations vary in terms of mode, intensity and 
duration in relation to the spatial and temporal orchestration of the 
dramaturgy; from this point of view, and second, the notion of collectivity 
presents varying degrees in relation to the number of participants; that is, the 
concept becomes pliable in relation to how each collectivity is modelled.  
 
Intersubjectivity can be also considered as a communal identity. This 
communal aspect, articulated by empathetic processes, creates, we argue, 
“an aligned arrangement of consciousness” as a sense of purpose.104 This 
                                                        
104 Bruce Barton (2010) explains that, through the performative aspect of the intermedial 
event, the phenomenon creates a new sense of intimacy between the participants, whose aim 
could be said, as a collective, to intimately engage with the event. Barton states, ‘Intermedial 
intimacy is, thus, not generated through the portrayal of shared cultural attitudes and beliefs 
(a relationship that reinforces ‘timeless’ and ‘universal’ values), but rather through the 
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conscious alignment is not understood here in terms of flows of circulating 
energies; ‘intensifications of energy’ by the actors (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 59); 
spectators ‘absorbing energy’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 58-59); ‘energy flows as 
a tool to create a communal experience’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 59); energy as 
superseding ‘mere corporeality’ (Fischer-Lichte, 2008: 97); exchanges of 
desire and/or any other esoteric claims, as Fischer-Lichte does (Fischer-
Lichte, 2008: 99). But, rather, the suggested alignment is radically grasped as 
a sense of purpose through which each individual collectively constitutes this 
conscious community of intermedial subjects, and participates in its acts of 
consciousness that are dependent on the conditions of the given previous 
learned experiences and shared expectations that emerge at the moment of 
the interaction, as described in DOF when the activating participants discuss 
the tasks they are and have been involved in. In this sense, this “aligned 
arrangement” can be conceived as a group learning process; that is, a 
collective of learners and/or a community of practice, moving from individual 
cognitive processes to processes of learning in which the community of 
practice functions as an integrative activation for both the individual in a 
learning context and the idea of groupwork as a learning system.105  
 
In this context, the work of Blast Theory, in their radical dramaturgical 
articulations, enables the intersubjective experience occurring during the 
intermedial event in a myriad of manners. Firstly, as with all intermedial 
practice, we may argue, the participant subjects are placed and immersed in 
performative environments106 responding to the same set of attending 
                                                                                                                                                              
performance of shared perceptual frames and dynamics (interaction that posits ambiguity and 
dis/reorientation as the constant of contemporary existence)’ (Barton, 2010: 46).  
 
105 On his pedagogical writings, particularly in A Sociology of Teaching, Paul Trowler (2005) 
discusses how a community of learners and the learning that takes place in a given 
community must be considered in relation to the social background in which the community is 
located. For him, learning is always socially informed. He also refers to communities of 
practice in relation to how learning is institutionalized.  
 
106 Chiel Kattenbelt (2010) terms this aspect the ‘performative and aesthetic orientation’ 
(Kattenbelt, 2010: 30-31) of intermedial praxis. Within the specificities of intermedial modes of 
experience, Nelson’s ‘experiencer’ explores new modes of interaction in digital performance. 
It is through these modes that the ‘experiencer’ develops a sense of self-reference and self-
reflexivity. In performatively executing the event the ‘experiencer’ in intermedial performance 
refers to and reflects on himself, and the occurring intermedial dramaturgy and himself. 
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variables. As Kattenbelt explains, the ‘communicating participants meet each 
other in duality, as both ‘I’ and ‘you’. These two perspectives are geared for 
one another in balance, as it were – with respect to their attempts to achieve a 
mutual understanding of a situation’ (Kattenbelt, 2010: 31). This is the case in 
Something American, 10 Backwards and DOF. Secondly, as noted at the start 
of this section in relation to Kattenbelt’s understandings, each participant 
experiences himself as ‘experiencing subject and subject of the experience’. 
In doing so, each participant, as ‘subject of the experience’, is also 
experienced by the other as part of the experience and experiencer. This is 
also the case in Something American, 10 Backwards and DOF. However, and 
thirdly, as distinct from Kattenbelt’s valid remarks, Blast Theory’s creation of 
radical dramaturgies sees narrative as being created incorporating 
mereotopological characteristics. In this manner, the shared subjective 
experience presents in itself a series of possible intersubjective engagements 
because, as seen in DOF, for instance, in its orchestration of a more open 
dramaturgical structure, (i) there are participant subjects who do not know 
they are part of a performance; (ii) the performance does not present a linear 
temporality or continuity of dramaturgical engagements; (iii) the number of 
participating subjects changes continuously during the execution of the event; 
and (iv) the activation of each narrative articulation is presented in different 
physical environments – the hub where the board is and the streets of the city 
where the performance takes place. In this way, what Blast Theory maximizes 
in its dramaturgical structures is the possible number of modalities in which 
intermedial dramaturgy experiences intersubjectivity. This is because of the 
‘the operational and qualifying aspect of media’ (Ellestrom, 2010: 25) and the 
different types of dramaturgical modalities in and through which the participant 
subject experiences the intra-active constructions of dramaturgy.107 
                                                                                                                                                              
Kattenbelt writes, ‘the performative orientation and, even more so, the aesthetic orientation 
are very much self-referential and self-reflexive’ (Kattenbelt, 2010: 32). In the engagement 
with the aesthetic intermedial transaction, according to Kattenbelt, the ‘experiencer’ confronts 
his own personal experience with the background of performance experience.  
 
107 In How We Think: Digital Media and Contemporary Technogenesis, within the critical 
context of post-humanism, Katherine Hayles (2012) explains how, when engaged in digital 
processes, the subject engages in thinking processes – yet again emphasizing the 
epistemological – that can be categorized as technogenesis; that is, the subject thinks 
through, with and inside the mediated environment. This position places the agency of the 
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As a final remark, and in Deleuzian terms, intersubjectivity as collectivity can 
work as a machine, where the making of multiple relations interlaces with the 
possible virtual arrangements that such a collectivity may take, and where the 
creative composition is that such a machine could remain indeterminately and 
relationally open in the performative activation of the frames. The collective as 
a whole also remains as an individual. Collectivity is not outside the logic of 
the individual, but in the realm of how the development of each enables the 
conditions for the development of all as in a group learning experience. 
 
In relation to group learning and the creation of a collectivity, the pedagogs 
David Jaques and Gilly Salmon (2008) explain that group cohesiveness ‘is a 
measure of the attraction of the group to its members … the sense of team 
spirit, and the willingness of its members to coordinate their efforts’ (Jaques 
and Salmon, 2008: 28). They also observe how the normative formation and 
the development of learning group dynamics evolve at the same time that the 
procedures change: the ‘explicit rules and conventions for ensuring that what 
a group wants to happen, does in fact happen’ (Jaques and Salmon, 2008: 
30). In this sense, the different modalities of group formation vary according to 
the situated emergence of the particularities of the learning structures. From 
this perspective, the thresholds of intensity, determining transactions between 
engagements, mark processes of intersubjectivity. Seen thus, intersubjectivity 
can be grasped as mereotopological because of the constant conditioning of 
the relationships that enable such intersubjective entanglements.  
 
4. The Intermedial Subject: Final Thoughts and Problematics. 
 
Dramaturgical complexity is the key term for the understanding of the multiple 
affective layers, the complex spatio-temporal variables, which frame the 
intermedial subject’s mediated and embodied existence and how the 
                                                                                                                                                              
media and the agency of the subject at the same level of “intersubjective” agency. Similarly, 
Rosalind Krauss (2000) describes that the notion of intersubjectivity should include the 
agential mode of interactions that the digital media brings. 
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production of subjectivity emerges out of the differential inter-layering of the 
conditions that enable such intelligible and affective ecologies. The 
dramaturgical frame, particularly maximized in the work of Blast Theory, 
becomes mereotopological by its interaction with other frames. In this way, 
the intermedial subject, as nomadic, is a threshold identity between frames of 
transformations in an intricate web of dramaturgical affairs. Each producing 
process of subjectivition, each performative layer of this accumulative identity 
is an emergent attunement that depends on the re-establishing of the 
condition from which it emerged in the first place – a performative journey with 
no specific point of arrival – while leaving room for any stops during the ride 
as a single moment between different occasions. This is a performative 
journey of territory construction. As with any journey, the identity of the subject 
is temporal, transcendentally persistent throughout the expedition, affectively 
responding and learning about the specificities of each station, each stop, and 
each encounter with his fellow travellers.  
 
With these parameters, it is the evental experience which enables the 
intermedial subject’s consciousness to loom through the moment of praxical 
engagement with the performance work; this praxicality provides the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness to emerge and be the 
outcome of these praxical encounters. In other words, the performative 
activities of the triadic execution involve a constructive relationship between 
the human and the non-human, therefore generating thought (consciousness) 
and an onto-epistemic manner of articulating experience, learning and 
creativity.  
 
In this sense, the epistemic intermedial subject is, as the diagrammatic map 
below visualizes, the outcome of the performative actions that activate the 
dramaturgical complexity of the intermedial event.108 
 
                                                        
108 This image is this thesis’s author own re-creation of one of many drawings by the artist 
Marc Ngui, particularly his work titled Diagrams for Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand 
Plateaus.  
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Figure 1: The onto-epistemic intermedial subject: a visual conceptualization. 
 
The subject is immanently realized in a world of virtuality (dotted arrows) and 
actuality (arrows), where new concepts (circles) and knowledge are activated, 
incorporated and put into practice through each constructive and generative 
plane of composition, and where the multiplicity of the dramaturgical 
orchestrations, as a web, enables processes of differential intra-active 
relations.   
 
In the previous chapter we highlighted the positionality of the subject within 
the narrative as only affording him a “restricted view” within the overall 
narrative orchestration. Here, within the same parameters, we also suggest 
that this positionality, particularly in more open dramaturgical structures 
enables the subject to only understand and learn about a punctual section of 
the overall epistemic knowledge that the dramaturgy generates in its entirety. 
In this sense, the scope of the processes of learning and knowledge making is 
clearly context-dependent and specifically situated. Even if we acknowledge 
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the virtualizing processes of learning, which potentially unfold in expanding 
bifurcations and pluralities of possible learning activations, what the 
structuring development of a given dramaturgy and the position of the subject 
within it entail is that the potential learning engagements are only feasible 
within the realm of the situated activity emerging from each intra-action. The 
dramaturgical structures, then, act as a catalyzing mechanism that dictate the 
possible learning experiences that the subject may be involved in within the 
constructed punctuality of his own positionality. Simply put, even when 
considering the nomadic aspect of learning, what intermedial performance 
tells us about epistemic constructivism is that the temporal punctuations of 
such a nomadic learning trajectory and the knowledge that emerges from 
them need to be fully acknowledged.   
 
As a final note, the notion of the event is, yet again, primordial. The onto-
epistemic characteristics of the intermedial event are the enabling 
characteristics of intermedial subjectivity. If, for Whitehead, these onto-
epistemic characteristics imply and provide the unity of the subject, for 
Deleuze, these characteristics – which he sees as repetition and seriality, 
difference, structuring, and series – imply the temporal dissolution and 
fragmentation of the subject as a unity, which should not be read as the 
disappearance of the subject, but as a subject that is mereotopologically 
multi-layered and stratigraphic, yet still united; a process of subject creation 
that becomes-one to become-other. This stratigraphic unity means that the 
subject is conceptualized as a non-hierarchical complexity of intensities, and it 
is through the synthesis of these temporal and spatial orchestrations that the 
immanent subject shows univocity. The intermedial subject is a self-referential 
territory in-itself and for-itself within a dramaturgical world composed of 
generative spatio-temporal narratives, presenting a sense of mereotopological 
multiplicity. This is not a subject enabled by linear processes of teleological 
cause and effect, as in Kant. Instead, the subject is generated out of creative, 
affective and intelligible dramaturgical engagements – a self-feeling and self-
understanding multiplicity/unicity. The world of Blast Theory fittingly highlights 
how the intermedial subject is creativity at the experiential and learning 
threshold.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
The work of Blast Theory explores the interdisciplinary intersections between 
theatrical performance and media technologies as a functional structuring that 
orchestrates complex dramaturgies. The company’s practice interrogates 
novel explorations of spatio-temporal narrative configurations, the 
dramaturgical potentialities of the very nature of intermedial praxis and the 
creation of communities of experiential participant subjects who explore the 
impact of mediatized dramaturgical systems across a variety of performative 
situations and theatrical landscapes such as games as performance, virtual 
environments, dance-theatre pieces in “traditional” proscenium settings and 
immersive parameters in urban structures. More than simply embedding 
media technologies in performance practices as a mode of staging, the work 
of Blast Theory exemplifies the potentiality of such mediatized performance 
encounters, actively highlighting the agential impacts of the human and non-
human entanglements, and the productive interaction between theatrical 
performance and other artistic fields of practice such as video art within the 
realm of analogue and digital aesthetics. These defining considerations, we 
have claimed, make the work of Blast Theory unique in relation to other 
examples of intermedial performance. 
 
This research has argued that Blast Theory’s type of intermedial dramaturgy 
can be described as a radical departure from traditional understandings of 
dramaturgy, generally grasped as a linear and pre-established structure 
waiting to be activated by an attending subject, because it requires a different 
manner of conceptualizing it; that is, the work presents a generative 
characteristic that enables a multi-linear and multi-faceted in its execution. 
This is a dramaturgy that introduces multiple performative variations, self-
positings and re-configurations of each dramaturgical frame, which, in turn, 
generate other frames at the moment at which the encounter between the 
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dramaturgical attending variables and the participant subjects activates from 
within, as intra-actions, the intermedial event: ‘the execution of the event’.  
 
Departing from Nelson’s idea of the triadic performative encounter between 
media, audiences and performers as the constitutive and defining element of 
intermedial practice, this thesis has suggested that the way to fully understand 
the argued generative characteristic of such a triadic encounter in the work of 
Blast Theory is through the introduction of a constructivist reading of 
epistemology. Drawing on the process philosophy positions of Deleuze and 
Whitehead, this epistemic constructivist aesthetic understands, first, 
epistemology and ontology as non-separated fields of enquiry; second, the 
aesthetic position assumes no difference between the notions of subject and 
object. Rather, a combination of subject and object is perceived as an 
individualized singularity, as an intra-action, that incorporates differential, 
relational and mereotopological processes with a sense of unity through 
processes of creativity; and third, this critical position entails no difference 
between an aesthetic art event and an everyday event; that is, both are seen 
as the evental execution of processes of life.   
 
The proposed constructivist aesthetic fully explains the particularities of the 
dramaturgical worlds created by Blast Theory’s praxis via the intrinsic 
relationship between ontology and epistemology as an onto-epistemic 
construction. Moreover, it also accounts for the effects of the technological 
media in dramaturgies, experiences of spatiality and temporality, 
technologically informed narrative structures, and knowledge-making 
aesthetic processes. Furthermore, the constructivist aesthetic highlights the 
shift from the questions of knowledge production, representation and the 
subject’s identity raised within classical epistemological perspectives such as 
Kant to the onto-epistemic questions about human and non-human agencies 
and organic and non-organic life. 
 
The performative encounter between the mediatized performance 
phenomenon and the participating subjects most radically highlights the 
potentialities of such a constructive experience of the aesthetic phenomenon. 
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Consequently, this radical aspect problematizes and, therefore, calls for a 
repositioning of the much-debated ontological liveness and presentness of 
performance. In this sense, this thesis has argued that theatrical performance 
debates such as the ontological analytical framework articulated by Phelan 
and Fischer-Lichte and the liveness and presentness debates discussed by 
Power and Mock can offer only a reduced explanation of the specificities of 
Blast Theory’s work and the generative activation of its radical dramaturgies 
because they fail to fully account for the myriad of dramaturgical intricacies 
that Blast Theory’s praxis enables. Specifically, because such an ontological 
debate neglects the ‘onto-epistemic conditions’ – the spatial, temporal and 
narratological conditions that construct the execution of the event. 
 
The application of an onto-epistemic constructivist aesthetic has provided an 
alternative discourse from conceptualizations of the intermedial performance 
event as a chronological linearity and as an essentialist ontological reading 
discussed around the primacy and authenticity of an ephemeral “here and 
now” as the platform to articulate the performance event. Instead, it has 
proposed a radical theorization of the intermedial performance event as one 
of multiple temporalities (i) where the “here and now” is grasped as 
differential; (ii) where presentness notions include temporal synthesis that 
incorporates the past, the present and the future in each present moment; and 
(iii) where the intensive, virtual and potential aspects of such an event are 
also acknowledged. This onto-epistemic constructivist aesthetic also 
abandons a conceptualization of intermedial performance within the confines 
of an essentialist reading of ontological vitalism which is imbued in 
phenomenological connotations of co-dependence between a performance 
and an attending subject to that performance – as in Fischer-Lichte’s notion of 
the autopoietic feedback loop. Subsequently, this constructivist framework 
implements an onto-epistemic vitalist approach, as described by Deleuze, 
Colebrook and Barad, in which the notion of co-dependence is radically 
repositioned as an intra-active onto-epistemic construction. In this way, this 
research’s framework is a shift away from a categorizing ontological vitalist 
context as a means of understanding the processes of actualization of the 
performance event. Drawing on the philosophical proposals of Shaviro, 
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Stengers, Protevi, Hendriks-Jansen and Toscano among others, this thesis 
has argued that Fischer-Lichte’s framework only offers a simplistic 
understanding: although it favours the idea of performative emergence over 
one of static being, it heavily relies on the attending subject as the enabling 
platform for the actualizing of performance processes. Simply put, her reading 
of the notion of co-dependence is looked at through an anthropomorphic lens. 
Here, we have not denied that performance can be thought out as an 
autopoietic system where the interaction of the attending elements constantly 
re-configure and enables the development of such a system; instead, we have 
argued against Fischer-Lichte’s understanding of autopoiesis within her 
phenomenal and ontological reading of theatrical performance.  
 
Contrary to her reading, this thesis has offered an onto-epistemic 
constructivist vitalism that places a clear emphasis on encountering the 
realities of entities that are constituted through (i) non-human agency and 
perception; (ii) the immanent characteristic of human cognition, interpretation, 
experience and consciousness; and (iii) the mediating processes occurring 
between them both. From this point of view, the radical dramaturgy is 
mediation in the making. In this sense, there is a clear recognition of the 
givenness of entities – the attending variables – whose measuring and 
making sense of can never be complete without accounting for the self-
measuring processes of the entities themselves. In other words, the onto-
epistemic vitalism framework proposed here also presents an autopoietic 
characteristic. However, this one fully accounts for the autonomous and 
immanent movement of becoming whereby the performance phenomenon 
and the subject self-posit or realize themselves concurrently and co-
terminously both understood as a system within the system of a plane of 
immanence. Simply put, the object and the subject are both emergent in the 
situated aesthetic activity that brings them both forth. Thus, it is the creative 
connection – as intra-actions – of these elements, the individual and the pre-
individual, that is continuously produced in an ongoing re-activation that 
always shows a creative dimension tending towards the exploration of the 
creatively new as life. 
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Drawing on the philosophical writings of Barker, Toscano and Bains, the 
suggested radical dramaturgy of the execution of the triadic encounter as a 
constructivist aesthetic sees the classical aesthetic notion of representation 
reconceived as a constant process of re-presentation and re-activation in 
generative immanence; traditional hermeneutics repositioned as activated 
hermeneutics; and the traditional binary of pre-established narrative form and 
content as colliding, since the constructive characteristic conceives the 
activating process as creating dramaturgical form and content in a constant 
and mutual mediated re-shaping.   
 
The focus of this thesis has been twofold. First, through the interrogation of 
three of Blast Theory’s performances, it has looked at the way in which the 
company’s intermedial praxis uniquely investigates, questions, and 
experiences the onto-epistemic conditions of a given intermedial event here 
identified with temporality, spatiality and narrativity. Second, once these 
spatial, temporal and narrative complexities and structures have been 
identified, this thesis has contributed to the intermedial debate and created 
new knowledge by providing an account of the type of subjectivity that Blast 
Theory’s intermedial practice enables: ‘the onto-epistemic intermedial 
subject’.  
 
Following Kattenbelt, Nelson and Boenisch among others, we have defined 
intermediality as a mode of performance and a performative practice in which 
the interaction of the media results in a constant interplay of mediation 
processes. These processes, we have suggested, entail fundamental 
reconfigurations of spatio-temporal relationships and narratological 
articulations. As such, on the one hand, through the three case studies we 
have addressed different modalities of experiential constructiveness, looking 
at dramaturgical points of connectivity; and, on the other hand, we have 
argued against a reductive understanding of the intermedial praxis – although 
aptly conceptualized as a performative transaction by critical intermedial 
positions such as Nelson and Kattenbelt – as a praxical entity to be 
experienced by an “already-established” perceiving subject and as a modality 
of staging.  
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Chapter one has been used as a platform to introduce the theoretical 
positions that underline a constructivist reading of epistemology. Through 
these readings, we have highlighted its pivotal notions such as creativity, 
event, the Deleuzian distinction between the actual and the virtual and 
Whitehead’s concept of actual occasions among others. The chapter has also 
presented a theoretical reading of the three proposed onto-epistemic 
conditions in relation to process philosophy, stressing notions such as 
differential temporality, relationality, the hypersurface, the fold and 
mereotopology, to list a few.    
 
Chapter two has discussed, using Blast Theory’s 10 Backwards, the first 
suggested specificity of the proposed radical reading of intermedial 
dramaturgy; that is, its differential characteristic in relation to mereotopology, 
particularly interrogating areas of intermedial temporality. Contra to 
ontological debates that conceive time within an essentialist reading of 
ontology as the “here and now” and highlight the ephemerality of the 
performance event, here, time has been discussed, with the help of a process 
philosophy background and the philosophical positions of Deleuze and 
Whitehead, as a temporal event composed of internal multiplicities and 
differential articulations. The chapter has suggested that temporality in the 
work of Blast Theory is best understood as the production of multi-temporal 
rhythms that present intensive and liminal characteristics. Following Cull and 
Mullarkey, it has also repositioned notions of actuality as a construction of 
temporal multiplicities and mutualities, where the Deleuzian virtual and actual 
amalgamate. In this way, the chapter has rendered obsolete notions of 
presentness as occupying a chronological and essentialist “now”. 
Furthermore, it has emphasized the production of time and the dramaturgical 
strategies such as slowness and repetitive loops that enable such a temporal 
construction. The Deleuzian notion of becoming has been employed to 
highlight the generative nature of the dramaturgical event in which the 
attending dramaturgical parameters occur in all their actual and virtual 
relations, not as pre-given to the event’s constitution, but as a given to the 
immanent processes during the triadic execution. 
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Chapter three has discussed notions of relationality, the second emphasized 
aspect of the mereotopological dramaturgy suggested here, particularly 
regarding critical positions of intermedial spatiality in relation to Blast Theory’s 
Something American. The chapter has explored intermedial spatiality in 
relation to the notions of topology, the interval and transversality, and has 
linked spatiality with temporality. Supported by the writings of Deleuze and 
Whitehead, intermedial spatiality has been addressed as combining both 
synchronic and diachronic aspects. It has also stressed that intermedial 
spatiality is to be understood as amalgamating the physical space of the 
theatre venue and the scenographic attending variables. Drawing on 
Deleuze’s smooth and striated space and Whitehead’s nexuses, intermedial 
spatiality has been said to occupy any-space-whatever at any-instant-
whatever. Furthermore, as with the concept of landscape, intermedial 
spatiality unfolds, creating agential, affective and knowledge-making territories 
that are relational in their configuration. Intermedial spatiality, as an always 
changing and nomad territory, has been discussed as a relational field of 
heterogeneous elements where the transitional aspect of the interval enables 
from within the capacities of the relational. Seen thus, intermedial spatiality 
opens to constant processes of deterritorialization where spatial topological 
relations activate the intermedial event. In this context, it has been argued that 
the intermedial scenographic plays an intrinsic part in enabling spatial 
orchestrations. Here, the proposed notion of the scenographic moves away 
from static readings of mise-en-scene. Instead, it also occupies the 
topological territory of being in the making and becoming.  
 
Chapter four has seen the final suggested aspect of the radical dramaturgy –
the interrogation of the mereotopological as a complexity of dramaturgical 
intensities and an ecology of multifaceted assemblages, principally engaging 
with narrativity, and as integrating the other two proposed onto-epistemic 
conditions, temporality and spatiality, in its functionality and constructive 
emergence. Blast Theory’s Day of the Figurines has been used as a case 
study to exemplify such as a proposal. In discussing intermedial narrativity, 
the chapter has stressed its becoming where the differential and relational 
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aspects function as a hypersurface. We have seen that intermedial narrative 
cannot be conceptualized as a linear structure. Instead, it radically disrupts 
traditional understandings of narrative composition, focalization and 
fabulation, and blurs the distinction between the intra-diegetic and the extra-
diegetic. Intermedial narrativity has been described as trajectories of spatio-
temporal narrative expansions, in which the becoming narrative structure 
mereotopologically and ontogenetically morphs into emergent compositions 
that re-configure in a multiplicity of varying degrees and where the constant 
process of virtualization expand the narrative into a myriad of configuring 
relationships. In this way, intermedial narrative in the work of Blast Theory 
explores a world of intertextualities that, also as a hypersurface, enfold in their 
becoming from within. With all this in mind, intermedial narrativity pulverizes 
any notion of narrative chronological linearity, essentialist readings of the 
“here and now”, and transient autopoietic feedback loops. Instead, it occupies 
the territory of the multiple and the differential narrative. Furthermore, as a 
mereotopological relation, it expands in becoming narrative processes of 
composition and experiential interfaces. 
 
With the help of the three case studies, this thesis has highlighted how the 
arrangements of the dramaturgical attending variables impact on the subject’s 
experience as a self-bounded entity within the dramaturgical artwork where 
active thinking is essentially creation. The creative spatio-temporal narrative 
occasions arise from the intra-actions of both the participant subject and the 
intermedial transaction in a constant process of onto-epistemic vitalist 
mediation. In this regard, this research’s onto-epistemic constructivist 
aesthetic has stressed the becoming process of the re-activating materiality; 
semioticity; hermeneutical interpretation; and narrative form and content that 
generate the existence of multi-modal and radical dramaturgical interfaces, 
which, in turn, inform the intermedial subject’s construction through the 
enabled processes of mediation. Furthermore, drawing on Colebrook and 
Toscano, the proposed constructivist aesthetic has emphasized the conditions 
for mediatized vitalist dramaturgical instantiations to emerge, comprising 
cognition, affect and the production of subjectivity. This is because the identity 
of the experiential and creative thinking subject is re-made – as becoming-
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other – at every instant of the evental process. Thus, the constructivist 
aesthetic proposed has not restrictively accounted for the specificities of 
media objects and their staging modalities, the “pre-given” to the phenomenon 
participant subjects or the outcomes of subject-object interaction. Instead, the 
onto-epistemic aesthetic has radically privileged the process that 
constructively constitutes the analogue and digital attending variables and the 
participant subjects as an intra-active unified aesthetic of life.  
 
In this sense, the epistemic knowledge that emerges from the aesthetic 
fundamental encounter can be only grasped as a process of conditioning and 
autopoietic self-positing between both the transaction and the subject and as 
nomadic thinking-in-action, stressing the idea of the dynamic and self-
structuring articulations of thought processes, framed by affects and concepts. 
Hence, the focus is not in the manner of staging an intermedial artwork 
through which semioticity, materiality, experiential reception and 
hermeneutical interpretation by “pre-given” attending subjects form. Rather, 
the focus is the radical process of the mediatized encounter through which 
these aspects emerge. In its radical dramaturgical aspect, the intermedial 
event constantly creates the conditions of the new – of the generative – and 
sees the processes that enable these conditions unfold where the subject’s 
identity is formed as an extension of them. Here, the intermedial subject is the 
product of the experience – the phenomenology of the event as opposed to 
the phenomenology of a subject intending to a given phenomenon.  
 
With all this in mind, this thesis, in chapter five, has created new knowledge 
and discussed the specificities of the onto-epistemic intermedial subject as a 
transcendental subject. This subject, engaged in processes of dramaturgical 
construction, is part of a world of mereotopological affects and effects and is 
in a constant need to create new praxic knowledge to respond to generative 
performative activations. In this sense, the radical conceptualization of 
intermedial subjectivity proposed here understands the intermedial subject as 
a creative learner, thinking-in-action and reflecting-in-practice, whose 
concepts are created and thought is applied at the very moment of activation. 
The creative engagement with the ongoing development of dramaturgy allows 
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the intermedial subject to actively become self-reflexive and observe 
processes of self-development. This is a subject that is heuristic-epistemic 
because each of the dramaturgic activations incorporates processes of 
creativity and self-reflexivity, while being aware of the other participant 
subjects. In this way, the intermedial subject is intersubjective since it is part 
of a community of other activating subjects whose overall aim is to activate 
the radical dramaturgy.   
 
Through the writing of this thesis, a dialogue between intermedial 
performance and constructivist epistemology has emerged. The dialogue has 
pointed out a mutual crossing between both critical backgrounds. In the 
course of the application of the argument it has been observed that a literal 
application of the theoretical proposals of Deleuze and Whitehead to 
intermedial performance praxis became at times problematic. Intermedial 
performance as a critical field has indeed informed the reading of 
epistemology proposed here. In fact, some positions required re-assessment 
and a middle position needed to be found. Throughout the chapters, we have 
highlighted how some positions such as notions of authorship; the relation 
between the Deleuzian actual and virtual; the positionality of the subject 
regarding a dramaturgical context; the binary striated-smooth space; and the 
relational aspect of mereotopology needed critical recalibration. The 
responsive relationships between both backgrounds have happened from the 
middle, from within, as thinking-in-practice and exchange-as-attunement, 
creating the conditions for the becoming of future thinking.  
 
Further questions remain open. We have claimed that the proposed reading 
of epistemology and its application as an interrogating methodology has 
fittingly explained the particularities of Blast Theory’s work, its originality and 
distinctiveness, what sets them apart from other intermedial practices, in a 
manner other critical proposals such as the liveness debate and ontological 
readings of performance could have never done. Now, can this constructivist 
position be also successfully applied to other intermedial practices? Can it 
even be transferred in order to conceptualize theatrical performance in 
general? The potential answers may yet again come from the middle. We may 
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only suggest for now that the majority of the positions discussed in this thesis 
might be fittingly extrapolated to intermedial praxis in general, even though 
further dialogue between intermediality and epistemic constructivism may be 
needed. As for theatrical performance in general, a reading of performance in 
terms of its epistemology will necessarily reveal a stronger conceptualizing 
position regarding an interrogation of what and who enables and conditions 
the “live” performance event; that is, fully taking into account the epistemic 
conditions of the experience, the moment in which the subject encounters the 
experience, and the generation of mediality through the encounter. However, 
the recalibration between both critical landscapes may need to be even more 
intensive and some of the constructivist positions such as the complexity of 
the mereotopological might become rather challenging when applied to a 
“traditional” reading of theatrical performance, particularly regarding aspects 
such as narrative linearity. The hope in finding these answers lies in the 
thinking that this research is simply a middle; a position that is setting the 
potentiality for future deterritorializations.  
 
In this analytical context, the writer of this thesis sees this research project 
expanding the analysis of other artistic fields. As an artist, his practice has 
been developing into areas of installation art that include mediatized elements 
and performance aspects. His practical work explores what he calls 
‘installative performance’. He envisions, in the near future, his proposed 
constructivist epistemological methodology will critically engage with, for 
instance, notions of relational aesthetics as described by Nicholas Bourriaud, 
Rosalind Krauss and Claire Bishop, particularly interrogating his own work 
and that of Japanese artist Tadashi Kawamata and installation and mixed 
media American artist Jamie Davies, among others.  
 
The radical dramaturgy of intermediality proposed here – taken to the 
experiential-limit by the work of Blast Theory – cannot be categorized as a 
pre-established dramaturgy of embedded technologies, but as a radical 
structure that folds in, and through, a multiplicity of spatio-temporal 
orchestrations of experience. In the work of Blast Theory, what emerges is a 
dynamic dramaturgy of complexity. What emerges is the radical characteristic 
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of a generative environment of human and non-human agential relations. 
What emerges is the onto-epistemic generation of mediality as ‘a life’. What 
emerges is the radicality of life as a work of art.  
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